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Thy sons, Edina, social, kind, 
With open arms the stranger hail; 
Their views enlarg’d, their lib’ral mind, 
Above the narrow rural vale; 
Attentive still to sorrow’s wail, 
Or modest merit’s silent claim: 
And never may their sources fail! 
And never envy blot their name! 



























This thesis examines the appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh, the 
court over which they presided, and their consistorial jurisdiction during the era of 
the Scottish Reformation. It is argued that the Commissaries of Edinburgh were 
appointed by Mary, Queen of Scots, in February 1563/4 as a temporary measure 
following the suppression of the courts of the Catholic Church in Scotland during the 
Wars of the Congregation. The Commissaries’ jurisdiction was substantially that of 
the pre-Reformation Officials centralized into a national jurisdiction administered 
from Edinburgh. The Commissaries of Edinburgh’s jurisdictional relations with the 
inferior Commissaries, the Lords of Council and Session, the suppressed courts of 
the Catholic Church and the Lords Interpreters of the Law of Oblivion are examined, 
whilst their relations with the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk are given particular 
attention. The thesis argues that despite the complex constitutional, legal and 
religious legacy of the spiritual jurisdiction in Scotland, the Commissaries and Kirk 
achieved a high degree of jurisdictional harmony, despite occasional conflicts. 
The Commissaries continued to administer the Canon law of the medieval 
Church in consistorial matters, with the prominent exception of the innovation 
introduced into Scotland by the Protestant Kirk from 1559 concerning divorce and 
remarriage on the grounds of adultery. Through an analysis of sentences and decreets 
pronounced by pre-Reformation Officials, the Commissaries of Edinburgh, and the 
tribunals of the Protestant Kirk, it is argued that this reform was essentially a reform 
of divorce a mensa et thoro using concepts and formulas borrowed from pre-
Reformation sentences of annulment. The result was a type of divorce unique to 
Scotland, where the innocent party was immediately freed to remarry, whilst the 
guilty party remained bound to the failed marriage until freed to remarry by the death 
of their innocent spouse.  
An analysis of consistorial litigation before the Commissaries of Edinburgh is 
used to explain and illustrate the Romano-canonical procedure used in their court and 
the documentation generated during litigation. Litigants’ gender, domicile and social 
status are also analysed, together with their use of procurators and the expenses 
incurred during litigation.   
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THESIS INTRODUCTION 
 
[i] HISTORIOGRAPHY & SCOPE OF THESIS 
 
 The early history of the Commissaries of Edinburgh has been a relatively 
neglected aspect of the Scottish Reformation for many years. The charter by which 
they were appointed and the various instructions passed to them by the Lords of 
Council and Session have been long known from Balfour’s Practicks, although the 
full meaning of these documents has not always been appreciated. Beyond these 
primary sources, nothing has been published concerning the organization of the 
Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh and the procedure they used, nor has any 
statistical analysis of litigation before them been undertaken, despite being called 
for.1 Where the early Scots consistorial law administered by the Commissaries has 
been concerned, various nineteenth-century authorities have ventured to try to 
establish the law through recourse to the Registers of Acts and Decreets of the 
earliest Commissaries. Most noteworthy among these attempts were those of the 
peerage lawyer John Riddell, who was the first pioneer in this respect, and Patrick 
Lord Fraser, whose own efforts yielded more ambiguous fruit. Yet despite these 
shortcomings, many aspects of the Commissaries’ early law are now better 
understood, not through further research among their records, but through a greater 
appreciation during the last 50 years of the Canon law.2  
The other major area of interest to nineteenth-century authors, including 
Riddell and Fraser, but also Joseph Robertson and David Hay Fleming, was the 
supposed jurisdiction conflict which arose between the tribunals of the Protestant 
Kirk and the first Commissaries of Edinburgh over the jurisdictional and legal legacy 
of the spiritual jurisdiction in Scotland, particularly in respect to the consistorial 
matters of marriage and divorce. The works of all these authors, it will be argued, 
nevertheless suffered from a faulty constitutional understanding of the position of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh during the Reformation era and the personal reign of 
                                                 
1 David Sellar has indicated that such analysis be undertaken (W.D.H. Sellar, ‘Marriage, Divorce and 
the Forbidden Degrees: Canon Law and Scots Law’ in W.N. Osborough (ed.), Explorations in Law 
and History: Irish Legal History Society Discourses, 1988-1994 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 
1995), 59-82, 74). 
2 The work of Riddell and Fraser is discussed in greater length in Chapter III, together with advances 
of knowledge during the 20th century. 
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Mary, Queen of Scots, which led them to misconceive relations between the 
Commissaries and the Kirk. 
 Chapter I will therefore offer a reconsideration of the constitutional 
circumstances within which the appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh was 
deemed needful by Mary, Queen of Scots, and many of her Privy Councillors during 
the winter of 1563/4. This task has been greatly aided by the only twentieth century 
scholar of the early Commissaries’ records, Sheriff David B Smith, whose article 
concerning the fortunes of the spiritual jurisdiction from 1560-1564 has shed much 
light on the juridical revolution occasioned by the downfall of the Catholic 
establishment in Scotland. It will be argued that all the nineteenth-century authorities 
erroneously accepted an early Protestant narrative that the courts of the Catholic 
Church in Scotland were suppressed as a direct corollary of the abrogation of papal 
authority in Scotland, by Act of Parliament, 24 August 1560, and that this simplistic 
understanding has led to a failure to appreciate the complexity of the constitutional 
convulsions which occurred during the first phase of the Reformation. An alternative 
understanding of the suppression of the courts spiritual will be proposed, drawing 
upon previously overlooked or forgotten sources, from which basis a more 
historically accurate understanding of the appointment of the Commissaries and their 
place within the early modern Scottish polity will be set forth, drawing in particular 
upon the work of Gordon Donaldson, Peter McNeill, David Smith and Julian 
Goodare.  
 Chapter II will begin with an overview of the first four Commissaries and the 
court over which they presided, its personnel, organization and jurisdiction. Next, the 
Commissaries’ relations with the ‘new’ inferior Commissaries will be considered and 
it will be argued that there was a high degree of continuity in the localities between 
the ‘new’ Commissariots and the old diocesan courts spiritual. The Commissaries’ 
jurisdictional relations will then be considered with: the inactive courts spiritual, 
arguing that the Commissaries continued to acknowledge the validity of papal 
authority in Scotland down to December 1567; the Lords of Council and Session and 
the Lords Interpreters of the Law of Oblivion; and the tribunals of the Protestant 
Kirk, in respect of their activity from the time of the cessation of the courts spiritual 
in 1559 to the appointment of the Commissaries in February 1563/4. It will be argued 
that the Commissaries of Edinburgh were inclined towards accepting the consistorial 
decisions and sentences of the tribunals of the Kirk pronounced from 1559 until the 
appointment of the Commissaries, whilst at the same time carefully avoiding any 
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acknowledgement of the inherent authority of the tribunals of the Kirk to pronounce 
such sentences.     
 The remaining chapters of the thesis will consider the consistorial jurisdiction 
of the Commissaries of Edinburgh in considerable detail. Chapter III will consider 
the Scots consistorial law administered by the Commissaries, arguing that whilst 
traditional understandings of the retention of the Canon law prescriptions concerning 
the contracting of marriage are correct, reforms introduced by the Protestant Kirk in 
respect of divorce for adultery have been only partially understood. Through a close 
analysis of various sentences and decreets of annulment and divorce for adultery 
pronounced by pre-Reformation Officials, tribunals of the Protestant Kirk, and the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh, it will be argued that early Scottish Protestant divorce 
law was uniquely Scottish within the wider European context.  
 Chapter IV will consider the Romano-canonical procedure employed by the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh in consistorial litigation as a prelude to a full statistical 
analysis of such litigation. It will be argued that the plenary procedure of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh was a slightly reformed and improved version of that 
employed in the pre-Reformation Courts of the Officials, and was in effect that of the 
Lords of Session. The Commissaries’ ‘popular’ summary procedure will also be 
discussed, whilst examples from the English ecclesiastical courts will be used for 
comparative purposes. Having discussed the fixed procedural steps in any given 
action, the range of competent allegations and exceptions in consistorial actions will 
be considered, together with the standards of proof required to prove each relevant 
point and the range of competent remedies available to the Commissaries.  
 Chapter V will provide a full statistical analysis of actual consistorial 
litigation before the Commissaries of Edinburgh from 1564 down to the winter of 
1576, including the frequency of litigation, the gender, social status and domicile of 
litigants, their use of procurators, and the time and expenses involved in pursuing 
consistorial actions before the Commissaries in Edinburgh. Within this context, an 
analysis of actions concerning solemnization will be used to argue that non-regular 
marriage should have been reformed in Scotland along the line of the suggestions of 
the Council of Trent in the interests of female litigants. 
 The final chapter will consider the ongoing relations between the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh and the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk from the time of 
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the appointment of the Commissaries until the winter of 1576/7.3 It will be argued 
that the kirk sessions of the Kirk tended to acknowledge the exclusive national 
competence of the Commissaries of Edinburgh in consistorial actions, whilst the 
court of the superintendent of Fife, Fotherick and Strathearn came into regular 
conflict with the Commissaries’ jurisdictional claims. Nevertheless, it will be argued 
that the tribunals of the Kirk enjoyed a legitimate jurisdiction, arising substantially 
from their powers of excommunication, in disciplinary matters. This disciplinary 
jurisdiction was acknowledged by the Commissaries of Edinburgh, and obliged the 
Commissaries and the Kirk to seek to achieve a degree of jurisdictional co-operation 
in consistorial matters, involving both legal aspects regulated by the Commissaries 
and moral aspects regulated by the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk.   
      
   
[ii] METHODOLOGY 
 
 The principal primary source material used in this thesis are the Registers of 
Acts and Decreets of the Commissaries of Edinburgh from the earliest extant entries 
in late April 1564 until the end of the eighth volume, which ends in January 1576/7, 
after which there is a complete break in the Registers until May 1580. The Registers 
for the clerkship of Sebastian Danelourt (August 1565 to August 1567) are missing.4 
As such, of the first twelve years of the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh, ten 
years are extant, comprising 3000 folios. 
 For the period of the first three volumes (April 1564 to June 1569) a database 
for all diets in all consistorial actions has been compiled, regardless of whether some 
diets are missing, or whether an action was completed. The database contains the 
dates of each diet, the type of action, the names of the litigants, the sederunt of the 
judges, the names of the procurators in attendance (when their services were used), 
the domiciles and social status of individual litigants (when indicated), the details of 
any interlocutors and decreets pronounced, the expenses of the plea when recorded 
(although this was rare), and the details of any arguments used about jurisdiction. 
                                                 
3 The rationale for dividing the discussion of the Kirk into two sections (1559/60-1563/4 and 1563/4-
1576/7) is explained below, page 38. 
4 Discussed below, pages 50-52. 
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Digests and summaries of most of these various aspects of consistorial litigation are 
included in Appendix II, and form the basis of the analysis in Chapter V. §I of 
Chapter V explains the methodology used in that chapter in more detail.  
 The 186 consistorial decreets pronounced by the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
from their appointment down to the end of 1576 have been located and transcribed. 
The contents of these decreets will be used as the basis of arguments put forward 
concerning the early Scots consistorial law in respect of the contracting of marriage 
and the parameters of divorce law for adultery (Chapter III, §II, ‘Scottish Protestant 
Divorce for Adultery’, sets out the specific method of analysis used in that section). 
They will also be used to discuss the Commissaries’ relations with the Protestant 
Kirk, and problems arising from continued countenancing of the un-reformed Canon 




 Years have been cited in conformity with pre-1600 conventions. Since the 
year then turned upon 25 March, dates for 1 January to 24 March have been given 
thus: i.e. “2 February 1563/4”, in this example the “3” referring to the pre-1600 
reckoning, the “/4” denoting modern reckoning. Since the majority of unpublished 
source citations refer to mid-sixteenth-century material written in Old Scots, the 
original language has been retained, all such quotes being in Scots, with Scots 
spellings of place and personal names. The names of cases have likewise retained the 
original Scots spellings of the surnames of the litigants involved, whilst on 
occasions, when sixteenth-century place and personal names have been discussed in 
the text of the actual thesis, both have been modernized.  
 It should also be noted that the judgements pronounced by the Commissaries 
and tribunals of the Kirk were variously referred to in a manner which may seem 
imprecise to the modern reader. The standard label for the judgements of the pre-
Reformation courts spiritual was and is ‘definitive sentence’. From this common 
source the judgments of both the Kirk and the Commissaries could be referred to as 
sentences, whilst the Commissaries’ decisions were also referred to as decreets.5 For 
                                                 
5 St Andrews, i, 26-27; Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 658, item xii. 
   6
the sake of clarity during the course of this thesis, the decisions of the pre-
Reformation Officials and of the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk will be referred to as 
sentences, whilst the decisions of the Commissaries will be referred to as decreets. 
Various other terms of reference also need defining, particulalry in respect of the 
jurisdiction of the medieval Church, of the post-Reformation Commissaries and of 
the Kirk, but these are discussed below.6 
 























                                                 
6 See below, pages 38-40. 







An idea deeply engrained in Scottish historiography concerning the spiritual 
jurisdiction during the Scottish Reformation is that the abrogation of papal authority 
in Scotland by an Act of the Reformation Parliament of August 15607 resulted in the 
abolition of the courts of the Catholic Church in Scotland. The seeds of this thesis 
may have had its origins in the Reformation era,8 but what is certain is that it has 
enjoyed considerable currency since at least the early nineteenth century. One of the 
earliest examples of this thesis was that proposed by John Connell in his Treatise on 
the Laws of Scotland Respecting Tithes (1815), wherein he asserted that “the 
jurisdiction of our bishops, during the subsistence of the Roman Catholic religion, 
flowed from the Pope. By an act of parliament of 24th August 1560… it was ordained 
‘that the Bischop of Rome, called the Pape, have na jurisdictioun nor authority within 
this realme in ony time coming’. With the power of the Pope, the jurisdiction of the 
bishops fell to the ground…”.9 This thesis was re-iterated by Patrick Fraser in his 
Treatises of 1846 and 1876: “On the 24th August 1560, an Act of the Convention of 
the Estates passed, abolishing the authority of the Pope and all popish jurisdictions 
within this realm; and so closed the history of the courts of the Officials in Scotland, 
and appeals to the Court of Rome”.10 In 1866 Joseph Robertson linked the demise of 
the courts spiritual to the Reformation Acts of 1560, but emphasised the 
‘establishment of the Kirk’ as the pivotal event.11 In 1889 David Hay Fleming 
repeated the basic thesis, emphasising the importance of the abrogation of papal 
authority, in a footnote to his edition of the St Andrews Kirk Session Register.12 
                                                 
7 RPS, A1560/8/4 & presumably A1560/8/3.  
8 As is discussed below, pages 29-30. 
9 John Connell, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland, Respecting Tithes and the Stipends of the 
Parochial Clergy (Edinburgh, 1815), i, 196-197. 
10 Fraser, Treatise (1846), i, 11; Fraser, Treatise (1876), i, 11.  
11 Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxiii – clxxiv. 
12 St Andrews, i, 268, n. 2, although he in fact misapplied John Riddell’s careful narrative, which had 
not explicitly linked the abrogation of papal authority to the demise of the courts spiritual. 
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During the twentieth century the same thesis linking the abrogation of papal 
authority to the suppression of the courts of the Catholic Church in Scotland has been 
rehearsed by A.E. Anton (1955),13 Ronald Ireland (1958),14 Simon Ollivant (1982),15 
Roderick Phillips (1988),16 David Sellar (1995)17 and David B. Smith (1995).18 The 
editors of the Fasti mentioned the idea, though seemed sceptical.19 The idea was 
often mentioned in passing as a received orthodoxy, usually as a convenient 
introduction when discussing some aspect of the spiritual jurisdiction or Canon law 
in pre- and post-Reformation Scotland. For example, Simon Ollivant began his 
indispensable work by quoting the Act abrogating papal authority, but was of course 
pre-occupied with the Court of the Official.     
Nevertheless, it is a striking feature of this received orthodoxy that those by 
whom it has been rehearsed often pointed out that it does not quite describe the 
phenomena it sought to explain. For example, back in 1866 Joseph Robertson had 
noted that after August 1560 “in rare and exceptional circumstances, trial was still 
taken, and sentence given, under authority of the ancient hierarchy”,20 whilst Ollivant 
referred the reader to Gordon Donaldson’s objections as stated in his Scottish 
Reformation of 1960. Donaldson’s principle objection was that the abrogation of 
papal authority in Scotland ought not to have abolished the authority of the native 
Scottish episcopate, and that as such the Courts of the Officials should have been 
unmoved by the statute:  
 
“at the time of the parliament of August 1560…the only statute bearing on 
the subject of ecclesiastical polity was one which forbade any bishop to 
exercise jurisdiction in virtue of authority derived from Rome. This did not 
                                                 
13 A.E. Anton, ‘Medieval Scottish Executors and the Courts Spiritual’ in Juridical Review, 67 (1955), 
129-154, at 129. 
14 Ronald Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Post-Reformation Law of Marriage of the Commissaries’ 
Court and Modern Common and Statute Law’ in An Introduction to Scottish Legal History 
(Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1958), 82-89, 82. 
15 Court of the Official, 1. 
16 Roderick Phillips, Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 60. 
17 Sellar, ‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 60. 
18 Sheriff David B. Smith, ‘The Spiritual Jurisdiction 1560-64’ in Records of the Scottish Church 
History Society (Edinburgh: Scottish Church History Society, 1995), 1-18, 1-2. 
19 “the administration and judicial offices of deans of Christianity and officials were presumably 
included in the so-called abolition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction of August 1560” (Fasti, x). 
20 Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxiv. 
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make a very serious change in the de facto position, it went no further than 
the anti-papal clauses of an English act of supremacy, if, indeed, it went so 
far, and while it ought to have been fatal to the archbishop’s legatine 
authority it did not – so at least it might have been argued – affect the 
normal episcopal powers”.21  
 
Donaldson’s distinction between papal and episcopal powers may have reflected his 
own Episcopalianism, yet the distinction is not only Anglican or Episcopalian, but 
also Roman Catholic, and is a distinction of ancient provenance which reoccurred 
throughout medieval constitutional and ecclesiological thought. The primitive origins 
of the idea of the apostolic succession and the idea of the Petrine commission are 
beyond the scope of this study, but the basic distinction was maintained by medieval 
canonists, however far they might have tried to promote the authority bestowed by 
one over the authority bestowed by the other. In Scotland, as in the rest of 
Christendom, the authority of the native episcopate was grounded in the doctrine that 
the authority bestowed by Christ upon his Apostles had in turn been bestowed by 
them upon their successors through the consecration of bishops to oversee regional 
churches. Yet over and above this general authority of oversight of the Church, it 
was maintained that Peter and his episcopal successors, the bishops of Rome, had 
been delegated extra-ordinary powers over the entire Church from Christ, as 
symbolized by the keys of heaven and earth. The precise authority and powers thus 
conferred, their jurisdiction and precedence have been long debated throughout the 
history of Christianity. But what has seldom if ever been maintained is the latent 
ecclesiology underpinning the traditional theory of the demise of the courts of the 
Catholic Church in Scotland: that all episcopal authority and jurisdiction is derived 
from the bishops of Rome.22  
The lack of clarity in the historiography on this subject is best illustrated by 
Ireland, when he stated that the abrogation of papal authority in Scotland in August 
                                                 
21 Gordon Donaldson, The Scottish Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 60.  
22 The most sweeping claims for the extent of papal authority were made by Innocent III, who asserted 
that “the pope received plenitude of power directly from God, and was himself the source of all other 
authority in the Church” (Brian Tierney, Church Law and Constitutional Thought in the Middle Ages 
(Variorum, London, 1979), 2). Such claims were modified by conciliarist theories which argued for a 
more diffused distribution of authority within the Church. In Scotland it is noteworthy that 
Archbishop Hamilton’s Catechism went so far as to maintain that the ‘power of the keys’ had been 
given not to Peter and his successors, but to the apostles collectively (Alec Ryrie, The Origins of the 
Scottish Reformation (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 99), and that in 1558 John 
Knox noted that the Scottish episcopate “in matters of religion claim all authority to appertain to 
them” (Roger Mason (ed.), John Knox on Rebellion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
75). 
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1560 “destroyed not only the spiritual pre-eminence of the Roman church, but also 
the Officials’ Courts which had exercised the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the 
bishops”.23 Whilst Ireland correctly noted that the episcopate was the source of the 
authority and jurisdiction of the Officials,24 it simply does not follow that the 
authority of the Scottish episcopate was automatically imperilled by any abrogation 
of papal authority. The continued validity of the episcopacy in constitutional thinking 
following the abrogation of papal authority in Scotland is central, in this thesis, to 
understanding both the approach taken to the spiritual jurisdiction by Mary, Queen of 
Scots, and her councillors and later by the British Stewarts.   
 In recent years a further problem has arisen which makes the accepted thesis 
concerning the demise of the courts spiritual in Scotland yet more untenable. It has 
been argued and illustrated most convincingly that the legislation of the Parliament 
of August 1560 cannot have been considered as legally binding by those who wished 
to uphold the rule of law, and that this was the position maintained by several leading 
members of the Scottish government during Mary’s personal reign and by at least 
two of the first Commissaries of Edinburgh.25 The validity of the legislation of 1560 
is of course a distinct issue from the survival of episcopal authority, particularly 
since there was no doubt that papal authority was finally and legally abolished in 
Scotland in December 1567, when the Act of 1560 was ratified.26 Nevertheless, the 
timing of the valid abrogation of papal authority in Scotland is still a pertinent issue 
for this thesis, and helps explain some of the peculiarities surrounding the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh’s relations with the old courts spiritual in general and 
papal judges delegate in particular.27 
 Finally there are several chronological problems with the old accepted 
orthodoxy. From as early as February 1559/60 the kirk session of St Andrews had 
begun to hear actions for divorce,28 whilst by 18 August 1560, Archbishop Hamilton 
could remark to the Archbishop of Glasgow that  “the eldaris callit of every town 
                                                 
23 Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Post-Reformation’, 82. 
24 i.e. Court of the Official, 19 et seq. 
25 Discussed below, particularly pages 15-17. 
26 RPS, A1567/12/1; APS, iii, 14, c.3. 
27 Discussed below, pages 67-69. 
28 Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 4 et seq; Gordon Donaldson, ‘The Church Courts’, in An 
Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1958), 363-373, 367 et seq. 
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takis all the causis of our ecclesiasticall jurisdiction and intrometis with our office”.29 
By 24 August 1560 when the first Act abrogating papal authority in Scotland was 
enacted, the revolution in the spiritual jurisdiction was already under way.   
 
§II 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND NEW UNDERSTANDINGS 
 
Bishop Keith drew attention to what actually befell the courts of the Catholic 
Church in Scotland in his History in the Affairs of Church and State in Scotland, first 
published in 1735. During the Wars of the Congregation the Lords of the 
Congregation issued an ordinance proclaiming that any churchmen who presumed to 
convene any consistorial court would answer with their lives. This original ordinance 
is now lost, but the consistory of Brechin soon contravened it, which brought forth a 
solemn (and extant) reminder from the Lords of the Congregation that they had 
already forbidden such activities on pain of death. This second ordinance was issued 
from Dundee on 14 December 1559, which therefore dates the original ordinance 
suppressing of the courts of the Catholic Church to some point between the removal 
of the Regent on 21 October 1559 and the issue of this latter ordinance on 14 
December 1559.  
 The latter ordinance opened:  
“The Lords of the Council, in the names of Francis and Mary 
(understanding the hurt done in times past to Christ’s Church by 
maintaining the laws of Antichrist, and his Consistory, boasting (terrifying) 
the simple people with their cursings, gravatures, and such like other their 
threatenings, whereby they sat on the consciences of men of long time 
byegone,) have ordained that no Consistory should [be] afterwards 
holden…” and concluded “Certain persons, however, (as the Lords are 
informed,) within the city of Brechin, malevolent members of the said 
Antichrist, contemptuously disobey the said Ordinance, cease not still to 
hold Consistory, and execute the pestilent laws of the said Antichrist 
within the said city ; wherefore it is commanded that neither the 
commissary nor scribe of Brechin, nor any other member of the said 
Consistory, hold any Consistory or assist thereunto under pain of death. – 
Dundee, 14 Dec., 2 and 18 years”.30  
 
                                                 
29 Donaldson, ‘Church Courts’, 367. 
30 Calendar of State Papers, foreign series, of the reign of Elizabeth, ed. Joseph Stephenson et al 
(London: Longman, Roberts and Green, 1863-1950), ii, item 421; Robert Keith, History of the Affairs 
of the Church and State in Scotland (Edinburgh: Spottiswoode Society, 1844), i, 247-248. 
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 The rhetoric was potent, and whatever the true intent of the threat, it may be 
supposed that Scottish clerics took it seriously: the last Protestant uprising had 
witnessed the murder of the Cardinal Archbishop of St Andrews.31 Clerical 
immunity, precedence and strongholds could not be relied upon by those who defied 
the pious wrath of the Protestant Kirk militant through the convocation of any court 
in any way associated with the authority and jurisdiction by which the Protestant 
faithful had been condemned to the flames. It is against this backdrop that the partial 
continuation of the courts spiritual can be seen for what they were, the last defiant 
gestures of an imperilled Church.32  
 What is also striking is the sense of the members of the consistory being 
members of the Antichrist, enforcing the law of the Antichrist, which echoed John 
Knox’s Appellation to the Nobility and Estates of 155833 and which also paralleled 
some aspects of the early stages of the Lutheran Reformation.34 The whole idea of 
the Antichrist was a fluid one, emotive and polemic, and could be applied to any 
person or system which was opposed to the Protestant party. If the statute of the 
Parliament of August 1560 abrogating papal authority in Scotland can be considered 
as an attempt to further legitimize the earlier de facto suppression of the courts 
spiritual, its inaccuracy as a piece of legislation can perhaps be attributed to the fluid 
conception of what the Antichrist was. That is to say, if the canon law was the law of 
the Antichrist, and the members of a consistorial court were members of the 
Antichrist, abrogating the authority of the bishop of Rome, the Antichrist sine qua 
non, could have been intended to lend statutory validity to the de facto suppression of 
the consistories of the Catholic Church. This certainly seems to have been opinion of 
the General Assembly, when objecting to the restoration of Archbishop Hamilton’s 
consistorial jurisdiction in 1566: “For in ane lawfull and most frie parliament that 
ever was in this realme before, was that odious beast depryvit of jurisdictioun, office, 
                                                 
31 Margaret H. B. Sanderson, Cardinal of Scotland: David Beaton, c.1494-1546 (Edinburgh: John 
Donald, 1986), 226-228. 
32 Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxiv, n.1. 
33 Knox appealed to the nobility and estates of Scotland against the sentence of “your false bishops 
and ungodly clergy” who had condemned him to death for maintaining heretical beliefs. He went on 
to describe the Scottish Catholic episcopate and clergy as “this pestilent generation of Antichrist”, 
asserting the “kingdom of the pope to be the kingdom and power of Antichrist”. In the appellation 
Knox asserted the right of inferior magistrates to reform religion and discipline the clergy (Mason, 
Knox on Rebellion, 74-75, xvii). 
34 The Lutheran perspective and its relevance to the appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
and the laws they administered are discussed below, pages 89-90. 
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and auctoritie within this realme”.35 If the intention was to abrogate episcopal as well 
as papal authority, the execution was, in terms of contemporary constitutional 
accuracy, wide of the mark from the perspective of various members of Mary’s 
government: Balfour’s Practicks acknowledged the continued validity of episcopal 
authority in Scotland following 1560 and 1567.36 
  
 In terms of the appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh, the principal 
perspective to appreciate is that of Mary’s government during her personal rule. 
There were two clear policies open to her when she returned to Scotland in 1561. 
The first option was to land in Aberdeen where it was proposed 20,000 men at arms 
would be assembled for the crushing of the Protestant faction and the reaffirmation 
of the Catholic establishment.37 In the event, Mary declined this proposition, 
communicated to her by John Leslie, whilst still in France. Quite what Mary’s full 
reasons were are beyond the scope of this inquiry, but it would have been contrary to 
the conciliatory approach of her mother, and a troubling circumstance to visit upon 
the Scottish realm just as France herself slid into the horrors of its own wars of 
religion. 
 The second option was one of diplomacy, conciliation and compromise, 
which can reasonably be described as an insistence upon the collective observation 
of the ‘rule of law’ or of lawful government. This policy was in effect created by 
Mary’s arrival at Leith on 19 August 1561, without occupying forces, and her 
subsequent proclamation of 24 August that was effectively a moratorium upon the 
tumultuous affairs of the realm. The proclamation acknowledged the division in the 
realm “for the differens in materis of religioun” and warned that no-one should “tak 
upoun hand, privatlie or oppinlie, to mak ony alteratioun or innovatioun in the state 
of religioun, or attempt ony thing aganis the forme quhilk hir Majestie fand publict 
and universalie standing at hir Majesteis arrival in this hir realme, under the pane of 
deid”.38 Mary’s proclamation gave the de facto religious situation which she found 
                                                 
35 Acts and Proceedings of the General Assemblies of the Kirk of Scotland, ed. Thomas Thomson 
(Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1839-45), i, 88-90; Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxviii-clxxx. 
36 Balfour’s Practicks, i, xliv; cf Donaldson, ‘Church Courts’, 366-7. 
37 Jane Dawson, Scotland Re-formed, 1488-1587 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univeristy Press, 2007), 244; 
Rosalind Marshall, ‘Lesley, John (1527-1596)’ (ODNB, accessed 3 June 2009). 
38 RPC, i, 266-267. 
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upon her return legal validity.39 The position of both the Protestant and the Catholic 
Churches as they stood on her return was given legal protection by the proclamation. 
The Protestants were not to be tried as traitors and heretics and driven from the land, 
but nor was the disestablishment of the Catholic Church in Scotland to proceed 
further. The policy was aimed at avoiding religious and civil war, buying time for 
Mary and her government, but could only really be considered temporary, depending 
in great measure upon Mary and the principle of her personal sovereignty for its 
success.  
 The conditions created by Mary’s proclamation had a direct bearing upon the 
legal and constitutional circumstances surrounding the creation of the Court of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh and its inferior commissariots. The de facto situation 
from the perspective of Mary and various members of her government was that the 
courts of the Catholic Church in Scotland had been suppressed during a rebellion, 
and that this de facto situation had no constitutional validity, and no legal validity 
beyond that provided by Mary’s proclamation. That some members of Mary’s 
government considered the Lords of the Congregations’ actions as rebellious, even 
treasonable, seems beyond dispute.40 The laws informing such judgements had been 
gathered together in the Discours Particulier d’Escosse,41 and such was the legal 
force of the position that an Act of Oblivion was required to grant immunity from 
prosecution for all illegalities committed between 6 March 1558/9 and 1 September 
1561:42 the alternative was of course the enforcing of the law of treason by a Crown 
                                                 
39 Julian Goodare, ‘The First Parliament of Mary, Queen of Scots’ in The Sixteenth Century Journal, 
36 (2005), 55-75, 62-63; Peter McNeill, ‘ “Our Religion, Established Neither by Law or Parliament”: 
Was the Reformation Legislation of 1560 valid?’ in Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 
35 (2005), 68-89, 74-75; cf David Baird Smith, ‘The Reformers and Divorce: A Study in Consistorial 
Jurisdiction’ in Scottish Historical Review (Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons, 1912), vol. IX, 10-
36, 25, wherein it has been noted that in response to the argument put forward in the action concerning 
Dalgleish and Wemyss led before the tribunals of the Kirk at St Andrews, that the Commissaries were 
only judges competent to hear their matrimonial dispute, the Kirk repelled the argument “on the 
strength of the Royal Proclamation of 25 August 1561, which maintained the status quo as it existed at 
the date of the landing of Queen Mary”. 
40 The Lords of the Congregation maintained that the authority of the Regent, Mary of Guise, had 
devolved upon them ‘by God’s providence’ and presumed to issue ordinances in the name of their 
lawfully sovereigns on the grounds that they were the Lords of Council ‘that be Reformed’ (Keith, 
History, i, 246). Nevertheless, in law they had presumed to remove a Regent who represented an adult 
sovereign, without recourse to that sovereign’s authorization, which constituted an act of rebellion and 
treason. I am grateful to Amy Blakeway for explaining how the removal of Mary of Guise from the 
Regency differed from earlier, more legal instances of the removal of Scottish Regents. 
41 Peter McNeill, ‘Discours Particulier D’Escosse’ in Miscellany II (Edinburgh: Stair Society, 1984), 
86-131, at 87, 94-95, 123 et seq. 
42 RPS, A1563/6/1; APS, ii, 535, c.1; McNeill, ‘Discours Particulier’, 98. 
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that could not be expected to carry the prosecution through without civil war. Given 
this perceived illegality of the ‘uproar for religion,’ the ordinances by which the 
consistories of the established Church in Scotland had been suppressed had no 
inherent legal validity.43 Yet on the other hand, the restoration of the consistories, 
which a strict reading of the law still allowed, would involve the government in 
restoring what many Scottish Protestants commonly held to be instruments of the 
Antichrist. 
 Against this understanding it could be objected, that the abrogation of papal 
authority in August 1560 ought to have altered the situation. As had already been 
suggested, papal authority could not be considered the constitutional basis of the 
ordinary authority and legal jurisdiction of the native Scottish episcopate. More 
importantly, it is clear that various members of Mary’s government did not accept 
the statutes of August 1560 as legally valid in themselves. 
There are numerous pieces of evidence which support this understanding of 
the validity of the statutes of August 1560. In the first place it is clear from Peter 
McNeill’s analysis of the Treaty of Edinburgh and other relevant documents that the 
statutes of the Parliament of August 1560 could not be accepted by various members 
of the government as legally binding: the treaty had reserved matters of religion to 
Mary and Francis; the statutes had not been ratified by Scotland’s lawful and 
universally acknowledged sovereigns.44 Evidence that this recent reading of the 
legality of the statutes of August 1560 was current among leading jurists in Mary’s 
governments is plentiful. John Sinclair45 is known to have argued openly that “the 
Reformation Parliament was invalid and that Protestantism had no sound legal 
basis”, a view which had sufficient currency by the time of Mary’s first parliament of 
1563 to cause John Knox to make a characteristic public outburst, in which he 
accused Sinclair of committing “treason against God” for speaking such “malicious 
words” the proper punishment for which ought to be “the gallows”.46 Despite Knox’s 
invective against the position, it was clearly shared by many other leading jurists. It 
                                                 
43 McNeill, ‘Our Religion’, 68-69. 
44 McNeill, ‘Our Religion’, 71 et seq. 
45 Bishop of Brechin (1565-1566) and author of Sinclair’s Practicks, who succeeded his brother 
Henry as the Lord President of the College of Justice in 1565.  
46 Goodare, ‘First Parliament’, 68; John Knox is known to have stated “Yea, I hear that some say that 
we have nothing of our Religion established, neither by Law or Parliament” (John Knox's History of 
the Reformation in Scotland, ed. W. C. Dickinson (London: Nelson, 1949), ii, 81). 
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is most probable that the view was held by John’s bother, Henry Sinclair,47 and was 
certainly held by James Balfour (as witnessed by his Practicks), and the compilers of 
the Black Acts of 1566, the statutes of August 1560 being omitted from both works. 
The compilers of the latter included John Leslie, John Spens of Condie,48 James 
Balfour and Edward Henryson.49 Balfour and Henryson were among the first 
Commissaries of Edinburgh.50 There are also considerable indications in statutes and 
ordinances following 1560 which suggest that papal authority was still 
acknowledged in law. As Donaldson has pointed out, legatine powers were derived 
directly from the bishops of Rome. It is therefore striking to find the Act of Oblivion 
of 1563 discharging all judges whatsoever from hearing actions encompassed by the 
act, including all “legates, archbishops, abbots, commendators, priors and all uther 
judges”.51  
This acknowledgment of the continued constitutional validity of the judicial 
function of legates is further underlined by the document by which Archbishop 
Hamilton’s consistorial jurisdiction was restored on 23 December 1566.52 Mary, by a 
writ under her sign-manual, restored and ‘reponed’ the “Archbischop of 
Sanctandrois, Primat and Legat of Scotland, to all and sindrie his jurisdictionis 
alsweill vpoun the south as the north sydis of the watter of Forth…”. Hamilton’s 
legatine authority was clearly still viewed as legally valid in 1563 and 1566 despite 
the statute of August 1560.53 There are yet further examples which support this 
view,54 whilst further evidence concerning the continued validity of papal authority 
in Scotland following August 1560 will be discussed in Chapeter II.55 For the present 
                                                 
47 Henry Sinclair, Bishop of Ross (1558-1565), Lord President (1558-1565), appointed in December 
1563 to the Commission for advising on the order to be taken anent the consistories (RPC, i, 252). 
48 See John Finlay, ‘Spens, John, of Condie (d. 1573)’ (ODNB, accessed 5 March 2010). 
49 McNeill, Our Religion, 73; John Cairns, ‘Historical Introduction’ in A History of Private Law in 
Scotland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), i, 14-182, at 95 for those appointed to “correct the 
laws of the realm”.  
50 Discussed below, pages 43-44. 
51 RPS, A1563/6/1; APS, ii, 535, c.1. 
52 Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxviii – clxxix. 
53 Robertson discusses further examples (Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxiv, n. 1). 
54 For example, Hamilton dispensed the fourth earl of Bothwell and Lady Jane Gordon from the 
impediment of consanguinity (according to the Canon law prescriptions) by virtue of his legatine 
authority in 1565/6 (John Stuart, A Lost Chapter in the History of Mary Queen of Scots Recovered 
(Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1874), 5).  
55 See below, pages 71-73.  
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it may finally be observed that the Protestant party felt the statutes of August 1560 
sufficiently in doubt during Mary’s personal reign to necessitate their ratification in 
December 1567.56  
Goodare has put the matter succinctly when he describes “the epoch-making 
but constitutionally questionable Reformation Parliament. The latter’s acts, although 
it may have been hard to contravene them, were not actually valid”.57 Goodare goes 
on to demonstrate how any legal force the ‘Reformation’ statutes did enjoy were by 
virtue of Mary’s proclamation of August 1561.58 The most striking example is the 
prosecution of Archbishop Hamilton and 47 other priests for celebrating Mass on the 
grounds not that the Mass had been outlawed by the Reformation Parliament, but that 
they had contravened Mary’s proclamation.59 The government’s desire to maintain 
what may be conceived as ‘the rule of law’ is again seen in the downfall of Huntly,60 




CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES ARISING FROM HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
 
Within this legal and constitutional context the predicament of the spiritual 
jurisdiction and the old consistories may be appreciated more fully. In the first place 
the courts of the Catholic Church had been de facto suppressed in the autumn of 
1559 by the Lords of the Congregation on the grounds that such courts were presided 
over by members of the Antichrist, and enforced the law of the Antichrist, an 
accusation based predominantly on Protestant experiences of heresy trials and 
persecution. Next, any attempt to give this situation statutory validity in August 1560 
                                                 
56 RPS, 1567/12/1; APS, iii, 14, c.3. 
57 Goodare, ‘First Parliament’, 69. 
58 Ibid., 56. 
59 Ibid., 62-3. 
60 Ibid., 58. 
61 See Mark Dilworth, ‘Sinclair, Henry (1507/8-1565)’ (ODNB, accessed 23 January 2006). Despite 
his Catholicism Sinclair supplied bread and wine for the celebration of Protestant communion. In this 
entry Dilworth emphasises Sinclair’s legal learning and his rule of law policy. See also Knox’s History 
of the Reformation, ed. Dickinson, ii, 76 anent mass-mongers: Henry Sinclair, bishop of Ross 
commented to [Lethington the elder] in 1563 that Mary “must see her laws kept, or else she would get 
no obedience”. 
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failed, the statute abrogating papal authority in Scotland being insufficiently accurate 
in terms of accepted constitutional theory and ecclesiology, and invalid in law as far 
as various members of Mary’s government were concerned. Yet the de facto 
suppression of the courts spiritual could not be directly reversed since this would 
have been to alter the state of religion in Scotland as it stood in August 1561, thereby 
violating Mary’s proclamation of that month, and also to invite the strongest possible 
reaction from the Protestant party in re the Antichrist. 
It is therefore no surprise that quite what to do about the fact that a significant 
section of Scotland’s courts could no longer be expected to convene took some time 
to resolve. Some of the old courts did occasionally pronounce judgments in spiritual 
matters, and as shall be seen those which appeared in litigation before the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh seem to have been accepted as legally valid by them.62 
But it was one thing to accept a judgement as legally valid, quite another for the 
government actively to encourage the courts by which such a judgment had been 
pronounced to sit in judgement. The pressing problem was of course how the great 
mass of actions previously dealt with by the courts spiritual could be dealt with by 
the remainder of the legal system in Scotland.  The rebel Lords of the Congregation 
had suggested that there were “enough civil ordinary judges, to whom recourse may 
be had in all actions”,63 a reasonable enough clause to insert among an ordinance 
fulminating against the Antichrist, but one which was not practical until the 
nineteenth century.64  
In the mean time it was universally acknowledged that some order had to be 
taken in respect of the spiritual jurisdiction. The work of Sheriff David B. Smith65 
demonstrates that litigants tried a number of creative ways to get their spiritual 
actions heard following 1559, but that the Lords of Council and Session provided the 
central focus to which recourse was had.66 In the event the Lords of Council 
                                                 
62 Discussed below, pages 71-73 and 84-85. 
63 Calendar of State Papers, foreign series, of the reign of Elizabeth, ii, item 421. 
64 i.e. see below, pages 35-36, for John Nisbet’s acknowledgement of the practical problems attedant 
upon absorbing the Commissary Courts into the civil legal system and the final deconstructions of the 
Commissary Courts. 
65 Not to be confused with David Baird Smith. 
66 Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’. The Lords of Council were clearly widely regarded by litigants as 
the “maist competent jugeis” (i.e. NAS, CS7/23, fos. 318r -319r, 20 March 1561/2). Lord Fraser has 
drawn attention to the “ingenuity of litigants” following the “annihilation of the ecclesiastical 
courts…without substituting anything in their room” (Fraser, Treatise (1846), i, 12).  
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proceeded to assume the spiritual jurisdiction, and as Smith points out, the 
constitutional basis upon which they presumed to assume the spiritual jurisdiction 
has been preserved in Balfour’s Practicks. The earliest post-1559 spiritual action 
extant in the Acts of the Lords of Council and Session is Chalmer v. Lumisden, 19 
December 1560,67 although the Lords are known to have granted a commission to the 
kirk session of Edinburgh earlier than this to proceed to hear a spiritual action, 
Hammyltoun v. Sclater, the kirk session pronouncing sentence on 25 July 1560.68 It 
seems probable that the Lords of Council had formulated some constitutional 
grounds upon which to administer the spiritual jurisdiction before granting the 
commission in Hammyltoun v. Sclater, but Chalmer v. Lumisden, the first spiritual 
action which they took to themselves, clearly stood out for James Balfour, in that he 
recorded the Lords’ reasoning in his Practicks. 
 Before discussing this case, there is a useful distinction to make between the 
reasons given by litigants approaching the Lords of Council and Session as to why 
the Lords ought to hear spiritual actions, and the reason given by the Lords for 
proceeding to deal with such actions. This is an important distinction, since Smith 
has located all the relevant actions in the Registers of the Acts and Decreets of the 
Court of Session (NAS, CS7 series) where litigants approached the Lords between 
1560 and the appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh, and the range of 
opinions given in these letters indicates a plurality of views as to quite what had 
befallen the courts spiritual.69 
 Various terms were used by litigants to describe what precisely had ceased, 
including ‘the office of spirituale Juge’,70 ‘the consistorial law’,71 the consistoriall 
jurisdictioun’,72 ‘the consistorie’,73 and ‘the consistoriall’.74 In several cases it was 
                                                 
67 Having read all the relevant CS7 volumes, Chalmer v. Lumisden was the first spiritual action 
located by David Smith (Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 11; NAS, CS7/20, fo. 219r-v, 19 Dec 1560). 
68 NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 323v-324v, 26 January 1564/5. It is of note that this is the earliest known 
instance of the involvement of the Lords of Council. The Treaties of Leith and Edinburgh had only 
been concluded on the 5th and 6th of July 1560 (McNeill, Our Religion, 69). It seems that only from 
this time was the authority of the Privy Council restored, following the usurpation of the same by the 
Lords of the Congregation. 
69 Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 11-15.  
70 NAS, CS7/20, fo. 219r-v, 19 Dec 1560. 
71 NAS, CS7/23 fos. 252v – 253v, 12 March 1561/2; CS7/26, fos. 232v -234r, 31 March 1563; 
CS7/27, fos. 202r – 203r, 19 July 1563. 
72 NAS, CS7/23, fo. 307r-v, 19 March 1561/2; CS7/27.fo. 130r – 131r, 6 July 1563; CS7/29, fo. 258r-
v, 15 April 1564. 
73 NAS, CS7/23, fo. 318r – 319r, 20 Mar 1561/2. 
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asserted that the spiritual jurisdiction had been abolished, most of them referring to 
the ‘consistorial jurisdiction’,75 with one asserting that the ‘consistorie’ had been 
abolished.76 One further action asserted ‘the consistorie do now obleist’.77 Two main 
ideas are clearly discernible, that the spiritual jurisdiction had ceased, and that it had 
been abolished. The value of this latter position is that it suggests that at least some 
of the supplicants were of the opinion that the suppression of the consistories had 
been legally valid, and that they had therefore been abolished, which could well have 
been grounded in the Protestant insistence that the Reformation Parliament was valid 
and had somehow abolished the consistories. 
 Two final cases give a more narrative description of what had occurred to the 
spiritual jurisdiction and accord very well with the general tenor of the thesis put 
forward so far. In one case, the supplicant explained that she had sought an edict of 
executry from the sheriff and dean of Edinburgh “because of the alteratioun of the 
relegioun and lawis of this realm It wes dowtsum quha had power to do the 
same…”.78 In the other case, an appeal had been made against the sentence of the 
Official of Glasgow, and “Maisteris Johne Stevinsoun James Balfour thesourar and 
John Lang chantour of Glasgow” had been commissioned to hear the appeal “as the 
actis maid thairintill schawin to the saidis lordis is manifest and be ressoun of 
cummeris quhilkis raisis within the realm anent the religioun and the acclesticall [sic] 
Jurisdictioun the pronunceing of ane decreit in the said caus of appellatioun hes 
ceissit and wes nocht gewin furth…”.79 In all these examples the Lords proceeded to 
provide a remedy to the practical problems which attended the cessation of the 
consistories, either hearing the cases themselves or granting commissions. 
In the letters purchased by the pursuer in Chalmer v. Lumisden (the first 
spiritual action the Lords took to themselves), it was argued that “becaus thair is na 
consistoreis instant and the office of the spirituale Juge quhilkis of befoir wes wont 
to cognosche in siclike causis now ceisis Thairfoir necessar it is that the lordis of 
                                                                                                                                          
74 NAS, CS7/27, fos. 324v-325v, 28 July 1563. 
75 NAS, CS7/23, fos. 307v-309r, 19 Mar 1561/2, Bishop of Dumblane v. divers; CS7/26, fos. 212v – 
213r, 26 March 1563; CS7/28, fo. 306r - v, vltimo January 1563/4. 
76 NAS, CS7/29, fo. 64r-65r,14 March 1563/4. 
77 NAS, CS/27, fo. 109r-v, 7 July 1563. 
78 NAS, CS7/26. fo.255r-v, 3 April 1563. 
79 NAS, CS7/28, fo. 389r-v, 21 Feb 1563/4. 
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counsale put remeid thairto”.80 The Lords proceeded to hear the action on the basis 
that “The Lordis of counsall hes powar to cognosce and decide upon spiritual causes, 
gif the consistorie, or ecclesiastical jurisdictioun ceissis, or be stopt be civil wars or 
utherwayis”.81 The variation in wording is suggestive that the Lords’ reasoning was 
not simply copied from the letters purchased by the pursuer, but was their own 
considered response to the problem of the spiritual jurisdiction. It is noteworthy that 
in both narratives it was deemed that the courts spiritual had “ceissit,” since this was 
a concept carried through to the charter of constitution of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh in the Latin “cessationem”.82 
 The sense of the Lords’ reasoning in Chalmer v. Lumsiden was that the Lords 
could hear spiritual actions, but only in lieu of the consistories “if they be stopped by 
civil wars of utherwise,” a clear nod in the direction of what had occurred during the 
autumn of 1559. There was no suggestion that the consistories had been legally and 
permanently abolished, that papal and episcopal authority were lawfully abrogated, 
that the spiritual jurisdiction was now considered civil and therefore restored to the 
supreme civil judicature.83 The sense was that this was a valid practical expedient, 
and that there was nothing in law to say that it was permanent, or the result of some 
permanent alteration in the constitution of the realm. As shall be shown presently, 
this understanding was evident in the constituting charter of the new court. 
  
 The granting of commissions by which the Lords of Council delegated their 
authority in particular spiritual actions was a needful device given the practical 
constraints upon their time and resources; “the lordis of council havand consideration 
of the multitude of actionis dependent befoir thaim”.84 The ad hoc granting of 
commissions to kirk sessions, Superintendents, sheriffs and advocates has two 
features of note for this thesis. The first, the involvement of the Protestant Kirk in 
spiritual actions, especially those of a strictly consistorial nature, will be considered 
                                                 
80 Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 11. 
81 Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 11; Balfour’s Practicks, i, 269. The words used by Balfour have not 
been simply copied from the Chalmer’s precept: it seems certain that, in keeping with the purpose of 
compiling practicks, that Balfour records the Lords opinion of why they should proceed in the matter. 
82 See Appendix 1, clause [1]. This clause in the charter is discussed further below, pages 25-26. 
83 This last point being contrary to the theories of Riddell (Inquiry, i, 426), Fraser (Treatise (1876), i, 
12), and Baird Smith (‘The Reformers and Divorce’, 15) and others. 
84 Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 13-14; NAS, CS7/23, fo. 252v, 12 March 1561/2; cf Baird Smith, 
‘The Reformers and Divorce’, 17.  
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in Chapter II.85 The other, the granting of commissions to groups of advocates to sit 
in St Giles’ or the Tolbooth and hear spiritual actions, is of immediate note here. 
 Sheriff Smith has drawn attention to these commissions and highlighted the 
fact that many of the advocates named in the commissions went on to be 
Commissaries of Edinburgh.86 The first such commission was granted 12 March 
1561/2 to “Masteris John Abircrumby, Clement Litill, John Marioribankis, 
Alexander Sym, Robert Creytoun, Eduart Henrisoun [and] Alexander Mauchane” to 
sit in the “kirk of sanctgeill”.87 The other such extant commission granted 20 March 
1561/2 was to “Maister Alexander Sym, Maister Alexander Mauchane, Maister 
Henrie Kinross, Maister Edward Hendirsoun [i.e. Henrysoun], Maister John Scharp 
[and] Maister Richard Strang” “to sitt in the towbuth of Edinburgh”.88 The details are 
striking: Clement Litill and Edward Henrysoun were two of the first four 
Commissaries of Edinburgh appointed in February 1563/4, whilst Alexander Sym 
replaced James Balfour on the same bench in October 1565.89 Of the others, Henry 
Kinross was the first Procurator Fiscal of the Court of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh,90 whilst Richard Strang and John Schairp regularly procured before the 
new Commissaries, with John Marjoribanks, John Abircrumby putting in occasional 
appearances.91 The locations are also to be expected, but it is noteworthy that the 
group met first in St Giles, then in the Tolbooth: the Official of Lothian had sat in St 
Giles; the Commissaries of Edinburgh were to sit in the Tolbooth.92 There can be no 
real doubt that the groups of advocates delegated to hear consistorial actions pre-
figured the Court of Commissaries of Edinburgh. Beyond the similarities already 
noted, the entire concept of judges appointed to hear actions formerly pertaining to 
the courts spiritual of the Catholic Church and enjoying a jurisdiction delegated from 
                                                 
85 Pages 80-88. 
86 Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 13-14. 
87 CS7/23. fos. 252v-253v, 12 March 1561/2. 
88 CS7/23, fo. 318r-319r, 20 March 1561/2. 
89 Sym’s presentation is extant in RSS, v, 2396, 27 October 1565 “and surrogateis him in the place and 
rowme of the said Maister James Balfour,” Sym also getting Balfour’s 400 marks per annum. 
90 Discussed below, pages 45-46. 
91 See Appendix II, F (1) and (2) for examples of cases in which they appeared as procurators. 
92 Court of the Official, 54 “the consistory aisle of St Giles”; cf John Finlay, Men of Law in Pre-
Reformation Scotland (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2000), 59; for the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
see below, page 44. I am not clear when the Upper Tolbooth was built into the west end of St Giles; it 
may be, therefore, that the first Commissaries of Edinburgh sat in the Upper Tolbooth. 
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the Lords of Council and Session is that which underpinned the appointment of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh in 1563/4.93 
 
 Within the context of these remarkable circumstances, the Court of 
Commissaries of Edinburgh and its inferior commissariots were a very carefully 
conceived and deftly established system of courts. That some more permanent order 
had to be taken beyond the ad hoc solutions provided by the Lords of Council and 
Session was evident to all. The obvious solution was the restoration of the 
consistories, since, as has already been argued, they were still held to be a legally and 
constitutionally valid system of courts in Scotland, but this was politically impossible 
given the Protestant party’s reasons for suppressing them. Another point to consider 
was how any sort of solution would sit with the policy of the ‘rule of law’ maintained 
by Mary and her government: the proclamation of August 1561 ought not to be 
contravened. Here there are two main points to consider. In the first place, when 
Mary returned to Scotland in 1561 the Lords of Council and Session had already 
presumed to administer the spiritual jurisdiction and as such no one could object to 
this in principle. In the second place, there is much evidence that the Protestant Kirk 
co-operated with the position adopted by the Lords of Council and Session, and that 
they wished for a more orderly solution to the problems attending the inactivity of 
the courts spiritual.  
The example which will suffice for now is the petition given in by the 
General Assembly in July 1562 to the Lords of Council requesting that “either they 
give up universally the judgement of divorce to the kirk and their sessions, or else 
establish men of good lives, knowledge and judgment, to take order thereof”.94 The 
petition indicates that the Assembly considered this jurisdiction to pertain to the 
Lords, whilst the reference to giving it up “universally” indicated the many 
commissions granted by the Lords to various kirk sessions and superintendents to 
hear divorce actions. It is also clear that the Assembly was prepared to accept 
whichever decision the Lords deemed most fitting, and as such any possible 
accusations from the Kirk of a breach of the status quo could have been countered by 
                                                 
93 Cf Baird Smith, ‘The Reformers and Divorce’, 18, wherein he defends his assertion that the Court 
of the Commissaries of Edinburgh was “to a large extent the creature of the Court of Session”. 
94 Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 16; Acts and Proceedings of the General Assemblies, i, 19. 
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the Lords by referring to the Assembly’s petition: in effect the Assembly had 
indicated that the Kirk would not be against the Lords “taking order” of the situation 
without further recourse to the Kirk.  
In December 1563 the Lords of Council duly proceeded to commission a 
number of distinguished jurists to consider the erection of jurisdictions in sundry 
parts of the realm which could discuss “the caussis quhilkis the prelattis of this 
realme had decidit in the consistories of befoir”. The details of the new order were 
left to the members of the commission, it being explicitly stated that the Lords of 
Council could “nocht gudlie await upoun the devising of the hale ordour of the saidis 
jurisdictiounis”.95  
The first name on the list of commissioners was Henry Sinclair, Bishop of 
Ross, Lord President of the College of Justice, and brother of the equally 
distinguished John Sinclair, dean of Restalrig, author of Sinclair’s Practicks, who 
succeeded his brother in the presidency in 1565. Both remained Catholics, both were 
leading jurists of their day,96 and its seems reasonable that the opinions known to be 
held by John concerning the legality of the Reformation Parliament were shared by 
his brother. The other commissioners were Richard Maitland of Lethington and his 
son William, together with “the Clerkis of Register, Justiciare and Advocat”.97 At 
this time the Lord Clerk Register was James McGill of Nether Rankeillour,98 the 
Lord Justice Clerk was Sir John Bellenden of Auchnoul99 and the Queen’s Advocate 
was John Spens of Condie.100 All those appointed to the commission were Senators 
of the College of Justice by this date.101 Whilst William Maitland had been one of the 
principal Lords of the Congregation,102 he nevertheless became a central member of 
                                                 
95 Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 16-17; RPC, i, 252, 28 December 1563. 
96  Mark Dilworth, ‘Sinclair, Henry (1507/8-1565)’ (ODNB, accessed 23 January 2006); Athol Murray 
‘Sincalir, John (c.1510-1566)’ (ODNB, accessed 23 January 2006); “They were both learned of the 
laws, and given to maintain the Popish religion, and therefore great enemies of the Protestants” 
(Knox’s History of the Reformation, ed. Dickinson, ii, 185). 
97 RPC, i, 252. 
98 Michael Lynch, ‘MacGill, James, of Nether Rankeillor (d. 1579)’ (ODNB, accessed 5 March 2010). 
99 John Finlay, ‘Bellenden, Sir John, of Auchnoul (d. 1576)’ (ODNB, accessed 5 March 2010). 
100 John Finlay, ‘Spens, John, of Condie (d. 1573)’ (ODNB, accessed 5 March 2010). 
101 i.e. see Brunton and Haig, An Historical Account of the Senators of the College of Justice from its 
Institution in 1532 (Edinburgh: Thos. Clark, 1832), xii. I am grateful in particular to John Cairns for 
discussing who the members of the commission were. 
102 Mark Louglin, ‘Maitland, William, of Lethington (1525x30-1573)’ (ODNB, accessed 5 March 
2010).  
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Mary’s government. Most notably, however, was the fact that McGill and Bellenden 
were the authors of the Discours Particulier, whilst John Spens had been involved in 
its production.103 As such, its seems clear that within this group of high officers of 
state and leading jurists were a number of persons who likely held that the 
suppression of the court of the Catholic Church had not been legal.  
Whilst James Balfour was not appointed to the commission, it is difficult to 
believe that he was not involved in the deliberation of the commission at some level. 
As last Official of Lothian and one of the first Commissaries of Edinburgh, 
Habakkuk Bisset credited him with the composition of the instructions given to the 
first Commissaries of Edinburgh in 1563/4.104  
The constitutional position indicated by Balfour’s Practicks, that the Lords 
administered the spiritual jurisdiction in lieu of the consistories, proved definitive in 
the devising of the new order. Since the Lords had already established a pattern of 
delegating the spiritual jurisdiction to groups of advocates to sit in Edinburgh, the 
idea of some sort of permanent delegation of this authority to a new bench was a 
reasonable progression. That the jurisdiction of all the regional Officials was thereby 
to be centralized under the administration of the Commissaries of Edinburgh is less 
predictable, and a significant development in the history of the administration of 
justice in Scotland. But this trend was not unique, and was already prefigured by the 
jurisdiction of the Lords of Council and Session: indeed the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh’s national jurisdictions were a reflection of the constitutional provenance 
of their authority. 
The charter of constitution of the Commissaries of Edinburgh confirmed the 
idea that the Commissaries enjoyed their new jurisdiction in lieu of the old 
consistories only. The charter began with a reference to the “inaction of the 
jurisdiction of the officials and the commissaries,” with no mention of the abolition 
of the consistories or the abrogation of papal authority in Scotland.105 The 
understanding upon which the Commissaries of Edinburgh were appointed seems 
clear: the old consistories were de facto suppressed, but not legally abolished; in such 
                                                 
103 McNeill, ‘Discours Particulier’, 86. 
104 Habbakuk Bisset’s Rolement of Courts, ed. Sir Philip Hamilton-Grierson (Edinburgh: Scottish Text 
Society, 1920-1926), ii, 57. 
105 See Appendix I, clause [1]; Donaldson, ‘Church Courts’, 368; McNeill, Our Religion, 74. 
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circumstances the spiritual jurisdiction devolved upon the Lords of Council and 
Session; from here the Lords had elected to delegate the major part of this 
jurisdiction to the Commissaries of Edinburgh so that order could be restored to the 
legal system, without restoring the old order to the outrage of Protestants and the 
breakdown of Mary’s rule of law. Considering this within the wider context that 
papal authority had not been legally abolished, the Catholic Church suppressed but 
not disestablished and the Protestant Kirk de facto in the ascendancy, but not legally 
acknowledged beyond Mary’s proclamation of August 1561 several interesting 
inferences may be drawn.106 
The first was that there is no sense of permanence about the Court of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh:107 it was in effect a surrogate, which existed only so 
long as the old consistories continued in abeyance. In this, the new system may be 
considered as an elegant hedge against the two futures facing Scotland in 1564, on 
the one hand the restoration of the Catholic Church, on the other the establishment of 
the Protestant Kirk. For the Catholics in Mary’s government the strict constitutional 
understanding upon which the Commissaries of Edinburgh were appointed inclined 
towards the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy, since it was still established in law. 
For Protestants, the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh was inoffensive and 
raised none of their fears about heresy trials and the Antichrist. Indeed the name of 
the new court seems calculated to avoid such fears, for it could have more accurately 
been called, jurisdictionally speaking, the Court of the Officials of Scotland, but 
perhaps such strong episcopal connotations would have proved too much. 
The ease with which the new consistorial order could be set aside was 
demonstrated by the restoration of Archbishop Hamilton to his consistorial 
jurisdiction in December 1566. The immediate reasons for the restoration of 
Hamilton’s jurisdiction are well known,108 and much has been made of the Queen’s 
                                                 
106 The sense of uncertainty created by this unique set of circumstances has been noted by Robert 
Hannay, who commented that “it was not in fact clear at the time (December 1564) how events were 
likely to turn” (‘On the Church Lands at the Reformation’ in The Scottish Historical Review, XVI 
(1919), 52-72, 60) and is generally discussed by Donaldson in The Scottish Reformation, ‘Chapter III: 
An Unstable Situation, 1560-7’. 
107 This has been noted by Baird Smith in ‘The Reformers and Divorce’, 18: “This erection seems to 
have been a temporary expedient…”. 
108 He was to annul the marriage then standing between the 4th earl of Bothwell and his countess, the 
Lady Jane Gordon, on the grounds of consanguinity, an impediment from which the couple had in fact 
been dispensed. The couple were also divorced by the Commissaries of Edinburgh on the grounds of 
the earl’s adultery, although this decree of divorce is no longer extant. The divorces were a prelude to 
   27
subsequent marriage to Bothwell and its disastrous effects for her personal reign. Yet 
besides these details, the restoration of Hamilton’s consistorial jurisdiction itself 
highlights many of the contextual themes already argued to have been of importance 
in understanding the precise manner in which the new consistorial order was created.  
In the first place the writ by which Mary restored Hamilton “to all and sindrie 
his jurisdictionis alsweill vpoun the south as the north sydis of the watter of Forth” 
acknowledged him as “Legat of Scotland” a style which could not have been 
admitted had papal authority been abrogated in Scotland in August 1560. Next, there 
was clearly no legal bar to “dischairgeing be thir presentis all vtheris Commissaris 
clerkis and vtheris officiaris quhatsumeuir thairintill of thair offices forder in that 
part”:109 the new consistorial order could readily be put aside in favour of the old 
hierarchy.  
Similarly, one of the features of the new order which might be expected to 
have inclined the Lords of Council and Session to argue for the permanence of the 
new order was explicitly addressed. As has been discussed at some length by R.K. 
Hannay in his College of Justice, one of the foremost features of interest to the Lords 
in the new Commissary enterprise had been financial.110 The levying of the quot on 
the dead’s part of all moveable estates had been a lucrative feature of the old 
consistories’ business, and the opportunity to channel some portion of these revenues 
into the coffers of the College of Justice was understandable, given the relative 
under-funding of that in many ways ecclesiastical foundation. With the Court of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh confirming all the greater testaments of the realm and 
the new inferior Commissariots confirming the lesser testaments, those members of 
the Council who were also senators anticipated collectively £1600 a year for the 
College of Justice. This institutional aspect of the new order with its financial gain 
for the senators might suggest some desire on behalf of the Lords to perpetuate the 
new order, thus ensuring £1600 per annum. Nevertheless, when Archbishop 
Hamilton was restored to his jurisdiction to the detriment of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh’s national jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the new inferior 
                                                                                                                                          
the earl of Bothwell’s marriage to Mary Stewart, and pleased neither the Catholic nor the Protestant 
factions (Stuart, Lost Chapter in the History of Mary Queen of Scots, 9 et seq). 
109 Concilia Scotiae, i, clxviii-clxxix. 
110 R.K. Hannay, The College of Justice (Edinburgh: Wm. Hodge, 1933; reprinted by The Stair 
Society, 1991), chapter VI. 
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commissariot at St Andrews, the recently acquired rights of the senators were upheld: 
“Provyding all wayis that the Lordis of thair Sessioun be thankfullie payit of 
samekile of the reddiest of the cottis [sic] of the saidis testamentis as salcum to thair 
said traist counsalouris pairt pro rata yeirlie of the sowme of ane thousand sex 
hundreth pundis quhilk thai haue grantit of befoir to the saidis Lordis of Sessioun”.111 
It might be argued against this thesis that if the Court of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh was impermanent why had the clerks of court and other such members of 
the Court had been appointed for life. Yet despite this appearance of permanence, in 
the month that Hamilton’s jurisdiction was restored, the Lords of Council were given 
a general supervision over the Commissary Courts. As part of this supervision, they 
were authorized to revoke any appointments made for life and directed to make 
appointments to commissary posts “only for as long as the senate wills it and 
considers them suitable for their offices”.112 This alteration in the supervision of the 
new courts was ostensibly made as a prelude to the reform of the new courts on the 
narrative that various unsuitable persons had been appointed to them: but given the 
timing of this alteration to December 1566, it is reasonable to speculate that it was 
intended to presage a potentially more far reaching ‘reform’ of the new courts, 
namely their deconstruction and re-integration into the episcopal hierarchy of the 
Scottish Church. 
In these respects in can be seen that the new consistorial order had been 
established so as not to preclude, and therefore possibly to anticipate, the restoration 
of the Catholic hierarchy in Scotland to their ancient jurisdictions. Yet as can be 
readily anticipated, the move to restore Archbishop Hamilton’s consistorial 
jurisdiction was deeply troubling to the Protestant party, since the original grounds 
upon which the Lords of the Congregation had suppressed the consistories had not 
subsided. On 27 December 1566 the General Assembly gave in a remonstrance to the 
Privy Council describing Hamilton as “that conjured enemie of Jesus Chryst and 
cruell murtherer of our brethren”.113 It continued “His ancient jurisdictioun was, that 
                                                 
111 Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxix. 
112 This ordinance was ratified by Parliament in November 1581 (see Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 673 et 
seq and RPS, 1581/10/84. 
113 Hamilton was legally responsible for the execution of the aged Walter Myll (or Miln) for heresy in 
1558 (John Herkless and Robert Kerr Hannay, The Archbishops of St. Andrews (Edinburgh & 
London: W. Blackwood, 1907-1915), v, 92), the last Protestant known to have been martyred in 
Scotland (Jane Dawson, ‘The Scottish Reformation and the Theatre of Martyrdom’ in Studies in 
Church History, 30 (1993), 259-270, 260, note 5). 
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he with certaine his collegues collaterals, might have dampnit of heresie as it pleasit 
him, and then to take all that were suspect of heresie… Our Queine belyke is not well 
informit; scho aucht not, nor may not justly break the lawes; and so consequently, 
scho may not sett up against us, not without our consent, that Romane Antichryst 
againe”.114  
What is also of note in this statement was that the Assembly held Mary’s 
actions to have broken the law. This is central to a full understanding of why the 
restoration of Hamilton’s jurisdiction presaged Mary’s downfall, not in respect of the 
business transacted by Hamilton’s delegates in the action of Bothwell v. Gordon 
only, but in Mary’s violation of her own ‘rule of law’ policy. Even from the 
government’s perspective the restoration was surely a de facto alteration in the state 
of religion and therefore a violation of the proclamation of August 1561.115 Yet these 
were not the grounds cited by the Assembly. Rather, the Assembly insisted that 
Hamilton had been deprived of his jurisdiction in August 1560: “For in ane lawfull 
and most frie parliament that ever was in this realme before, was that odious beast 
depryvit of jurisdictioun, office, and auctoritie within this realme”.116 The 
constitutional ineptitude of the statute and its illegality has already received full 
consideration. Yet what is striking is that this was clearly the Scottish Protestant 
understanding of the intention behind the statute abrogating papal authority in 
Scotland, namely the abrogation of papal and episcopal authority in Scotland. This 
not only suggests the Scottish Reformation in its earliest stages aimed at the 
eradication of papal and episcopal authority in the Kirk, but indicates the provenance 
of the thesis long maintained in Scottish historiography, that the courts spiritual were 
abolished by the statute abrogating papal authority. 
Also of note is the recurrence of the theme of the consent of the Kirk, already 
noted where the erection of the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh was 
concerned. This too had been a kind of alteration in the state of religion, but as has 
                                                 
114 Robertson thought the remonstrance Knox’s work (Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxix-clxxx, n. 1) 
115 Despite the fact that the ‘Act concerning religion’ 14 April 1567 maintained that “hir hienes, sen 
hir foirsaid arryvall, hes attemptit na thing contrar the estait of religioun, quhilk hir majestie fand 
publictlie and universallie standing at hir arryvale foirsaid, quhairby hir majestie is maist worthy to be 
servit, honourit and obeyit,” the error was clearly perceived by the government: the remainder of the 
act goes on to reassure the subjects of the realm, albeit in a roundabout way, that they cannot be tried 
for heresy and will be defended against all foreign authorities whatsoever (RPS, 1567/4/6). 
116 Acts and Proceedings of the General Assemblies, i, 89; Concilia Scotiae, i clxxviii-clxxx. 
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been noted, the Assembly’s petition of 1562 had consented to the Lords of Council 
‘taking some order’ of the consistorial jurisdiction. Yet in the example of Hamilton’s 
restoration, the Assembly explicitly stated that Mary “may not justly break the 
lawes… not without our consent”.117 In this, Mary’s failure to obtain the agreement 
of both Catholic and Protestant factions to an alteration of religion in Scotland was 
fatal not only to the order established by her own return to Scotland, but to her 
personal rule.    
The restoration of Archbishop Hamilton’s jurisdiction proved abortive, and 
Mary’s forced abdication extinguished any realistic expectations of a Catholic 
restoration in Scotland. Her downfall also presaged the legally valid abrogation of 
papal authority in Scotland in December 1567.118 The remarkable events of 1566 and 
1567 altered the constitutional context within which the new Commissary system had 
now to exist.  
 
§IV 
THEMES OF EPISCOPACY AND THE CONSISTORIAL JURISDICTION 
IN POST REFORMATION SCOTLAND 
 
The enduring problem for the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh and 
its inferior commissariots from 1567 until the nineteenth century was that the 
original context in which they had been created and could be properly understood 
had perished. Not only had the original context been effaced, but the expectation 
against which the founders of the system had hedged, the termination of the new 
system in the restoration of the Catholic hierarchy, was no longer a constitutionally 
valid possibility. On the basis of this understanding, the subsequent constitutional 
history of the Commissary system can be viewed as a series of attempts to rationalize 
its continued existence within post-Catholic, Episcopalian and Presbyterian contexts. 
                                                 
117 Nevetheless it is unclear that the General Assembly was referring to its own consent exclusively; 
rather the phrase may have been a general protest against the arbitary nature of Hamilton’s restoration, 
without the ‘consent of the commonweil’ or the estates. 
118 RPS, A1567/12/1; APS, iii 14, c.3. The fact that the ratification of the August 1560 statutes was 
deemed necessary by the Protestant Kirk triumphant following Mary’s abdication bears further 
witness to the deep seated misgivings many had had concerning the legality of the statutes of August 
1560. 
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The precise details of these various constitutional understandings are beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but in sketching later constitutional theories it is possible to 
indicate the provenance of various conceptions which have enjoyed some currency in 
recent historiography. 
 One of the earliest solutions to the constitutional limbo in which the 
Commissary system was placed by the second Protestant revolution was quite 
simple: the whole idea of the Commissary system and its organization ought to be re-
considered. Whilst the Commissary system had not been reabsorbed by the Catholic 
Church, the sense that they had been a temporary measure awaiting some future re-
ordering lingered on. On 10 June 1575, Morton and the Privy Council charged all 
Commissaries to appear before them, narrating that “eftir the abolishing of the 
papistical jurisdictioun and religion within this realme, thair wes certane 
Commissaris constitute be the Quene, berand authoritie for the tyme for decisioun of 
beneficiall and matrimoniall caussis, confirmatioun of testamentis and utheris, quhill 
ane mair perfyte ordour mycht be providit for and establissit”.119 The distinctly 
retrospective elements of this narrative, that Catholicism had been legally abolished 
prior to the appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh conformed to the 
Scottish Protestant narrative of Reformation history. As it transpired, Morton made 
no headway with any proposed re-ordering (the proposed details of which are not 
known), but it illustrates the point in hand. It is clear also that the Protestant Kirk 
wished for some sort of re-evaluation of the Commissaries’ jurisdiction, the second 
Book of Discipline of 1578 attacking “the mingled jurisdictioun of the commissaris 
in sa far as they mell with ecclesiasticall materis and have no commissioun of the 
kirk thairto bot war erectit in tyme of our soveranes moder quhen thingis wer out of 
ordour”.120 Whatever the Kirk’s objections to the Commissary system during the 
latter sixteenth century, the system was not altered and remained part of the Scottish 
legal system into the seventeenth century.  
During the seventeenth century, the weighting of the Commissary system 
towards the restoration of the old order found partial utilization and realization in the 
Episcopalian policies of the British Stewarts. In 1609 the consistorial jurisdiction 
was restored to the Scottish episcopal hierarchy. The precise constitutional basis 
                                                 
119 RPC, ii, 455-6. 
120 Second Book of Discipline, ed. James Kirk (Edinburgh: St Andrew Press, 1980), 228. 
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upon which this restoration proceeded is not entirely clear, but it would seem that the 
understanding of Mary’s government in the 1560s no longer applied. Whilst Mary 
and her councillors had explicitly stated that the Commissaries authority to 
administer the spiritual jurisdiction was a corollary of Mary’s plena potestas,121 they 
had also been careful to maintain that the Crown’s involvement arose not out of 
some permanently altered constitutional basis, but out of expediency. During the 
reign of James VI the theoretical basis of the Scottish polity had certainly acquired a 
more Anglican colouring.  
The Black Acts of 1584 had asserted that the sovereign’s power and authority 
extended over all “statis alsweill spirituall as temporall within this realme” and that 
the sovereign and their successors were “juges competent to all personis…spirituall 
or temporal”.122 As such, when the Act of 1609 asserted that the person of the 
monarch was the source of the Commissaries’ jurisdiction, it did not automatically 
follow that the Commissaries’ jurisdiction was therefore considered to be civil or 
temporal. Rather, the Act of 1609 restored “the archibischoppis and bischoppis of 
this realme to their former authoritie, dignitie, prerogative, privileges and 
jurisdictiouns lauchfullie pertening and shall be knawin to pertene to thame (alwayes 
flowing frome his majestie alsweill as ony uther ordinar jurisdictioun doth), and 
specialie to the jurisdictioun of comissariatis and administratioun of justice by thair 
comissioneris and deputeis in all spirituall and ecclesiasticall causes”.123 In this, the 
sense that the spiritual jurisdiction pertained to the Crown in lieu of the courts 
spiritual was clearly negated; rather the jurisdiction of the Commissaries was 
considered to emanate from the Crown on the basis of Anglican and Episcopalian 
conceptions of monarchic spiritual authority.124  
Despite the altered constitutional basis upon which the Commissary Courts 
were now based, the latent principle that the Commissaries administered an episcopal 
jurisdiction became more pronounced. In March 1610/11 the restored Scottish 
episcopate proceeded to re-organize the jurisdiction of the Commissary Courts. The 
                                                 
121 See Appendix I, clause [4]. 
122 RPS, 1609/4/20; APS, iii, 292-293, c.2; Alan MacDonald, The Jacobean Kirk, 1567-1625: 
Sovereignty, Polity and Liturgy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 26. 
123 RPS, 1609/4/20. 
124 I am grateful to Alan MacDonald for discussing James VI’s Episcopalian policies and the 
constitutional basis upon which they proceeded. The views expressed and any faults they contain are 
my own.  
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national jurisdictions of the Commissaries of Edinburgh were re-distributed to the 
inferior Commissariots, with the exception of actions for divorce on the grounds of 
adultery, which was reserved to Edinburgh. In this, the jurisdiction of the inferior 
Commissaries became closer to that of the pre-Reformation Officials,125 whilst the 
Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh suffered a loss of status.126 
 
 The rationalization of the Commissary system through explicit re-association 
with the Scottish episcopal hierarchy proved problematic from 1638.127 It was within 
the Presbyterian context of the first temporary overthrow of the Scottish episcopate 
that the enduring understanding of the Commissary system took shape. The precise 
provenance of the Presbyterian view requires further research, but a prominent role 
must have been played by the Prebyterian John Nisbet, later Lord Dirleton. Nisbet 
was one of the Commissaries of Edinburgh from 1641 to 1668 and it is probable that 
his constitutional understanding of the Commissary system was developed during 
this period.128 His defence of the continued validity of the Commissary system within 
a Presbyterian establishment was published posthumously in 1698 in his Some 
Doubts and Questions in the Law, but it is seems clear from the parliamentary 
debates about the future of the Commissaries129 that his arguments must have 
enjoyed considerable currency during the 1680s and ‘90s, since it is clear that the 
arguments he put forward were accepted over and against more radical voices.  
                                                 
125 See Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 664 et seq. Research into the process of re-organization as it actually 
happened has yet to be undertaken. It would be particularly interesting to know if the episcopal 
Commissaries were authorized to use spiritual sanctions. 
126 Hector MacQueen, ‘Two Visitors in the Session, 1629 and 1636’ in Miscellany IV (Edinburgh: The 
Stair Society, 2002), 155-168. Christopher Lowther observed in 1629 that the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh “be, as I perceived, not much respected” (p.162). 
127 In 1638, during the Covenanting revolt, the General Assembly condemned episcopacy as contrary 
to the constitution of the Church of Scotland, whilst in the following year it condemned episcopacy as 
contrary to the law of God (Gordon Donadlson, Scotland: James V to James VII (Edinburgh: Oliver & 
Boyd, 1971), 320-324).  
128 Nisbet died in 1688, and since the decisions of the Lords of Session upon which he commented 
were from the period 1665 to 1677 (A.J. Mann, ‘Nisbet, Sir John, Lord Direlton (1610-1688)’ 
(ODNB, accessed 8 November 2008), it seems reasonable to suppose that his opinions concerning the 
commissary courts were formulated during his period as a Commissary of Edinburgh. 
129 See APS, ix, appendix, 87b-89a. An act was read for the abolishing of the Commissary Courts in 
Parliament 9 June 1693. The act envisaged the abolitions of the Commissary Courts and the dispersal 
of their civil jurisdiction to other courts. At the same time the ‘goodmen of Air’ petitioned Parliament 
for the abolition of the commissariot of Glasgow, which narrated the old Protestant understanding 
with some variations “during the time of popery, there was a spiritual jurisdiction in each diocy 
exerced by officials…this jurisdiction was suppressed by the abolishing of popery: but episcopacy 
shortly succeeding, the Bishops in their several dioceses, in place of their Officials, appointed 
Commissaris, whose jurisdiction was by them understood as spiritual…”. 
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 The Presbyterian assault upon prelacy had a considerable resonance with the 
earliest assaults upon the old courts spiritual during the Wars of the Congregation in 
1559. Just as the Lords of the Congregation had suppressed the old consistories on 
account of their association with the Antichrist, so too prelacy was attacked by the 
Presbyterians as a remnant of the old Catholic order. The Jacobean association of the 
Commissary system with the Scottish episcopate therefore rendered it liable to attack 
as a “remnant of popery”.130 
 Against this understanding, John Nisbet formulated the following defence, 
which in order to be convincing had to distance the Commissary Courts from any 
association with papal or episcopal authority. He argued that the jurisdiction of the 
Bishops and their Officials had consisted of two main components. The first had 
been a spiritual jurisdiction, usurped from the true Church, and which properly 
belonged to the Presbyterian Kirk.131 The second had been a temporal, civil 
jurisdiction, delegated to the episcopate from the Scottish Crown. The temporal 
jurisdiction enjoyed by the episcopate was for Nisbet the jurisdiction of the 
Commissary system, and as such, the Commissary system could not be attacked 
along with prelacy, since it was a system of courts “erected by Queen Mary in time 
of greatest Purity and Reformation,” the system’s jurisdiction being considered civil, 
emanating from the Crown.132 Nisbet’s theory was clearly predicated upon the 
Presbyterian assertions that the episcopate enjoyed no inherent authority and that the 
Crown was a source of temporal authority only. Whilst it would be difficult to argue 
that this idea was present in the thinking of those by whom the first Commissaries of 
Edinburgh were appointed or by the British Stewarts, the logical corollary of 
Nisbet’s thesis, that the jurisdiction of the post-Reformation Commissaries had been 
a civil jurisdiction, emanating from and delegated by the Crown, was consistently 
applied by nineteenth and twentieth century authors to the appointment of the first 
                                                 
130 James Fergusson, A Treatise on the Present State of the Consistorial Law in Scotland (Edinburgh: 
Bell & Bradfute, 1829), xiv-xv.  
131 “the Official’s jurisdiction was episcopal, ecclesiastical in both the former respects, and was 
continued as it had been in the Popish Church, the Bishop usurping the jurisdiction that belonged to 
Sessions, Prebyteries and Assemblies” (Dirleton’s Doubts and Questions in the Law of Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Hamilton & Balfour, 1762), 82). 
132 Unlike Anglicanism, Presbyterianism could not consider the Crown as anything other than a source 
of temporal, civil authority. Dirleton read the Act of 1609 from the perspective necessitated by his 
Presbyterian views: “It is most evident from the Act of his [James VI’s] 20 Parliament, 1609, that the 
jurisdiction of Commissaries is a temporal jurisdiction, acknowledged in the Act to flow from his 
majesty” (Doubts and Questions, 81).  
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Commissaries of Edinburgh in 1563/4. This ‘Presbyterian’ understanding was clearly 
echoed in Riddell’s assertion that “at the epoch of the Reformation, which began on 
August 24, 1560, the jurisdiction of the Church in consistorial matters, on its 
suppression, returned to the Crown from whence, as described by our Acts of 
Parliament, it sprang originally”133 and in David Baird Smith’s argument that the 
appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh “set the final seal on the theory of 
the civil origin of consistorial jurisdiction”.134   
The only question which Nisbet therefore had to answer was why the 
Commissary system should be maintained as a distinct system of civil courts. Two 
reasons were put forward. The first was a final, if faint, nod in the direction of the old 
spiritual jurisdiction in that the actions tried in the Commissary Courts were of such 
a quality as to recommend “a circumspect, and as it were, a religious handling of 
them”. On this ground, Nisbet maintained, the jurisdiction of the Commissaries had 
been “neither entrusted to the lowest Sort of Judges, neither to the Judges of the great 
Employment about the Decision of other Civil Actions, to be decided in a tumultuary 
Way, and promiscuously with other Causes, but by a considerate Choice of Judges, 
singled out for these Causes: It was provided, that neither the Meanness of the Judge, 
nor the Greatness, nor the Multitude of his other Employments, should prejudge 
Causes of so great Gravity and Importance”.135  
The second reason proposed by Nisbet for retaining the system as it stood 
was that the Commissary Courts could not be suppressed, for sheriffs were 
gentlemen of insufficient legal learning to hear consistorial actions,136 whilst the 
Lords of Session were too busy. Practical considerations such as these had always 
had a place in the deliberations of those who had to deal with the consequences of 
the cessation of the old courts spiritual. In 1559 the Lords of the Congregation had 
maintained that “no consistory should afterwards be holden, there being enough of 
                                                 
133 Riddell, Inquiry, 426. 
134 Baird Smith, ‘The Reformers and Divorce’, 17. It is clear that Baird Smith linked this 
understanding of the civil origin of the consistorial jurisdiction to Calvinist theories (Ibid., 15-16), 
thereby assuming a sixteenth-century source of this theory within the Scottish context. Nevertheless, 
this does not change the fact that the Calvinistic theories he discusses were not in the minds of those 
who appointed the Commissaries – Baird Smith made a similar error in arguing that Scottish 
Protestant divorce for malicious desertion was introduced into Scotland on the grounds of Calvinist 
theology (discussed below, page 141, including n. 210). 
135 Doubts and Questions, 77. 
136 “Sheriffs are known to be gentlemen who understand not the law” (Doubts and Questions, 80). 
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civil ordinary judges, to whom recourse may be had in all actions,” but the resultant 
disorder had proved intolerable.137 Again in a Presbyterian context, the practical 
problems attending any serious attempt to efface any trace of the old courts spiritual 
in the organization of the Scottish legal system made it still untenable. 
Yet despite the continued survival of the Commissary system in Presbyterian 
Scotland, there was no longer any constitutional bar to some future assimilation of 
the Commissary system. During Mary’s reign the idea of the spiritual jurisdiction 
had remained intact, the Commissaries enjoying their jurisdiction in lieu of the courts 
spiritual of the Catholic Church. Under the British Stewarts the principle that the 
Commissaries’ jurisdiction was derived directly and properly from the Crown had 
been firmly established, but at the same time the monarch was presented as a source 
of temporal and spiritual authority, whilst the Commissary Courts became more 
overtly episcopal. Under the Presbyterian settlement the Commissaries’ jurisdiction 
was determined to be temporal and civil, with only practical considerations arguing 
convincingly for its continued existence. By the nineteenth century, this remaining 
consideration was finally set aside, and the Commissary system was absorbed into 
the Scottish civil legal system, the jurisdiction of the inferior Commissariots passing 










                                                 
137 Calendar of State Papers, foreign series, of the reign of Elizabeth, ii, item 421. 
138 See Guide to the National Archives of Scotland (Edinburgh: The Stationary Office & The Stair 
Society, 1996), 154 for a narrative of these alterations. 
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CHAPTER II 




 It has been argued in the previous chapter that the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh were entrusted with the administration of the spiritual jurisdiction of the 
Scottish episcopate during a period of religious revolution and jurisdictional 
confusion. The primary focus of this thesis concerns one aspect of this jurisdiction, 
namely law and litigation involving marriage, divorce and legitimacy and the 
jurisdictional problems this occasioned between the Commissaries and the Kirk. 
Nevertheless it seems appropriate to first discuss the general practical significance of 
the appointment of the Commissaries against the backdrop of the pre-Reformation 
context. This is advisable for several reasons. On the one hand, very little has been 
published concerning the actual Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh and its 
jurisdiction as a whole. When nineteenth-century antiquaries first took an interest in 
the old Courts of the Officials, their principal focus was upon actions of marriage, 
divorce and legitimacy and resulted in the publication of the Liber Officialis Sancti 
Andrei in 1845. But as Gordon Donaldson pointed out, this focus gave a 
“misleading” impression as the jurisdiction of the old Officials.139 Whilst the 
Official’s competence in marriage, divorce and legitimacy actions has now been set 
in its proper context by Simon Ollivant,140 it would be unfortunate to repeat the 
misleading impressions of the past in respect of the Commissaries of Edinburgh. On 
the other hand, since this thesis is also concerned with how the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh’s competence in matrimonial matters brought them into extensive and 
often confusing contact with the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk, it seems necessary 
to set this particular relationship within the broader context of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh’s relations with other courts, principally the old episcopal courts and the 
‘new’ inferior Commissariots.  
                                                 
139 Donaldson, ‘Church Courts’, 365. 
140 Court of the Official. 
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There is also a general danger that discussions concerning the relations 
between the Commissaries and the Kirk could become too dominant a theme in this 
thesis, which would lead to excessive digression into the early history, theology, 
aims and objectives of the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk. In order to guard against 
this and to ensure a consistent focus on the Commissaries of Edinburgh and their 
consistorial jurisdiction, sections dealing with relations with the Kirk have been 
broken into two main chronological periods. The first period concerns how the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh treated the sentences of divorce and other ‘consistorial 
decisions’ pronounced by the tribunals of the Kirk from 1559 down to the 
appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh in February 1563/4. This first period 
in many ways represented a confused situation, which the Commissaries had to deal 
with both rationally, but also with a degree of expediency and pragmatism; after all, 
they were dealing with the aftermath of a complex revolution. This first period is 
discussed at the end of this present chapter along with the Commissaries’ relations 
with other courts. The second period concerns the ongoing and possibly more 
regularized relations between the Commissaries and the Kirk from 1563/4 down to 
the 1570s, during what will be argued to have been a search for jurisdictional 
harmony in a shifting and often unclear situation. This second period will be 
discussed in the final chapter of the thesis, having first discussed the consistorial law 
of the Commissaries of Edinburgh and the consistorial litigation brought before 
them. This will not only break the focus on the Kirk rather than on the Commissaries, 
but should also aid the reader, since the chapter on the ongoing relations between the 
Commissaries and the Kirk presupposes a firm grasp of the consistorial law and 
procedure of the Commissaries of Edinburgh. It should be emphasised that the 
involvement of the tribunals of the Kirk in ‘consistorial’ matters from 1559 onwards 
really was the complicating factor in the history of the spiritual jurisdiction in 
Scotland. Such problems did not arise for the comparable period of the English 
Reformation. In short, it has given this thesis as much trouble as it must have given 
the earliest Commissaries of Edinburgh!   
 On account of the relative jurisdictional disorder attending the Scottish 
Reformation, it is necessary to define a number of terms relating to the jurisdiction of 
the Commissaries and other courts, which will be used during the course of this 
thesis. The basic problem concerns the categorization of the jurisdiction of the 
medieval Catholic Church and how it related to the jurisdiction of the Commissaries 
of Edinburgh and the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk. In its broadest sense the 
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jurisdiction of the medieval Church in Scotland can be considered to have been a 
combination of the authority and jurisdiction of the bishops of Rome, the Scottish 
episcopate, and the religious orders of Scotland. As a whole, this can properly be 
called the spiritual jurisdiction of the medieval Catholic Church in Scotland. Within 
this, the distinction between papal and episcopal jurisdiction has already been 
discussed, and it is the episcopal jurisdiction with which the Commissaries were 
principally involved.141  
 The episcopal jurisdiction may be broken down into several categories of 
actions and business concerning: ‘marriage, divorce and legitimacy’, ‘benefices and 
teinds’, ‘executry business’, ‘defamation or slander’, the appointment of curators and 
tutors to minors, the breaking oaths, and deeds and obligations registered in the 
books of the episcopal courts.142 Marriage, divorce and legitimacy actions have come 
to be designated as the consistorial actions in Scots law,143 and the term will be used 
during the course of this thesis. Benefice and teind business, or, more generally, 
actions involving the patrimony of the medieval Church, have often been designated 
‘ecclesiastical’ actions,144 and the term will be used during the course of this thesis. 
These two terms are of course potentially problematical. The term ‘consistorial 
jurisdiction’ has often been used to refer to the spiritual jurisdiction in general, whilst 
the same is true of the term ‘ecclesiastical jurisdiction’. To compound matters 
further, the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk has also been referred 
to as the ‘ecclesiastical jurisdiction’. For clarity, this thesis will use the term 
‘episcopal jurisdiction’ to refer to the overall jurisdiction of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh and the inferior, provincial Commissaries subject to them,145 and within 
                                                 
141 It seems undisputable that the powers of the Commissaries of Edinburgh were “similar to those 
formerly exercised by the bishops” (Connell, Treatise (1815), 197). 
142 See Cosmo Innes, Lectures on Scotch Legal Antiquities (Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas, 1872), 
238-9 for further discussion of these and other aspects of the old episcopal jurisdiction. 
143 i.e. Riddell, Inquiry, i, 390 et seq being An Exposition of our Genuine, Original Consistorial Law; 
Lord Hermand’s Consistorial Decisions, 1684-1777, ed. F.P.Walton (Edinburgh: Stair Society, 1940).  
144 i.e. Court of the Official, 77 et seq. 
145 Quite how the jurisdiction of the post-Reformation Commissaries’ Courts ought to be categorized 
is of course a debateable point. David Sellar has noted that “at first they were in some sense spiritual 
courts” (‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 61), and that Thomas Craig used the phrases in curia 
christianitatis and in foro Ecclesiastico to refer to them (‘Marriage by Cohabitation with Habit and 
Repute: Review and Requiem?’ in D L Carey Miller and D W Meyers (eds.), Comparative and 
Historical Essays in Scots Law: A Tribute to Professor Sir Thomas Smith QC (Edinburgh: The Law 
Society of Scotland, 1992), 117-136, 120). Litigants before the Commissaries of Edinburgh could 
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this general category will used the term ‘consistorial jurisdiction’ to refer to the 
jurisdiction concerning marriage, divorce and legitimacy actions, and the term 
‘ecclesiastical jurisdiction’ to refer to the jurisdiction concerning the patrimony of 
the medieval Church. In addition, those aspects of the jurisdiction of the tribunals of 
the Protestant Kirk which involved the Commissaries of Edinburgh will be 
designated the ‘disciplinary jurisdiction’.  
The complexity of the legacy of the pre-Reformation spiritual jurisdiction in 
post-Reformation Scotland demands that some further qualifications be made. In the 
first place the episcopal jurisdiction of the pre-Reformation episcopate, and the 
episcopal jurisdiction of the post-Reformation Commissaries, whilst substantially the 
same in many respects, was not identical, and the differences are discussed during 
the course of this chapter. In addition, the jurisdiction of the Protestant Kirk cannot 
have said to have consisted solely of a ‘disciplinary’ jurisdiction.146 Nevertheless, it 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the entire jurisdiction of the Protestant 
Kirk, and the term ‘disciplinary’ jurisdiction is sufficient in the limited sense used 
above. 
 Finally, arguments which will be put forward in the next sections of the 
current chapter pre-suppose a knowledge of the organization of the administration of 
the episcopal jurisdiction in Scotland prior to the Reformation, which may be quickly 
rehearsed here. Prior to the Scottish Reformation, the spiritual jurisdiction of the 
Scottish episcopate was administered at the diocesan level. Each bishop appointed 
his own Official, who in turn could delegate all or some of their jurisdiction to 
Commissaries, who usually sat in the Official’s court.147 Commissaries could also be 
appointed directly by bishops to exercise various aspects of the episcopal jurisdiction 
in more remote places, where a full Official’s court was not necessary, but where the 
local population could more readily avail themselves of the episcopal jurisdiction 
without travelling to the court of the main diocesan Official. This latter type of 
“territorial” Commissary could also be appointed by religious houses and by 
                                                                                                                                          
describe them as “judge[s] ecclesiastical” (NAS, CC8/2/6, fos. 93v, 20 May 1573, Dunbar v. Adair) 
and protest that certain actions were not competent before the Commissaries, being “civile and 
profane” (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 253v, 28 November 1564, Young v. Marchamstoun).  
146 Indeed, it would be more accurate to say that they exercised a ‘Reformed spiritual jurisdiction’. 
147 Court of the Official, 49 et seq. 
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archdeacons.148 Bishop’s Officials, Official’s Commissaries and episcopal territorial 
Commissaries were subject to the appellate jurisdiction of archiepiscopal Officials, 
or Officials principal, who exercised the archiepiscopal jurisdiction of the 
Archbishops of St Andrews and Glasgow. The dioceses of Dunkeld, Dunblane, 
Galloway (Whithorn) and Argyll (Lismore) were subject to Glasgow, whilst the 
dioceses of Aberdeen, Moray, Brechin, Ross, Caithness, The Isles (Sodor) and 
Orkney were subject to St Andrews.149 In general terms, many of the ‘territorial’ 
Commissaries, together with the deans of Christianity dealt with many of the minor 
parochial aspects of the episcopal jurisdiction in Scotland, and these will be 
discussed below within the context of the inferior Commissaries subject to the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh. The more important aspects of the episcopal jurisdiction 
were administered primarily by each diocesan Official. Where a diocese was 
particularly large, it may have been traditionally divided into archdeaconries, each 
archdeaconry having its own Official. This was the case within the diocese of St 
Andrews, which was divided into the archdeaconries of St Andrews and Lothian, 
with an Official presiding over each.150 These Officials tended to deal with the major 
aspects of the episcopal jurisdiction, including, among others, actions involving 
marriage, divorce and legitimacy, benefices, and the greater testaments. There are 
nevertheless so many exceptions to these general observations that the reader is 
referred to Ollivant’s Court of the Official: bishops could take matters directly into 
their own hands, whilst ‘territorial’ Commissaries could enjoy unique jurisdictional 
privileges and customary rights which in effect derogated from the jurisdiction of 
some Officials. The situation was further complicated in Scotland (and indeed 
beyond) by the widespread exploitation of the idea of the pope as ‘universal 
ordinary’ and the attendant rise in first instance business directed to the Holy See and 
the proliferation of Scottish churchmen being appointed papal judges delegate to hear 
specific cases,151 in effect bypassing and indeed undermining the whole system of 
native Scottish episcopal courts. Various aspects of this complex pre-Reformation 
                                                 
148 Court of the Official, 37-39. 
149 Dickinson, Donaldson and Milne (eds.), A Source Book of Scottish History (Edinburgh: Thomas 
Neslon and Sons, 1953), ii, 93,96; Atlas of Scottish History to 1707 eds. P.G.B.McNeill and 
H.L.MacQueen (Edinburgh: The Scottish Medievalists and Department of Geography, University of 
Edinburgh, 1996), 338. 
150 The Official of Lothian sat in Edinburgh, the Official (in fact Official Principal) of St Andrews sat 
in the archiepiscopal city of St Andrews. 
151 Court of the Official, 39-40. 
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system will be discussed in more detail below within the context of the re-




SITTING IN JUDGEMENT: THE COMMISSARIES  
OF EDINBURGH AND THEIR COURT 
 
[i] THE JUDGES 
 
 The charter of constitution152 of the Commissaries of Edinburgh appointed 
four men of law to sit within the burgh of Edinburgh and administer the jurisdiction 
entrusted to them on account of the inactivity of the courts of the Officials and 
Commissaries of the Catholic Church in Scotland. They enjoyed a local jurisdiction 
within the sheriffdoms of Edinburgh and Stirling and the constabularies of 
Haddington, Peebles and Linlithgow in actions concerning the payment of tithes and 
other ecclesiastical revenues,153 executry business relating to lesser testaments,154 
slander and defamation,155 and the appointment of curators,156 and many small debt 
actions.157 They also enjoyed an exclusive national jurisdiction in actions concerning 
titles to Scottish benefices,158 actions concerning legal aspects of marriage, divorce 
and bastardy,159 and all executry business relating to greater testaments.160 The Court 
                                                 
152 See Appendix I, n. 1 for details about which versions of the charter are extant and for an English 
translation. 
153 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 197r ; CC8/2/4, fos. 35r-36r; CC8/2/6, fos. 136v-138v. 
154 i.e. Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 660, items xxv-xxvi. 
155 Discussed below, pages 228-235. 
156 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 77r-v, 23 June, 1564. 
157 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 658, items xiii-xv; The ‘popularity’ of small debt actions is discussed 
below, pages 207-210. For a summary of the local inferior jurisdiction of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh see Appendix I, clause [4]; Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 658, items xiv-xv. 
158 For an example of this see Thomas Green, ‘Scottish Benefices and the Commissary Court of 
Edinburgh: the Example of McGibbon v. Struthers’ in Miscellany VI (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 
2009), 45-61. It should be noted that this aspect of the Commissaries’ jurisdiction has sometimes been 
overlooked, for example Guide to the National Archives of Scotland, 153 et seq. 
159 For a summary of the Commissaries of Edinburgh’s national jurisdiction see Appendix I, clause 
[5]. The Commissaries consistorial jurisdiction also included dealing with the contractual 
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of the Commissaries of Edinburgh can therefore be understood to have been both a 
national court and a local inferior Commissariot. 
 The superior national jurisdiction of the Commissaries of Edinburgh in effect 
represented the centralization of the higher functions of the pre-Reformation 
episcopal courts. Certain qualifications need to be applied to this generalization. The 
Commissaries of Edinburgh did not inherit any of the episcopal functions relating to 
the sacrament of penance, that is to say, they could not hear confessions and grant 
absolution. Neither could the Commissaries presume to excommunicate those who 
failed to conform to their summonses and decreets, nor were they competent to 
decide the orthodoxy of religious beliefs.161 In this, many of the distinctly spiritual 
functions of the old episcopal courts were absent from the Court of the Commissaries 
of Edinburgh. It is therefore more accurate to say that the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh were entrusted with the administration of those legal functions of the old 
episcopal Officials and Commissaries which could be reasonably administered and 
enforced by the temporal or secular power, if circumstances dictated that this was a 
reasonable expedient. 
  
The four men of law appointed as the first Commissaries of Edinburgh were 
distinguished lawyers in the own right. Master James Balfour, parson of Flisk, a 
graduate of Wittenberg, last pre-Reformation Official of Lothian, senator of the 
College of Justice (extraordinary Lord 1561, ordinary 1563), later Sir James Balfour 
of Pittendreich, author of the famous Practicks and Lord President of the College of 
Justice (1567-8) was the first named of the new judges, and it is often thought that he 
was the ‘chief’ Commissary, on account of the fact that he received a higher salary 
                                                                                                                                          
consequences of divorce in making provision for the proper separation of a couples’ shared property 
and rights.  
160 See Appendix I, clauses [7], [12] and [13]. As well as granting the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the greater testaments, note also that they were precluded from 
involvement with the lesser testaments throughout the realm, bearing in mind the earlier grant of 
jurisdiction over testate bona within the ‘commissariot of Edinburgh’. This arrangement was made 
explicit in the instructions passed to the Commissaries in 1563/4 (Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 660, item 
xxv). 
161 It is noteworthy that the Lords of Council and Session assumed this latter aspect of the spiritual 
jurisdiction, which nevertheless did not pass to the Commissaries of Edinburgh. In 1561 the Lords had 
granted a commission to the “Superintendent and ministerie of Sanctandrois” to take cognisance of Sir 
John Borthwick’s ‘precept of reduction’ raised against the sentence of Cardinal Beaton which had 
condemned him for heresy (St Andrews, i, 89-104). 
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than the other three Commissaries.162 Next named in the charter was Edward 
Henryson, doctor of laws, formerly professor of Roman law at Bourges163 and royal 
lecturer in law and Greek under Mary of Lorraine,164 and from 1566 senator of the 
College of Justice.165 Henryson was to work with Balfour compiling the Black 
Acts.166 Next named was Master Clement Litill, advocate, a law graduate of Leuven 
and a Protestant convert with a definite interest in theology, best remembered for 
founding the University of Edinburgh’s library.167 Last named was Master Robert 
Maitland, whose early career is obscure, but who was soon presented to the deanery 
of Aberdeen (a living which he resigned in favour of Aberdeen University around 
1579168) and appointed a senator of the College of Justice (1564).169 There are good 
reasons to suppose that the bench was composed out of moderates, regardless of 
religious persuasion.170 
 The Commissaries of Edinburgh elected to sit in the Tolbooth of 
Edinburgh171 where they sat from ‘the morn’172 until some time after dinner,173 
                                                 
162 Balfour’s Practicks, i, xii-xv; Peter McNeill, ‘Balfour, Sir James, of Pittendreich (c. 1525-1583)’ 
(ODNB, accessed 12 December 2005); Senators of the College of Justice, 110-114. The normal salary 
for the Commissaries of Edinburgh was 300 marks (£200 Scots) per annum, but Balfour is known to 
have received 400 marks (RSS, v, 1633): the most senior judge on a bench could be distinguished by a 
higher salary. 
163 From around 1553 (Marie-Claude Tucker, ‘Henryson, Edward [Henry Edourd] (1522-c.1590)’ 
(ODNB, accessed 12 December 2005). 
164 John Durkan,‘The Royal Lectureships Under Mary of Lorraine’ in Scottish Historical Review, 62 
(1983),73-78, 74. 
165 Senators of the College of Justice, 132-3. 
166 Cairns, Historical Introduction, 95 
167 Charles Finlayson, Clement Litill and His Library: The Origins of the Edinburgh University 
Library (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Bibliographical Society, 1980), 4-6. 
168 NAS, RH15/29/203; Register of the Great Seal of Scotland, ed. J.M. Thomson et al (Edinburgh, 
1912- ), iv, 2862; Fasti, 12. 
169 Senators of the College of Justice, 122-123. “Mr. ‘Rober’ MtLand” was thought to be a Protestant 
in 1570 (Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots, 1547-1603, ed. 
J. Bain et al (Edinburgh, 1898-1969), iii, no. 601). 
170 Balfour seems to have been a moderate Lutheran, Henryson a moderate Catholic (speculation in 
Marie-Claude Tucker, ‘Henryson, Edward [Henry Edourd] (1522-c.1590)’ (ODNB, accessed 12 
December 2005), but note his time in the household of Henry Sinclair), and Litill a moderate Scottish 
Protestant, being a lifelong friend of Henry Sinclair (Finlayson, Clement Litill, 1). The links with 
Henry Sinclair, head of the commission appointed in December 1563, are of course noteworthy. 
171 i.e. an edict was raised by one Margaret Dowglass on 27 February 1564/5 summoning several 
persons “to compeir befoir the saidis commissaris in the tolbuyth of Edinburgh the xxvi day of februar 
instant” (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 364r-v); see also NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 341v, 9 February 1564/5. On 24 
October 1571 they were ordered to leave Edinburgh and sit in Leith on account of the civil war (RPC, 
ii, 85-87). By ‘Tolbooth’ it seems that the Over or Upper Tolbooth in St Giles was indicated (see 
MacQueen, ‘Two Visitors in the Session’, 160-162).  
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Monday to Saturday. The court was adjourned for two weeks at Christmas and for 
two months during the ‘harvest recess’ from mid-August to mid-October.174 As the 
charter of constitution made clear, each judge had been personally entrusted with 
power from the sovereign for the administration of the jurisdiction entrusted to them, 
and accordingly the presence of one judge only was necessary for the court to 
convene, although the number of judges present was regularly two, three or four. 
Initially, the Commissaries were entitled to continue practising as advocates,175 but 
this practice was forbidden in 1580.176       
 
[ii] THE PROCURATOR FISCAL 
 
The pre-Reformation Courts of the Officials had tended to employ 
Procurators Fiscal, for the purposes of dealing with executry business, collecting 
fines, and “instigating judges to take cognisance of offences”. As Simon Ollivant has 
pointed out, all these functions were associated with Procurators Fiscal in the 
Scottish episcopal courts prior to the Reformation.177 The first Procurator Fiscal of 
the Commissaries of Edinburgh was Master Henry Kinross, one of the advocates 
who had been appointed by the Lords of Council to hear spiritual actions in St Giles’ 
                                                                                                                                          
172 The Commissaries regularly assigned ‘the morn’ for the pronouncing of interlocutors, or for the 
productions of writs by parties or their procurators (i.e. NAS, CC8/2/2, fo 251v; CC8/2/3, fo 270r; fo 
300r) 
173 i.e. in Walker v. Kay the pursuer referred the libel to the defender’s oath “quhome the saidis 
Commissaris ordanit tobe present eftirnone to be examinat,” dinner presumably having intervened 
(NAS, CC8/2/7, fo. 184r, 18 June 1575). When the Commissaries of Edinburgh were debarred from 
practicing as advocates before the Session and other courts in 1580, it was on the grounds that they 
often failed to attend the Commissary Court until the Session rose, by which point they were impelled 
by hunger “to pass to thair dennaris” (Finlayson, Clement Litill, 16). 
174 i.e. they did not sit between 21 August and 6 October 1564; 19 December 1564 and 6 January 
1564/5 (NAS, CC8/2/1, fos 165r & 171r; fos 288r & 291v). They also presumably adjourned for 
Easter, and for holy days, in conformity with the practice of the Lords of Council and Session. The 
Lords were accustomed to sit in judgement Monday to Saturday, with vacations at Christmas, Easter 
and over the summer recess (see RPS, A1567/12/28; APS iii 32, c.29). 
175 Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Post-Reformation’, 82. 
176 Finlayson, Clement Litill, 16. 
177 Procurators Fiscal were found in most Scottish courts, civil, ecclesiastical and criminal “from the 
earliest times”. Ollivant has demonstrated that the ‘criminal’ role of Fiscals in prosecuting miscreants 
was a feature of pre-Reformation Fiscals, and not a French import dating from around 1560 as had 
previously been argued (Court of the Official, 54-55). 
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and the Tolbooth during March 1561/2.178 Kinross received 80 marks a year179 and 
had the power to appoint a deputy as he saw fit.180 The fiscal was particularly active 
in pursuing actions for annulment181 and for solemnization,182 and from this it is clear 
that he was obliged to make inquiries and, if appropriate, pursue actions on the basis 
of information received concerning breaches of the law of the Commissaries.183 In 
addition, the fiscal was heavily involved in executry business, particularly in issuing 
edicts against anyone with an interest in the moveable estate of a defunct for whom 
the Commissaries had no testament in their registers, so that either a testament might 
be produced and testamentary executors confirmed or, if the defunct had died 
intestate, executors dative might be given.184 The fiscal also pursued those who 
deforced the officers and messengers of the Commissaries of Edinburgh.185  
Whilst Kinross’s religious affiliations are not know, one of his fiscals-depute, 
Master Alexander Skene, continued to adhere to the old religion. His actions both 
before and after the appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh suggest that he 
was not a moderate intent on observing the rule of law: during the summer of 1561 
he was imprisoned in the Tolbooth of Edinburgh for a short time for participating in 
a Mass the previous Easter, and whilst released on a promise of good behaviour, was 
nevertheless excommunicated by the Kirk in July 1569.186 
                                                 
178 Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 13-14. 
179 Kinross received £26/13s/4d (40 marks) at Martinmas 1566 and Whitsunday 1567 (NAS, CS4/6. 
fos 6v-7r). 
180 For example, Master Alexander Skene appeared as ‘procuratoure fiscall depute’ on 21 March 
1568/9 (NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 239r). It is peculiar to note that one of the Commissaries, Clement Litill, 
appeared as Procurator Fiscal on 29 November 1569 (NAS, CC8/2/4, fo. 92v). 
181 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/6, fos 428r-429r, 8 July 1574, Fiscal v. Ogilvy, Fraser & Chisholme; NAS, 
CC8/2/7, fo 243r, 21 July 1575, Fiscal v. Patersoun & Johnestoun. 
182 Indeed, the fiscal was just as likely to bring an action to compel solemnization as a male litigant! 
(see below, Chapter V, §II, Table 1). 
183 Riddell described the Procurator Fiscal of the Commissaries of Edinburgh as censor, castigatorque 
morum (Riddell, Inquiry, ii, 1003). 
184 A standard formula was employed by the clerks of court when an edict of executry had been raised 
by the Fiscal: i.e. “Anent the edict rasit at the instance of maister henrie kinross procuratour fischale to 
oure Soverane Lady aganis the executouris testamentaris spouss and barnis gif ony be and 
intromettors with the gudis and geir of vmqle…” (NAS, CC8/2/2, fo 30r, 21 May, 1565). There are 
dozens of examples of such entries in the early registers of acts and decreets. 
185 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 138, Fiscal v. Sympsoun; fo. 227v, Fiscal v. Maxwell. 
186 Michael Lynch, Edinburgh and the Reformation (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers Ltd, 1981), 
292. 
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[iii] THE COLLECTOR OF QUOTS 
 
 One of the principal administrative problems encountered by the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh concerning executry business was in ensuring that they 
were reliably informed of the deaths of those with moveable estate, especially when 
there was no testament. The old Officials and Commissaries of the Catholic Church 
had certainly relied upon the knowledge of the parish clergy within their 
jurisdictions.187 Two principal problems faced the new administration. On the one 
hand the tenure of the Catholic clergy had been interrupted, and it was by no means 
clear that the ministry of the Reformed Kirk was in a position in 1564 to keep 
detailed registers of deaths for the assistance of the Commissaries. In addition, the 
interruption in the effective administration of justice in executry business occasioned 
by the ‘uproar for religion’ from 1559 left the new administration with the basic 
problem of re-asserting order.188 On the other hand, whilst the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh’s jurisdiction in confirming lesser testaments within the constabularies of 
Haddington, Linlithgow and Peebles and the sheriffdoms of Edinburgh and Stirling 
was possibly manageable, it was a taller order to gather information from the entire 
realm concerning the death of any intestate persons whose dead’s part exceeded the 
sum of £50 Scots.189 The old Officials, who had dealt with the greater testaments 
prior to the Reformation, had done so on the level of dioceses or archdeaconries: the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh were expected to do so for the whole of Scotland. 
 The confirmation of testaments, great and small, was one of the principal 
points of interest in the Commissary system, from the perspective of the senators of 
the College of Justice. As is well known, the quot silver levied each time a testament 
was confirmed190 had been one of the most lucrative sources of the profits of justice 
for the medieval Church,191 and in the new order it was intended that the quot silver 
would help remunerate not only the Commissaries of Edinburgh, but provide £1600 a 
                                                 
187 Donaldson, ‘Church Courts’, 366. 
188 Hannay, College of Justice, 82. 
189 Practicks, ii, 660, item xxv. 
190 Where the defunct was intestate, the quot was levied for the right to intromit with the defunct’s 
movable estate (RPS, v, 1633, note). 
191 Rentale Sancti Andree, trans. & ed. R.K.Hannay (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1913), 90, 
105-106, 173-174, 207-208. 
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year to the senators of the College of Justice.192 The executry business of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh and the inferior, territorial Commissariots, was therefore 
intended to generate revenues which could be centrally administered and collected in 
Edinburgh. As such the ‘Quot Collectory’ was part of the general inclination towards 
the centralization of the collection of revenues pertaining or formerly pertaining to 
the medieval Church, of which the Collectory of the Thirds of Scottish Benefices 
was the most ambitious example.193 
The organization of the Quot Collectory was clearly beyond the remit of the 
Procurator Fiscal of the Commissaries of Edinburgh and Duncan Livingston was 
accordingly appointed “collectoure and ressauer of the cottis of all testamentis of the 
commissariat and jurisdiction of Edinburgh, grete and small and all utheris 
jurisdictionis and commissariattis within hir hienes realme” on 28 March 1564, 
shortly after the appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh.194 It would appear 
that Livingston was initially subject to the Commissaries of Edinburgh and that the 
senators of the College of Justice had intended to take no part in the organization of 
the Collectory, content to wait for their twice yearly payment of £800.  
The Collectory was not initially a success. The basic problem already 
mentioned was that the Commissaries of Edinburgh and the territorial Commissaries 
were not in possession of the intimate parochial knowledge of death necessary for the 
enforcement of their jurisdiction in executry business. On this head, the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh petitioned the General Assembly,195 whose minutes for 
27 June 1565 recorded that “Tuiching the requeist of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh, that everie Minister or Reader sould have a register of the names of the 
deceased of the place where they dwell, the day of the moneth and yeere, and deliver 
a copy thereof to the procurator fiscall, that pupils and creditors be not defrauded: It 
was answered, they could not lay suche a charge upon their brethren, in respect none 
or few of the Ministrie had manses and gleebes to make residence in; bot how soone 
                                                 
192 The Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session, from the 15th January 1553, to the 11th of 
July 1790 (Edinburgh: Elphinston Balfour, 1790), 6-7. 
193 See Accounts of the Collectors of the Thirds of Benefices, 1561-1572 ed. G. Donaldson 
(Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1949). 
194 RSS, v, 1658/9. 
195 Conform to their initial instructions (Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 660, item xxvii). 
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they obtained their manses, they sould exhort them, as they salbe required, to doe 
conforme to the said Request”.196  
Clearly some different order was required, but before the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh could take further order in the matter their powers were curbed. By the 
summer of 1566 no financial account of the Collector of the Quots had been rendered 
and the senators were frustrated of their remuneration. “The Chancellor and some 
others were now to have commission for a general reckoning since the late institution 
of the testamentary jurisdiction, with orders to pay the available balance to the lords 
according to their residence. In December [1566] a royal ordnance… gave the 
Chancellor and the senators of the College of Justice a general supervision of the 
commissary system… The ordnance was devised to improve the effective working of 
the recently established courts, and at the same time to bring in the money for the 
senatorial emoluments…”.197 Accordingly, on 26 March 1567, the Lords of Council 
and Session passed new instructions to the Commissaries of Edinburgh and the 
inferior commissaries, all of which concerned testamentary business and the 
collection of the quots. 
 The instructions are printed in full in Balfour’s Practicks,198 but the principal 
features for the present discussion were as follows. Each inferior Commissary was to 
appoint a Procurator Fiscal. Each Fiscal was to “send the namis of all persounis that 
sall happin to deceis within thair jurisdictioun, als weill of greit and small 
testamentis, to the Procurator-fiscal of Edinburgh” twice a year, as well as acting as 
executor dative in various cases, making compt and reckoning for their intromission 
to the Collector of the Quots. Inferior Commissaries were also to take a more active 
role, by regulating intromissions and ensuring the production of inventories, and by 
keeping registers of testaments. Copies of the latter were to be brought to Edinburgh 
once a year,199 for production before the “Lords of Session and Commissaries of 
                                                 
196 Acts and Proceedings of the General Assemblies, i, 63. 
197 Hannay, College of Justice, 82-83; cf Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 673-676 (see RPS, 1581/10/84 for 
English translation); Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxix. 
198 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 662-664, but note the dating of them to MDLVII is a misprint. A 
contemporary copy of the instructions survives, dated 1567 (NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 430v-434v). 
199 The original instructions given to the Commissaries of Edinburgh had insisted on the measure 
(Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 659, items xxix and xxii), but presumably to no avail. It must have been 
rapidly apparent that the authority of the Commissaries of Edinburgh required more direct 
augmentation by the Lords of Session than had previously been envisaged. 
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Edinburgh” so that each inferior Commissary could be held liable for the payment of 
the quots recorded in their registers of testaments. Hannay has suggested that prior to 
1566 some inferior Commissaries had been acting improperly.200 The keeping of 
registers of testaments (and inventories) was one of the essential services offered by 
the Commissary system, and since a record of the quot levied on the dead’s part was 
recorded in the margin next to each testament, the new arrangements allowed the 
Collector of the Quots to keep a close eye on the provinces. 
 
[iv] THE CLERKS OF COURT 
 
 The principal clerk of the Commissaries of Edinburgh was John Johnston.201 
Johnston’s appointment was for life, although his tenure was interrupted between the 
harvest recess of 1565 and that of 1567, during which time the French courtier 
Sebastian Danelourt held the clerkship.202 Those who consult the principal registers 
of the Commissaries of Edinburgh will note that the registers of acts and decreets, 
together with the register of deeds, are missing for the period of Danelourt’s office, 
whilst no registers of testaments are extant until Johnston’s return to office in 1567 
following Mary’s abdication. The principal clerk was the only clerk whose source of 
income was made explicitly clear in 1563/4. He was to have one third of all “the 
profitis of all summondis, actis, contractis, obligatiounis, sentences, transumptis, 
confirmatiounis, and registering of testamentis and uther writingis 
quhatsumevir…[with] the profit of the signet, and seill thairof” and to provide his 
own “paper, ink, walx [sic] and writing chalmer”. Since the other two thirds were to 
be paid to the Commissaries of Edinburgh, it must be presumed that all other clerks 
who found employment in the court were remunerated by the principal clerk for their 
services.203  
                                                 
200 See below, pages 75-76. 
201 Certainly from at least 17 July 1564 (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 108v). See NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 241v for his 
signature, and fos. 322v, 333r and CC8/2/2, fo.44v for his notorial sign. Johnston’s hand is the neatest 
in the registers of acts and decreets, and is the predominant hand for some time following CC8/2/2, fo. 
139r, 14 October 1567. 
202 RSS, v, 2323: Johnston re-instated RSS, vi, 13. 
203 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 661, item xxxiii: the exception being the Keeper of the Seals, who received 
£10 every six months from the Collector of the Quots (NAS, CS7/6, fos. 6v-7r). 
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The evidence of the extant registers demonstrates that Johnston deputised 
from time to time, and the identities of some of these clerks-depute may have be 
Adam Wauchope204 and James Nicholson.205 Sebastian Danelourt’s main deputy was 
Michael Majoribanks,206 who seems to have acted in a similar capacity for the last 
Official of Lothian.207 There were also a number of other clerks to whom specific 
functions were given. On 1 March 1564/5 William Cowry was named former of 
testaments,208 upon whose decease George Sinclair was appointed in his place on 16 
October 1566.209 On 5 December 1566 John Broun was granted the office of ‘Keeper 
of the Commissariot Seals of Edinburgh’.210 These various clerks kept three principal 
registers: acts and decreets; testaments; deeds and obligations.211 They also prepared 
vast amounts of loose papers including summonses, copies of various process papers, 
sentences, instruments, transumpts and the like, very little of which is still extant for 
the period under study. 
In contrast to the moderates on the bench, Johnston was one of the more 
active and radical members of the Court, whose strong Protestant convictions212 
involved him directly in the Moray conspiracy against Mary and Darnley during the 
summer of 1565. Johnston, together with James Nicolson, acted as agents of the 
English ambassador Randolph, passing monies sent by Elizabeth to Moray.213 When 
                                                 
204 NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 138r, 18 August 1565. 
205 NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 135v. 
206 NAS, GD16/41/28, extract copied ‘furth of the bukis of causis of the said Commissariat [of 
Edinburgh] be me Michael Marioribankis clerk of the samyn…’ dated 13 May 1566. Marjoribanks 
was clerk of the kirk session of Edinburgh in 1565 (Lynch, Edinburgh and the Reformation, 341). 
207 i.e. Majoribanks was referred to as “kepar of the bukis of the consistorial jurisdictioun of 
Edinburgh for the tyme” in an action before the Commissaries (NAS, CC8/2/2, fo 58r, Borthwik v. 
Megot). 
208 RSS, v, 1936. Many testaments were written by persons other than the testator (especially when the 
testator was illiterate), and whilst this function could be carried out by notaries, the inclusion of a 
former of testaments among the clerks of court was most likely an attempt to regulate the production 
of authentic testaments. 
209 RSS, v, 3095. 
210 RSS, v, 3119. The function of the keeper of the seals is discussed below, page 148. 
211 For authorization to keep the latter see Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 658, xiii. See the Guide to the 
National Archives of Scotland, 158, for further details of the registers which are extant. 
212 Johnston was named by Knox as one of his most trusted contacts in Edinburgh in June 1559 
(Lynch, Edinburgh and the Reformation, 282-283, citing The Works of John Knox, ed. D. Laing 
(Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1846-1864), vi, 27).  
213 Lynch, Edinburgh and the Reformation, 110. 
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the Moray conspirators entered Edinburgh on 31 August 1565 and publicly attempted 
to rally the townsfolk to the “defence of the glory of God” and the Protestant religion 
with offers of money, 214 Johnston and Nicolson were almost certainly with them, 
having fled the town five days earlier.215 The conspirators retreated from Edinburgh 
on 1 or 2 September216 and Johnston and Nicolson fled into England, petitioning 
Elizabeth for support on the grounds that they had been “put to great extremity” by 
their pro-Protestant and pro-English actions, suffering the confiscation on their rents, 
houses and goods and the eviction of their families.217 Whatever manner of support 
they may have received in England, both men presumably returned to Scotland, 
receiving remissions from Mary during the winter of 1565-6 for their involvement in 
the conspiracy.218 
 
[v] OFFICERS AND MESSENGERS 
 
The Commissaries of Edinburgh also employed a number of officers and 
messengers both within the Commissariot of Edinburgh, and, where the 
Commissaries’ national jurisdiction was concerned, throughout the realm. The 
messengers were clearly men of at least basic literacy whose principal function was 
the serving of summonses and sentences, always executing such writs in the presence 
of witnesses, and having so served the writs, duly endorsing them.219 On a national 
level, the Accounts of the Collector of the Quots for 1566-7 lists several men who 
were employed to serve edicts of executry throughout the realm. William Douglas 
was well remunerated for passing to Fife, Tweedale, Clydesdale, Angus, Strathearn, 
                                                 
214 Knox's History of the Reformation, ed. Dickinson, ii, 161. 
215 Johnston and Nicolson fled Edinburgh and passed to the conspirators on 25 August 1565, having 
been “banist as is afoirsaid of our soueranis” (A Diurnal of Remarkable Occurents that have passed 
within the country of Scotland since the death of King James the Fourth till the year 1575, ed. T. 
Thomson (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1833), 81)). 
216 Knox's History of the Reformation, ed. Dickinson, ii, 163. 
217 Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots, ii, no. 240. 
218 Nicolson’s remission was dated 23 December 1565 (RSS, v, 2508), Johnston’s 15 January 1565/6 
(RSS, v, 2541). 
219 Prior to 1559 it had been common for priests to execute summonses issued by the episcopal courts 
(Court of the Official, 99), but there is no evidence that ministers of the Protestant Kirk assumed a 
similar function under the Commissaries of Edinburgh and the inferior Commissaries.  
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“langis the cost syd to Sanctandrois,” Dundee, Perth, Dunblane and Stirling serving 
edicts, whilst Thomas Wilke was similarly well remunerated for passing to East 
Lothian, “Lauderdaill & to the forest,” Teviotdale, “Lynlythgwschire” and “Ratho 
kirkliston and thairabout,” Peebles, Jedburgh, Selkirk and the Merse, Glasgow, 
Dumfries, Dalkeith, Lasswade and Newbattle serving edicts. John Kerse’s 
remuneration for similar work suggests he operated on a more local level.220       
 Officers on the other hand221 were more involved in the poinding of goods for 
the payment of debts. Details of their duties and the risks they ran are revealed in the 
registers of acts and decreets on those occasions when they were deforced. One of 
the more vivid accounts concerned the “maisterfull deforcing and dinging of Robert 
Drummond ane of the saidis commissaris officiaris” whilst executing a precept of 
poinding and arresting brewing equipment from a private dwelling. Having been 
assaulted, Drummond returned with witnesses and formally broke his wand.222 Other 
officers included John Dickson, whose appointment as an officer is narrated in the 
acts and decreets of the Commissaries of Edinburgh,223 and Alexander 
Leckprevick,224 whilst the same register contains a further example of deforcement, 
namely that of “James Falconer messenger”.225 
Nevertheless, the Commissaries were not reliant upon their own messengers 
and officers alone, especially were the execution of sentences was concerned. The 
original instructions passed to the Commissaries of Edinburgh stated that “the 
Judges, gevar of the sentence, to direct his precept to his Officiaris, to be creatit be 
him for executing thairof, or to ony uther the Quene’s Grace’s Officiairis of armis, 
Schireffis, Stewartis, Baillies, thair deputis, Provestis and Baillies of burghis, and 
Baronis Officiaris, at the optioun of the partie obtenar of the decrete…”226 In 
                                                 
220 NAS, CS4/6, fos. 11r-v. Douglass and Wilke could be paid anything between 7 and 40 shillings per 
job. For example, Wilke’s passage to Glasgow and Dumfires cost 40 shillings, Whilst Douglass 
received 30 shillings for serving edicts in Fife. For a vivid insight into what this kind of work could 
entail see Margaret Sanderson, Mary Stewart’s People (Edinburgh: James Thin, 1987), 135-148. 
221 Although it is not clear if a strict distinction was maintained in the Commissaries’ Court between 
messengers and officers. 
222 NAS, CC8/2/1, fos 227v, 250v-251r, Fiscale v. Maxwell. 
223 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 410v, penult March 1565. 
224 NAS, GD137/2210, precept of poinding issued by “Maister Robert Maitland, Dene of Abirdene, 
ane of the Commissaris of Edinburgh” and duly executed and endosed by Alexander Leckprevick. 
225 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 188v. 
226 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 658-9, item xvi. 
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addition, it was clearly intended from the beginning, that if subjects of the Crown 
failed to co-operate with the precepts of the Commissaries of Edinburgh, the 




 Procurators were in effect self-employed members of the Court who only put 
in appearances when employed to do so by litigants. A great many procurators 
practised out of the luckenbooths on the High Street.228 There was no obligation on 
the part of litigants to employ their professional services, but they were nevertheless 
widely used, particularly in complex actions.229 Several famous sixteenth-century 
men of law acted as procurators before the Commissaries of Edinburgh, including 
Thomas Craig,230 John Shairp231 and Alexander Sym.232 There is also evidence that 
they were a closely knit group of professionals who were capable of acting in unison 
on occasion. This was certainly evident in the quite remarkable case of Ruthven v. 
McCalzean (1570), which provides several vivid insights into the procurators of the 
Courts of the Commissaries of Edinburgh. 
 The action was brought by Archibald Ruthven, brother of William Lord 
Ruthven against Thomas McCalzeane of Cliftonhall233 and his daughter Euphame 
McCalzeane,234 desiring that Euphame be compelled by the Commissaries to 
solemnize marriage with Ruthven. On 14 December 1570 Ruthven appeared before 
                                                 
227 See below, pages 74-75. 
228 See Finlay, Men of Law, 94. 
229 See below, pages 215-216. 
230 See John W. Cairns, ‘Craig, Thomas (1538?–1608)’ (ODNB, accessed 24 Feb 2010). 
231 See Sanderson, Mary Stewart’s People, 22-33. 
232 Alexander Sym was appointed a lecturer in “the lawis or ony utheris sciences” under Mary of 
Lorraine (Durkan,‘The Royal Lectureships’, 73-74), and was Balfour’s successor as a Commissary of 
Edinburgh from October 1565, who likewise received 400 marks a year (RSS, v, 2396). See Appendix 
II, F (1) and (2) for the names of all men of law known to have procured before the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh in consistorial actions, although these tables are arranged by ‘action’ rather than the 
surnames of procurators. 
233 By the time of this action, McCalzeane had been admitted as Ordinary Lord of Session (Senators of 
the College of Justice, 149-151). 
234 Euphame McCalzeane was executed for witchcraft in 1591 (L.A. Yeoman, ‘North Berwick witches 
(act. 1590-1592)’ (ODNB, accessed 24 February 2010). 
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the Commissaries “and producit ane act of the saidis Commissaris deulie execute & 
indorsate vpoun Maisteris Johne Schairp, Edmound Hay, Maister Johne Moscrope, 
Henry McCalzyn, Alexander King, Master Johne Frude, Thomas Westoun, Johne 
Logye, Henrye Kynross, Thomas Craig, Johne Abircrumby, berand that thai wer 
lauchfullie chargit be vertew thairof to anser & declare ane ressonable caus quhy 
thay will not procure in persute of the said Archibaldis actioun aganis the said Master 
Thomas & the said Eufame his dochter, with certificatioun to thame & thai falzeit 
thairin the saidis Commissaris wald discharge thame of all procuratioun befoir 
thame”. King and Weston duly appeared, but when the Commissaries asked Ruthven 
if he wished them to procure for him, he declined their services, requiring instead 
that Kinross, Hay and Craig should act as his procurators. Both Hay and Craig 
objected, but the Commissaries ordained that Kinross and Craig were to procure for 
Ruthven “vpoun his Ressonable coistis vndir the pane of depriuatioun of thame of all 
maner procuratioun befoir thame”.235 
 On the one hand this remarkable occurrence illustrates the fact that those men 
of law who practiced before the Commissaries of Edinburgh were formally admitted 
to do so by the Commissaries.236 On the other hand, there seems to be striking 
evidence that they were prepared to act in concert if faced with a litigant to whom 
they strongly objected.237 Whilst the character of Ruthven and the nature of relations 
between the litigants have not been researched here, there is more than a suggestion 
that even the Commissaries were not entirely against the procurators’ actions: 
Ruthven also alleged that one of the Commissaries had desired “the remanent of the 
men of law to have maid ane burs to send men to invade him in his persoun, saying 
with litle money and thair servandis he suld be compellit to Liepe the wallis of thair 
toun”!238   
  
 
                                                 
235 NAS, CC8/2/5, fos 26v-27r, 14 December 1570, Ruthven v. McCalzen. 
236 This was clearly stated in the charter of constitution (see Appendix I, clauses [7] & [15]). 
237 There is ample evidence that generally speaking Edinburgh’s men of law (many of whom practised 
before the Commissaries) were a close knit and often interrelated group of professionals who 
constituted a discrete component of Scottish society by the mid-sixteenth century (see Finlay, Men of 
Law, 58 et seq). 
238 NAS, CC8/2/5, fos 26v-27r, 14 December 1570, Ruthven v. McCalzen. 
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[vii] THE COURT AND CIVIL WAR, 1571-1572 
 
 The most disruptive event in the history of the Court of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh during the period covered by this thesis occurred after Edinburgh fell 
under the control of the Marian lords during the course of March 1570/1 and April 
1571. A struggle for the control of the administration of the central civil, criminal 
and ecclesiastical courts of justice in Scotland ensued between the rival factions of 
those still loyal to Mary in Edinburgh and of those loyal to her infant son and his 
regent, the Earl of Mar, in Leith. The Marian lords’ gradual assertion of martial 
control over Edinburgh broke out into open hostilities on 29 April 1571, with a 
skirmish at the Netherbow port between the Marians and the king’s men,239 setting in 
motion a sequence of events which forced the Commissaries and the members of 
their court to make their loyalties clear by either remaining in Edinburgh or repairing 
to Leith.  
Three days after the skirmish at the Netherbow port, on 2 May 1571, the 
Commissaries sat in judgement in Edinburgh for the last time in the person of 
Edward Henryson,240 although evidence from the registers of deeds show that 
Clement Litill continued occasionally to register deeds down to 18 June.241 By the 
time of the usual two month harvest recess from mid-August the business of the 
court had clearly ground to a halt, and before the court had reconvened in late 
October, the Regent Mar and his Privy Councillors at Leith had issued an ordinance 
ordering various judges and officers of the realm, including the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh and the Senators of the College of Justice, together with all advocates, 
procurators, clerks, scribes and writers to come to Leith “and nawyse depart without 
licence quhill the xx day of December nixt to cum”.242 
 The Commissaries of Edinburgh duly conformed to the ordinance and 
sederunts at Leith began to be recorded from 2 November 1571.243 Whilst the 
                                                 
239 Lynch, Edinburgh and the Reformation, 130-131. 
240 NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 161v. 
241 Lynch, Edinburgh and the Reformation, 133. 
242 RPC, ii, 85-87. 
243 NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 162v. 
   57
sederunts often gave only the date and the location of the sittings, some sederunts 
reveal that Edward Henryson, Clement Litill and Alexander Sym were all present.244 
The fourth Commissary, Robert Maitland, although not named in any of the Leith 
sederunts, was numbered among the king’s men. When the Marian lords somewhat 
belatedly responded to this triumph for the Regent, issuing a proclamation at the 
market cross of Edinburgh on 28 April 1572, “Robert Maitland, dene of Abirdene” 
was listed along with Henryson, Litill and Sym as those who were “present at Leith 
partakaris with the king and rebellis to the quene and hir lieutennentis”.245 The same 
proclamation also sheds considerable light upon the actions of the lesser members of 
the Commissaries’ Court during the troubles. John Johnson, having been re-
appointed to his clerkship in 1567, was listed among those present at Leith,246 
together with George Sinclair, confirmer of testaments and Duncan Livingston, 
Collector of the Quots. 
 Events in Edinburgh were also revealing. Whilst James Balfour had ceased to 
sit as a Commissary of Edinburgh from October 1565, it is nevertheless worth noting 
that he was a queen’s man, remaining in Edinburgh during the troubles and indeed 
being appointed provost of the ‘Marian’ town council of Edinburgh during October 
1571.247 Adam Wauchope, sometime clerk-depute in the Court of the Commissaries 
was killed early on in the troubles, fighting for the king’s men on 2 June 1571 at 
Edmonston Edge in “the first really serious skirmish of the wars”.248 Michael 
Marjoribanks, Sebastian Danelourt’s old clerk-depute, also remained loyal to the 
queen, being appointed clerk to the ‘Marian Commissaries of Edinburgh,’ who, 
despite being appointed in the proclamation of 28 April 1572, “gott aither litill or 
nathing adoe”.249 
 Despite the Marian lords’ attempt to appoint rival Commissaries to those 
sitting in Leith, it is clear that Maitland, Henryson, Litill and Sym retained 
                                                 
244 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/5, fos. 166r (20 December 1571), 178r (13 February 1571/2), 207r (13 June 
1572). 
245 Diurnal of Remarkable Occurents, 294-295. 
246 An entry was made in the registers of acts and decreets in Johnston’s hand on 8 January 1571/2 
(NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 168r). 
247 Lynch, Edinburgh and the Reformation, 245. 
248 Wauchope was servant to James McGill, Clerk Register, a king’s man (Lynch, Edinburgh and the 
Reformation, 304-305 and 132). 
249 Diurnal of Remarkable Occurents, 295. 
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possession of their registers of acts and decreets, presumably through the offices of 
John Johnston, who seems to have kept possession of ‘his’ registers on the earlier 
occasion of his flight into England. This was in contrast to the records of the Lords of 
Session, in that Maitland of Lethington had been able to boast that the king’s party 
would struggle to “gar the session sit in ony part of Scotland, as we have stayit the 
clarkis thairof in Edinburgh, with the hail bukis, writtis & processes”.250 Entries in 
the Commissaries’ register for the period contained the Edinburgh sederunts 
recorded up to 2 May 1571 before immediately continuing with the Leith sederunts 
from 2 November 1571.251 Whilst the Leith sederunts were sparse for November and 
December 1571, it is clear that by the middle of January 1571/2 the Commissaries at 
Leith were sitting fairly regularly. They continued to sit at Leith until 28 July 1572, 
being the last sederunt in NAS, CC8/2/5, immediately after which a clerk wrote “The 
Buke concludis with this decreit. Quhen this buke tuke end the abstinence [i.e. truce] 
betuix the king his Regent and the partye of Edinburgh tuke begyningis”.252 By the 
next recorded sederunt on 16 August 1572 the Commissaries had returned from Leith 
and were once again sitting in judgement in Edinburgh.253 
   
 The various religious and political difficulties and divisions of the 
Reformation era were all to be found in the personal beliefs and loyalties of the 
members of the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh. Yet whilst the court was 
not without its more radical and active elements among the minor personnel, whether 
Catholic or Protestant, king’s men or queen’s, the fact remains that the court was 
presided over by deeply learned and moderate judges. As will be shown during the 
course of this thesis, the moderate approach of the Commissaries was manifested in 
the policies they developed in dealing with the legacy of the old courts spiritual, their 
personnel and the Canon law they had administered, and in dealing with the 
emergent and then established tribunals of the Protestant Kirk. This is no surprise: 
the very appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh proceeded upon a desire to 
                                                 
250 Miscellaneous Papers principally illustrative of events in the Reigns of Queen Mary and King 
James VI, ed. W.J. Duncan (Glasgow: Maitland Club, 1834), 66. 
251 See NAS, CC8/2/5, fos. 161v-162v. 
252 NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 237r. 
253 NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 1r. This folio began with sederunts for 16 August and 23 September 1572, 
although little business was done. Regular sederunts began from 7 October. 
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protect and continue to administer many of those aspects of the spiritual jurisdiction 
imperilled by radical Protestantism, whilst at the same time acknowledging the role 
of the Protestant Kirk in Scottish life. The initial undertaking, reflecting Mary’s own 
approaches whilst queen, did not seek to push either a radical Catholic or Protestant 
line, but by allowing aspects of both to be acknowledged under the new order, 
harnessed the hopes and motivations of both Catholics and Protestants in the 
common interest of order. 
 
§III 
THE INFERIOR COMMISSARIES 
 
[i] JUDGES AND SEATS OF JUDGEMENT 
 
 A significant amount of information about the inferior Commissaries and 
their Commissariots has already been published. In the Atlas of Scottish History to 
1707 Sheriff David Smith has provided a map of the locations of the inferior 
Commissariots for the post-Reformation period, which has been set opposite a map 
of the locations of the pre-Reformation Courts of the Catholic Church in Scotland.254 
In addition, the editors of the Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae Medii Aevi have included 
some of the details of the of the post-Reformation Commissaries down to 1638, in 
acknowledgement of their continued administration of the functions of pre-
Reformation episcopal judges.255 The compilation of data for the post-Reformation 
Commissaries in the Fasti is still ongoing.256 Whilst a comprehensive and 
authoritative study of the history and relations between the pre- and post-
Reformation regional episcopal and Commissary Courts is still some way off, 
various themes can be at least partially explored here.  
                                                 
254 Atlas of Scottish History, 381 & 380. 
255 Fasti, arranged by diocese, the Commissaries details appear after those of the deans of Christianity 
and the Officials. 
256 Many of the references in the Fasti must have been provided by Sheriff David B. Smith, who is 
thanked by the editors in their preface. David Smith has allowed the present researcher full access to 
his own notes and research, upon which the maps in the Atlas are based, and which contained various 
additional references which have been passed to Athol Murray for inclusion in the Fasti: many of 
these have provided the references cited in this section.  
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 That there were instances of the continuity of place and personnel between 
the pre- and post-Reformation episcopal and Commissary Courts in the localities has 
long been understood. As early as 1957 Gordon Donaldson had pointed out that in 
“the obscure matter of the transition of the subordinate commissariots… in Dunkeld 
the existing commissary, John Bertoun, seems simply to have received a fresh 
commission from the queen, and continuity is strongly suggested by the fact that sir 
Duncan McNair was appointed commissary clerk in succession to the late sir Robert 
McNair. It is known from other sources that the local commissaries appointed by the 
bishops did in fact sometimes retain their offices”.257 The reference to ‘other sources’ 
was amplified in Donaldson’s article on Church Courts in 1958 and is worth quoting 
at length: 
 “Local jurisdiction throughout the country remained after 1564 with the local 
commissaries. Those actually holding office (by episcopal appointment) were 
apparently authorised to continue to act: thus Archibald Menzies was commissary of 
Dumfries from about 1543 until 1579 and “usit that charge and office to the gude 
lyking and contentment of the maist part” of the people of the district; in Glasgow, 
Archibald Betoun, official general in 1560, was still commissary in 1581; Hugh 
Craigie was commissary of Moray from 1559 to 1586; and James Duff seems likewise 
to have been commissary of Inverness before and after the Reformation. The manner 
of filling vacancies was not defined until 1566, when it was laid down that the Lords 
of Council and Session should present candidates for appointment by the crown. In 
practice there were twenty-three local commissariots, their boundaries based on those 
of the old dioceses and their subdivisions”.258  
Further instances of continuity of personnel in the localities may be added in support 
of Donaldson’s general thesis, and there is also widespread evidence that post-
Reformation commissaries continued to sit in the ‘consistory places’ of the pre-
Reformation courts. In Aberdeen, Nicol Hay had sat in judgement prior to 1559 with 
John Leslie, Official of Aberdeen and Sir David Seton, his commissary: in the new 
system Hay enjoyed a long career as commissary of Aberdeen, sitting in judgement 
in “the consistorie place of auld Aberdeen”.259 In Brechin, continuity of judge is not 
clear, but what is clear is that the earliest post-Reformation commissary, Thomas 
                                                 
257 RSS, v(i), xvi-xvii. 
258 Donaldson, ‘Church Courts’, 369. 
259 Presumably in St Machar’s Cathedral (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 271r-v); Fasti, 33. Hay was also Civilist 
at King’s College from 1558 (David Stevenson, King’s College, Aberdeen, 1560-1641 (Aberdeen: 
Aberdeen University Press, 1990), 49, 134, n.22). 
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Ramsay, sat in judgement in Brechin cathedral.260 In Dunkeld, continuity of place 
cannot be confirmed, and it is possible that Donaldson erred in asserting that John 
Barton had been commissary prior to the Reformation.261 Nevertheless, Barton held 
benefices prior to the Reformation, and was presented to the deanery of Dunkeld in 
1566.  
Jurisdictionally speaking, it is noteworthy that the post-Reformation 
commissary Barton was a dean of Christianity.262 This was also the case in 
Lauderdale where “Schir Williame Cranstoune vicar of Legertwod and Commissar 
of Laderdaill,” sat in judgment “in Thirlsytane.”263 Whilst is it not clear if there was 
continuity of judge and court in the instance of Lauderdale (no information is 
included in the Fasti) it is clear that Cranston had enjoyed a considerable career as 
spiritual judge prior to the Reformation, as dean of Christianity in the Deanery of the 
Merse (1543-1559), Official of St Andrews, with general authority (1553-1558) and 
Provost of Seton collegiate church (1549-1562).264 The thread provided by the deans 
of Christianity is again found at Lanark. Whilst the Commissariot was not erected 
until 1574, the first Commissary, John Weir, was also the dean of Christianity, a 
position which possibly went back as far as 1561.265 The deans of Christianity had 
confirmed minor testaments and nominated executors when necessary and had been 
involved in the collection of various dues owed to the diocesan coffers:266 both these 
functions may be reflected in the inferior Commissaries’ jurisdiction concerning 
lesser testaments and the collections of teinds and other ecclesiastical dues. 
In the West, as noted by Donaldson, Archibald Beaton, last pre-Reformation 
Official of Glasgow, became Commissary of Glasgow,267 and probably sat in 
judgement in the north tower of Glasgow Cathedral.268  
                                                 
260 “Curia commissariatus brechinensis tenta in ecclesia cathedrali eiusdem per magistrum Thomas 
Ramsay commissar” (NAS, CC3/1, fo. 3v, 9 March 1579/80).  
261 RSS, v, Donadlson’s Introduction, xvii. i.e. CC8/2/2, fo 2v, 1 May 1565. 
262 RSS, v, 3156. 
263 NAS, GD16/41/27, at Thirlstane, 17 March 1564/5. 
264 Fasti, 417,421,487; he was also Provost of St Salvator’s (Court of the Official, 52). 
265 Fasti, 235; RSS, vi, 2579. 
266 Court of the Official, 32. 
267 Fasti, 246, 250. 
268 Elizabeth Williamson, Anne Riches and Malcolm Higgs, Glasgow (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1990), 113. 
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Within the deanery of Inverness it is certain that Sir James Duff had been 
Commissary in 1558, and became the first Commissary in those parts under the new 
regime, although it appears that there was no Commissary appointed there following 
the disruptions until 1577.269  
In Orkney and Shetland it is well known that Adam Bothwell, Bishop of 
Orkney conformed to the Protestant Reformation, and in so doing continued to 
exercise some of his old consistorial jurisdiction throughout the 1560s.270 The 
earliest reference to a Commissary in Shetland is that for George Strang on 12 June 
1560.271 Whilst no claim can be established concerning continuity of personnel, what 
is clear is that the next named Commissary of Shetland, Jerome Chene,272 was also 
Archdeacon of Shetland from 1554 to 1584:273 again the link between the deans of 
Christianity and the earliest Commissaries of the new order can be discerned.  
In Ross the sense of continuity was again strong. Duncan Chalmer was 
Chancellor from 1526 until his death in 1571,274 sat as a pre-Reformation Official,275 
and was appointed Commissary in 1561 by Mary, Queen of Scots, and again in 1566 
by John, Bishop of Ross.276 In Moray, Donaldson has maintained that “Hugh Craige 
was commissary of Moray from 1559-1586”.277 
Yet along with the sense of continuity, there must have been a sense of 
change. The Officials no longer sat in judgment, since their primary jurisdictions had 
been centralized and subject to the Commissaries of Edinburgh. For example, at St 
Andrews the Official principal had ceased to sit from 1559 and it is clear that there 
was no Commissary Court during the early 1560s. The first Commissary, William 
Skene, appointed in 1564 had no pre-Reformation role as a spiritual judge. Given the 
strength and organization of the Reformed Kirk in St Andrews, with its competent 
                                                 
269 Records of Inverness, eds. William Mackay and Herbert Cameron Boyd (Aberdeen: New Spalding 
Club, 1911), i, 26, 16 November 1558; NAS, CS1/2, fo. 50, 12 Jul 1577. 
270 Discussed below, pages 84-85. 
271 Fasti, 345. 
272 NAS, CS1/2, fo 218v, 13 February 1583/4. 
273 Fasti, 341. 
274 Fasti, 362. 
275 Fasti, 374 
276 Fasti, 375; CC8/2/25, 29 May 1594. 
277 It would be interesting to know if he sat in judgement in part of Elgin Cathedral, since although the 
lead was removed from the roofs following the Reformation, it may still have possessed some useable 
chambers. 
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kirk session and superintendent’s court,278 it is not surprising that the appointment 
went to a judge who was involved with and well known to the kirk there.279 Yet even 
in St Andrews, Skene still retained strong links with the old order, being a canonist at 
St Mary’s College280 and sitting in judgement in the “college kirk of 
Sanctsaluatour”.281    
  The sense of continuity and change must also have been marked in 
Edinburgh. Whilst Edinburgh was a-typical, it is still worth noting that of the first 
commissaries Robert Maitland was a dean of Christianity,282 whilst James Balfour 
had been the last Official of Lothian. Soon after the appointment of the 
Commissaries, Balfour was sat in judgement when Agnes Cranstoun raised a precept 
“to heir and se it be procedit in the caus of exoneratioun movit be hir… befoir 
Maister James Balfour officiall of the spiritual jurisdictioun within the archdenure of 
Lowthiane for the tyme, that is to say to hier and se the process thairof avysit and 
sentence gevin thairintill…”. Thus whilst there must have been a sense of continuity 
from the perspective of litigants, the fact remained that the Officials had been 
overthrown.283 
 
[ii] JURISDICTION OF THE INFERIOR COMMISSARIES 
 
The inferior Commissaries of the new consistorial order were subject to the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh: precepts of reduction might be raised against any 
interlocutors or decreets284 pronounced by the inferior Commissaries before the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh,285 and in addition, the Commissaries of Edinburgh had 
the right to advocate to themselves any action pending before an inferior 
                                                 
278 i.e. see Linda Dunbar, Reforming the Scottish Church: John Winram and the example of Fife 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 83-101.  
279 St Andrews, i, 26, 38 (text and footnote). 
280 John W. Cairns, ‘The Law, the Advocates and the Universities in late eighteenth-century Scotland’ 
in Scottish Historical Review 73, issue 2 (1994), 171-190, at 179-183. 
281 NAS, GD45/17/20; NAS, RH9/2/217. 
282 From 1565 (Fasti, 12). 
283 CC8/2/1, fo. 11r, 5 May 1564. 
284 This conformed to the general practice of appeals in the Court of the Official (Court of the Official, 
119), and in the English episcopal courts (Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 349). 
285 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 250r, 7 January 1567/8; CC8/2/3, fos. 96v-97r, Pitcairne v. Guthrie. 
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Commissary.286 The basic jurisdiction of the inferior Commissaries was presumably 
based on that of the inferior jurisdiction of the Commissaries of Edinburgh, namely 
executry business relating to the lesser testaments;287 ecclesiastical business relating 
to teinds and other revenues generated by the patrimony of the medieval Church;288 
slander; curatory;289 the registration of deeds, contracts and obligations and small 
debt actions. Specific inferior Commissaries may have enjoyed additional powers in 
deference to the status of a pre-Reformation Commissary, or some local custom, 
whilst any inferior Commissary had the potential to be commissioned by the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh to take trial of individual cases, especially matrimonial 
actions.290  
There is good evidence to suggest that the inferior Commissaries could hear 
actions concerning the staying of banns. An examination of actions arising from the 
staying of banns before the Commissaries of Edinburgh strongly suggest that only 
when banns were stayed in south-west Scotland did the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
hear the resulting action.291 Such litigation was certainly competent before Andrew 
Hay, Commissary of Hamilton292 and it therefore follows that inferior Commissaries 
may also have been authorized to pronounce declarators of freedom and putting to 
silence. Directly allied to this were actions for solemnization of marriage, which 
were likewise competent before Andrew Hay,293 yet it ought to be noted that there 
may have been variations between the jurisdictions of individual Commissaries in 
respect of the pre-Reformation provenance of some of the ‘new’ Commissariots. 
Ronald Ireland, seemingly on Baron Hume’s authority, also thought the inferior 
                                                 
286 NAS, CC8/2/7, fo 329r, 24 November 1575, Dunbar (Leslie) v. Dunbar. Precept of advocation 
raised by Grissell Leslie against a commission allegedly granted to the Commissary of Ross to take 
cognition in an action of divorce pursued by her husband. The precept alleged that the Commissary of 
Ross was a “iuge suspect” in the matter, given the formidable nature of Grissell’s husband, “ane grit 
clannit man in the partis of Ross,” who neither the judge nor witnesses dared to disobey. This was a 
distinct procedure from Leslie having made a dilatory exception (see Court of the Official, 108) before 
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287 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 660, item xxv. 
288 NAS, CC10/1/1, fo. 3v, 24 April 1564 (teinds); fo. 53v, 11 August 1564 (vicar pensioner); fo. 131v 
(vicar pensioner); fo. 149r-v, 22 May 1565, Vicar of Campsy v. Parochinaris of Campsy. 
289 NAS, CC10/1/1, fo. 131v, 5 March 1564/5 (curatory). 
290 See Appendix I, clause [5].  
291 See below, pages 236-237. 
292 NAS, CC10/1/1, fo. 123v, 9 February 1564/5. Zoung v. Richie. 
293 NAS, CC10/1/1, fo. 131r, 1 March 1564/5, Walkynschaw v. Patersone. 
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Commissaries were competent in actions of adherence, but there is as yet no direct 
evidence of this.294  
Unfortunately, since “many aspects of the nature of the extent of [the pre-
Reformation commissaries’] jurisdiction remains obscure”295 it is difficult to 
establish the extent to which regional variations in pre-Reformation jurisdictions 
survived into the post-Reformation situation, or to what extent the jurisdiction of 
‘new’ inferior Commissaries was standardized. Since although there is scant 
evidence as to the jurisdiction or pre-Reformation ‘territorial’ commissariots, in the 
case of Stirling, the pre-Reformation Commissary’s competence consisted “almost 
entirely of acts of monition and the registration of contracts”, whilst other territorial 
commissaries may have enjoyed “a jurisdiction similar to, if more limited than the 
diocesan officials”.296 It is noteworthy that the pre-Reformation territorial 
Commissaries of Douglas, Lesmahagow and Kilbride could hear matrimonial 
causes,297 and that following 1564 Andrew Hay, as just discussed, clearly heard some 
matrimonial actions. Given the variations in the jurisdiction of pre-Reformation 
commissariots, it would be inadvisable to think that the evidence cited concerning 
Andrew Hay’s decreets are indicative of the jurisdictions of other inferior 








                                                 
294 Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Post-Reformation’, 82; Ronald Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Divorce, 
Nullity of Marriage and Separation’ in An Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Edinburgh: The 
Stair Society, 1958), 90-98, 96. 
295 Fasti, xiii. 
296 Court of the Official, 37-38. 
297 Court of the Official, 38. 
298 The first ports of call in this respect would be NAS, CC10/1/1 and NAS, CC20/1/1-2. 
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§IV 
RELATIONS WITH OTHER COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
 
[i] PRE-REFORMATION COURTS SPIRITUAL 
 
 Whilst something of the historical relationships between the post-
Reformation Commissary system and the old episcopal courts has been sketched 
above, several procedural links continued to exist between the pre- and post-
Reformation episcopal courts. The violent interruption of the courts of the Catholic 
Church in Scotland during the autumn of 1559 left a degree of jurisdictional and 
practical chaos in its wake.299 It was certainly clear to the Lords of Council and 
Session that the new order of the Commissaries of Edinburgh would have to include 
provision for the continuation of interrupted actions and appeals, together with the 
recovery of the various registers kept by the old courts, and the enforcement of the 
acts, sentences, deeds and obligations which they contained: in short, justice should 
not be frustrated through disorder in the realm. 
 Accordingly the charter of constitution empowered the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh to discuss and decide “all appellations interponed or depending from any 
other Commissary or Commissaries or other ecclesiastical judge whatsoever within 
this our realm in times gone by; also appellations or reductions interponed hereafter 
from any Commissary whatsoever within this our realm”.300 John Connell 
understood this clause to mean that “those processes which formerly depended 
before the bishop’s court were immediately transferred to the Commissaries” and 
there is ample evidence that this was the case in practice.301 Yet there was also room 
for ambiguity in this clause, since mention was made only of appellations depending 
“within this our realm” and as such there seems to have been a studious avoidance of 
mentioning any appeal depending outwith the realm in Rome. Various cases from the 
                                                 
299 See Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’. Some of these episcopal courts did nevertheless continue to 
function after 1559 (see Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxiv). The withering of the old episcopal courts in 
Scotland during the Reformation era has parallels with the fate of the English episcopal courts during 
the early 1640s (Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 297). 
300 See Appendix I, clause [6]. 
301 Connell, Treatise (1815), i, 200. 
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extant Registers of Acts and Decreets shed more light on the precise jurisdiction of 
the Commissaries of Edinburgh in respect of both the old episcopal courts and papal 
judges delegate.   
 The complexity of the situation occasioned by the early stages of the Scottish 
Reformation is well illustrated by one of the early cases in the Acts and Decreets, 
Glen & Or v. Glen. The case revolved around a sentence pronounced by the Official 
of Glasgow in 1556 against James Or for the payment of various sums of money. 
The sums had never been paid, and as such, following the appointment of the 
Commissaries, James Glen had sought to have the sentence enforced against Janet 
Glen and Thomas Or (presumably as executors of the late James Or) by the ‘new’ 
Commissary of Glasgow, Archibald Beaton. However, James Or had appealed 
against the sentence of the Official of Glasgow and had obtained “commissioun fra 
my lord of Sanctandrois as legat302 to Maister Nichole Spittale provest of Fowlis juge 
delegat to cognosce in the said caus of his said appelatioun”. Unfortunately this 
appeal had run into difficulties since Nichole Spittal had had his commission 
revoked, and as such no decision had been pronounced. Since the original sentence 
had been appealed against, even though the judge delegated by legatine authority had 
had his commission revoked, the issue was not a sentence pronounced in the first 
instance by the Official of Glasgow, but an appellation against that sentence. On this 
reading, “be ressone of the trouble and ceissing of the consistorial jurisdictioun the 
said vmquhile James culd not persew and finische his said caus of appelatioun 
alwayis the samyn is now [blank] be ressone of the said appelatioun to be decydit in 
tertia saltem303 secunda instantia To the quhilk the saidis commissaris [of 
Edinburgh] be ressone of thair commissioun ar onlie juges comptent and the said 
juge [i.e. ‘new’ Commissary] of Glasgow is na wyiss juge competent to the said 
pretendit translation. And thairfoir the samyn suld be remittit be the said commissar 
of Glasgow to the saidis commissaris [of Edinburgh] and the saidis commissaris 
inhibite fra further proceding thairintill in respect of the saidis appelatiounis 
instrumentis and act maid thairupoun befoir the said Maister Nichole and secund 
rescript schawin to the saidis commissaris thairupoun”. The Commissaries of 
Edinburgh duly called the action to themselves “as accordis with the law”.304 
                                                 
302 The date of the commission is not stated. 
303 saltem is not entirely clear in the MS. 
304 NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 401v-402r. 
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 From this example it is clear that the terms of the charter of constitution were 
upheld in that, an appeal having been made against a pre-Reformation sentence, the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh were deemed sole judges competent to hear subsequent 
litigation. Yet what is less clear is whether or not the new Commissary of Glasgow 
was competent to enforce and transfer sentences pronounced by the old Official of 
Glasgow305 if no appeal had been made against them.  
A more straightforward example of the Commissaries of Edinburgh’s 
competence to hear appeals is found in Marscheall v. Dikesoun although many of the 
particulars together with the final outcome of the action are not known. It may be 
inferred that an initial sentence had been pronounced in Sir William Marshall’s 
favour, and that Alan Dickson had appealed to the Official principal of St Andrews. 
Although the appeal had begun to be heard, no definitive sentence had been 
pronounced, and accordingly, following the interruption of the consistories, Marshall 
had instituted proceedings before the Commissaries of Edinburgh to have the appeal 
brought to a conclusion. The Commissaries duly ordained Dickson to “exhibite and 
produce befoir thame the hale process led and deducit in the caus of appelatioun in 
the second instance dependand befoir the officiale of Sanctandrois principale betuix 
the said Alane and Schr William Marscheall” to which end Dickson had had  “oure 
soverane ladeis letters deulie execute and indorsate [upon] Maister George 
Makesoun clerk and kepar of the consistoriall bukis of sanctandrois” charging him 
“to extract draw furth and deliver to the Alane vpoun his ressonable expensis the 
autentik copy of all actis and proces deducit in the said caus of appelatioun”.306 An 
extract of the process was duly produced at a subsequent diet “inclosit with the seill 
of the officiallie of Sanctandrois and vnder the subscirptioun of Maister George 
Makesoun clerk of the said auditorie for the tyme”.307 The process was duly 
published308 by the Commissaries four days after its production.309 
 This action illustrates both the Commissaries’ jurisdiction in this respect, 
together with one of the practical problems attending the chaotic manner in which the 
                                                 
305 Both posts were held by Archibald Beaton (Fasti, 246, 250) 
306 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 148r, 10 August 1564. 
307 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 217v, 10 November 1564.  
308 That is to say, made available to parties with an interest, having satisfied themselves as to its 
authenticity. 
309 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 222r, 14 November 1564. 
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spiritual jurisdiction had been interrupted. In this example one of the litigants had to 
go to the expense and trouble of compelling the keeper of the consistorial books of 
the Official of St Andrews to make a formal copy of the process of appellation. On 
other occasions Michael Marjoribanks was cited as the keeper of the consistorial 
books of the Official of Lothian and compelled to extract various entries contained 
therein.310 As such, it seems reasonable to suppose that following the de facto 
suppression of the consistories from the autumn of 1559 many of the registers of 
those courts had been carried away by the clerks of court. This is in keeping with the 
situation which pertained after the clerkship of Sebastian Danelourt in the court of 
the Commissaries of Edinburgh: all the registers from his two year clerkship are 
missing and may be supposed to have been carried away by him.311   
There are also various examples in the Registers of Acts and Decreets of 
litigants raising precepts of reduction against the sentences of the old episcopal 
courts. In Leslie v. Oliphantis, the pursuer sought to have a sentence of divorce 
pronounced against her by “Maister Andro Triall allegit Commissar Generale to the 
Officiale of Sanctandrois Principale” reduced by the Commissaries.312 In Gray v. 
Wod a sentence had been pronounced in David Wod’s favour by Master William 
Cranston, Official of St Andrews principal in an action for the payment of teinds for 
the year of 1541. Gray now pursued before the Commissaries of Edinburgh, for the 
production of the process led before Cranston and its reduction.313 The issue is not 
known, but the fact that the Commissaries deemed themselves competent to take trial 
of an action of reduction of a sentence of an Official principal clearly indicates that 
they were competent to reduce any sentence pronounced by any Commissary or 
Official within Scotland regardless of where appeal would have been previously 
made. In this respect it may be supposed that a sentence of the Official of Lothian, 
which would formerly have been reduced by the Official of St Andrews principal 
might now be reduced by the Commissaries of Edinburgh, and similarly that a 
                                                 
310 In Borthwick v. Criag & Megot, Megot “producit diligence be deliuerance of the Lordis of 
Counsale chargeing Michaell Marioribankis kepar of the bukis of the consistoriall jurxoun of 
Edinburght for the tyme to extract and deliuer to him vpoun his expensis the autentik copy of certane 
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ane caus etc” (NAS, CC8/2/2, fo 58r, 19 June 1565). 
311 See above, page 50. 
312 NAS, CC8/2/2, fos. 382r-383v, 16 March 1567/8. 
313 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 384v, 10 March 1564/5; fo. 408v, 26 March 1565. 
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sentence of the Official of St Andrews principal, which would have previously been 
reduced by the Rota Sacra Romana might now be reduced by the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh. As such, whilst the issue here is distinct from appeals pending in Rome at 
the time of the interruption of the consistories, it seems clear that, where appeals had 
not yet been made, the Commissaries were sole judges competent for the reduction 
of all sentences pronounced by Commissaries and Officials even when appeal lay to 
Rome. What is not made entirely clear however is whether or not appeal could still 
have been made to Rome in preference to the Commissaries of Edinburgh, prior to 
the ratification in December 1567 of the Act abrogating papal authority in Scotland, 
24 August 1560.      
 One final area of the Commissaries of Edinburgh’s competence in respect of 
the old episcopal courts was in the transfer of deeds registered in the books of the old 
Officials and Commissaries. The need for this service was a common enough 
occurrence when the terms of a deed had not been fulfilled at the time of one of the 
parties’ death. In these circumstances it was often needful for the legal obligations 
contained in the deed to be transferred by an act of the Commissaries to the executors 
of the defunct. The Commissaries of Edinburgh were petitioned principally 
concerning deeds and acts registered in the books of the Official of Lothian314 and 
those of the Official of St Andrews.315 This evidence strongly implies that inferior 
Commissaries were judges competent for the transfer of acts and deeds registered in 
the books of their consistorial predecessors. The inference is confirmed by a request 
made to the Commissary of Hamilton on 10 May 1564 that his authority be 
interponed to an act of the pre-Reformation [Commissary] of Kilbride regarding a 
debt of five pounds,316 and by the action Kincaid v. Striviling, which concerned an 
act which “be consent of bayth parteis wes ordanit to be insert[it] in the Officiallis 
buikis of Glasgw for the tyme renunceand all vther jurisdictiounis & submittand 
thame thairto, to the quhilk Officialrie the said Commissar of Glasgow succeidis”.317 
                                                 
314 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 109r, 18 July 1564; 116r, 22 July 1564; 154v, 14 August 1564; 246v, 24 
November 1564; 302v, 12 January 1564/5; 333v, 5 February 1564/5; 334v, 5 February 1564/5; 
CC8/2/2 fos 33r, 24 May 1565 etc.    
315 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 113r-v, 21 July 1564; 25[1]r, 27 November 1564; 309r, 17 January 1564; 
333r, 3 February 1564/5; 342v, 10 February 1564/5; 427v, 12 April 1565; CC8/2/2 fos 47r-48r, 4 June 
1565 etc.  
316 NAS, CC10/1/1, fo. 9v. 
317 NAS, CC8/2/7, fos. 106r, 22 March 1574/5.  
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 The distinction between papal and episcopal jurisdiction in respect of the 
authority of the pre-Reformation Courts of the Official and Commissaries has 
already been made at length in the introduction. An ancillary point concerns the legal 
validity of papal authority in Scotland prior to December 1567, in that it has been 
argued elsewhere that various leading men of law (including two of the first 
Commissaries of Edinburgh, James Balfour and Edward Henryson) did not consider 
the Acts of the Reformation Parliament of August 1560 to have legal force in the 
realm until they were ratified in December 1567. If this was the case, then it would 
be expected that the Commissaries of Edinburgh would still have countenanced 
sentences pronounced in Scotland by virtue of papal authority or decisions reached in 
appeals pending in Rome so long as such sentences were pronounced prior to 
December 1567. 
There is some evidence that the status of decisions pronounced by virtue of 
papal rather than episcopal authority during the Reformation era had not been clear at 
the time. In 1581 a piece of legislation was passed in Parliament purported to ratify 
an Act maid “concerning the decisioun of appelatiounis maid be the court of Rome” 
on 24 August 1560. The alleged Act of 24 August 1560 was narrated to have 
ordained that litigants “havand pleis dependand in the saidis court of Rome, or 
consistoreis, or befoir uthir judges callit delegatis or subdelegatis” were to pursue 
such actions “at thair optioun befoir the lordis of oure soveranis sessioun, the schiref, 
stewart or baillie of regalite, baille of barony, provest or baillies of burrowis, or uthir 
temporall judges ordinaris within this realme”.318   
 There is one case extant in the Registers of Acts and Decreets which seems to 
suggest that the alleged Act of 1560 was not known to the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh, and that they did in fact continue to consider papal authority to be valid 
prior to December 1567. On 23 January 1567/8, five weeks after the ratification of 
the Act abrogating papal authority in Scotland, “Stevin Kincaid secristane for the 
tyme of the college kirk of Thayne in Ross” petitioned the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh to decern to have been deserted an appeal made against a sentence given 
in his favour by “Maister Johne Carncorst chan[tor] of the cathedral kirk of Ross 
Juge Deligait of the paip”. The date of the original sentence pronounced by the papal 
judge delegate is not explicitly mentioned in the extant records, but the date of the 
                                                 
318 RPS, 1581/10/39; APS, iii, 221, c.20. 
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appeal was stated as “befoir the feist of Witsonday the zeir of God jai vc lxv 
zeris”.319  
 Several initial points arise. The first point concerns the date of the original 
definitive sentence against which an appeal had been made. Simon Ollivant has 
maintained that appeals made against definitive sentences, either to a Scottish 
Official principal, or to Rome, had to be commenced within 10 days of the giving of 
the original sentence according to canonical procedure.320 Assuming that such rules 
applied in this instance, the pronouncing of the definitive sentence of John 
Cairncross321 must have been around the same time as the appeal was made, that is to 
say ‘before the feast of Witsunday 1565,’ which occurred on 10 June that year, thus 
suggesting a date for the giving of the original sentence of no earlier than spring 
1565.  
 The second point concerns to which tribunal appeal had been made. It is of 
course conceivable that appeal could have been made to the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh, but this is unlikely on two grounds. In the first place, it was desired by 
Kincaid that the appeal be produced before the Commissaries of Edinburgh,322 and as 
such it seems most unlikely that the appeal was contained in the Commissaries’ 
books. In the second place it seems far more likely that the appeal had been made to 
Rome, presumably the proper tribunal for the reduction of the decision of a papal 
judge delegate. This is at least suggested by that fact that Kincaid had been content 
for the appeal to be pending for the fairly long period of at least 2 years 7 months 
(being the time between Witsunday 1565 and the date of Kincaid’s petition given in 
to the Commissaries of Edinburgh) and that he had not decided to petition the 
Commissaries until after the ratification of the Act abolishing papal authority in 
Scotland.323 
                                                 
319 NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 283r, 23 January 1567/8, Kinnaid v. Vduard.  
320 Court of the Official, 121-122. In the English episcopal courts “appeals were to be made within 10 
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were normally given one year to prosecute the appeal…” (Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 350).  
321 For whose details see Fasti, 359. 
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the judge a quo (Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 350). That this did not happen in this case 
therefore demonstrates that even if Kincaid had still wished to maintain the principle of papal 
authority in Scotland through his actions, by December 1567 he would have realised the futility of his 
stance and petitioned the Commissaries of Edinburgh. 
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 Yet regardless of whether or not appeal had been made to Rome, the fact 
remains that no arguments were raised before the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
concerning the right of John Cairncross as a papal judge delegate in Scotland to 
pronounce a sentence in 1565. As such, whilst the final outcome of Kincaid’s action 
to have the appeal decerned to have been deserted is not known,324 it would seem 
that the Commissaries of Edinburgh were prepared to countenance the sentence of 
the papal judge delegate, despite the fact that it was pronounced after the Act 
abolishing papal authority in Scotland, 24 August 1560. 
  
[ii] THE LORDS OF COUNCIL AND SESSION 
 
 As Gordon Donaldson noted in 1958 “it appears to have been intended from 
the outset that appeal should lie from the inferior commissaries to the commissaries 
of Edinburgh, and thence to the Court of Session”.325 The superiority of the Session 
was reasonable given the context in which the Commissaries of Edinburgh were 
appointed, and the evidence of a proto- ‘Court of the Commissaries’ during the early 
1560s.326 Whilst not mentioned in the charter of constitution, the instructions passed 
to the Commissaries of Edinburgh made the superiority of the Lords explicit: “the 
reductioun of ony sentence gevin be the Commissaris of Edinburgh, in prima 
instantia, or secunda, of appellatiounis or reductiounis interponit fra uther 
Commissaris, to be judgit be the haill Lordis of Sessioun, or ane part of thame, 
quhilk sall be appointit thairto be the remanent of the saidis Lordis, usque ad 
sententiae definitivae prolationem exclusive”.327  
 Two examples of appeals against the decreets of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh to the Lords of Council and Session are known at present, both of them in 
‘consistorial’ actions. One was made by Jane Stewart, divorced countess of the 5th 
earl of Argyll, against the Commissaries’ first known decreet of divorce, pronounced 
against her, on the grounds of malicious desertion, and is discussed in detail 
                                                 
324 The Commissaries assigned litteratorie (NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 345r) to pronounce their interlocutor, 
which does not appear to be extant. 
325 Donaldson, ‘Church Courts’, 369. 
326 See above, pages 22-23. 
327 Practicks, ii, 659, item xix. 
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below.328 The other appeal was made by Euphame McConnal against a decreet of 
Scottish Protestant divorce for adultery pronounced by the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh on 29 July 1573 in favour of her husband John Stewart of Appin. 329 The 
Lords reduced this decreet on 26 March 1576.330   
 The Lords of Council and Session were also involved in the affairs of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh on a more day-to-day basis. Whilst the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh exercised a special mandate and authority from the sovereign, and whilst 
the subjects of the realm were expected to co-operate with the summonses and 
decreets of the Commissaries, difficulties in the imposition of a new consistorial 
order by virtue of the authority of the Commissaries alone were anticipated from the 
beginning. One of the principal ways in which the authority of the Commissaries 
differed from that of the spiritual judges of the old consistories was that they lacked 
the authority to excommunicate those who failed to co-operate with their authority. 
Whatever the predicament of Roman Catholics following the Reformation crisis of 
1559-1560, Protestants were subject to the tribunals of the Reformed Kirk in this 
respect.  
Accordingly, the instructions passed to the Commissaries in 1563/4 stated 
that if subjects failed to compear on the strength of the Commissaries’ precepts, 
litigants might “raise letteris be deliverance of the Lordis of Session, for compelling 
of thame to compeir, under the pane of horning, as the Judge shall think 
expedient”.331 Similarly, if subjects failed to conform to decreets pronounced by the 
Commissaries within fifteen days, recourse could be had to the Lords of Council and 
Session so that the Lords might grant “letteris to charge the parties condemnit to 
fulfil the said sentence within sa mony dayis as the saidis Lordis sall think expedient, 
under the pane of rebellion, and thay failzeing, to put thame to the horn”.332 
Likewise, if subjects failed to fulfil contracts and obligations which had been 
registered in the Commissaries’ books, the Lords were “to give out letteris in the four 
formis, or of poinding, for fulfilling the samin, as wer sont to be gevin upon 
                                                 
328 Chapter III, §III. 
329 NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 157r-v, 29 July 1573, Stewart of Appin v. McConle. 
330 NAS, CS7/63, part 1, fos. 24v-25r (ink), 26th March 1576, Makcall v. Stewart. 
331 Practicks, ii, 657, item viii. 
332 Practicks, ii, 658-9, item xvi. 
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persounis quhilkis of befoir lay xl. dayis under cursing”.333 Finally, should the 
Commissaries’ officers happen to be deforced, the deforcer was to be “callit befoir 
the Lordis of Council, or Commissaris, as the partie persewar pleases” and punished 
“as gif the Quene’s Grace’s Officiar of armis wer deforcit in execution of hir Hienes 
letteris”.334 
 Despite the close involvement of the Lords of Council and Session in the 
augmentation of the authority of the Commissaries of Edinburgh,335 the Lords clearly 
wished for the Commissary system to be distinct from the Session as far as was 
reasonable practicable. Indeed, given the direct involvement of the Lords in the 
spiritual jurisdiction between 1560 and the appointment of the Commissaries, it is 
clear that had they so wished, the College of Justice could have appropriated the 
business of the old consistories directly into its own jurisdiction. It has been 
suggested that this was not done on the understanding that the spiritual jurisdiction, 
whilst in need of systematic administration during a period of revolution, might yet 
be restored to the Scottish episcopate. Yet on a more practical level, it may have been 
the case that the Lords had no desire to increase their own direct jurisdiction, since it 
is manifestly clear that they were already over burdened with litigation and under 
remunerated for their labours.336 Nevertheless, despite the constitutional and practical 
considerations moving the Lords to maintain a distance from the Commissaries, early 
shortcomings with the Commissary system clearly demanded greater involvement of 
the Lords from 1566. Problems with the Quot Collectory upon which a sizeable 
portion of the senatorial emoluments depended have already been discussed. In 
addition, it was held that “in the initial elevation of the said Commissaries, certain 
men who were unsuitable to and useless for these offices, perverted these high 
offices by fraud and cunning” and that “some of the commissaries have obtained 
such wide commissions of their jurisdiction - with widely scattered boundaries 
embracing various sheriffdoms - that neither they themselves are able to keep up 
with and on top of their offices, nor are our subjects able to pursue justice without 
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very serious effort and expense, and the dangers of crossing firths, rivers and 
estuaries”.337 On account of these shortcomings the Chancellor, President and 
senators of the College of Justice were given the right to appoint to all positions 
within the Commissary system and  “to study and investigate the jurisdictions of the 
commissaries of this realm, and reduce, expand, change and separate their limits and 
boundaries”. In addition they were given power to summon all commissary 
personnel to “bring and display the provisions and donations of their offices to be 
seen by the senate and explored. If they have been granted either to them themselves 
for the entire course of their lives, or to their children, friends or others to succeed 
them, forthwith by decision of the said senate they are to be abolished, revoked and 
nullified. As a result, those who afterwards seek that kind of office shall acquire it 
and perform it only for as long as the senate wills it…”.338 In this, it is plain that the 
original intention of entrusting the supervision of the Commissary system to the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh had been frustrated and that the direct involvement of 
the Lords of Council and Session in the ongoing organization and administration of 
the Commissary system became unavoidable. Given the original powers of the Lords 
in terms of superiority and the augmentation of the authority of the Commissaries, 
the enhancement of the Lords powers from December 1566 further blurred the lines 
of distinction between the bench of the Commissaries and of the Session. Three of 
the first four Commissaries were also senators of the College of Justice.339  
 
[iii] THE LORDS INTERPRETERS OF THE LAW OF OBLIVION 
 
 The law of oblivion passed by Mary’s first parliament in 1563 had in effect 
granted immunity from due process of law to those involved in the legally dubious, if 
not treasonable, events of ‘the uproar for religion’ from 1559.340 The broad wording 
of the Act certainly required some future provision for interpretation.341 Accordingly, 
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339 See above, pages 43-44. 
340 Connell, Treatise (1815), i, 199. 
341 RPS, A1563/6/1; APS, ii, 535, c.1. 
   77
Parliament immediately appointed a group of Lords Interpreters to whom actions 
might be remitted should “the partie persewit, be him self or his procuratouris… 
allege that the persewar sould not be hard in respect of the law of oblivioun”.342 
Whilst the legislation had cited civil or criminal actions as those encompassed by the 
Act of Oblivion, the fact that all “legattis, archibischoppis, bischoppis, abbottis, 
commendatouris, priouris and all uthers jugeis, magistratis and officiaris of 
quhatsumever estate, degre or conditioun thay be of” had also been discharged from 
proceeding to hear actions based upon wrongs committed during the period covered, 
it is reasonable to anticipate that actions before the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
might also be remitted to the Lords Interpreters.343  
 This was to prove to be the case, and various actions were remitted to the 
Lords Interpreters from both the Commissaries of Edinburgh and the inferior 
Commissaries. The evidence from the MS Acts of the Lords Interpreters of the Law 
of Oblivion indicates that the majority of such cases were ‘ecclesiastical’.344 
Evidence from the Registers of Acts and Decreets of the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
confirm this picture. In Annand v. Grahame, it was objected that an alleged title to 
the “prebendary of the lady kirk of sanday within the boundis of Orknay… is daitit in 
the lx zeir of God, quhilk zeir is ane of the zeris comprehendit within the zeris of the 
law of oblivioun and thairfoir aucht and suld be remitted to the Lordis 
Interpretatouris thairof Quhilk the saidis Commissaris remittis to the said Lordis to 
be decidit be thame as Juges competent thairto”.345 Meanwhile, in Dennestoun v. 
Skene & Strachauchin, an action concerning the payment of a pension due to Sir 
George Strachan alleged vicar pensioner of Dysart for the years 1558 to 1563 had 
been begun before William Skene, Commissary of St Andrews. Skene had 
pronounced an interlocutor in the action pending before him, against which 
Dennistoun had raised a precept of reduction before the Commissaries of Edinburgh. 
Nevertheless the payment of the pension for the years 1559 and 1560 was exempted 
from discussion in Edinburgh, since this question had already been “remittit to the 
lords havand interpretatioun of the act of oblivioun maid in oure Soverane ladies 
                                                 
342 RPS, A1563/6/2; APS, ii, 536, c.2. The Lords Interpreters are all named in this act, and were not 
surprisingly the leading nobles and prelates of the realm. 
343 RPS, A1563/6/1; APS, ii, 535, c.1. 
344 NAS, PA9/1, fragments covering 14 March 1564 - 30August 1569. 
345 NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 349r, Annand v. Grahame, 26 Feb 1567/8. 
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parliament”.346 From these two examples it is clear that discussions about rights and 
titles to Scottish benefices, the payment of ecclesiastical revenues, and actions 
pending before inferior Commissaries might all be remitted to the Lords Interpreters 
on the grounds that a presentation and collation, or a non-payment of monies, had 
occurred during the period comprehended by the Law of Oblivion. 
 What is perhaps more surprising is that marriage litigation could be remitted 
to the Lords Interpreters. A striking example of this was the action brought by 
Elizabeth Galbraith against her sometime husband Thomas McCalzean, later Lord 
Cliftonhall. A sentence of divorce had been pronounced against Galbraith in 
McCalzean’s favour, 9 August 1548 “be Maisteris Johne Guilterinj provest of 
Seytoun and William Meldrum vicar of Piterculter allegit commissaris in that part of 
the vicar generallis of Sanctandrois for the tyme the sait thairof than vacund”,347 
which sentence was presumably an annulment, or divorce a vinculo, since 
McCalzean had proceeded to marry Marion Ker. Yet on 4 April 1564 Galbraith 
raised a precept of reduction against the sentence of the Commissary General of St 
Andrews before the Commissaries of Edinburgh. The grounds are not clear, yet the 
danger for McCalzean was that should the pre-Reformation annulment be reduced, 
his subsequent marriage would be deemed null. McCalzean certainly argued against 
the precept of reduction at considerable length,348 but the litigation passed into 
Danelourt’s Registers, which are no longer extant. Nevertheless the Acts of the Lords 
Interpreters of the Law of Oblivion reveal that by 10 January 1567/8 the action of 
reduction had been remitted by the Commissaries of Edinburgh to the Lords 
Interpreters. The grounds of this peculiar development are obscure, but the 
arguments made before the Lords Interpreters are instructive. The Commissaries had 
certainly ceased from further proceedings, until the Lords pronounced whether or not 
some aspect of the litigation was comprehended by the Law of Oblivion. Galbraith 
argued that “the same actioun nowther meritis nor can cum vnder the act of 
oblivioun, nor zit can the said act be interpretit or extendit thairto, specialie sen the 
same wes not maid to 349 tak ony siclik actioun of reductioun standing betuix partiis 
concerning the band of matrimony, as be inspectioun of the said act cleirlie and 
                                                 
346 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 295r-v, 9 January 1564/5, Dennestoun v. Skene & Strachauchin.  
347 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 418r, 4 April 1565. 
348 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/2, fos 9r, 5 May 1565; 37v, 26 May 1565. 
349 [--- or] in MS, but cannot be made out due to staining of the paper 
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suficientlie may appeir, and swa it is constant and manifest that the said allegeance is 
proponit fraudulentlie for delay of tyme and na vtherwayis”. The argument seems 
reasonable: surely the Law of Oblivion had not been passed to indemnify parties 
against the enforcement of the laws of marriage, and surely litigants were aware that 
a remit to the Lords Interpreters was an excellent stalling static. Nevertheless, the 
Lords Interpreters declared “that the said actioun sould cum and is comprehendit 
vnder the said Law of Obliuioun and tobe extinct and expyrit for euir, and the said 
Elizabeth neuir tobe hard to persew the samyn agane and thairfoir Discharges the 
saidis Commissaris and all vtheris iugeis spiritual or temporall within this realme Of 
all forder calling and proceding aganis the said Maister Thomas thairin in ony tyme 
heireftir”.350  
 One other marital action remitted to the Lords Interpreters deserves note, 
although their decision is not extant. On 3 April 1568 Isobell Semple, daughter of 
Robert Lord Semple, raised a precept of reduction before the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh against a Protestant sentence of divorce for adultery pronounced against 
her by the minister of Edinburgh on 31 September 1560. Nevertheless, the precept 
being raised, the defender’s procurator, Alexander King, alleged that he ought not to 
be compelled to produce the process led before the minister of Edinburgh for 
reduction “becaus the dait of the said decreit is comprehendit within the zeris of the 
Law of Oblivioun and thairfoir desiriit the said mater to be remittit to the Lordis 
Interpretatouris thairof”.351 The Commissaries took the allegation into their 
consideration and on 6 April 1568 “be thair interlocutour remittit the said mater to 
the Lordis Interpratouris of the Law of Oblivioun tobe decydit be thame as juges 
competent thairto”.352  
 This cunning exploitation of the provisions of the Act of Oblivion in 
consistorial litigation before the Commissaries of Edinburgh is redolent of the oft-
condemned abuses of the system of appeals found in the pre-Reformation courts 
spiritual.353 Whilst the opportunities afforded by papal involvement in the spiritual 
jurisdiction were gone, litigants and their men of law were clearly still willing and 
                                                 
350 NAS, PA9/1, fos 15v-16r, 10 January 1567/8, Gawbrayth v. Makcalzeane. 
351 NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 419v, 3 April 1568, Sympill v. Hammiltoun. 
352 NAS, CC8/2/2, fo 422v, 6 April 1568. 
353 See Court of the Official, 119-127, esp. 127; cf Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 349. 
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able to exploit the Indian summer of procedural ambiguities afforded by the 
jurisdiction of the Lords Interpreters.     
 
§V 
RELATIONS WITH THE PROTESTANT KIRK AND ITS TRIBUNALS 
ARISING FROM SENTENCES PRONOUNCED PRIOR TO THE 
APPOINTMENT OF THE COMMISSARIES OF EDINBURGH 
 
 Relations between the Commissaries of Edinburgh and the Protestant Kirk 
during the Scottish Reformation are of central interest in this thesis from the 
perspective of ecclesiastical history. The inactivity of the courts of the Catholic 
Church in Scotland and the emergence of the kirk sessions and superintendents’ 
courts of the Protestant Kirk during the earliest stages of the Reformation had 
significant repercussions for the Commissaries of Edinburgh in that their very 
appointment was intended to bring order into a chaotic situation. There is no doubt 
that from as early as February 1559/60 tribunals of the Protestant Kirk began to hear 
what appear to be consistorial actions, most notably in the granting of divorce on the 
grounds of adultery with licence to the innocent party to remarry. At least part of the 
Kirk can be demonstrated to have had direct involvement in ‘consistorial’ matters 
somewhere in the region of 4 months after the ordinance of the Lords of the 
Congregation ordaining the consistories of the Catholic Church to cease to sit. This 
was prior to the definite assumption of the spiritual jurisdiction by the Lords of 
Council and Session in December 1560,354 and prior to Mary’s proclamation of Leith 
in August 1561, which, as already discussed, was widely understood to have given 
legal validity to the de facto religious situation standing at the time of the Queen’s 
return to Scotland. It may be therefore reasonably expected that the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh, upon being appointed to administer the consistorial jurisdiction of the old 
episcopal courts, by virtue of a delegation of authority from the sovereign, would 
nevertheless have been inclined to countenance the judgements pronounced by the 
tribunals of the Protestant Kirk from 1559/60 down to their appointment. But what is 
not clear, and what this section will seek to clarify, was to what extent and upon what 
                                                 
354 i.e Chalmer v. Lumisden discussed above, pages 19-21. 
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actual grounds the Commissaries acknowledged and accepted the involvement of the 
tribunals of the Kirk in what appear to have been consistorial matters during a 
revolutionary stage of the Scottish Reformation.     
Nineteenth-century scholars tended to assume that the appointment of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh in February 1563/4, with their exclusive national 
jurisdiction in consistorial actions would have resulted in a conflict between the 
Commissaries and the Kirk. This was predicated upon their understanding that 
during the early stages of the Reformation, the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk had 
attempted to at least partially take over the functions of the courts of the Catholic 
Church, but had effectively been checked by the Crown through the appointment of 
the Commissaries. This narrative was rendered more coherent by a rigid insistence 
that the jurisdiction of the courts spiritual, the tribunals of the Kirk and the 
Commissaries had been one and the same. As this jurisdiction, as far as these 
nineteenth-century authorities were concerned, was ultimately a civil jurisdiction 
emanating from the Crown, it followed that the jurisdiction of the medieval 
episcopate had been either voluntarily delegated by the Crown to the ancient 
hierarchy, or usurped by that hierarchy at some point in Scotland’s ancient past. At 
the Reformation, therefore, this jurisdiction properly reverted to the Crown and was 
granted to the Commissaries of Edinburgh, having been temporarily administered by 
the Lords of Council and Session. Within this constitutional context, the involvement 
of the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk was viewed as nothing other than a usurpation 
of the authority of the Crown.355 From this basis, it followed that the newly 
appointed Commissaries of Edinburgh would come into conflict with the usurping 
tribunals of the Kirk and strip them of their pretended consistorial jurisdiction.356 
                                                 
355 John Riddell imputed the Protestant clergy with an “encroaching, nay, usurping spirit” (Riddell, 
Inquiry, i, 443) in respect of the consistorial jurisdiction, insisting that the Kirk’s brief ascendancy in 
consistorial matters occurred without “any proper sanction or authority – nay, latterly, in the face of 
the expressly constituted and legitimate tribunals [the Commissary Courts], [the ‘Knoxite clergy’] 
actually did aspire to, and arrogate to themselves, the consistorial cognizance” (Riddell, Inquiry, i, 
430). The theme of usurpation was rehearsed in the twentieth century by Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: 
Divorce’, 95. 
356 Lord Fraser opined that whilst the Reformation the Protestant kirkmen claimed “the jurisdiction of 
their Romish predecessors” the Commissaries of Edinburgh “checked the interference of the clergy, 
by reducing their sentences, and declaring that there was no court competent to take cognisance of 
such matters but themselves” (Fraser, Treatise (1846), i 13). Joseph Robertson added more detail to 
this picture by pointing out that the Charter of Constitution of the Commissaries of Edinburgh had 
granted them the power inhibit incompetent judges. Whilst this was a normative power for competent 
and indeed superior judges, Robertson, without any direct proof, opined that “this clause was, no 
doubt, aimed at the Reformed church” (Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxvi, footnote). 
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Interesting as this is, however, it has little to do with historical knowledge of the 
sixteenth-century Scottish Reformation, and much to do with the later ‘Dirletonian’ 
understanding of ecclesiology and polity alien to the era of the Reformation. 
Accordingly, the themes of usurpation, conflict and suppression, which 
predominated in nineteenth-century understanding of relations between the 
Commissaries and the Kirk, now seem an overly dramatic caricature.  
 There can now be no doubt that Scots prior to the Reformation understood the 
spiritual jurisdiction to be entirely distinct from the civil jurisdiction, and to emanate 
from a different quality of sovereignty to that of monarchs.357 What also seems plain 
is that the jurisdiction of the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk arose out of what was 
seen as one of the true hallmarks of the Christian community, namely the discipline 
of members of the Kirk and the regulation of their moral lives in accordance with the 
tenets of Scottish Protestant doctrine and practice.358 Finally, as has been argued 
above, the Reformation crisis did not seem to have occasioned an intellectual 
revolution in the way Scottish jurists considered the spiritual jurisdiction; rather there 
is every evidence that the jurisdiction of the Commissaries of Edinburgh was 
understood to emanate from the Scottish episcopate, to whom it should be restored at 
such time as the Commissaries’ temporary administration came to an end. In this, a 
proper understanding of the jurisdictional relations between the Commissaries and 
the Kirk should not proceed upon the nineteenth-century assumption that both were 
competing over the self-same jurisdiction and therefore in a state of conflict, but that 
both were seeking to exercise their own competent authority in the confused 
circumstances of the Scottish Reformation. 
 
 There is direct evidence that between 1559 and 1564 various tribunals of the 
Protestant Kirk heard actions of Scottish Protestant divorce on the grounds of 
adultery and indeed it is through the decisions of these tribunals that this legal 
innovation was introduced into Scotland.359 Sentences were pronounced by the kirk 
                                                 
357 “By my truth, there are two laws, the spiritual law and the temporal: the cure of the one pertaineth 
to the pope’s holiness and the spirituality; the other to kings princes and the temporality… as for the 
spiritual law, in good faith we take no regard therof, but commit that to the pope’s holiness, and other 
ordinary ministers of the kirk within our realm.” James V, 1539/40 (The State Papers and Letters of 
Sir Ralph Sadler, ed. Arthur Clifford (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1809), i, 27). 
358 Discussed below, page 225. 
359 Discussed further below, 114 et seq. 
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session of St Andrews and by the court of the superintendent of Fife, Fotherick and 
Strathern at St Andrews,360 by the superintendent, elders and deacons of the kirk of 
Glasgow,361 by the minister, elders and deacons of the kirk of Edinburgh,362 by the 
superintendent and minister of the kirk of Aberdeen,363 by the Bishop, minister, 
elders and deacons of the kirk of Orkney,364 by the minister, elders and deacons of 
the kirk of Jedburgh,365 and by the minister, elders and deacons of the kirk of Dundee 
with the superintendent of Angus.366  
Of these sentences of divorce, six were produced in litigation before the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh, and the Commissaries’ treatment of these sentences 
indicates that they employed a coherent policy towards those sentences of the Kirk’s 
tribunals which had been pronounced prior to the appointment of the Commissaries 
of Edinburgh.367 Their approach may be broken down into three discernible 
rationales: accepting sentences pronounced by virtue of commissions from the Lords 
of Council and Session; accepting sentences pronounced by virtue of episcopal 
authority; accepting sentences the tenor of which either could be verified by some 
process of inquiry or seemed to be uncontested by the parties involved.  
 Concerning the first rationale, in Hammyltoun v. Sclater the pursuer sought to 
have the defender decerned to have ‘tint her tocher et donationes propter nuptias’368 
                                                 
360 i.e. Gudlawde v. Archbald (St Andrews, i, 49-50); Gedde v. Rantoun (Ibid., i, 59-60); Lathrisk v. 
Symsoun (Ibid., i, 58-59); Clerk v. Schevez (Ibid., i, 62); Calland v. Alexander (Ibid., i, 70-72); Thecar 
v. Martyn (Ibid., i, 80-81); Scrymgeor v. Dundas (Ibid., i, 140); Kaye v. Duncan (Ibid., i, 141); Philip 
v. Thomson (Ibid., i, 150); Hyllok v. Gyb (Ibid., i, 155-156). 
361 Referred to in NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 393v-394v, 16 March 1564/5, Hammyltoun v. Maxwell & 
Lindesay; NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 86r-v, 11 July 1565, Patersoun v. Stevinsoun & Pollock. 
362 Referred to in NAS, CC8/2/1 fos. 323v-324v, 26 January 1564/5, Hammyltoun v. Sclater; NAS, 
CC8/2/2, fo. 419v, 3 April 1568, Sympill v. Hammiltoun; NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 323r-v, 26 January 
1564/5, Westoun v. Ewart. 
363 NAS, CS7/25, fo 353, 19 February 1562/3, in which Janet Ogilvy was stated to have “ane actioun 
and caus of divorce dependant before the superintendent and minister of abirden”. 
364 Referred to in NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 140r-v, 5 August 1564, Tullocht v. Sinclair. 
365 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 425r-v, 11 April 1565, Hardy v. Rutherfurde. The kirk of Jedburgh actually 
remitted the process to the Commissaries of Edinburgh upon their appointment. 
366 Referred to in NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 46v, 6 July 1564, Forrester v. Rollock. 
367 In contrast to David Baird Smith who argued that “the Commissary Court generally declined to 
recognize the validity of divorces granted by the small Reformed units” (‘The Reformers and 
Divorce’, 19). 
368 That is to say ‘to have forfeited her dowry together with those things given to her on account of the 
marriage’. 
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on the grounds that the litigants had been divorced by the “Ministeris eldaris and 
deacons of the burgh of Edinburgh” on 25 July 1560 on account of Elizabeth 
Sclater’s adultery with a named paramour. The Commissaries duly decerned Sclater 
to have tint her tocher et donationes, in part because she had failed to appear before 
the Commissaries and give her oath de calumnia, but also because Hamilton had 
proponed and proven that the kirk of Edinburgh “in respect of the wechtines of the 
caus had speciale licence gevin to thame be the Lordis of Secreit Counsale to proceid 
and do justice in the said mater”.369   
 Such granting of special commissions by the Lords of Council and Session 
during their administration of the spiritual jurisdiction from 1560 has already been 
discussed,370 and there is evidence beyond that of the records of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh that various tribunals of the Kirk were regularly commissioned by the 
Lords. Joseph Robertson has highlighted the fact that a husband petitioned the Lords 
of Council on 22 December 1560 concerning his wife’s adultery, the Council 
requesting that “the ministeris and eldaris of Sanctandrois” hear the case.371 A similar 
commission was granted by the Lords of Council to the kirk session of Glasgow and 
then Edinburgh in the action of divorce brought by the Countess of Eglinton against 
her husband.372 In addition the Lords also saw fit to grant the superintendent of 
Lothian, John Spottiswood, a commission on 19 March 1560/1 to hear all actions of 
divorce with the kirk sessions of Haddington, Edinburgh, Linlithgow and Stirling 
until the three estates were next convened.373 In this is it is clear that many of the 
tribunals of the Protestant Kirk heard consistorial actions because commissioned to 
do so by the Privy Council and not out of any “encroaching, nay, usurping spirit” as 
Riddell had had it.  
 Concerning the second rationale, in Tulloch v. Sinclair, as in Hammyltoun v. 
Sclater, the pursuer James Tulloch petitioned the Commissaries to decern his wife to 
                                                 
369 NAS, CC8/2/1, fos 323v-324v (earlier diets at CC8/2/2, fos 72v-73r, 87v-88r, 92r, 300v and 314r). 
Discussed in Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxv; Riddell, Inquiry. i, 443; James Fergusson, Reports of Some 
Recent Decisions by the Consistorial Court of Scotland (Edinburgh: A. Constable and Co., 1817), 
425-427; Fraser, Treatise (1876), ii, 1140. 
370 See above, pages 21-23. 
371 Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxv, footnotes; and discussed in more detail in Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 
10. 
372 Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 9. 
373 Donaldson, Scottish Reformation, 122; Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 10. 
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have ‘tint her tocher et donationes propter nuptias’ on the grounds that they had been 
divorced for adultery. To prove that they had been divorced, Tulloch appeared before 
the Commissaries of Edinburgh and “producit tua decreitis of the Divorcement 
obtenit be him aganis the said Margaret, that ane befoir the bishop minister eldaris 
and deaconis of the kirk of Orkney, and the vther befoir the Superintendent of 
lowthiane minster eldaris and deaconis of the kirk of Edinburcht”.374 The 
Commissaries accepted the sentences as valid. On the one hand it may be supposed 
that the Commissaries were prepared to accept the sentence of the bishop of Orkney 
by virtue of his episcopal authority. On the other hand, the sentence pronounced at 
Edinburgh had proceeded upon an appeal against Orkney’s decreet to the General 
Assembly. The Assembly in turn had “committit” the “caus of appelatioun” to the 
“superintendent of lowthiane Ministeris eldaris and deaconis of the kirk of 
Edinburgh”, who confirmed the first sentence on 27 April 1564 “and sua decernand 
in effect the said pretendit appelatioun to haue bene iniustlie interponit”.375 One of 
the members of the commission appointed by the General Assembly to hear the 
appeal was Clement Litill,376 who whilst an advocate only when the commission was 
chosen, had been appointed one of the Commissaries of Edinburgh by the time the 
commission had reached its decision. As such, the judgement of the appellate 
tribunal may have been accepted by the Commissaries on account of the fortuitous 
presence of one of their number among the judges. 
 These first two rationales suggest that the Commissaries may have been 
reluctant to acknowledge that the tribunals of the Kirk had an inherent right and 
authority to hear consistorial actions, or to acknowledge that the pronouncements of 
the tribunals of the Kirk were authoritative in themselves when used before the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh. This is also suggested by the third rationale. It would 
seem that if neither commission from the Lords of Council nor episcopal 
involvement was evident in the consistorial proceedings of the Kirk prior to the 
appointment of the Commissaries, the Commissaries were still generally inclined to 
accept any consistorial sentences which peradventure had been pronounced, but 
without granting the inherent authority of the Kirk to have pronounced such 
sentences. 
                                                 
374 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 140r-v, 5 August 1564. 
375 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 140r-v, 5 August 1564. 
376 Acts and Proceedings of the General Assemblies, i, 35, 27 June 1563. 
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 Whilst the evidence for the precise basis of the Commissaries’ acceptance of 
the sentences of the Kirk is scant for some cases, there is a suggestion of this third 
rationale. For example, in Weston v. Ewart the pursuer desired that the defender be 
decerned to have forfeited all things given to her (Ewart) in contemplation of 
marriage, on the grounds that the litigants had been divorced, for her adultery, by the 
minister elders and deacons of Edinburgh, 2 April 1562. The Commissaries, having 
first summoned and examined 8 witnesses, accepted this sentence of the Kirk, the 
clerk of court noting that the ‘divorcement’ of the litigants had been “lauchfully 
led”.377 It is not entirely clear what line the Commissaries had taken, but there is at 
least a suggestion that they had vetted the sentence of the Kirk: yet what is certain is 
that they had not accepted the Kirk’s sentences as the sole means of probation.378 
Yet in the last example, it could have been just as reasonably argued that the 
Commissaries accepted the sentence of the Kirk because it possessed some inherent 
authority which the Commissaries were obliged to acknowledge and accept. This, 
however, seems untenable in view of the final example to be considered, the case of 
Forbes v. Sandelands, in which the Commissaries of Edinburgh went to considerable 
lengths to underline the fact that they did not consider the consistorial decisions of 
the tribunals of the Kirk to have an inherent authority in litigation brought before 
them.  
Prior to the appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh, Barbara 
Sandilands had brought an action of adherence against her husband John Forbes 
before the court of the superintendent of Fife, Fotherick and Strathearn, John 
Winram.379 In his defence before the superintendent, Forbes had argued that he ought 
not to be compelled to adhere to his wife since she had committed adultery with one 
William Hunter. This peremptory exception, being relevant, was admitted to 
Forbes’s probation. Some 20 witnesses were summoned and their depositions were 
                                                 
377 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 323r-v, 26 January, 1564/5, Westoun v. Ewart. This phrase echoes the phrase 
“iustlie procedit” used on occassion by the Lords of Session (see Mark Godfrey, Civil Justice in 
Renaissance Scotland: the Origins of a Central Court (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 190). 
378 In another case, Fiscal and Paterson v. Stevenson and Pollock it is simply not clear why the 
sentence of the Kirk was accepted. The sentence was not a direct feature of the case, and some 
argument could be made for acceptance of the Kirk’s sentence on the grounds that the parties divorced 
by them had consented to the Kirk’s arbitration. The case is discussed in considerable detail below, 
but for other reasons (see pages 139-141). 
379 St Andrews, i, 156-167, action commenced possibly 23 June 1563, sentence pronounced 8 
December 1563. 
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recorded in the register of the kirk session.380 Barbara Sandilands’s adultery with 
William Hunter was duly proven, because it was certain a child had been born to the 
adulterous couple. As such, the superintendent’s court pronounced a sentence in 
which John Forbes was assoilized from the action of adherence on the grounds of 
Sandilands’ adultery.    
 On 12 May 1564, shortly after the appointment of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh, John Forbes brought an action of Scottish Protestant divorce before them, 
against his wife Barbara Sandilands, whom he alleged to have committed adultery 
with a named paramour, again William Hunter.381 To prove his libel, Forbes 
produced the sentence of the superintendent of Fife in which it was explicitly stated 
that Sandilands had committed adultery with William Hunter.382 Nevertheless, the 
Commissaries clearly did not accept the sentence of the superintendent of Fife as 
proving Forbes’s libel. Rather, the Commissaries admitted Forbes’s libel to 
probation, that is to say probation by witness. Of those witnesses who were 
summoned to Edinburgh and who actually appeared and deponed on oath, four had 
already given evidence before the superintendent of Fife. It seems clear from the 
depositions of these self-same witnesses recorded in the register of the kirk session of 
St Andrews383 that their evidence was sufficient to prove Forbes’s libel.384 It is clear 
that the Commissaries of Edinburgh could have had the original depositions of 
several witnesses examined in St Andrews extracted from the register of the kirk 
session there and brought to Edinburgh, but they clearly decided to re-examine the 
same witnesses in Edinburgh. Moreover, several members of the superintendent’s 
actual court were also summoned to Edinburgh, namely Master John Douglas, rector 
of the University of St. Andrews; Master William Ramsay, Master of St Salvator’s 
and elder in the kirk; and Master James Wilkie, elder and prominent member of the 
                                                 
380 St Andrews, i, 160-167. 
381 NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 18v-19r, 37r, 47v, 133v, 153v, 258v, 269r, 270v, 280r, 288r, 304v-305v 
(Decreet). 
382 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 133v, 2 August 1564. 
383 David Ramsay of Brakmouth (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 153v; St Andrews, i, 160, no. 1); John Vre (NAS, 
CC8/2/1, fo 258v; St Andrews, i, 161, no. 2); Master Robert Hamilton (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 269r; St 
Andrews, i, 164, no. 12); George Levingstoun (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 270v; St Andrews, i, 164, no. 13); 
note also that Michael Balfour of Burly had also deponed in St Andrews (St Andrews, i, 161-2, no. 8), 
and was summoned before the Commissaries, but he failed to compear (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 258v).   
384 It is noted that a further five witnesses were examined in Edinburgh, who had not been examined in 
Fife. 
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kirk of St Andrews.385 These men had not been witnesses in the original action 
before the superintendent of Fife, Fotherick and Strathearn but rather were leading 
members of the kirk of St Andrews who had appended their names to the sentence 
pronounced by the superintendent’s court.386 
 It seems certain that the Commissaries were not willing to accept the sentence 
of the superintendent’s court at St Andrews as the sole means by which Forbes’s 
allegation of adultery could be proven. The re-examination of witnesses and the 
summoning of Douglas and his colleagues were undertaken deliberately by the 
Commissaries. Given these certainties, it seems probable that they were making a 
general jurisdictional and constitutional point, namely that the tribunals of the 
Protestant Kirk did not have an inherent authority by which they could pronounce 
consistorial decisions which would be accepted as legally binding and enforceable by 
the wider Scottish legal system. Nevertheless, important as this conclusion is, it 
would be a mistake to use it to argue that the Commissaries of Edinburgh considered 
the tribunals of the Kirk to have enjoyed no legitimate authority and jurisdiction 
within the Scottish realm. The contrary appears to have been the case and this will be 
discussed in chapter VI, within the context of the ongoing relations between the 







                                                 
385 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 269r, 5 December 1564. 
386 “Pronunced in the parroche kyrk of the cite of Sanctandrois, upon the viij of December anno 1563, 
being present Masteris Ihon Dowglas, Rector, Crostofer Gudman, minister; Masteris Wyliam 
Ramsaye, James Wylke, Alan Lawmonth and hol ministerie” (St Andrews, i, 168). 
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CHAPTER III 
SCOTS CONSISTORIAL LAW DURING THE REFORMATION ERA 
 
 
 With the abrogation of papal authority in Scotland the inherent authority of 
the Canon law was called into question and its status, authority and continued 
validity in consistorial actions cannot have been entirely clear to the earliest 
Commissaries. However, in a number of ways it cannot be said that the 
Commissaries were in an unprecedented situation. It is quite likely, for example, that 
the first chief Commissary, James Balfour, would have had the example of the 
Lutheran Reformation before him as he resumed his administration of the episcopal 
jurisdiction in many senses where he had left off as last Official of Lothian. As a 
young man he had studied at Wittenberg,387 where he probably become aware of 
Lutheranism’s initial rejection, and subsequent re-acceptance of the Canon law. 
Luther’s fulminations against the “accursed papal law”388 or “holy canon law of 
unrighteousness”389 during “the heady days of the revolutionary defiance of Pope and 
Emperor in the 1520s”390 cannot have been without its parallels in Balfour’s own 
mind. As last Official of Lothian, Balfour must have been acutely aware of the 
rebellion of the Lords of the Congregation and their strikingly Lutheran railings 
against the maintainers of the “laws of Antichrist”, namely the courts of the Catholic 
Church, which the Lords had sought to overthrow. And like the early Lutheran 
reformers, radical Scottish reformers sought to abolish the Canon law.391 
 These may well have been alarming parallels for Balfour, who despite the 
religious radicalism of his youth, had become conservative in his later years, and 
indeed a spiritual judge in the Catholic Church prior to the Reformation.392 The 
                                                 
387 Balfour’s Practicks, i, xii. 
388 John Witte, ‘The Transformation of Marriage Law in the Lutheran Reformation’ in John Witte and 
F. S. Alexander (eds.), The Weightier Matters of the Law: Essays on Law and Religion (Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1988), 57-97, 57. 
389 John Witte, ‘Canon Law in Lutheran Germany’, in M. Hoeflich (ed.), Lex et Romanitas: Essays for 
Alan Watson (Berkley, California: Robbins Collection Pub., 2000), 181-224, 197. 
390 Witte, ‘Canon Law in Lutheran Germany’, 183. 
391 See references to the “laws of Antichrist” above, pages 11-13. 
392 Balfour had been “a fanatical Calvinist” in his youth and was numbered among the castillians 
following Cardinal Beaton’s murder (Peter McNeill, ‘Balfour, Sir James, of Pittendreich (c. 1525-
1583)’ (ODNB, accessed 12 December 2005). His change of attitude may have occurred during his 
time at the oars of French galleys with John Knox for company!  
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chaos which Lutheran Germany had experience as a result of its unworkable 
rejection of the Canon law393 must also have been known to Balfour. And as a 
student at Wittenberg in 1544 he may even have read a canon law textbook used 
there in teaching, for which Luther, despite his venomous attacks against the Canon 
law in the 1520s, had written a “commendatory preface”.394 
 It is therefore no surprise that when radical Protestantism imperilled the 
future of the Canon law in Scotland, Balfour emphasised the episcopal origins of the 
consistorial jurisdiction and involved himself intimately in the attempt to extricate 
the consistorial jurisdiction and its law from papal associations, and to continue its 
administration under the protection of the Crown and College of Justice until such 
time as it could be restored to the Scottish episcopate. And it is also no surprise that, 
this attempt proving successful, a great many aspects of the medieval Canon law 
were successfully transplanted into the law of the Commissaries of Edinburgh and all 
Scotland: a similar process had already proved successful in Lutheran Germany.395 
The likely rationale used by the Commissaries in regulating this process has also 
survived in the works of Thomas Craig, himself a procurator before the earliest 
Commissaries of Edinburgh.396 Craig argued in his Ius Feudale that “although the 
authority of the Pope was rejected at the Reformation, the Canon law remained 
authoritative: ‘so much so, that where it differs from the Civil law…we follow the 
Canon law’”.397  
 Whilst the Canon law seems to have been adopted wholesale in executry 
business and in the regulation of Scottish benefices,398 the early consistorial law of 
the Commissaries of Edinburgh did witnesses considerable departures from the 
Canon law of marriage and divorce, and as such is of particular interest to this thesis. 
Yet even here, the continuity of the Canon law was pronounced in respect of the 
contracting of marriage, and even where new laws of divorce were introduced, the 
presence of concepts from the Canon law are still discernible. This section will 
therefore begin by considering the contracting of marriage and the continued 
                                                 
393 Witte, ‘Canon Law in Lutheran Germany’, 204-205. 
394 Ibid., 183. 
395 Ibid., 182. 
396 For example, Craig famously represented the 5th earl of Argyll in his proceedings against his 
countess, Jane Stewart (discussed below, page 144). 
397 Sellar, ‘Habit and Repute’, 117-136, 120, see also 123. 
398 For benefice law see Green, ‘Scottish Benefices’. 
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enforcement of the Canon law, before turning to a detailed consideration of the two 
great alterations introduced by the Reformation, Scottish Protestant divorce for 




REGULAR, IRREGULAR AND CLANDESTINE MARRIAGE 
 
[i] REGULAR MARRIAGE 
 
 During the course of the twentieth century Scottish legal historians have 
become fully aware of the almost total continuity of the Canon law concerning the 
contracting of marriage in Scots consistorial law. This has been achieved not so 
much as a result of the development of a fuller understanding of Scots law, but from 
a greater appreciation of the Canon law. A renewal of interest in the pre-Reformation 
law of marriage may be traced to the publication of the Liber Officialis Sancti 
Andree in 1845, but it was not until the publication of William Hay’s Lectures on 
Marriage in 1967 that Scottish legal historians were presented not just with “the 
Canon Law in isolation, but something much more illuminating – legal prescriptions 
set out within that framework of reference which alone gives them meaning, the 
intricate structure of Catholic theology”.399 The renewed appreciation of the 
intellectual basis of the Canon law of marriage in Scotland has been used to correct 
many of the misunderstandings which had arisen in Scotland.400  
One of the principal sources of confusion in Scotland arising out a failure to 
grasp the principles of the Canon law concerned the contracting of marriage in post-
Reformation Scotland arose out of the work of the nineteenth-century Lord of 
Session, Patrick Fraser. Whilst it is now well understood that Fraser’s work was 
“marred”401 on account of his “insistence that in the Middle Ages both England and 
Scotland had a national ecclesiastical law of their own, influenced by, but not 
                                                 
399 Quoted from I.D. Willock’s apology offered by the Stair Society for publishing William Hay’s 
Lectures on Marriage. 
400 For example, David Sellar has corrected various errors concerning marriage by cohabitation with 
habit and repute by setting Scots law within its Canon law context (‘Habit and Repute’,117-136); 
Sellar also notes that Hay’s Lectures on Marriage and Ollivant’s Court of the Official have added 
much to our knowledge of the Canon law in Scotland (Ibid., 119).  
401 Hector MacQueen, ‘Fraser, Patrick, Lord Fraser (1817–1889)’ (ODNB, accessed 5 March 2010). 
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identical with that of the church of Rome”,402 Fraser’s writings still remain the only 
work in which extensive evidence from the early Registers of the Acts and Decreets 
of the Commissaries of Edinburgh is used to support arguments about the shape of 
early Scots consistorial law concerning the contracting of marriage. Whilst a greater 
understanding of the Canon law of marriage, together with a definite and certain 
knowledge of later Scots consistorial law403 has long laid Fraser’s errors to rest, the 
fact that he based his arguments upon an analysis of the early cases of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh makes a degree of engagement with Fraser necessary: 
the same material has not been discussed in detail until now. 
In addition, there still seems to be a persistent confusion in Scotland about the 
use of the terms ‘regular’, ‘irregular’ and ‘clandestine’ marriage, as highlighted in a 
recent article by Brian Dempsey. He has summarized the confusion thus: 
 
“It is, however, accepted that there is a great deal of overlap between 
clandestine and irregular marriage in Scots law and that in many particular 
cases it would prove difficult to establish with any clarity whether the 
“confused happenings” in the records were either clandestine or irregular 
marriages or both. Notwithstanding the confusion, [Patrick] Fraser was at 
pains to keep separate the two types of marriage. On the other hand, Leah 
Leneman and Rosalind Mitchison…state that one can ignore the distinction 
and refer to “‘irregular’, ‘disorderly’ or ‘clandestine’ marriage (the terms are 
synonymous)” ”.404 
 
In the case of Leneman and Mitchison it will be shown that their conflation of 
the terms has been predicated upon a lack of understanding of the Canon law context. 
Dempsey himself nevertheless goes on to submit that “an attempt should be made 
where possible to differentiate between the two types of “non-regular” marriage”. 
The category ‘non-regular’ is undoubtedly useful. Dempsey has reserved his method 
of differentiation for “a later article”, but has suggested that the distinction between 
‘irregular’ and ‘clandestine’ “is important in terms of understanding people’s 
motivation to marry other than according to the formally correct procedure”.405 Be 
that as it may, it will be argued here that the confusion has arisen out of the 
                                                 
402 Sellar, ‘Habit and Repute’, 118. 
403 The principal published source of which remains Lord Hermand’s Consistorial Decisions (Stair 
Society, 1940). 
404 Brian Dempsey, ‘The Marriage (Scotland) Bill 1755’ in Miscellany VI (Edinburgh: The Stair 
Society, 2009), 75-119, 77. 
405 Dempsey, ‘The Marriage (Scotland) Bill 1755’, 78. 
   93
conflation of two distinct perspectives of marriage law, namely the Canon law 
perspective and the Scots law perspective, which use the same vocabulary to 
designate different concepts. 
 
The ideal to which the Church in western Christendom had been aspiring 
since the Fourth Lateran Council regarding the contracting of marriage was regular 
marriage. The Council, “extending the special custom of certain regions to other 
regions generally” decreed that “when marriages are to be contracted they shall be 
publicly announced in the churches by priests, with a suitable time being fixed 
beforehand within which whoever wished and is able may adduce a lawful 
impediment. The priests themselves shall also investigate whether there is any 
impediment”.406 All marriages contracted without a prior proclamation of banns were 
deprecated and deemed ‘clandestine’.  
 As has been noted by James Scanlon, the term ‘clandestine’ “could mean a 
marriage contracted without witnesses and therefore incapable of juridical proof; a 
marriage which could indeed be proved but was contracted without the prescribed 
solemnities; and lastly, after the 4th Lateran Council, a marriage without previous 
banns”.407  This is certainly accurate. Within the Canon-law context of Lateran IV, 
‘clandestine’ was used in a broad sense to distinguish all ‘non-regular’ marriages, 
whilst simultaneously defining ‘clandestine’ marriages as all those not conforming to 
the new prescription that all regular marriages be prefaced by the proclamation of 
banns.408 On the other hand, within the Scots law context, the Canon law category 
‘clandestine’ in the sense of ‘non-regular’ was broken down into ‘clandestine’ and 
‘irregular’ marriages, in respect of the probation of marital promises. That is to say, 
if the promise was made in secret and could only be proven through recourse to an 
oath, the promise was ‘clandestine’ in Scots law. If, however, a promise had been 
made before witnesses, and possibly recorded by a notary, but went on to form the 
basis of a ‘non-regular’ marriage then it was deemed irregular in Scots law. Thus, 
when Lateran IV forbade priests to be present at ‘clandestine’ marriages it meant 
                                                 
406 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed N.P. Tanner, SJ, (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), i, 258. 
407 James D. Scanlon, ‘Husband and Wife: Pre-Reformation Canon Law of Marriage of the Officials 
Court’ in An Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1958), 69-81, 73; 
see also Lectures on Marriage, 29.  
408 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, i, 258; Cf Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Post-Reformation’, 
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those not prefaced by banns (i.e. ‘non-regular’), rather than those that could only be 
proven by oath, since the presence of the priest provided a witness to the union. 
The decrees of the Fourth Lateran Council were clearly accepted by the 
Scottish Church, with the “thrice-repeated proclamation” of banns on three separate 
Sundays becoming mandatory, whilst priests were prohibited from celebrating 
‘clandestine’ marriages.409 Nevertheless, the problem with the Church’s attempted 
reform rested upon the fact that ‘non-regular’ marriages were still valid, if proven. 
The text-book problem was that attendant upon the giving in of a couples’ names to a 
priest to have their banns proclaimed. The giving in of names clearly implied, and 
indeed could only practically proceed upon sponsalia per verba de futuro. The 
danger here for the Church’s drive for regularity was that if copula preceded either  
the proclamation of banns or the solemnization of the marriage, an irregular marriage 
was contracted.  
The Scottish Church sought at the least to limit the consequences of this weak 
point in proceedings, and at best to prevent it altogether, by ordaining that couples 
wishing to be betrothed “whether according to the formula for a union ‘at present’ or 
‘in the future,’ contract the said espousals in the presence of a priest and of 
trustworthy witnesses”. In addition the Church enjoined that banns should be 
published as soon as possible thereafter, that any subsequent nuptial blessing be 
public and not private, and that those who had sexual intercourse following their 
espousals, but prior to the public celebration of their marriage, should be punished as 
fornicators.410 Several distinct elements can be discerned in the Church’s policy. On 
the one hand the presence of “a priest and of trustworthy witnesses” when any 
promise of marriage was made was aimed at making probation easier in the event of 
a subsequent denial of the promise. On the other, the pragmatic step of having the 
banns proclaimed as soon as possible, was intended to limit the time-frame in which 
copula could occur. The final provision was to use the Church’s censures to deter 
couples from entering into sexual relations between initial promise and 
solemnization, by threatening to punish them ‘as fornicators’. This censure can be 
misleading if taken in the wrong sense. It was not meant to imply that irregular 
marriages were no marriages at all and therefore the couple involved were 
                                                 
409 Statutes of the Scottish Church, 1225-1559, trans. & ed. D. Patrick (Edinburgh: Scottish History 
Society, 1907), 39, 63, 71-72, 142-143.  
410 Ibid., 72-73. 
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fornicators. Rather the sense was that those who disobeyed the Church’s injunctions 
in this matter were to be punished as if fornicators, or with the same punishments as 
those meted out to fornicators. This sense was expressed by Andrew Forman, 
Archbishop of St. Andrews (1516-1521) when he condemned the “two evil customs” 
of clandestine espousals, and public espousals followed by copula prior to “the 
contracting of marriage and its solemnization in the face of the church…” in an 
attempt to rouse the clergy to instruct the people to cease to practice such customs.411 
Following the Reformation, the Kirk continued to take a strong stance against such 
customs, describing them as “manifest fornication and huirdom”,412 although it is 
unclear if the Kirk intended to actually make regular marriage the only lawful kind of 
marriage, as did the Council of Trent.  
 Regular marriage was therefore proclamation of banns followed by sponsalia 
per verba de praesenti in facie ecclesiae. But it must be pointed out that the banns 
were the essential element, since sponsalia per verba de praesenti could be 
contracted in facie ecclesiae without the proclamation of banns, but would be ‘non-
regular’ or ‘clandestine’. This arose from the definition of ‘the face of the Church’. 
William Hay quotes the definition of Angelus that “marriage is said to be contracted 
in the presence of the Church when it is contracted before a number of witnesses, for 
by Church in this context is meant an assembly of the faithful”.413 In this, the 
presence of a priest at the celebration of the marriage was not a legal necessity until 
the Council of Trent’s Tametsi which insisted on the presence of a priest for legal 
validity; as is well known, this decree did not become law in Scotland. In Scotland, 
whilst the presence of a priest was always preferable, but not legally essential, the 
key phrase in distinguishing clandestine from irregular marriages became the 
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412 Quoted in Sellar, ‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 62. 
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[ii] IRREGULAR AND CLANDESTINE MARRIAGE415 
 
 Concerning irregular and clandestine marriages, continuity between the pre-
Reformation Canon law and the Scots consistorial law of the Protestant age was near 
total. Patrick Fraser’s errors are most pronounced in this respect, since despite his 
erudition and interesting observations, his preconceptions concerning the pre-
Reformation Scottish polity and Canon law gave rise to a series of interconnected 
errors when he sought to interpret and systematically arrange evidence from the early 
decreets of the Commissaries. 
 The basic error from which Lord Fraser’s misconceptions arose concerned his 
understanding of the reception of the Canon law into Scotland prior to the 
Reformation. Lord Stair had asserted in his Institutions that the Canon law had no 
binding authority in Scotland, but was accepted by Scottish courts on its merits.416 
Whilst Stair’s statement tenable during the post-Reformation period, Fraser applied 
this rule in an undifferentiated way to pre-Reformation Scotland. Accordingly, Fraser 
made a distinction between ‘Roman’ and ‘Scotch’ Canon law. The former was that 
promulgated by the bishops of Rome, the latter that received into Scotland by 
tribunals of the Scottish Church. For Fraser, Roman Canon law had no inherent 
binding force in Scotland either before or after the Reformation: only those elements 
of the Roman Canon law which had had the authority of a native Scottish tribunal 
interpolated upon them were binding. Whilst this conception provides a helpful 
model by which the post-Reformation reception of Canon law may be understood, it 
is entirely misleading regarding the pre-Reformation Scottish polity. The result for 
Fraser was that he did not believe that the Corpus Iuris Canonici was a valid source 
from which to infer the ‘Scotch’ Canon law. Rather ‘Scotch’ Canon law had to be 
demonstrated from the evidence of statutes of the Scottish Church and the extant 
records of the pre-Reformation Officials.417 
 From the pre-Reformation Scottish material Lord Fraser deduced and inferred 
that the law of Scotland concerning contracting marriage was as follows. A promise 
of betrothal per verba de futuro on its own was a pre-contract, which whilst it 
                                                 
415 The definitions used here are in terms of the distinctions of ‘non-regular’ marriage relative to the 
probation of the promise on which they were founded. 
416 Fraser, Treatise (1846), i, 27, quoting Institutes, I.1.16. 
417 Fraser, Treatise (1846), i, 30-35; Treatise (1876), i, 23-25. 
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impeded the contracting of another marriage, could nevertheless be dissolved by the 
decree of a competent court:418 in this he was correct. His error arose from the 
extension of this concept of pre-contract to all other kinds of betrothal and 
subsequent copula which fell short of regular marriage419. Two main pieces of 
evidence suggested this theory to Lord Fraser’s mind. In the first place, there was 
clear evidence that the Scottish Church deprecated clandestine and irregular 
‘marriage’ in the most vehement terms, denouncing it as ‘fornication’. In the second 
place, Fraser noted how the Officials had always decerned couples so united to 
solemnize the band of marriage in facie ecclesiae. From this, Fraser deduced that 
without solemnization no marriage could be deemed to have been contracted, 
because otherwise the Officials would have pronounced a declarator of marriage 
rather than compel solemnization.420 
 Nevertheless, Fraser had fundamentally misunderstood the Church’s position 
concerning irregular and clandestine marriage. The Church had always maintained 
that irregular and clandestine promises of marriage in the present tense, or in the 
future tense followed by copulation, formed the bond of marriage between a couple. 
The primary grounds for this position was the Church’s understanding of marriage as 
a sacrament, and that consent in the present tense or its equivalent was all that was 
necessary to contract marriage, an understanding derived from a consideration of the 
marriage between Mary and Joseph.421 The Church reasoned that since the marriage 
of two baptized Christians was a source of grace, all obstacles to the reception of 
such grace ought to be removed. Whilst the Church never altered this basic 
theological understanding, practical considerations obliged it to regulate the 
contracting of marriage through the Canon law enforced with ecclesiastical 
sanctions. As such, prior to the Tridentine reforms, the Church would still ultimately 
acknowledge the validity of clandestine marriages, but could fulminate against those 
who contracted such marriages on the grounds that they had violated the Canon 
law.422 
                                                 
418 Fraser, Treatise (1876), i, 263 et seq. 
419 Ibid., i, 322 et seq. 
420 Ibid., i, 331 et seq. 
421 See below, page 101. 
422 “The Church always reprobated clandestine marriages” (Scanlon, ‘Husband and Wife’, 73). 
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The Church’s tightening of the regulations governing the contracting of 
marriage was a lengthy process which spanned the 350 year period between Lateran 
IV and Trent. A significant tightening of regulations within the Scottish context was 
that introduced by Archbishop Forman (1516-1521), who ordained that promises 
made in public without being prefaced by banns had to be made in front of a 
priest;423 in reality this became in effect before ‘famous witnesses’. Even then, 
whenever Officials found a couple to have contracted an irregular (or indeed a 
clandestine) marriage, they would ordain that the couple proceed to have the banns 
proclaimed and their marriage celebrated with full solemnities in facie ecclesiae. 
This policy was aimed at continually enforcing in the minds of the laity the Church’s 
desire that all marriages be regularly celebrated and contracted. As such, what Lord 
Fraser observed was not the Church’s dismissal of clandestine and irregular 
marriages as de facto null, but rather the Church’s attempt to reduce the number of 
such marriages and increase the proportion of marriages contracted in a regular 
manner through recourse to ecclesiastical censures and the courts spiritual. 
 The policies of the medieval Church, or at least the laws they gave rise to, 
were retained by the Commissaries of Edinburgh. Nevertheless, reforms introduced 
by the Council of Trent, which tightened marriage law yet further by declaring 
‘clandestinity’ in the sense of ‘non-regularity’ to be an impediment to marriage in 
Canon law, thereby providing a handle by which all marriages proceeding without 
proclamation of banns could be annulled424 were not adopted in Scotland. 
 When discussing the valid contracting of marriage in Scotland Fraser allowed 
that “the direct legal authorities on the subject are very scanty, and one is compelled 
to illustrate what the law is by reference to practice, and custom, and usages found 
elsewhere than in direct decision of the Consistorial Court. Many of the latter will 
here be cited; but the labour of searching among the MSS. records must be the 
excuse for leaving so much learning in the obscurity in which it now lies buried”.425 
If Fraser been less occupied as a Lord of Session and had had more time to continue 
his researches among the Acts and Decreets he would found plentiful evidence 
among his cherished native Scottish sources that openly contradicted his opinion that 
                                                 
423 Statutes of the Scottish Church, 267-8. 
424 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ii, 755 et seq, Council of Trent, session 24, chapter 1, 
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425 Fraser, Treatise (1876), i, 326.  
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only solemnized marriages were actual marriages, all other forms of betrothal being a 
pre-contract. The principal source of information for the illustration of this branch of 
the law are actions for solemnization of marriage. Decreets compelling solemnization 
were in effect declarators of marriage, albeit they conformed to the policy of the late 
medieval Church of channelling as many clandestine and irregular marriages as 
possible towards regularity.  
 
 
[a] SPONSALIA PER VERBA DE FUTURO 
 
 This type of betrothal was a marital pre-contract in Scotland, both before and 
after the Reformation. It was nevertheless an impediment to entering into a 
subsequent marriage agreement with a third party. On a number of occasions during 
the 1560s and 70s the Commissaries of Edinburgh dealt with actions occasioned by 
these types of pre-contract. In McWalter v. Galbraith, the pursuer and defender had 
“contractit sponsalia per verba de futuro and euery ane of the saidis parteis maid 
faithfull promeis to vtheris for solempnizatioun of the band of mariage foirsaid,” yet 
the defender refused to compleit the promise and openly declared that she did not 
wish to be joined to the pursuer in marriage. The pursuer therefore sought to “be 
decernit fre of the promeis foirsaid and to haue als greit libertie in mariage as he had 
of befoir the tyme of the promeis foirsaid and making thairupoun seing that thair hes 
na carnale deill followit thairupoun.” The Commissaries duly declared the pursuer 
free, since both parties, being sworn, made faith that there had been no ‘carnal 
conversation’ between them.426  
 The quality of the promise, in terms of whether it was made secretly or 
publicly, made no difference to its de facto validity, but rather gave rise to 
complications of proof, which are dealt with in the section on consistorial procedure 
and competent actions.427 It is also clear that the proclamation of banns following 
upon a promise of marriage per verba de futuro did not prevent the Commissaries 
from dissolving the pre-contract. Thus is McWalter v. Galbrayth, whilst the banns 
were not explicitly mentioned in the Commissaries’ decreet, the Buik of the Kirk of 
the Canagait notes “Valter McValter, Bessie Cabreth, 1, 2, devorsment vith the 
                                                 
426 NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 41, 30 May 1565. 
427 See below, pages 173-177. 
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commissar” in its list of “the namis of all thois that ar cryit in our kirk”.428 This is of 
course a logical position for the Commissaries to have adopted: the giving up of 
names to a parish minister to be proclaimed was indicative of a promise per verba de 
futuro and nothing more. Thus, whilst banns were a helpful indicator of sponsalia 
per verba de futuro, without copula such promises remained pre-contracts.    
 
 
[b] SPONSALIA PER VERBA DE FUTURO CUM COPULA SUBSEQUENTE 
  
 The pre-contract of sponsalia per verba de futuro became a binding contract 
of marriage if completed by subsequent copula. This Canon law doctrine was clearly 
retained in Scotland following the Reformation, despite Lord Fraser’s arguments.429 
On several occasions, this doctrine was stated explicitly in principal precepts issued 
by the Commissaries of Edinburgh. In Goddiskirk v. Tenent, it was asserted that the 
litigants had “maid promeis of mariage ather to vther quhilk promeis wes alsua 
corroborat betuix thame be proclamatioun of thair bannis maid opinlie in the kirk of 
Calder of thair consentis in publict audience, and als be carnall daill and copulatioun 
had thaireftir quhairthrow in effect the mariage was consummat & finnist betuix 
thame”.430 In Duncane v. Fairley, it was alleged that the defender had sought the 
pursuer’s consent to fornicate together, but being rebuffed, promised to marry the 
pursuer, which promise was followed by copula. The pursuer thus asserted that the 
defender ought to be compelled to solemnize the band of marriage “sen it is of veritie 
that sik faythfull promes maid as said is makis matrimony carnale dale followand 
thairupoun”.431 Similar statements were made in Bartene v. Mowbray,432 Crawfurde 
v. Makdill,433 Denis v. Brysoun434 and Quhitlaw v. Stewart.435 Finally the matter was 
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put slightly differently in McCrerie v. Hunter, in which it was alleged that the 
litigants had “promittit to Gode per verba Defutur436 to tak vtheris in the holie band 
of matrimony,” and thereafter allegedly “gaif the vse of thair bodyis till vtheris, in 
respect quhairof be the law of God nather of thame can nor may seperat thame selffis 
fra vtheris & tak vther personis quhatsumevir in marriage”.437  
 
 
[c] SPONSALIA PER VERBA DE PRAESENTI 
  
 In Scotland, both before and after the Reformation, promise of marriage in 
the present tense constituted marriage, and indeed was held to be the very essence of 
marriage. Prior to the Reformation the Church held that such a promise did not have 
to be consummated in order to constitute marriage. William Hay treated his students 
at Aberdeen to a substantial discourse on the matter under the heading “Whether 
there was a true and valid marriage between the glorious Virgin Mary and Joseph the 
just, notwithstanding their vows of chastity”: the answer was emphatically 
affirmative.438 Whilst it should be doubted that the Scottish Reformers maintained 
the doctrine of the perpetual virginity of Mary, the law which stemmed from this 
doctrine was retained in Scotland.439 This law was stated explicitly in Makewin v. 
Stalker, in which it was alleged that the couple had “contracti[t] mareage befoir 
diuers famows wittneses bretheris of the kirk of God per verba de presenti with thair 
mutuall consentis ilk ane to vtheris be thair faithfull promeses hinc inde & j[un]ying 




                                                                                                                                          
435 “Nochtwithstanding the quhilk promeis and carnall daill following thairvpoun quhilk is mariage in 
the self” (NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 172r-v, 20 October 1573). 
436 Certainly no o, and possibly even Defutire in MS. 
437 NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 448v, 23 July 1574, McCrerie v. Hunter. 
438 Lectures on Marriage, 305-317. 
439 I have made no study of the Reformers on this question, though I recall the late Professor David 
Wright explaining that the first generation of European Reformers did not treat upon the subject of 
Marian doctrine at length.  
440 NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 152v-153r, 20 January 1569/70. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Continuity between pre- and post- Reformation law in Scotland concerning 
regular, irregular and clandestine marriage was total. The essential principle 
remained that consent as expressed per verba de praesenti was the essence of 
marriage, regardless of subsequent copula. In the case of sponsalia per verba de 
futuro, such a promise remained a dissoluble pre-contract, unless completed by 
subsequent copula, such copula being taken as evidence of present consent to the 
proposed marriage,441 thus tantamount to sponsalia per verba de praesenti. The 
distinction between clandestine and irregular marriage depended before whom the 
promises had been made. Thus, whilst the promises of marriage made between two 
parties free to consent were always de facto valid, they were clandestine if made in 
secret, and irregular if made before “famous witnesses”,442 but without having been 
prefaced by the proclamation of banns. Yet the preferred manner of contracting 
marriage in Scotland, prescribed by positive law, remained the proclamation of banns 
and the solemnization of marriage in facie ecclesiae.     
















                                                 
441 See Sellar, ‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 62. 
442 See below, page 174, n. 137. 
   103
§II 
SCOTTISH PROTESTANT DIVORCE FOR ADULTERY 
 
 
 The precise shape of the divorce law reforms introduced into Scotland by the 
tribunals of the Protestant Kirk from 1559 has been much discussed over the years. 
Prior to the Reformation, the competent remedy for adultery had been divorce a 
mensa et thoro, a divorce which allowed both parties to live separately, but which 
did not allow the remarriage of either the innocent or the guilty party. Such freedom 
was only bestowed following the death of one of the parties, at which stage the 
surviving party could usually remarry. The principal innovation of the Reformation 
was to allow a new kind of divorce which certainly allowed the immediate 
remarriage of the innocent party. Nevertheless, it remains a disputable point whether 
or not the guilty party was likewise entitled to remarry at once.  
 Later Scottish practice and opinion maintained that both parties were free to 
remarry. By the later seventeenth century Lord Stair summarized the law of divorce 
for adultery thus:  
 
“It may be doubted, whether the adulterer, after the dissolution of the marriage 
upon his default may marry again. But though positive law, as a penalty upon 
adulterers, may hinder their marriage with the adulterers or others and declare 
such marriages, as to succession and civil effects void; yet can it not simply 
annul it. With us marriage betwixt the two committers of adultery is declared 
null, and the issue inhibitate to succeed to their parents (by an Act of 
Parliament passed in 1600). But otherwise even the person guilty may remarry 
again.” 443 
  
This kind of divorce was commonly known as divorce a vinculo matrimonii and has 
been defined by Lord Trayner as setting “the parties as free from each other as if they 
had never been married, and entitles each to remarry, even during the lifetime of the 
previous spouse”.444 Whilst there can be no doubt that this was indeed the law of 
Scotland from at least Stair’s time, doubts have persisted as the whether or not this 
was the law of Scotland during the sixteenth century from 1559. For this earlier 
                                                 
443 James Dalrymple, Viscount of Stair, Institutes of the Laws of Scotland (Edinburgh: Hamilton and 
Balfour, 1759), I.4.7. 
444 Trayner’s Latin Maxims (Edinburgh: W. Green & Son, 1894), fourth edition, 6. 
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period, various authorities have questioned the applicability of Stair’s observations. 
To quote an extract from Patrick Fraser’s Treatise of 1846: 
  
“even Lord Stair himself has been accused with being on this subject 
unusually obscure...and his doctrines are said to be inconsistent with our early 
practice, which he professed to elucidate. ‘In the whole of this section of his 
work,’ says Mr Gillies,445 ‘Lord Stair has not expressed himself with his usual 
perspicuity,’ and [John] Riddell has added, that ‘however great a lawyer, 
[Stair], as has been already observed, is not always a close or apt illustrator of 
our peculiar or original practice.’ ” 446  
 
The questioning of Stair’s authority for the post-Reformation sixteenth 
century period left the questioners with a significant problem: how might the law be 
authoritatively understood? The first problem which has resulted in some obscurity 
on this matter arose from the veil of privacy which surrounded the proceedings of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh and the decreets of divorce they pronounced during the 
majority of the two-hundred-and-fifty-year history of their court. From the time of 
the appointment of the first Commissaries during the winter of 1563/4 down to 1812, 
the Commissaries of Edinburgh held court behind closed doors, outwith the view of 
public observers, on account of the perceived sensitivity of many of the cases they 
dealt with, many of which involved the adultery of representatives of noble houses, 
or occasionally even more delicate matters such as the impotence of such 
representatives.447 This need for delicacy has been stated by one of the last 
Commissaries of Edinburgh, James Fergusson, as the reason why consistorial cases 
were never reported from the Commissary Court until the nineteenth century, and 
even then the details only of what were then current, not sixteenth-century cases 
were made available.448  
                                                 
445 Adam Gillies, a senator of the College of Justice from 1811 (J. A. Hamilton, ‘Gillies, Adam, Lord 
Gillies (1760–1842)’, rev. Eric Metcalfe, (ODNB, accessed 5 March 2010). 
446 Fraser, Treatise (1846), i, 3. 
447 In 1693 an Act was passed opening the Scottish courts of justice to public scrutiny, whilst making 
a provision for some cases to be tried privately in the old manner, with only the litigants and their 
procurators present, and with the judges deliberating in private. The Commissaries extended the 
exception for “some special cases,” allowed by the 1693 legislation, “to all causes in their 
department,” and thus for a further century of more, their deliberations continued to be in private, 
behind closed doors (Fergusson, Present State of the Consistorial Law, xxi- xxii). 
448 Fergusson, Present State of the Consistorial Law, xviii-xxiii; a few handwritten ‘Practicks’ were 
compiled by individual Commissaries for their professional use from the 18th century onwards (see 
Fergusson, Reports of Some Recent Decisions, 249 for a summary of these. One of them went on to be 
published as Lord Hermand’s Consistorial Decisions by the Stair Society in 1940). 
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Authorities which could have left no doubt as the precise shape of Scottish 
Protestant divorce law during the sixteenth century were silent on the matter, most 
notably the first chief Commissary of Edinburgh, Sir James Balfour of Pittendreich: 
As James Fergusson stated “even Balfour himself... has left only some reports of 
cases tried there [the Commissary Courts], among other precedents,” in his 
Practicks, reports which Lord Fraser deemed “of no great value or interest”.449 As to 
later Commissaries of note such as John Nisbet, later Lord Dirleton, whilst he 
devoted a separate article to the subject of the Commissary Courts in his Doubts and 
Questions, James Fergusson pointed out that “that too was merely a defence of the 
“Consistories,” when assailed as a remnant of Popery, at the final establishment of 
the Presbyterian Church in Scotland”.450  
Given these problems, the only reasonable course left to nineteenth-century 
antiquaries was to establish what the law had been by recourse to the decisions of the 
earliest Commissaries of Edinburgh, preserved in their Registers of Acts and 
Decreets. During the early nineteenth century this approach was adopted first by the 
peerage lawyer John Riddell, then by Patrick Lord Fraser. The problems attending 
Fraser’s works have already been noted, but in contrast to Fraser’s misunderstanding 
of the pre-Reformation Scottish polity, Sir Walter Scott held that “among antiquaries, 
only Riddell and Thomas Thomson possessed a proper appreciation of pre-
Reformation Scotland”.451 Where the rights of the guilty party following divorce for 
adultery were concerned, it was Riddell who first suggested that the party guilty of 
adultery may have been impeded in post-Reformation Scotland from contracting 
marriage during the life-time of the innocent spouse. “It strikes me, after all,” wrote 
Riddell, “that the strict and maturer exposition of our law during the period, and 
before 1600, may be that divorced adulterers could… be precluded from marrying 
during the lifetime of the divorcing party”.452 But he was not entirely sure, mainly on 
account of the fact that he had argued during the course of the peerage case Duke of 
Roxburgh v. Ker, that the guilty party had been entirely precluded from remarriage 
prior to the Act of 1600. Riddell’s argument was rejected by the Court of Session and 
                                                 
449 Fraser, Treatise (1846), i, 3. 
450 Fergusson, Present State of the Consistorial Law, xiv – xv. 
451 Lionel Alexander Ritchie, ‘Riddell, John (1785-1862)’ (ODNB, accessed 3 February 2010). 
452 Riddell, Inquiry, i, 409. Whether or not conviction of adultery was an impediment to remarriage 
has also been briefly, but inconclusively discussed by Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Divorce’, 93-94. 
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again on appeal by the House of Lords, on the narrative that the need for the Act of 
1600 forbidding the marriage of divorced adulterers to their paramours inferred that 
they had been free to do so prior to the Act.453 Whilst Riddell’s inquiries did not 
prove entirely conclusive, it is the contention of this section of the thesis that 
Riddell’s hesitant assertion was in fact correct, and that it can be demonstrated from 
the decisions of the Kirk and Commissaries from 1559-1576 that the party guilty of 
adultery was impeded from remarriage during the lifetime of the innocent spouse. 
 
The first misunderstanding to lay to rest is that, contrary to most Scottish 
authorities,454 it is perhaps unhelpful to label the new kind of divorce for adultery 
introduced into Scotland from 1559 as ‘divorce a vinculo matrimonii’. In the first 
place, as already noted, divorce a vinculo came to be understood in later Scottish 
practice as a kind of divorce which freed both parties to remarry immediately. In the 
second place, the label is problematic from the Canon law perspective, from which 
divorce a vinculo is in fact annulment.455 As has already been discussed in respect of 
‘clandestine’ marriages, the Canon law and Scots law perspectives can apply the 
same term to two distinct concepts, which tends to result in a confusion of 
terminology and a conflation of distinct concepts. Since from the Canon law 
perspective divorce  a vinculo means annulment, whilst in Scottish legal terminology 
is has come to mean a divorce for adultery which allows both parties to remarry, it 
seems unhelpful to apply the same label to a third kind of divorce, namely early 
Scottish Protestant divorce for adultery, which, it will be argued, had its own distinct 
and unique parameters. This need for a new label is further enforced by the fact no 
sentence or decreet of divorce for adultery pronounced by the tribunals of the 
Protestant Kirk or the Commissaries of Edinburgh between 1559 and 1576 (the 
                                                 
453 RPS, 1600/11/42; APS, iv, 233, c.29; the basis of Riddell’s arguments were rehearsed in Riddell, 
Inquiry, i, 395-402, which includes a discussion of the Act of 1600; see Fraser, Treatise (1876), i, 
140-143 for a further discussion of Riddell’s views, the Act of 1600 and Roxburgh v. Ker. 
454 Riddell, Inquiry, i, 435 et seq; Fraser, Treatise (1876), ii, 1139; Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: 
Divorce’, 90-91, & esp. 97.  
455“Et duplex est divorcium Unum scilicet quo ad mutuam cohabitationem vz quo ad thorum mensam 
et redditionem debiti . Aliud est divorcium quo a vinculum matrimoniale Sic quod persone inter quas 
celebratum est divorcium licite possunt cum aliis matrimonium contrahere Et tale divorcium nunquam 
fit in matrimonio legittime contracto et consummato nisi per mortem naturalem alterius coniugum” 
(Lectures on Marriage, 58/59); Liber Officialis, No. 145 (annulment on the grounds of consanguinity) 
- “Propterea eosdem ab huiusmodi assidatione et vinculo matrimonii et mutual seruitute 
divorciamus…”. See also Sellar, ‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 70 and Helmholz, Marriage Litigation 
in Medieval England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 74. 
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chronological limit of the present study) used the label divorce a vinculo to designate 
the new type of divorce. As such, the label ‘Scottish Protestant divorce for adultery’ 
will be used to designate this ‘new’ type of divorce. It will be argued that this 
uniquely Scottish kind of divorce in post-Reformation sixteenth-century Scotland 
resulted from a modification of divorce a mensa et thoro, through an employment of 
the concept of ‘licence to remarry’ borrowed from pre-Reformation sentences of 
annulment.  
   
 The complicating factor in these discussions is the role of the Protestant Kirk. 
As has already been discussed, the Commissaries of Edinburgh were not appointed 
until February 1563/4, by which time Scottish Protestant divorce for adultery had 
already been introduced and established as the law of Scotland by the Protestant Kirk 
and its tribunals. The story is a complex one, and involves a wide range of 
constitutional and jurisprudential issues. The various theories explaining the Kirk’s 
extraordinary involvement in the consistorial jurisdiction from 1559 have already 
been put forward at the end of Chapter II.456 This section will argue that the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh accepted the divorce law reforms of the Kirk and 
retained the same legal formulas by which the Kirk had given expression to their new 
understandings of divorce for adultery. This continuity of legal formulas can be used 
to establish the probable continuity of intellectual and doctrinal understanding of the 
new divorce during the transition of competency between the Kirk and the 
Commissaries in consistorial matters, a transition, it has been argued, supervised by 
the overarching authority of the Lords of Council and Session. The assumption that 
continuity of legal formulas implies continuity of intellectual underpinning has its 
problems457 and as such the inference can only be considered probable, rather than 
certain. Nevertheless, since the deliberations of the Commissaries of Edinburgh are 
unknown, the ‘continuity of formulas’ argument is the only device by which the 
Commissaries’ understanding of the new divorce may be established with any degree 
of probability. As such, it will be necessary to understand the Kirk’s rationale for 
introducing the new type of divorce, analysing the legal clauses and formulas they 
appropriated to give legal expression to their new type of divorce, observing the 
                                                 
456 Chapter II, §V. 
457 For example, the Canon law was retained in Scotland were the contracting of ‘non-regular’ 
marriage was concerned, whilst the theological basis of the Canon law in this respect, concerning the 
creation of a sacramental bond between a man and a wife was rejected. 
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transmission of these legal clauses and formulas to the Court of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh and assuming that the Commissaries continued to understand the new 
type of divorce within the same intellectual and doctrinal constructs created by early 
Scottish Protestant reformers and judges. This common understanding of the new 
law as described in shared legal formulas will be further explored from the 
perspective of the provenance of the clauses and formulas used, which will be shown 
to have been the Courts of the Officials. Finally, it will be argued that this probable 
intellectual continuity can be demonstrated with reference to the unique case heard 
by the Commissaries of Edinburgh, Procurator Fiscal & Paterson v. Stevinson & 
Pollock, through which it will be conclusively demonstrated that those divorced for 
their own adultery were certainly impeded from remarriage during the lifetime of the 





 Any attempt to understand the shape of early post-Reformation Scots 
consistorial law is bounded by the limits of the source material. Neither the reformers 
of the Protestant Kirk, nor the Commissaries of Edinburgh wrote legal treatises on 
the alteration of the consistorial law in Scotland during the Scottish Reformation. 
The main sources of evidence upon which an understanding may therefore be based 
are the sentences and decreets pronounced by the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk and 
the Commissaries of Edinburgh. In addition, there are some fragments of information 
by which the evidence furnished by the tribunals of the Kirk may be supplemented, 
together with a comparison of the law reforms introduced in other Protestant 
countries during the sixteenth century. For the Commissaries of Edinburgh, there is 
almost no ancillary evidence available beyond the contents of the Registers of Acts 
and Decreets of their court, with the exception of the pre-Reformation material 
summarized in Liber Officialis, which may be used for comparative purposes.    
 The dependence on judicial sentences and decreets necessitated by the extant 
source material requires the formulation and consistent application of a method for 
analysing the material. This is particularly the case since during the period under 
consideration there was a great deal of variation in the words and phrases employed 
in individual pronouncements; that is to say no standard wording of formulas was 
adopted and applied. Indeed, Ronald Ireland has maintained, in respect of the 
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contents of the Liber Officialis that “nothing is to be assumed simply from the words 
used to describe the process of divorce, as they do not seem to have been used with 
much precision”.458 Whilst the dangers of basing assumptions on the wording of 
judicial decisions alone have been demonstrated by Lord Fraser’s works, the 
reasonable meaning of legal clauses and formulas can be established by setting such 
formulas in their proper jurisprudential context, a method conspicuously botched by 
Fraser. Furthermore, within the relative linguistic disorder of the extant legal 
material, the formulation and application of suitable categories can aid the 
comparison of the pronouncements of different courts and tribunals. The proper 
application of such methods can be used to established what is at least probable, if 
not certain.   
The principal category from which analysis of the material will proceed are 
what are here termed “clauses,” that is to say the principal clauses or phrases into 
which a sentence or decreet may be broken. For example in Wemis v. Dunbar, the 
Commissaries decerned:  
 
[1] “the said Margaret to be diuorciat separatit and cuttit of fra the said Johne 
 
[2] and to haif tint and to tyne hir tocher gude gevin to the said Johne with hir in 
contemplatioun of the said Mariage and all donationes propter nuptias grantit to hir 
 
[3] and hir  to be pvnist be the temporale magistrat Conforme to the lawis of the 
realme 
 
[4] And the said Johne tobe fre to marie in the Lord quhair he pleises 
 
[5] alsfrelie as he mycht haif done befoir the contracting of the mariage with the said 
Margaret”459  
 
Whilst there are no breaks in the original decreet, five distinct “clauses” have been 
highlighted. The first will be termed the “divorce clause,” the second the “tyne and 
tint clause,” the third the “punishment clause,” the fourth the “licence clause” and the 
                                                 
458 ‘Husband and Wife: Divorce, Nullity of Marriage and Separation’, 90. 
459 NAS, CC8/2/3, fos. 32v-33r, 25 May 1568. 
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fifth the “licence definition clause”. The second and third clause are relatively 
unimportant in deriving a valid understanding of early Scots consistorial divorce law 
from the extant material, but the “divorce clause” and the “licence clause” are 
central. Having defined these terms, each sentence or decreet may be analysed in 
terms of the presence or absence of these clauses, whilst each type of clause may be 
considered in its own right. In this latter respect, the “divorce clause,” for example, 
may be compared in one type of decreet with another and variations in actual “form,” 
that is to say the precise words and phrases employed to express a given clause, may 
be observed. In this way the variations within the same clause pronounced by the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh may be noted, and compared with those found in 
sentences of the Kirk, and indeed those of pre-Reformation Officials.  
 Having designated, analysed and compared various clauses and their forms 
conclusions may be drawn as to the importance each kind of clause (whether it was 
always included in sentences or decreets, or whether it was non-essential) and the 
meaning and function of each essential clause. From this basis, a precise legal 
understanding of what the new divorce for adultery was and was not may be 
proposed, and tested against known cases in which more obscure aspects of the law 
were raised.      
 
 
[ii] PRE-REFORMATION DIVORCE A VINCULO 
 
 The Liber Officialis provides a useful digest of the extant pre-Reformation 
sentences of annulment pronounced in Scotland by the Officials of St Andrews and 
their Commissaries. Three principal clauses may be rapidly identified among the 
material: a “nullity” clause decerning a marriage to have been null ab initio (and 
which was usually followed by a narration of the grounds of the judgement), 
followed by a “divorce” clause divorcing the couple from each other, and finally a 
“licence” clause stating which of the divorced parties could remarry. Whilst the 
divorce clause used in the extant Scottish material rarely employed the words a 
vinculo matrimonii explicitly,460 it is clear that the culmination of the nullity, divorce 
                                                 
460 The phrase was explicitly used in Sibbald v. Milis (Liber Officialis, no. 145). 
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and licence clauses constituted what the medieval Canon law designated a definitive 
sentence of divorce a vinculo matrimonii.461  
 The initial problem which may be posed is why, if the marriage bond was 
decerned to be null ab initio should it be necessary also to decern the couple to be 
divorced a vinculo, since the nullity clause has already established that no marriage 
bond existed between the parties? The answer lies in the distinction made almost 
constantly in the sentences of annulment, that marriages about to be annulled were 
marriages de facto et non de jure:462 that is to say the marriage had occurred in 
outward form, but on account of some impediment had no sacramental character, and 
as such could not be acknowledged in law by a spiritual judge. On this basis such 
marriages were declared “de iure ab inicio suisse et esse nullam et inualidam”,463 
whilst the couples concerned were divorced a vinculo in so far as the marriage 
appeared de facto valid.464  
 The next problem is why, having declared a marriage de jure null, and having 
made it explicitly clear that the couple were divorced from the de facto marriage 
bond, was there any need for a “licence” clause. This problem is only a problem from 
the later Scottish legal history perspective, which, as already noted, tends to 
understand divorce a vinculo matrimonii as automatically conferring freedom on 
both parties. Within the context of the medieval Canon law however, annulment / 
divorce a vinculo carried an automatic connotation of potential fault on the part of 
one or both of the parties who had contracted marriage to which there was lawful 
impediment. As the following examples will illustrate, the potential freedom to 
remarry created by the “nullity” and “divorce” clauses was often regulated by the 
“licence” clause, which could limit the freedom bestowed on either party depending 
on the quality and circumstances of the fault upon which the marriage had been 
deemed null.465 
                                                 
461 As already discussed, William Hay maintained that there were only two types of divorce, a mensa 
et thoro and a vinculo matrimonii the latter being pronounced on the grounds of nullity ab initio 
(Lectures on Marriage, 58 et seq). 
462 i.e. Liber Officialis, nos. 3, 5, 12, 16, 45 etc; a particularly clear example is no. 94. Cf Lectures on 
Marriage, 46/47. 
463 Liber Officialis, nos. 24; Cf nos. 7, 8, 13, 36, 41 etc. 
464 This was implicit in the usual form of the nullity clause. In Fiscal v. Patersoun & Johnestoun the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh made this explicitly clear when they declared the defenders’ marriage to 
be null ab initio and divorce them “in so far as the same may appear to the effect of marriage” (NAS, 
CC8/2/7, fo. 243r, 21 July 1575). 
465 This has been briefly noted by Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Divorce’, 90. 
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 There are three main variants within the “licence” clauses found in the Liber 
Officialis, and range from granting both parties licence to remarry, granting one party 
only licence to remarry, and explicitly prohibiting a party from remarrying. Licence 
to remarry would typically be granted to both parties when both had been ignorant of 
the grounds of the subsequent annulment of their de facto marriage. For example in 
Quhite v. Ewinson the couples’ marriage was annulled on the grounds that they were 
within the second degree of affinity, the pursuer having slept with a relative of the 
defender prior to the contracting of the marriage in question. The ignorance of the 
defender may be presumed, whilst it was explicitly stated in the definitive sentence 
that the pursuer (whose fornication with his future wife’s relative had created the 
affinity between the litigants) had been entirely ignorant of the blood relation which 
had stood between his earlier lover and his wife at the time of contracting the 
marriage.466 Since the ignorance of both parties was accepted by the court, the issue 
of the marriage were decerned legitimate, and both parties granted licence in domino 
to remarry.467 
 On the other hand licence to remarry might be granted to one party only. For 
example in Mailvill v. Hepburne, the couples’ marriage was annulled on the grounds 
of the defender’s impotence, and licence was granted to the potent party only.468 This 
precise pattern was repeated in Millar v. Watsoun,469 whilst in Myrtoun v. Forsyth 
licence was granted to both parties, despite Forsyth’s impotence.470 Thus whilst 
impotence did not automatically preclude licence being granted to both parties, the 
examples illustrate that in certain circumstances the court could extend licence to one 
party only. 
 On other occasions, licence was explicitly withheld from a party whose 
marriage had been annulled, when it was clear that they had knowingly contracted a 
marriage which was forbidden by Canon law. For example, in Aldinstoune v. Days, 
                                                 
466 “ipso Willelmo tempore contractus huiusmodi pretensi matrimonii penitus ignorante” (Liber 
Officialis, no. 116).  
467 “prolesque inter eosdem susceptas legittimas decernenetes ac alibi in domino nubendi licenciam 
impertimur” (Liber Officialis, no. 116). Cf Liber Officialis, nos. 3 (affinity); 24 (affinity); 41 
(nonage); 117 (affinity); 121 (consanguinity) etc. 
468 “et ex pro eo quia dicta Margareta est ita arcta quod non posit a prefato Dauid libellante cognosci 
propter arctitatem in membro secreto dicte Margarete et insufficientiam eiusdem Propterea dictos 
Dauid et Margaretam adinuincem diuorciandos fore prout diuorciamus licenciamque in domino dicto 
Dauid alibi nubendi impertimur” (Liber Officialis, no. 13). 
469 Liber Officialis, no. 139. 
470 Liber Officialis, no. 137. 
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the marriage was annulled on the grounds of the pursuer and the defender’s first 
spouse being within the fourth degree of consanguinity. The defender had however 
been aware of this impediment at the time of the contracting of the parties’ marriage, 
and as such, whilst the litigants were divorced, the defender was “to remain without 
the hope of marriage in the future”.471 Similar circumstances pertained in Newtoune 
v. Liddall, the couple’s marriage being annulled on the grounds of affinity: whilst the 
couples’ issue were decerned lawful (thus suggestive of the ignorance of the 
defender), the pursuer was ordained “absque spe coniugii in futurum remanere”.472  
  
 Whilst the “licence” clause was not always employed in pre-Reformation 
sentences of annulment, it is clear that on many occasions the freedom to remarry 
conferred by the annulment of a marriage, with divorce a vinculo, could not 
automatically be presumed or inferred. The “licence” clause was clearly used to grant 
licence to remarry to one or both parties, or to prohibit a party from remarriage 
according to the circumstances of the annulment.473 As shall be shown, an 
appreciation of these distinct features of pre-Reformation sentences of annulment is 
prerequisite to a proper understanding of the divorce for adultery innovations 












                                                 
471 “absque spe coniugii in futurum remanere quoad dictam Elizabetham eo quod dicta Elizabetha 
scienter contraxit” (Liber Officialis, no. 5). 
472 Liber Officialis, no. 12. Cf nos. 94 (licence withheld from pursuer since she had married the 
brother of a man she had already slept with), 103 (licence withheld from pursuer since he had married 
the sister of a woman he had already slept with). 
473 Cf Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Divorce’, 92. 
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[iii] THE INTRODUCTION OF SCOTTISH PROTESTANT DIVORCE  
ON THE GROUNDS OF ADULTERY BY THE TRIBUNALS 
 OF THE PROTESTANT KIRK FROM 1559 
 
 William Hay, in his Lectures on Marriage, delivered at the University of 
Aberdeen during the1530s, maintained the Canon law position on divorce for 
adultery: “divorce from the bond of marriage cannot be obtained for any sort of 
adultery once the marriage has been consummated”.474 This view was based upon the 
theologically grounded belief that marriage was a sacrament of the Catholic 
Church,475 and that once it had been formed validly, it could be dissolved only by 
death. As is well known, this theological position dictated that a validly married 
couple might be divorced a mensa et thoro only for adultery, that is legally 
separated, but forbidden to remarry until the sacramental bond between them was 
dissolved by the death of one of the parties, at which point the surviving spouse was 
usually free to remarry.476  
As is well known, the Scottish reformers rejected the Catholic belief that 
marriage is a sacrament, on the grounds that the only sacraments are those instituted 
by Christ in the scriptures. In this, the Scottish Protestant position arose on account 
of its understanding of the authority of scripture, and was not primarily motivated by 
a consideration of marriage. Nevertheless, the Protestant insistence that marriage was 
not a sacrament undermined the central intellectual premise upon which the Canon 
law had maintained that adultery was grounds for a divorce a mensa et thoro only. 
Whilst this theological development did not necessitate innovations to the law,477 it 
certainly removed the principal objection to the reform of any perceived injustices in 
the Canon law. In this sense, the Scottish reformers do not appear to have set out to 
have rigorously defined a new theological understanding of marriage from which to 
derive a new law of marriage and divorce, but rather sought to correct what they 
perceived to be the principal injustice in the Canon law concerning divorce, adultery 
and remarriage. 
                                                 
474 Lectures on Marriage, 61.  
475 “One first principle dominates the Canon law of marriage, namely, that the marriage of Christians 
is a sacrament” (Scanlon, ‘Husband and Wife’, 70). 
476 Complications could occasionally arise concerning the right of the surviving spouse to remarry, for 
example if they had murdered their first spouse, especially with the collusion of a paramour whom 
they intended to marry. 
477 As noted by Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Divorce’, 95. 
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It would appear that the reformers chose to reform divorce law not from the 
perspective of the husband, wife and children as a communal whole, but from the 
perspective of the innocent party only. It was from this perspective that the Canon 
law seemed most unjust: the innocent party would be bound to a failed marriage just 
as the guilty party was bound, and that since only the death of one of the spouses 
could free the other to remarry, there was an even chance that it would be the guilty, 
rather than the innocent party who would eventually be freed to remarry in the future. 
For the Scottish reformers, marriage was considered a ‘blessed ordinance of God,’ 
and whilst Ireland has noted that “the reformers were far from regarding marriage 
merely as a civil contract”,478 it is difficult to gauge what the reformers intended in 
terms of the positive relationship between reformed theology and marriage law. For 
example, pre-Reformation sentences of annulment addressed a marriage on two 
levels: on the one hand the sacramental bond between a couple was deemed to have 
never come into being; on the other, there being no inner reality to a couples’ 
marriage, they were divorced a vinculo in so far as their relationship had had an 
outward appearance of validity. The innovations introduced by the Scottish reformers 
do not appear to have maintained a distinction between the inner theologically 
defined realities of marriage, and the external, legally defined realities of marriage. 
That is to say, it is difficult to establish how they understood their religious beliefs 
about marriage to relate positively to matrimonial law.  
These difficulties may be observed, for example, when the effect of adultery 
upon a marriage is considered. If the bond of marriage was considered to be 
something supra-legal by the Reformers, affected and altered by factors outside of 
the sphere of legal regulation and judgement, it could be suggested that they 
considered an act of adultery itself to break the bond of marriage.479 If this was held 
to be true, problems arose when mutual guilt of adultery, or recrimination, which was 
a valid defence to an action of Scottish Protestant divorce on the grounds of 
adultery,480 was considered: it would have been absurd to argue that one act of 
adultery broke the bond of marriage, whilst a subsequent act of adultery by the other 
                                                 
478 Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Divorce’, 95. 
479 There is some evidence that Calvin countenanced this conception in his mature theology of 
marriage: “[I]f adultery is proven, even if no sentence is passed, a Christian church may proceed to 
marry those who can produce such hearings” (John Witte, From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, 
Religion and Law in the Western Tradition (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 102). 
480 NAS, CC8/2/1, fos 393v - 394v, 16 March 1564/5, Hammyltoun v. Maxwell & Lindesay; Fraser, 
Treatise (1846), i, 672; Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Divorce’, 95. 
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spouse re-formed it. Yet if adultery were not considered to affect marriage in some 
de facto manner, then it followed that a competent authority would need to pass 
judgement on the effect of any adultery alleged, and on that basis, the existence of a 
bond of marriage between a couple would become dependent upon judicial decree 
alone. But if the vital moment in the divorce of a married couple with licence to 
remarry became the pronouncing of sentence, then the concept of marriage as a 
supra-legal reality could in some sense be compromised, and the legal conception of 
marriage regulated by due process of law would acquire the potential to become the 
dominant model.481   
In this scenario, the marriage bond might no longer have been understood as 
a supra-legal reality with its own parameters and inherent dynamics, which the law 
sought to describe and acknowledge. In this, the intellectual flaw in presuming that 
divorce a vinculo matrimonii automatically bestowed freedom on both parties is 
highlighted: rather the marriage bond came to be regulated by law alone, and the 
shape of the law of marriage, rather than the doctrine of marriage, became the 
primary perspective from which the post-1559 Scottish law of divorce was 
developed. This understanding accords well with the Scottish Reformers’ treatment 
of the ‘word or law of God’ in relation to marriage law: it was used as a source of 
laws which were to be given precedence, rather than a source of doctrine upon which 
a new theology of marriage could be based. 
  
[iv] ANALYSIS OF SENTENCES OF SCOTTISH PROTESTANT DIVORCE 
PRONOUNCED BY TRIBUNALS OF THE PROTESTANT KIRK 
 
Around twenty sentences of Scottish Protestant divorce for adultery are 
known to have been pronounced by tribunals of the Protestant Kirk between 1560 
and 1565, of which 12 are still extant in the St Andrews Kirk Session Register. All 
twelve contain what have already been defined as “divorce” clauses and “licence” 
clauses, and it will be argued that the “licence” clause was taken directly from pre-
Reformation sentences of annulment pronounced by Scottish Officials and used to 
                                                 
481 These ideas were much discussed by Fraser and Riddell: “‘It has sometimes been maintained, that 
adultery is in itself a virtual dissolution of the band of marriage, and equivalent to an act of divorce 
(Bishop Taylor’s Ductor Dubitantium, b. i c. 5, rule 8). But this is a doctrine not recognised by the law 
of Scotland, which regards adultery and malicious desertion merely as handles whereby a competent 
court may dissolve the marriage (Stair, 1, 4, 7.).” (Fraser, Treatise (1846), i, 657).  
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give legal expression to the new law of divorce for adultery. Having studied these 
clauses, they will be discussed within the context of what is known of Scottish 
Protestant opinion during this period. 
    The first extant case is Gudlawde v. Archibald, 7 November 1560, in which 
the defender was found guilty of adultery, having left the pursuer and gone to 
Denmark 35 years earlier, contracting a second marriage with a Dane at some point 
thereafter. The kirk session of St Andrews held this second marriage to be in effect 
adultery, and on that basis divorced the couple: “be this our sentence we divorce and 
separate them simplie and perpetuallie; and libertie to the said Dauid [innocent party] 
in the Lord to contract and mary ony uthir lauchfull woman, as he micht haif done 
before he wes conjoined with the said Margaret [guilty party]”.482 Here may be 
plainly seen the “divorce” clause, the “licence” clause and a “licence definition” 
clause trying to convey and further define the quality of the freedom so bestowed. As 
is obvious, only the innocent party was explicitly granted licence to remarry. 
 This pattern was repeated in 10 out of the remaining 11 sentences, but with 
the usual addition of a “punishment” clause explicitly addressing the future condition 
of the guilty party. For example, in Elizabeth Gedde v. Williame Rantoun, the kirk 
session pronounced “the said Williame ane perjured adulterar, and the said Elizabeth 
innocent divorced, and fre of the company and societie of the said Williame, with 
full power to hir according to the law of God to mary in the Lord; and the said 
Williame to be haldin and reputte ane dead man, worthy to want his lyfe by the law 
of God, quhen ever it sall pleas God to stirre up the heart of ane gude and godlie 
magistrate to execute the same with the civile sworde”.483   
 Each clause could take on a number of particular forms. As has already been 
seen, the “divorce” clause could “divorce and separate [the couple] simplie and 
perpetuallie” or merely decern the guiltless party “innocent divorced,” without 
making specific reference to the guilty party. Other forms ranged from “divorced, 
separated and divided”484 and “cutted of, divorced, and separated”,485 to “seperated 
                                                 
482 St Andrews, i, 50. 
483 St Andrews, i, 60. 
484 Lathrisk v. Symsoun, 9 January 1560/1, St Andrews, i, 58; cf Hyllok v. Gyb, 11 August 1563 (St 
Andrews, i, 156). 
485 Clerk v. Schevez, 23 February 1560/1, St Andrews, i, 62; cf Calland v. Alexander, 14 May 1561 (St 
Andrews, i, 71) and Thecar v. Martyn, 23 July 1561 (St Andrews, i, 81). 
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and divorciat”.486 This general form was departed from on one occasion only, Smyth 
v. Duplyn, 12 December 1565. The couple had contracted marriage by promise (de 
futuro or de praesenti is not stated) with subsequent copula. On account of the fact 
that at this time the Kirk may have been agitating for the abolition of non-regular 
marriages as ‘fornication,’487 they did not divorce the couple, but rather “at [the 
innocent party’s] desyr decernit fred of hyr promys fra the said [guilty party]”.488 But 
this one exception aside, which proceeded upon a speciality of the Kirk, it can be 
seen that the “divorce” clause was variously and in a sense imprecisely expressed. 
From this is may be inferred that the divorce clause alone was not expected to 
provide the sole basis from which the freedom of the parties could be deduced. 
 The freedom of the parties was clearly regulated and defined by the “licence” 
clause. In the first case cited, the licence clause took the form “and libertie to the said 
Dauid [innocent party] in the Lord to contract and mary ony uthir lauchfull woman” 
and was further defined by the clause “as he micht haif done before he wes conjoined 
with the said Margaret [guilty party]”.489 In the second case cited the clause took the 
form “with full power to hir according to the law of God to mary in the Lord,” with 
no further clause attempting to describe the quality of the freedom thus granted.490 
Other forms ranged from “and libertie to the said Alexander to mary in the Lord”,491  
“to the said Alexander permitting agane newlie to mary quhome it sall pleass him, sa 
the same be lauchfullie in the Lord and according to the law of God”,492 “with liberte 
to hyr in the Lord to mare ony other man, according to the law of God”,493 “and 
licence and libertie to the said Margaret to mary in the Lord with ony other lawfull 
husband according to the law of God”494 to “libertie to marye in the Lord with ony 
                                                 
486 Scrymgeor v. Dundas, 7 January, 1561/2 (St Andrews, i, 140 - first divorce pronounced by 
superintendent Winram); cf Philip v. Thomson, 20 Jan 1562/3 (St Andrews, i, 150). 
487 See above page 95. 
488 St Andrews, i, 254-255. 
489 St Andrews, i, 50. 
490 St Andrews, i, 60. 
491 Lathrisk v. Symsoun (St Andrews, i, 58). 
492 Clerk v. Schevez (St Andrews, i, 62); cf Calland v. Alexander, 14 May 1561 (St Andrews, i, 71); 
Thecar v. Martyn, 23 July 1561 (St Andrews, i, 81). 
493 Scrymgeor v. Dundas (St Andrews, i, 140); cf Philip v. Thomson, 20 Jan 1562/3 (St Andrews, i, 
150). 
494 Hyllok v. Gyb (St Andrews, i, 156). 
   119
lawfull parte [sic]”.495 The basic clause took the same form as the “licence” clause in 
pre-Reformation sentences of annulment: “ac alibi in domino nubendi licenciam 
impertimur”.496 The provenance of the phrase “in the Lord” is therefore clearly not 
an innovation of the Protestant Kirk, but rather a Pauline phrase used in the Canon 
law.497 In all these cases, licence was extended to the innocent party only. 
Nevertheless, one final case has yet to be discussed, namely Leidhope, 
Russell & Kininmont, 24 October 1565, in which may be observed an a-typical case 
with unique outcomes. Cristine Kininmont had made a secret promise of marriage to 
Thomas Russell, slept with him, and was got with child. Kininmont’s father, not 
knowing this, wished her to make promise of marriage to another man, David 
Leidhope: she told her father about the secret promise, but fearing him concealed the 
fact, later granted, of the copula. It is probable that she did not know at this time that 
she was pregnant. At her father’s insistence she made promise of marriage to 
Leidhope, assuring Leidhope that she was a virgin. On the strength of the promise 
Leidhope slept with Cristine Kininmont, only to discover (presumably by the birth of 
a child, the timing of whose birth did not accord with his understanding of their 
union) that she had manifestly slept with Thomas Russell. In effect Kininmont had 
contracted a non-regular marriage with Russell secretly, and through dread of her 
father had contracted a second bigamous non-regular marriage with Leidhope. The 
superintendent of Fife, Fotherick and Strathearn, John Winram, held that 
Kininmont’s liaison with Leidhope was adultery, and therefore divorced Kininmont 
from Russell, granting Russell licence to remarry. Licence was also explicitly 
granted to Leidhope to remarry in the Lord, which was inconsistent, since his liaison 
with Kininmont had been classified as adultery, not an irregular marriage from which 
the parties might be freed. All three parties made satisfaction to the kirk of Dunino. 
Leidhope and Kininmont were subsequently reconciled “Dauid [Leidhope] remittit 
Cristen and resavit hyr in favor and solemnizat the band of mariaige wyth hyr, 
requirand and obtenand the consent of the kyrk tharto”. This of course was in effect 
the marriage of a divorced adulteress to her paramour, during the lifetime of her first 
                                                 
495 Smyth v. Duplyn (St Andrews, i, 254-255); this was the case were the innocent party was decerned 
free from the promise of marriage. 
496 Liber Officialis, no. 116. 
497 Lectures on Marriage, 66-67: “A woman is bound by the law as long as her husband liveth: but if 
her husband die she is at liberty. Let her marry to whom she will: only in the Lord”. John Barry 
clearly borrowed this English translation of 1 Corinthians, 7: 39 from the Douai-Rheims translation of 
the Biblia Sacra Vulgata.   
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innocent spouse. Nevertheless there are several extenuating circumstances. Leidhope 
had not knowingly committed adultery with Kininmont: he had not knowingly been 
her paramour, but rather thought he was contracting marriage with her, with her 
father’s consent. Kininmont had contracted a bigamous marriage with Leidhope in 
the first place through fear of her father. Finally, Leidhope, an aggrieved party, was 
willing to forgive Kininmont, marry her as originally intended and presumably look 
after her child from her first marriage. But of course this was only possible because 
Kininmont had been divorced from her first husband on the grounds of what was 
construed as her adultery with Leidhope. There is evidence of considerable 
conceptual confusion resulting from the complexity of the case, with the additional 
difficulties introduced by Godly discipline and reconciliation, which may have 
caused Winram to seek a pastoral solution to the problems involved, at the expense 
of good law. 498   
 Despite the curious and a-typical example of Leidhope, Russell & Kininmont, 
the recurring pattern in normal actions for divorce, where the first marriage was 
openly known to exist, and adultery was knowingly committed, the remedy was 
clearly to grant divorce, and grant licence to the innocent party to remarry. Yet what 
is not immediately clear is what the status of the guilty party was. As the analysis of 
pre-Reformation sentences of annulment explained, parties could sometimes be 
explicitly prohibited from remarrying in the future. Yet no such clause was ever used 
by the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk when granting their divorces on the grounds of 
adultery. Since the innocent party was explicitly granted licence to remarry, yet the 
guilty party was not explicitly prohibited from remarriage, it could be argued that the 
status of the guilty party was unclear.  
Nevertheless, the predicament, status and rights of the guilty party were 
usually made entirely clear. In Gedde v. Rantoun the kirk session of St Andrews 
asserted that the guilty party “be haldin and reputte ane dead man, worthy to want his 
lyfe by the law of God, quhen ever it sall pleas God to stirre up the heart of ane gude 
and godlie magistrate to execute the same with the civile sworde”.499 Other forms of 
the “punishment” clause ranged from “to be committed to the civill magistrates, to be 
punisched as Goddis law praescryves”500 and “committing the [guilty party] to the 
                                                 
498 St Andrews, i, 252-254. 
499 St Andrews, i, 60. 
500 Lathrisk v. Symsoun (St Andrews, i, 58). 
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handis and punischiment of the temporall power for the crym”,501 to “to be 
committed in the handis of his magistrat quhom to [the guilty party] is subject”.502  
Whilst the variations of form are considerable, the desire behind the 
“punishment” clause was that the party guilty of adultery ought to be executed. This 
was certainly the position maintained by the ‘law of God’ as far as the Reformers 
were concerned. Leviticus 20 v.10 held that “the man that committeth adulterie with 
another mans wife, because he hathe committed adulterie with his neighbours wife, 
the adulterer and the adulteres shal dye the death,” whilst Deuteronomy 22 v. 22 
enjoined that “If a man be found lying with a woman married to a man, then they 
shal dye euen bothe twaine: to wit, the man that lay with the wife, and the wife: so 
thou shalt put away euil from Israel”.503 Accordingly, hard-line Scottish Protestant 
Reformers were eager to enforce the Levitical law, if executing those found guilty of 
adultery would appease God and ensure His blessings upon Scotland.504  
 The injunctions of the ‘law of God’ in this respect received statutory 
recognition in Scotland on 4 June 1563:  
 
“Item, forsamekill as the abominabill and filthy vice and cryme of adulterie 
hes bene perniciouslie and wickitlie usit within this realme in tymes bygane be 
sindrie liegis thairof, havand na regaird to the commandementis of God bot to 
thair awin sensualitie and filthy lustis and plesoure thairof, and for eschewing 
of the samin in tymes cumming, it is statute and ordanit be the quenis majestie 
and thre estatis in parliament that all notoure and manifest committaris of 
adulterie in ony tyme tocum efter the dait heirof salbe punist with all rigour 
unto the deid, alsweill the woman as the man, doar and committar of the 
samin, efter that dew monitioun be maid to abstene fra the said manifest and 
notoure cryme; and for uther adulterie, that the actis and lawis maid 
thairupone of befoir be put to executioun with all rigour; and als declaris that 
this act on na wyse sall prejudge ony partie to persew for divorcement for the 
crymes of adulterie befoir committit conforme to the law”.505 
                                                 
501 Hyllok v. Gyb (St Andrews, i, 156). 
502 Scrymgeor v. Dundas (St Andrews, i, 140); cf Philip v. Thomson, 20 Jan 1562/3 (St Andrews, i, 
150). 
503 Passages taken from The Bible and Holy Scriptures conteyned in the Olde and Newe Testament 
(Geneva: Printed by Rouland Hall, 1560). In the Geneva Bible, marginal notes referred the reader 
from Leviticus 20, verse 10 to Deuteronomy 22, verse 22. 
504 John Witte notes that many European reformers called for the execution of those divorced for 
adultery, but that such a call “found little acceptance among the authorities, though many 
jurisdictions, in response, stiffened their penalties for adultery” (John Witte, Jr, Law and 
Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 250). 
505 RPS, A1563/6/10; APS, ii, 539, c.10. 
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It is likely that Parliament had sought to modify the full rigor of the Protestant 
party’s desire, in that only notorious and manifest committers of adultery were to be 
executed.506 Whilst the statute was not a dead letter,507 the scope of its applications 
had been severely restricted.508 The failure of the civil magistrate to execute those 
found guilty of adultery, even when enjoined to do so by the Protestant Kirk and to 
some extent the Scottish Parliament, gave eventual rise to the problematic issue of 
the rights of the guilty party, since they usually de facto continued in life. 
 The Scottish Reformers’ position appears to have been one of legal nicety. 
Their original vision of reformed divorce law had been of the execution of the guilty 
party and of the freedom of the innocent party to remarry. This could be argued to 
have been a minor modification of the pre-Reformation law only, in that it 
introduced the death penalty for the guilty party. In this respect, the Canon law of 
divorce would not actually have been modified, since the execution of the guilty 
party would have automatically ended their marriage, thereby bestowing freedom on 
the surviving innocent party to remarry.509 Curiously, faced with the de facto reality 
of the continued existence of the guilty party, the Scottish Reformers clung to the 
idea of the agency of death. Gedde v. Rantoun had already hedged against the 
possibility that the civil magistrate might not wish to be stirred up by God to execute 
those guilty of adultery, by holding and reputing the guilty party “ane dead man”. 
This idea clearly found general acceptance among the Scottish Reformers. In its 
section on marriage, the First Book of Discipline outlined the following position:  
 
“Mariage once lauchfullie contractit, may not be dissolved at manis pleasour, 
as oure maister Christ Jesus doeth witness, onles adulterie be committit; which 
being sufficientlie proven in presence of the Civil Magistrat, the innocent (yf 
thei so require) ought to be pronunced frie, and the offender aught to suffer the 
                                                 
506 Based on the evidence from Pitcairn’s Ancient Criminal Trials in Scotland, it would seem that 
‘notour’ came to be interpreted as including those who committed adultery, and then continued to do 
so having been admonished by the Kirk to desist. Thanks are due to feedback received at the Scottish 
Medievalists in 2010 for this and other points. 
507 “although there were few executions, the statute [of 1563] was not a dead letter” (Sellar, ‘Canon 
Law and Scots Law’, 72). 
508 In 1581 the Synod of Lothian cited the ambiguity of the word ‘notour’ as the root cause of the 
failure of the act to be enforced as originally envisaged (Baird Smith, ‘The Reformers and Divorce,’ 
32). 
509 This is given some support in that Baird Smith has argued that a sentence of divorce from the Kirk 
“was in fact an act of discipline which placed the injured wife in the position of a widow” (‘The 
Reformers and Divorce’, 23). 
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death as God hath commanded. Yf the Civile sweard foolischelie spair the 
lyeff of the offendar, yit may not the Churche be negligent in thair office, 
which is to excommunicat the wicked, and to repute thame as dead membris, 
and to pronounce the innocent partie to be at fredome, be thai never so 
honourabile befoir the warld”.510  
 
In this, the Scottish reformers followed John Calvin closely. Calvin had maintained 
that divorce for adultery was a substitute for the failure of civil magistrates to put to 
death those found guilty of adultery.511 
 The problem from the perspective of Scots consistorial law was that the 
guilty party nevertheless remained in life and their rights and status during the period 
under consideration were not immediately clear. Under the Canon law, adulterers 
who were free to remarry were initially prohibited from marrying their paramours, 
“but it was a rule from which dispensation was easy”. In time it became settled 
doctrine that an adulterous person might remarry their paramour, unless they had 
conspired to murder the innocent spouse, whose death was a precursor to the 
freedom of the guilty party to remarry under the Canon law.512 The right to remarry 
the paramour was an open question in Scots law until the Act of 1600 expressly 
forbade such unions. What remains an open question to this day, however, concerns 
the point at which a guilty party became free to remarry at all in post-1559 Scotland 
(be it to a paramour or to a third party). The problem which lies at the heart of this 
uncertainty concerns the rights possessed by the guilty party failing their execution. 
The First Book of Discipline of 1560 had realized the practical implications 
of the failure of the civil sword to execute those found guilty of adultery. Reputing 
the guilty party as dead clearly meant their excommunication from the kirk, which 
excluded them from remarriage whilst excommunicate. But the question remained 
whether or not the guilty party could remarry once they had been received back into 
the fold of the Kirk. After all, marriage was understood in part to be a remedy for 
concupiscence, and who more in need of such a remedy as one who had already 
deviated from ‘the blessed ordinance of God’. The First Book of Discipline therefore 
held “that yf thai [those divorced for their own adultery] can not leve continent, and 
yf the necessitie be suche as that thai fear farther offence to God, we can not forbid 
                                                 
510 Works of John Knox, II, 248; cf Smith, ‘Spiritual Jurisdiction’, 5. 
511 Phillips, Putting Asunder, 53. 
512 Scanlon, ‘Husband and Wife’, 80. 
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thame to use the remedy ordained of God”. To this the condition was added that if, 
however, the guilty party were reconciled to the innocent party, then the guilty party 
could remarry no one but the innocent party, in which case the couple could marry in 
facie ecclesiae without the proclamation of banns.513 
 Interesting as this position is, there is no evidence that it went beyond a 
suggestion in the First Book of Discipline, and indeed the evidence suggests that this 
position was not acceptable to the General Assembly. On the 27 December 1566, the 
General Assembly, perceiving that the effectiveness of the Act of 1563 concerning 
adultery had been severely curtailed, provided that superintendents should 
“admonisch all ministers within ther jurisdictiouns, that none joyne any partie 
separatit for adulterie in marriage, under paine of removeing from the ministrie,” 
whilst they considered the Kirk’s position.514 Further clarity was clearly desired from 
the localities, since “on 14th October, 1568, the question of the right of an adulteress 
to remarry was remitted to the General Assembly” by the kirk at St Andrews.515 By 
1571, the General Assembly had “directed that the marriage of adulterers was 
unlawful”.516 In 1575 the Assembly deprived Robert Graham, commissioner of 
Caithness of his office for having granted a divorced adulteress “such liberty as the 
kirk gives to others” and celebrating her remarriage.517 Yet by 1576, the Assembly 
declined to “presently resolve the [general] question, whither if a man or a woman 
divorcit for adulterie, ought to be admitted to the second marriage; but inhibites all 
Ministers and Reidars to marie any sick persons”.518 The evidence, at least as far as 
the General Assembly was concerned, suggests that the Protestant Kirk was far from 
certain what the law of Scotland ought to be, but whilst it continued to deliberate, it 
forbade the ministry to celebrate the remarriages of those divorced for their own 
adultery. The General Assembly’s unwillingness to grasp this nettle continued for 
some years, as is narrated at more length by David Baird Smith, until the statute of 
                                                 
513 See The First Book of Discipline ed. J.K.Cameron (Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1972), 197-
198. 
514 Baird Smith, ‘The Reformers and Divorce’, 30. 
515 Ibid., 25. 
516 Ibid., 30, although this decisions seems to have been reversed by the Privy Council in 1576 (The 
Records of the Synod of Lothian and Tweeddale 1589-1596, 1640-1649, ed. J.Kirk (Edinburgh: The 
Stair Society, 1977), xv). 
517 Baird Smith, ‘The Reformers and Divorce’, 31. 
518 Ibid., 32.  
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1600 was enacted.519 Nevertheless, even this Act did not resolve all the uncertainties 
surrounding those divorced for adultery. The Act of 1600 forbade those divorced for 
their own adultery from marrying their paramours, but no mention was made of the 
rights of the guilty party during the lifetime of the first innocent spouse.520 
  
 The example of other Protestant regimes provided a number of possibilities as 
to how the question of the guilty party’s rights could have been resolved. In 
Germany, Luther had held that “in the case of adultery Christ permits divorce of 
husband and wife so that the innocent person may remarry”,521 whilst Philip 
Melanchthon had held that divorce should be granted for adultery and that the 
innocent party ought to be permitted to remarry and “implied that the guilty party 
should not be permitted to remarry”.522 In Geneva, divorce for adultery with licence 
to both parties to remarry was introduced during Calvin’s ministry,523 whilst his 
successor from 1564, Theodore Beza, maintained that the guilty party ought to be 
allowed to remarry, so as to limit promiscuity.524   
 In countries that adopted the Lutheran Reformation the legislature tended to 
allow only the remarriage of the innocent party when divorce was granted for 
adultery. This was the case in Norway, Denmark and Iceland and “even then the 
innocent spouse had to obtain royal consent to the remarriage”.525 The law in 
Protestant Sweden was something of an exception, in that it allowed the remarriage 
of both the innocent and the guilty party when divorced for adultery: nevertheless the 
guilty party was not automatically entitled to remarry on account of the sentence of 
divorce, but had to be granted the right to remarry in court.526  
                                                 
519 The main reason for their hesitancy would appear to be that rather than define the rights of those 
divorced for adultery, the Assembly’s first preference was that they be put to death, the original and 
uncomplicated ideal of the Scottish reformers: only when is became absolutely clear that this would 
not occur were other measures taken (Baird Smith, ‘The Reformers and Divorce,’ 32-33). 
520 RPS, 1600/11/42; APS, iv, 233, c. 29. 
521 Cited in Witte, Law and Protestantism, 247. 
522 Phillips, Putting Asunder, 49. 
523 Robert Kingdon, Adultery and Divorce in Calvin’s Geneva (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 175. 
524 Ibid., 171. 
525 Phillips, Putting Asunder, 52. 
526 Ibid., 50-51. 
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 Opinion and practice among the European Reformers was therefore divergent 
on the issue of whether or not those divorced for their own adultery should be 
allowed to remarry. Given that the guilty party was allowed to remarry in Reformed 
Geneva, it might be expected that the leading Scottish Reformers such as John Knox 
and Christopher Goodman, both of whom had spent prolonged periods in Geneva 
under Calvin’s direct influence, would have introduced Genevan practices. 
Nevertheless, the evidence from the sentences of the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk 
at St Andrews suggests that only the innocent party was explicitly granted licence to 
remarry, whilst no positive statement was made of the guilty party’s rights to 
remarry. But in the event the issue was not left to the Kirk to decide. By the time it 
was clear that Scottish adulterers were not to be routinely executed, a penalty which 
would have helped tidy up the Kirk’s thinking on divorce by solving the problem of 
the guilty party, the Commissaries of Edinburgh had assumed sole competence in 
divorce actions for the whole of Scotland. 
  
[v] ANALYSIS OF COMMISSARIES’ DECREETS  
OF DIVORCE FOR ADULTERY 
 
 
 It is generally understood that the Scottish reformer’s law of divorce for 
adultery was introduced and accepted in Scotland as a common law right,527 
introduced “by judicial decision rather than by legislation”.528 The alteration of the 
law was of course predicated upon the overthrow of the Catholic establishment, and 
the conversion of Scotland to Protestantism. Yet between 1559 and 1567 the fate of 
the Catholic establishment still hung in the balance, and as such the precise grounds 
upon which alterations in the law proceeded are not entirely clear. There is of course 
no doubt that the rise of the sessions of the Protestant Kirk provided the forum within 
which legal reform took place, but prior to the ratification of the legislation of the 
Reformation Parliament of August 1560 at the ‘second’ Reformation Parliament of 
                                                 
527 Charles Guthrie, ‘The History of Divorce in Scotland’ in Scottish Historical Review, VIII (1911), 
42-43: “no statute authorising divorce for adultery was ever passed by the Scots Parliament, and the 
right to divorce in Scotland on that ground is still a common law right”; Fraser, Treatise (1846), i, 
656; A.D.M. Forte, ‘Some Aspects of the Law of Marriage in Scotland: 1500-1700’ in Elizabeth Craik 
(ed.), Marriage and Property (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1984), 104-118, 112; Phillips, 
Putting Asunder, 60. 
528 Sellar, ‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 71. 
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December 1567,529 it cannot be said that the Kirk had become the established Church 
of Scotland. It therefore follows that during the vital period 1559-1567 when Scottish 
Protestant divorce for adultery was introduced into Scotland and took root, its 
legality and permanence may well have been as uncertain as the future of the 
Protestant Kirk. In this, it may be argued that the new law was applicable only to 
those who choose to submit to the jurisdiction and doctrines of the Protestant Kirk.530 
In a similar sense, it could be said that Catholics were still bound by the teachings 
and laws of their religion, even if these were no longer upheld by the legal system.531 
One of the immediate problems for the Commissaries of Edinburgh upon 
their appointment must have been to what extent and on what basis they ought to 
accept legal innovations introduced by the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk. The 
tribunals of the Kirk had presumed to hear consistorial actions and alter the law at a 
time when leading members of the government, including at least two of the first 
Commissaries of Edinburgh, considered that the courts of the Catholic Church were 
de facto inactive, but not abolished,532 and that the Lords of Council were only 
judges competent in spiritual causes. A dilemma must therefore have arisen: the 
Commissaries were understood to exercise their jurisdiction in lieu of the 
consistories of the Catholic Church, but chose to uphold and enforce customs 
introduced by the new tribunals, whose primary function was the regulation of 
Protestant congregations. 
 In this complex and developing situation, the Commissaries may have held to 
two principal justifications for their actions. In the first place, the new de facto 
position enjoyed in Scotland by the word and law of God as the Protestants 
conceived of it authorised the reform of the law of marriage. In the first extant 
Scottish Protestant sentence of divorce, pronounced at St Andrews the judges 
included the clause “haiffand heirfore God onlie befoir our eis and the testimonie of 
his Word” immediately prior to pronouncing their sentence.533 This form was 
                                                 
529 RPS, A1567/12/1-3; APS, iii, 14. 
530 David Baird Smith has noted that “there are indications that the consistorial jurisdiction of the Kirk 
Session was frequently based on the consent of the parties” (‘The Reformers and Divorce’, 26). 
531 See Riddell, Inquiry (1842), i, 443-444, n. 2 for a discussion of this theme. 
532 It could even be argued that the canon law still pertained in Scotland in 1566: Bothwell married 
Gordon on the 22 February 1565/6, having been dispensed from the impediment of consanguinity (as 
per the Canon law) on the 17 February 1565/6 (Sanderson, Mary Stewart’s People, 38). 
533 St Andrews, i, 50. 
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repeated in a further two sentences pronounced at St. Andrews,534 whilst the majority 
included the clause “according to the law of God”,535 whilst the clause “according to 
the Word of God” was used on one occasion.536 Divorce for adultery with rights of 
remarriage was being granted by the tribunals of the Kirk in conformity with their 
understanding of the word and law of God. Yet on what basis did the Commissaries 
accept the authority of the law of God in this respect? 
 One possible angle would be to consider the effect of the legislation of the 
first Reformation Parliament in that it declared that all acts of Parliament “not 
agreeing with goddis word and now contrair to the confession of our fayth according 
to the said word publist in this parliament To be of nane avale force nor effect And 
decernis the saids actis and euery ane of thame to have na effect nor strength in tyme 
to cum”.537 The problems here are that in the first place many leading men of law, 
including James Balfour and Edward Henryson, did not consider this legislation to be 
legally binding, and that in the second place the statute annulled only statutes which 
failed to conform to the ‘word of God’: marriage law was of course not a subject of 
Scottish statute law, but of the Canon law. Nevertheless, as will be demonstrated, the 
Commissaries did accept the authority of the ‘word or law of God’ or at least allowed 
it to be cited as the grounds for the new kind of divorce in the processes led before 
them. In this, the exaltation of the ‘law of God’ should be understood as the direct 
result of a religious revolution which occurred outside of the legitimate structures of 
governance. 
 Whilst this understanding seems tenable as a general principle in the minds of 
the Commissaries, it lacks the degree of legal precision it has been presumed that the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh deemed necessary when dealing with novelty and 
revolution. This concern may be laid to rest by considering that a number of the 
sentences of divorce pronounced by the courts of the Protestant Kirk had proceeded 
upon commissions granted by the Lords of Council, being subsequently accepted by 
the Commissaries of Edinburgh as legally valid.538 In this it can be argued that the 
                                                 
534 Thecar v. Martyn (St Andrews, i, 80-81); Hyllok v. Gyb (St Andrews, i, 155-156). 
535 Gedde v. Rantoun (St Andrews, i, 59-60); Clerk v. Schevez (Ibid., i, 62); Scrymgeor v. Dundas 
(Ibid., i, 140); Kaye v. Duncan (Ibid., i, 141); Philip v. Thomson (Ibid., i, 150); Hyllok v. Gyb (Ibid., i, 
155-156), 
536 Calland v. Alexander (St Andrews, i, 70-72). 
537 RPS, A1560/8/5; APS, iii, 535. 
538 As shown in Chapter II, §V. 
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Lords of Council, whose competence in spiritual matters has already been discussed, 
validated and countenanced the innovations of the Protestant Kirk regarding divorce 
law. On this understanding, the Commissaries could well have accepted the contents 
of sentences of divorce pronounced by the Kirk by virtue of special commissions 
from the Lords of Council and Session as providing the legal basis of the law of 
divorce in Scotland.  
 
[a] GENERAL ANALYSIS OF CLAUSES 
 
  During the twelve year period from the appointment of the Commissaries 
down to 1576, for which ten years of the Registers of Acts and Decreets are extant, 
the Commissaries pronounced 73 sentences of divorce for adultery, and one for 
malicious desertion.539 Whilst a number of processes for divorce on the grounds of 
adultery were led before the Commissaries during the first year following their 
appointment, the first extant decreet or definitive sentence of divorce pronounced by 
them in such proceedings was in the action of Forbes v. Sandelands, 15 January 
1564/5. The libel was duly proven and the Commissaries decerned the defender “to 
haue brokin the said band of mariage be committing of adulterie… and thairfoir tobe 
and to haue bene sensyne na langer wyf to the said Johne [pursuer] and hir tobe 
diuorcit simpliciter fra him And decernis the said Johne fre to marie in the Lord with 
sik libertie as he mycht befoir the contracting of the mariage foirsaid, and thairfoir 
decernis the said Barbara to tyne and to haue tint hir tochir gude and all vther thingis 
gevin to hir in contemplatioun of the [marriage]540 foirsaid”.541  
The first point of note is that the “divorce” clause and the “licence” clause 
found in the Kirk’s sentences of divorce with licence, together with the “licence” 
clause found in pre-Reformation sentences of annulment were employed by the 
Commissaries. The next is that at this stage in the development of the Commissaries’ 
jurisdiction, no mention was made of the ‘law or word of God,’ nor the punishment 
of the guilty party. Finally, it may be noted that, the alleged adultery having been 
                                                 
539 See Appendix II, C, for a list of these cases with references. The latter being the celebrated cause 
of the 5th Earl of Argyle against his first Countess. This is so unique a case that it will be discussed in 
the section concerning the introduction of divorce for malicious desertion into Scotland in 1573 (see 
Chapter III, §III). 
540 marioun in the MS, but this is surely a clerical error. 
541 NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 304v-305v, 15 January 1564/5, Forbes v. Sandelands. 
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proven, the Commissaries deemed the ‘band of marriage’ to have been ‘broken’ 
since the time of the adultery, and not from the time of the pronouncing of their 
decreet. In this, the effect of the adultery on the marriage was considered to be at the 
time it was committed, not at the time of the Commissaries’ decreet, a device which 
combines two elements of the post-Catholic situation already discussed above,542 that 
the adultery did have some de facto effect on the marriage, but that it was not 
deemed to have had that effect in law until proven before a competent judge.543  
 Whilst the ‘law or word of God’ was not mentioned in Forbes v. Sandelands 
it was soon introduced into litigation before the Commissaries. The first sentence of 
divorce to have been pronounced by the Kirk and accepted by the Commissaries was 
Hammyltoun v. Sclater, and was produced before the Commissaries four days after 
the decreet in Forbes v. Sandelands was pronounced, on 19 January 1564/5.544 From 
what is known from the contents of the extant sentences of divorce pronounced by 
the tribunals of the Kirk, it is probable that the sentence of divorce produced in 
Hammyltoun v. Sclater contained the clause “conform to the law of God” or some 
such. The next decreet of divorce pronounced by the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
was Dunlop v. Broun, 14 March 1564/5, around two months after it is certain that the 
Commissaries had seen, considered and accepted a sentence of divorce pronounced 
by the Kirk. In Dunlop v. Broun, the Commissaries decerned the “said marriage 
betuix the saidis Hew and Elizabeth to be dissolvit for the cryme of adulterie foirsaid 
committit be hir as said is and scho and the said Hew to be divorcit and separatit 
thairfoir and libertie grantit to the said Hew to marie as he list in the lord according 
to the word of God”.545 The normative “word of God” clause used in sentences of the 
Protestant Kirk had been incorporated into the Commissaries’ decreets. 
  
 The third decreet of divorce to be pronounced by the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh was in the action Hardy v. Rutherfurde and contained a much fuller 
statement of the grounds upon which the divorce proceeded. The process of divorce 
                                                 
542 See above, pages 115-116. 
543 There are six cases where the effect of the adultery was mentioned – i.e. ‘brokin [and violat] the 
bond of marriage’. In Wrycht v. Drippis and Kincaid v. Ross there was a suggestion that the divorce 
was effective from the time of the adultery rather than the time of the decreet, though these clauses are 
rare. 
544 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 314r. 
545 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 388r, 14 March 1564/5. 
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had in fact been led before the kirk of Jedburgh, but was remitted to the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh upon their appointment.546 The Commissaries 
pronounced decreet in conformity with the process led on 11 April 1564, and 
included what had presumably been part of the libel given in by Hardy to the kirk:  
 
“and thairfoir sen the ward of God is now sinceirlie and treulie prechit and his 
trew kirk erectit in thir partis the said Patrik being ane member thairof and 
vnder the discipline of Chryst and his faithfull congregatioun aucht tobe 
separatit fra the societie and cumpany of the said Katherine And the said 
Patrik not permittit nor sufferrit being ane of the memberis of Chryst and his 
faithfull congregatioun to joyne his body with hir being ane hure and harlot 
according to his halie word and evangell… The saidis Commissaris decernis 
and ordanis the said Katherine to haif violat hir fayth and brokin the said band 
and promeis of matrimony, and thairfoir tobe cuttit of separatit and diuorcit fra 
the said Patrik simpliciter in tyme cumming, and decernis the said Patrik to 
marie at his avne plesour according to the word of the evangell: Becaus the 
said precept being be the saidis Minister eldaris and deaconis admittit to the 
said Patrikis probatioun previt the samyn sufficientlie as wes knawin to the 
saidis Commissaris”.547 
 
 This example suggests that the elevation of the ‘word of God’ in Scotland 
was accepted by the Commissaries as an acceptable basis upon which the new 
divorce proceedings were to proceed. The “divorce” and “licence” clauses are also of 
note, the couple being “cut off, separated and divorced” from each other 
“simpliciter” and Hardy being declared free “to marie at his avne plessour according 
to the word of the evangel”.  
 
[b] ANALYSIS OF THE “DIVORCE” CLAUSE 
 
Of all the extant actions brought for divorce for adultery during the period 
under study, 73 reached definitive sentence or decreet,548 and of these all granted the 
remedy sought by the pursuer, saving one instance where the defender was 
assoilized.549 Of these 72 decreets of divorce 70 used the word “divorce” to describe 
separation of the parties,550 whilst none made use of the phrase “a vinculo 
                                                 
546 This aspect of the case is discussed below, pages 220-221. 
547 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 425r-v, 11 April 1565, Hardy v. Rutherfurde. 
548 Listed in Appendix II, C, pages 294-300. 
549 NAS, CC8/2/6, fo 252r-v, Stewart v. Murray, 28 January 1573/4. 
550 The exceptions being Andersone v. Allasone and Garland v. Stewart. 
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matrimonii”. Of these 70 instances, 61 used the phrase “devorcit simpliciter” to 
describe the separation, and this was undoubtedly the predominant and more 
normative element when describing the separation of the couple.551  
 Various other words were often used in conjunction with ‘divorcit’ and 
‘simplicter’. In 34 of these 61 decreets the phrase “divorce simpliciter” was used 
alone,552 whilst in a further 15 the phrases “cutt off” and “seperat fra” were also 
used,553 whilst a number of other decreets included one of these two additional 
phrases. Various other decreets used some combination of these terms, whilst 
omitting the word ‘simpliciter’. The most full and typical divorce clause used in the 
decreets of divorce for adultery was therefore “divorcit cutt off and seperat fra 
simpliciter”.  Nevertheless, it is clear that this formula was not in fact essential to the 
libel or decreet and that what would now be considered considerable imprecision was 
acceptable. In Anderson v. Allasone the couple were decerned to be “seperatit and 
cuttit fra” one another for the adultery libelled, whilst in Mure v. McCullocht the 
couple were simply “diuorcit fer” one another. As such it may be concluded that 
where the divorce of the couple was concerned one of more of the phrases ‘cut off,’ 
‘seperatit’ and ‘divorcit’ was to be used, all or some of which could be further 
qualified by using the adverb ‘simpliciter’.554 The variations observed in the divorce 
clauses underlines the fact that it is not possible automatically to infer the freedom 
bestowed on the divorced parties from the divorce clause alone, since it was too 
vague and imprecise; a “licence” clause was clearly required to lend clarity. 
 
                                                 
551 i.e. Forbes v. Sandelands, Hardy v. Rutherfurde, Murray v. Irwyng, Levingstoun v. Crawfurd, Ker 
v. Cranstoun, Small v. Moffett, Barnair v. Nychole, Wrycht v. Drippis, Makcanzie v. Makgillechallum, 
Wilsoun v. Creichtoun, Pawton v. Lindesay, Patersone v. Bernis, Flemyng v. Flemyng, Merschale v. 
Broun, Kincaid v. Ross, Provand v. Steill, Gourlay v. Crystie, Reid v. Osburne, Hay v. Quhyteheid, 
Levingstoun v. Kincaid, Diksoun v. Borthwick, Wylie v. Speir, Clerk v. Scott, Hendirsone v. Robesone, 
etc. etc. (see Appendix II, C, for full citations). 
552 i.e. Murray v. Irwyng, Levingstoun v. Crawfurd, Barnair v. Nychole, Wrycht v. Drippis, Pawton v. 
Lindesay, Patersone v. Bernis, Provand v. Steill, Gourlay v. Crystie, Reid v. Osburne, Levingstoun v. 
Kincaid, Diksoun v. Borthwick, Wylie v. Speir, etc. etc. (see Appendix II, C, for full citations). 
553 i.e. Hardy v. Rutherfurde, Ker v. Cranstoun, Small v. Moffett, Makcanzie v. Makgillechallum, 
Wilsoun v. Creichtoun, Wemis v. Dunbar, Merschale v. Broun, Hay v. Quhyteheid, Clerk v. Scott, etc. 
etc. (see Appendix II, C, for full citations). 
554 Whilst DOST notes that ‘simpliciter’ may mean “without qualification or condition being placed 
upon the event described” it is difficult to think that it had this meaning in this context. On the one 
hand, the consequences of the divorce were immediately qualified by the “licence” clause. On the 
other, ‘simpliciter’ could also mean “simply”, and this second meaning accords better with earlier 
sentences of the Kirk, wherein couples could be divorced “simplie and perpetuallie” (St Andrews, i, 
50). 
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[c] ANALYSIS OF THE “LICENCE” CLAUSE 
 
 In the 72 decreets of divorce for adultery pronounced by the Commissaries up 
to the winter of 1576/7, 71 of them contained a “licence” clause, whilst in the 
exception, Grant v. Leslie, licence to remarry was sought explicitly in the libel, and it 
is likely that the licence clause was simply omitted by the clerk in the actual 
decreet.555 As with the other clauses analysed, the “licence” clause could be 
expressed in a number of different ways. In five out of the first ten decreets, the 
licence clause conformed to its pre-Reformation counterpart, granting the innocent 
party “licence in the Lord” to remarry as they pleased, but this formula seems to have 
soon fallen out of use.556 Rather, the predominant formula, used in 53 of the decreets, 
was that the innocent party was decerned or declared “free to marry in the Lord” 
where they pleased.557 A further six decreets granted “liberty in the Lord” to 
remarry,558 whilst in one instance the Commissaries granted “fre libertie in the 
Lord”.559 Despite this range of variation within the “licence” clause, its tenor was 
always the same: the innocent party was free to remarry. In twenty-nine of the 
decreets the quality of the freedom of the innocent party to remarry was further 
defined by the addition of the clause “as freely as they might have done before the 
contracting of the said marriage” or words to that effect.560 
                                                 
555 NAS, CC8/2/8, fos. 255r-257r, 30 July 1576. The decreet is unusually long, which may account for 
the clerical oversight of not explicitly granting licence, having been explicitly required by the pursuer 
as part of the remedy desired in the libel. 
556 i.e. Murray v. Irwyng, McCrache v. Patersoun, Andersone v. Allasone, Ker v. Cranstoun, Barnair 
v. Nychole (see Appendix II, C, for full citations). 
557 i.e. Forbes v. Sandelands, Levingstoun v. Crawfurd, Small v. Moffett, Wrycht v. Drippis, Wemis v. 
Dunbar, Pawton v. Lindesay, Patersone v. Bernis, Flemyng v. Flemyng, Merschale v. Broun, Kincaid 
v. Ross, Provand v. Steill, Gourlay v. Crystie, Reid v. Osburne, Hay v. Quhyteheid, Levingstoun v. 
Kincaid, Diksoun v. Borthwick, Wylie v. Speir, Clerk v. Scott, Garland v. Stewart, Mure v. 
McCullo(ch)t, Hendirsone v. Robesone, Hopper v. Davidson, Wilsoun v. Mathy, Levingstoun v. 
Levingstoun, Sutherland v. Sinclair, Hammiltoun v. Caldwell, Forret v. Lyndesy, Vrquhart v. Lyoun, 
Cunnyngham v. Hunter, Ross v. Cathcart, etc. etc. (see Appendix II, C, for full citations). 
558 i.e. Dunlop v. Broun, Makcanzie v. Makgillechallum, Mortoun v. Robesoun, Leslie v. Betoun, Lamb 
v. Anderson, Gourlay v. McQueen (see Appendix II, C, for full citations). 
559 Leslie v. Betoun (NAS, CC8/2/7, fo. 164r-v, 2 June 1575). 
560 i.e. Forbes v. Sandelands, Levingstoun v. Crawfurd, Ker v. Cranstoun, Wrycht v. Drippis, Wilsoun 
v. Creichtoun, Wemis v. Dunbar, Pawton v. Lindesay, Patersone v. Bernis, Merschale v. Broun, 
Kincaid v. Ross, Provand v. Steill, Hay v. Quhyteheid, Levingstoun v. Kincaid, Wylie v. Speir, Clerk v. 
Scott, Garland v. Stewart, Hopper v. Dauidsoun, Hammiltoun v. Caldwell, Hog v. Cutlar, Houstoun v. 
Adame, Caquhone v. Watsoun, Drummound v. Campbell, etc. etc. (Appendix II, C, for full 
citations).The “licence” clause can also sometimes be found in actions concerning solemnization (i.e. 
NAS, CC8/2/8, fos. 123r-v, 5 April 1576, Reid v. Ramonos), declarators of freedom (i.e. NAS, 
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[d] EXCEPTIONS TO THESE GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
 
 In the action of Garland v. Stewart the standard formulas were negated 
altogether. The couple had solemnized their marriage in the kirk of Kilwinning in 
December 1561 ‘in face of haly kirk’. The defender had committed adultery with a 
named paramour during the course of 1570, which adultery was proven. The 
language of the Commissaries’ decreet, however, was not that usual to their decreets 
of divorce: “The saidis Commissaris be thair decreit Decernis the said band of 
matrimony tobe dessoluit & tobe null & of nane avale force nor effect in tyme 
cuming and the said Thomas tobe fre of the said defender as gif the said band had 
neuir bene solemnizat betuix thame and him to marie in the Lord quhair he plesis”.561 
Whilst other decreets of divorce made use of the phrase “to be dissoluit”562 the 
phrase “to be null and of nane avale force nor effect” is strongly redolent of 
sentences of annulment (with the obvious difference that the marriage was not 
deemed null ab initio). Whilst it is tempting to interpret this unique formula as 
suggesting that adultery was somehow considered grounds for annulment, the 
conception is flawed. For this to be the case, adultery would have had to have been 
considered an impediment, which, since occurring after the contracting of marriage, 
could not be considered an impediment in any valid sense. In this curious example, 
therefore, the use of some of the language of nullity should be taken to indicate what 
has already been made clear, that the Kirk and the Commissaries pressed the 
vocabulary of annulment into the service of expressing the new and novel divorces 
they pronounced.563 
 In the action of Goddiskirk v. Tenent, the parties had promised to marry one 
another, had had the banns proclaimed, and proceeded to consummate their promise 
prior to solemnization, by which “the mariage was consummat & finnist”. 
Nevetheless, prior to any solemnization of the union, Isobell Tenant committed 
adultery, which was duly proven before the Commissaries. Yet rather than adopt the  
                                                                                                                                          
CC8/2/7, fo. 3v, Robesoun v. Liall) and putting to silence (i.e. NAS, CC8/2/7, fo. 82[r], Baxter v. 
Dun). 
561 NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 98r, 27 February 1570/1, Garland v. Stewart. 
562 i.e. Dunlop v. Broun (NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 387v-388r, 14 March 1564/5). 
563 Cf the analysis of post-1563 annulment decreets which follows: the decreet of annulment 
pronounced in Paislie v. Haistie, which conceived of the annulment more as a Protestant divorce than 
an annulment. 
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normative “divorce” and “licence” clauses, the Commissaries decerned “the said 
Gilbert [Goddiskirk] to be fre of the said promeis of mariage maid be him to the said 
Isobell and tobe fre siclik to marrye in the Lord as he sall pleis in tyme cuming”.564 
This was the formula used in declarators of freedom, which were concerned with 
promises of marriage only, rather than marriages, regular or non-regular.565 No 
obvious explanation presents itself to this unique usage. The libel alleged clearly that 
“it is of veritie that the said Isobell hes sen the said promeis & carnall copulatioun 
following thairvpoun gevin the vse of hir body and had carnall copulatioun with the 
personis following” and as such it would seem that it cannot be argued that her illicit 
copula had occurred prior to the copula which “consummat & finnist” her promise to 
Goddiskirk. Yet despite this, the libel never called Isobell’s illicit copula “adultery” 
and argued elsewhere that her conduct “mad hir selff vnworthye to contract mariage 
with the said Gilbert he havand keipit him selff fer of the cumpany of ony vther 
woman sen the promeis forsaid”.566 Here the sense is that at least some of her illicit 
copula occurred after her promise of marriage, but prior to its consummation. As 
such, the Commissaries must have decided that the promise of marriage had not been 
validly consummated on account of some intervening unfaithfulness on Isobell’s 




[vi] EXAMPLES OF THE “LICENCE” CLAUSE IN THE  
COMMISSARIES’ DECREETS OF ANNULMENT 
 
 It has been argued that Scottish Protestant divorce for adultery was given 
legal expression by both the Kirk and Commissaries through the borrowing of 
clauses and formulas from pre-Reformation sentences of annulment. Analysis of the 
post 1559 material indicates that only the innocent party was granted licence to 
remarry following the granting of Scottish Protestant divorce for adultery. Yet this 
conclusion pre-supposes that the Commissaries of Edinburgh remained alive to the 
fact that within the context of sentences of annulment, the licence clause could be 
                                                 
564 NAS, CC8/2/5, fos. 46v-47r, 12 January 1570/1. 
565 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 41r, 30 May 1565, McWalter v. Galbrayth. 
566 NAS, CC8/2/5, fos. 46v-47r, 12 January 1570/1. 
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used to bestow licence on one or both parties. The analysis of post-1563 decreets of 
annulment which follows demonstrates that the Commissaries were well aware of the 
full utility of the licence clause, and that as such, their employment of the clause in 
decreets of divorce was deliberate, and reflected the law of Scotland. 
 The first decreet of annulment pronounced by the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh adopted a somewhat unusual conception of the case. The pursuer in the 
action was Margaret Paislie, and the defender her alleged husband John Haistie. The 
pursuer “beand ane pover simpill damisell” had “completit the band of matrimony in 
the face of halie kirk… as vse wes” with Haistie. Haistie was nevertheless already 
married to Janet Auchinlek who duly “come furth of Lanerk and clamit the said 
Johne”. As such, the second bigamous union was clearly null ab initio. These facts 
having been proven, the Commissaries decerned “the said Margaret to be seperat and 
simpliciter diuorcit fra the said Johne and libertie tobe gevin to hir to maire in the 
lord quhome scho pleises And the said Johne to be pvneist [as] accordis of the law 
ffor the said filthie cryme of adulterie committit be him as said is”.567 This remedy 
conformed closely to the pursuer’s libel, and as such no “nullity” clause was 
explicitly employed, although nullity of the second union was implicit in the decreet. 
Despite this omission, the rest of the decreet was as expected, with a “divorce” 
clause and “licence” clause granting the ignorant party, Margaret Paislie, licence to 
remarry. Licence was obviously not granted to Haistie since he was already married 
elsewhere.  
In Newtoun v. Dalzell, whilst the defender was assoilized, since the pursuer 
succumbed in probation, the action also concerned a bigamous union. The pursuer 
alleged that, being widowed, she married the defender in the belief that “he had bene 
frie persoun”. Nevertheless, the pursuer alleged that the defender was “na fre persoun 
the tyme of the solemnizatioun of the said mariege [between them],” claiming that 
the defender was already married to another, his first spouse “quha as zit on life”. 
The remedy sought by the pursuer was for the litigants’ marriage to be “decernit to 
haue bene null & of nane availl fer the begynning & in all tymes cuming with all that 
followit thairvpoun and the said Margaret [pursuer] decernit to be frie to marie in the 
Lord siclik and als friele as scho mycht haif done befoir the solempnizatioun of the 
mariege foirsaid”.568   
                                                 
567 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 247v, 25 November 1564, Paislie v. Haistie. 
568 NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 16v-17r, 10 December 1570. 
   137
The decreet of annulment pronounced by the Commissaries in Gillaspene v. 
Marscheall conformed more closely to pre-Reformation formulas in that a “nullity” 
clause was explicitly used. The litigants had contracted marriage per verba de 
praesenti when both aged nine, and having reached the age of 15 years sought to 
have the marriage annulled on the grounds of nonage and fear of their parents.569 The 
libel narrated that since the marriage was impeded by a diriment570 “the samyn 
pretendit band is of the self null of the law and aucht tobe decernit null and ilkane of 
the foirsaidis personis seperat and diuorciat simpliciter and Leif tobe gevin to euery 
ane of thame to marie in the Lord quhome thai pleis”. The libel was duly proven, and 
the Commissaries decerned “the said band of matrimony from the begynning and in 
all tyme tocum null betuix the foirsaidis personis and the said Cristiane tobe seperat 
and diuorcit simpliciter fra the said Henrie And decernis thame bayth euery ane of 
thame tobe seperat and diuorcit simpliciter ane fra ane vther And gevis leif to euery 
ane of thame to marie in the Lord quhome thai pleis”.571 As may be clearly seen, the 
“licence” clause explicitly extended licence to both parties to remarry as they wished, 
and as such it is certain that the Commissaries were fully aware of the fact that the 





  It therefore appears that two principal clauses were used to express the new 
Scottish Protestant divorce for adultery. The first was a “divorce” clause, which 
declared two parties to be separated and cut off from each other, because of the 
unfaithfulness of one of the parties, whilst the second was a “licence” clause which 
granted the party innocent of adultery the right to remarry as they so desired. 
Although it was initially anticipated by the Protestant Kirk that the party found guilty 
of adultery would be executed, in the majority of cases the guilty party avoided this 
penalty. Since the guilty party had not been granted licence to remarry it may be 
                                                 
569 Although metus reverentialis was not a grounds for annulment in its own right (Scanlon, ‘Husband 
and Wife’, 76). 
570 A diriment impediment is one from which no dispensation can be obtained (Scanlon, ‘Husband and 
Wife’, 75). 
571 NAS, CC8/2/2, fos. 133v-134r, 5 August 1565. 
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reasonably inferred that they were prohibited from doing so by the law: an analysis 
of post-Reformation decreets of annulment has demonstrated that the Commissaries 
understood that the “licence” clause could be used to grant licence to one or both 
parties, depending of the circumstances of a given case. 
Nevertheless, following the Reformation and prior to 1600, those divorced 
for their own adultery did sometimes marry again, even to their own paramours (and 
presumably third parties, although these unions do not seem to have been deprecated 
specifically).572 These two points taken together suggest that whilst the guilty party 
was not granted licence to remarry, they became free to remarry at some point 
thereafter. Given the pre-Reformation background, it seems reasonable that since 
adulterers divorced a mensa et thoro under the Catholic dispensation were freed to 
remarry by the death of their innocent spouse it is reasonable to suppose that this 
principle continued to operate in post-Reformation Scotland. This conception of 
Protestant divorce, granting licence to the innocent party, but binding the guilty party 
to the marriage until the death of the innocent party accords well with the context 
within which the innovations to divorce law were introduced. That is to say, the 
Reformers’ principal problem with divorce a mensa et thoro had been the 
predicament of the innocent spouse, and since their law reforms were aimed at 
remedying this perceived injustice, it could be argued that the restrictions on the 
rights of the guilty party to remarry remained intact. This seems a more satisfactory 
perspective than the nineteenth-century insistence that Scottish Protestant divorce 
was some form of divorce a vinculo, that is to say some sort of reformed annulment.  
 Yet it still remains that whilst the shape of the law provisionally concluded 
above is reasonable given the extant evidence, it is desirable that the premise that 
those divorced for their own adultery might not remarry during the lifetime of their 
first innocent spouse should be shown to have been enforced by the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh. Thankfully, a series of cases concerning the marital problems of Janet 
Paterson and Constantine Stevenson, and involving the superintendent and elders of 
Glasgow, a group of arbiters and the Commissaries of Edinburgh, provide an extant 
example of the enforcing of this principle. Indeed, it was the final action of 
annulment in these series of cases which first led John Riddell to consider the 
                                                 
572 i.e. see Riddell’s discussion of Dame Margaret Whytlaw and Sir John Ker; the validity of the 
marriage of that adulterous couple had been of considerable importance in Roxburgh v. Ker (Inquiry, 
i, 395 et seq). 
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possibility that those divorced for their own adultery may have been impeded from 
remarriage during the lifetime of the innocent spouse.573 Within the context of the 
preceding analysis, his tentative assertions seem certain. 
 
 Janet Paterson and Constantine Stevenson had been lawfully married at an 
unknown point prior to the Reformation. Stevenson had subsequently committed 
adultery, although the name of his paramour is not known. Paterson subsequently 
pursued Stevenson before the superintendent and elders of Glasgow, desiring a 
Scottish Protestant sentence of divorce to be pronounced in her favour on the 
grounds of Stevenson’s adultery. The couple were accordingly divorced by the 
superintendent and elders of Glasgow in 1560. This sentence of divorce was 
produced before the Commissaries and accepted by them, although the contents of 
the sentence are not known.  
 As with other sentences of divorce pronounced by the Kirk, it would appear 
that the question of tocher had not been addressed.574 Since the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh had not been appointed, Paterson and Stevenson appointed arbiters to 
come to an agreement over Paterson’s tocher. It was settled that Stevenson should 
restore a sum of money to Paterson before the named arbiters “At McDokis Mure 
within the parrochin of Nelstoun the xxiiij day of Februar the zeir of God jai vc lxij 
zeris,” by virtue of which she exonerated Stevenson and his heirs from all further 
claims. In addition, the arbiters presumed to grant Stevenson licence to remarry, 
decerning that he “may marie and tak to his wife quhatsumeuir vomen he plesis best 
without ony molestatioun preturbatioun or titill to be maid or done be the said Jonet 
or vtheris in hir name or behuif In tym to cum and that because the saidis juges findis 
the saidis Jonet and Constene lauchfullie seperatit and put sundrie be ane decrete and 
sentence gevin be the superintendent eldaris of Glasgw as said is”.575 Whilst the 
arbiters were not competent to grant such a licence, the inclusion of this clause in the 
arbiters’ judgement indicates that Stevenson was desirous that he should be declared 
                                                 
573 Riddell, Inquiry, i, 392. 
574 For example the kirk session and superintendent’s court at St Andrews did not presume to make 
settlements between divorced couples concerning their temporal goods, but rather oversaw the 
appointment of arbiters to decide these question (St Andrews, i, 38-39). There were three ‘Tint’ 
actions brought before the Commissaries of Edinburgh, were the pursuer desired them to decern the 
party guilty of adultery to have ‘tint their tocher et donationes propter nuptias’ by virtue by a sentence 
of divorce pronounced by the Kirk (see above Chapter II, §V).  
575 NAS, CS7/29, fos. 42r-43r, 10 March 1563/4. 
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free to marry, and that Janet Paterson should in effect be put to silence. It is 
reasonable to assume that the sentence of the Kirk had granted licence to remarry to 
the innocent Paterson only, in conformity with all known extant sentences of divorce 
pronounced by the Kirk during this period, whilst this inference is confirmed by the 
fact that Stevenson’s desire to be declared free by arbiters belies his lack of a licence 
from the Kirk, together with a perceived need of such a declaration. Janet Paterson 
was clearly unhappy with the arbiters’ judgement, raising a precept of reduction 
against it before the Lords of Council on 10 March 1563/4, but the outcome of this 
action, if there was one, it not known at present.576 
 At some point during the summer of 1563 or thereabouts577 Constantine 
Stevenson contracted a marriage with one Agnes Pollock. On the 23 January 1564/5 
Henry Kinross, Procurator Fiscal of the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
together with Janet Paterson instituted an action of annulment against Constantine 
Stevenson and Agnes Pollock. After due process had been led in the matter, the 
Commissaries annulled Stevenson and Pollock’s marriage on the 11 July 1565 and 
declared the couple’s cohabitation ‘filthie and detestable’. The reason for the 
decision was given thus: “BECAUS it is of veritie that the said Jonet Patersone wes 
mariit lauchfullie with the said Constine Stevinsoun and he thaireftir divorcit and 
cuttit fra the said Jonet for the filthie adulterie committit be him As the decreit gevin 
thairon be the Superintendent and elderis of Glasgw at mair lenth proportis of the 
dait the [blank] day of [blank] the zeir of God jaj vc/ lx zeris And als that thir tua 
zeris lastbipast the saidis Constine and Agnes hes on 578 thair pretendit maner sen the 
said diuorcement contractit mariage togidder as mariit folkis in ane hous in [blank] 
havand carnale deill and copulatioun togidder the said Jonet zit being on lyfe and 
will not desist and ceiss fra thair sclanderous and detestable lyf foirsaid”.579  
 The two main points made in this statement were that the Kirk’s sentence of 
divorce had been pronounced for Stevenson’s adultery, and that Stevenson had 
                                                 
576 NAS, CS7/29, fos. 42r-43r, 10 March 1563/4. 
577 The Commissaries’ decreet of the 11 July 1565 stated that Stevenson and Pollock had been living 
together as supposed man and wife for “tua zeris lastbipast or thairby”. It therefore seems most likely 
that Stevenson had obtained the dubious licence to remarry from the arbiters prior to attempting to 
contract a second marriage, and that Paterson had initially petitioned the Lords following the 
contracting of the second marriage. Although speculative, it seems likely that the Lords of Council 
would have requested that Kinross look into the matter.  
578 na appears here in the MS, but is likely a clerical error. 
579 NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 86r-v, 11 July 1565, Patersoun (& Fischale) v. Stevinsoun & Pollock. 
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subsequently contracted marriage with another woman, his first innocent spouse “zit 
being on lyfe”.580 These were the only grounds given explicitly upon which the 
annulment of Stevenson’s second marriage proceeded.  
Given the tenor of the decreet there are only two theoretical grounds upon 
which Stevenson’s second marriage could have been annulled. The first, being the 
one given in the decreet, was that those divorced for their own adultery were barred 
from remarriage during the lifetime of their first innocent spouse. The second and 
less likely is that Agnes Pollock may have been Stevenson’s paramour, but this was 
never stated in the extant material. But even if it were to be granted that Pollock was 
Stevenson’s paramour, there are two reasons why it seems unlikely that remarriage to 
a paramour were the grounds upon which the annulment proceeded. The first reason 
was that no indication is given that Pollock was Stevenson’s paramour,581 which 
indicates either that she was not or, if she were, it was not deemed significant. The 
second reason is that the logic of the House of Lords’ ruling in Roxburgh v. Ker, that 
the need for the Act of 1600 must have arisen from the fact that such marriages were 
licit prior to the Act, would be difficult to contravene.582 As such, the only tenable 
grounds of the annulment of the marriage of Stevenson and Pollock, both 
theoretically and in terms of the explicit evidence of the Commissaries’ decreet is 
that the life of the innocent party was an impediment to the remarriage of those 
divorced for their own adultery. 
 
 Scottish Protestant divorce for adultery was therefore certainly a new kind of 
divorce which combined elements of both pre-Reformation divorces a mensa et 
thoro and divorces a vinculo matrimonii. Whilst under the new laws, married parties 
were divorced on the grounds of one of the parties’ adultery, the “divorce” clause 
used in these sentences and decreets carefully avoided the use of the phrase a mensa 
et thoro or a vinculo matrimonii. Rather, the language used was imprecise. The 
                                                 
580 It should be noted that this clause appeared in other consistorial decreets of the Commissaries, 
when the underlying concept was A may not remarry since married to B, and B is still alive, i.e. since 
the marriage between them still stands (i.e. NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 16v-17r, 10 December 1570, Newtoun 
v. Dalzell, which was a decree of annulment on the grounds of ‘bigamy’). 
581 Which is a contrary conclusion to that of David Baird Smith, whose attention having been drawn to 
the case by Riddell’s work, asserted that this annulment proceeded upon the grounds that “a divorced 
adulterer had married his paramour” (‘The Reformers and Divorce’, 19). There is no evidence to 
support Baird Smith’s assertion. 
582 Discussed above pages 105-106. 
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guilty party in effect continued to be bound to the marriage until released by the 
death of the innocent party: in this sense the guilty party had been divorced a mensa 
et thoro. The innocent party was granted licence and freedom to remarry, through the 
employment of a “licence” clause borrowed from pre-Reformation sentences of 
divorce a vinculo matrimonii (that is to say annulment): in this sense, the innocent 
party was treated as if through no fault of their own the marriage to which they had 
been bound had in effect ceased to restrict their capacity to remarry, rather as if the 
marriage bond had been annulled. During the Scottish Reformation, therefore, 
distinct conceptual elements from both types of pre-Reformation divorce were 
employed to create a uniquely Scottish divorce law, unknown not only to the Canon 
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§III 
SCOTTISH PROTESTANT DIVORCE FOR MALICIOUS DESERTION 
 
On 30 April 1573 the three estates of the Scottish Parliament passed an Act 
“Anent thame that divertis fra utheris, being joynit of befoir in lauchfull 
marriage”.583 The Act narrated “that in all times bypast, sen the trew and Christiane 
religioun was publictlie preichit, awowit and establischit within this realme, namelie, 
sen the moneth of August, the yeir of God ane thousand five hundreth threscoir 
yeiris, it hes bene, is and in all tyme cumming salbe” lawful for “the malicious and 
obstinat defectioun of the partie offendar to be ane sufficient caus of divorse and the 
said partie offendar to tyne and loss thair tocher et donationes propter nuptias.” 
Whilst malicious desertion was elaborately defined by the Act, the precise quality of 
the divorce and licence to remarry which would be granted were not stated.  
The Act clearly purported to be declaratory rather than prescriptive, and 
whilst the Commissaries of Edinburgh certainly accepted from 1573 that the law of 
Scotland had allowed divorce on the grounds of malicious desertion since August 
1560, they did so on the grounds of the authority of the Scottish Parliament, not on 
the grounds that Parliament’s understanding of divorce law since 1560 was 
historically accurate. The historical veracity of Parliament’s narration was first 
doubted in print by Riddell in his Inquiry of 1842, when he discovered that the law of 
divorce for malicious desertion was unknown to the Commissaries of Edinburgh in 
1571/2, and suggested that the statute had been enacted at the desire of the then 
Chancellor of Scotland, the 5th earl of Argyle.584 Whilst Riddell’s opinions were still 
considered as one of several possibilities until quite recently,585 recent work has 
elaborated and confirmed Riddell’s theory beyond reasonable doubt.586  
                                                 
583 RPS, A1573/4/2; APS, iii, 81, c.1. 
584 Riddell, Inquiry, i, 546 et seq. 
585 Forte has summarized the various options in ‘Some Aspects of the Law of Marriage’, 113. In 1995 
David Sellar noted that “the statute [of 1573] narrated that divorce for desertion had been available 
since the Reformation, but it is not clear that this is so” (‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 73); see also 
Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Divorce’, 96. 
586 J.E.A. Dawson ‘The Noble and the Bastard: The Earl of Argyll and the Law of Divorce in 
Reformation Scotland’ in Julian Goodare and Alasdair MacDonald (eds.), Sixteenth-Century Scotland: 
Essays in Honour of Michael Lynch  (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 147-168. I am grateful to Professor 
Dawson for providing me with her unpublished transcriptions of all the various stages of litigation 
involving the 5th earl and his first countess, Jane Stewart, and for various conversations about the 
legislation of 1573.   
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The evidence is as follows: Archibald Campbell, 5th earl of Argyle and one of 
the most powerful magnates in Scotland, Ireland and England had married Jane 
Stewart, natural daughter of James V of Scotland during April 1554.587 The marriage 
had not been particularly successful, and whilst Argyle had sired a number of natural 
children with various mistresses, his marriage produced no legitimate heir. The earl’s 
marriage experienced various difficulties, and by August 1567 his countess had 
deserted him.588 Various attempts to entreat the countess to adhere to the earl proved 
unsuccessful589 and accordingly the earl instituted an action for adherence against the 
countess before the Commissaries of Edinburgh during November 1570, being the 
normal procedure following desertion. The Commissaries duly decerned the countess 
to adhere to her husband on 28 January 1571/2. 
The countess failed to comply with the Commissaries’ decreet of adherence 
and was duly put to the horn on 23 February 1571/2.590 This was un-charted territory: 
few Scottish subjects would have had the capacity to defy the authority of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh and the Lords of Council and Session. Jane Stewart’s 
refusal to adhere to her lawful husband placed Argyle in a difficult and possibly 
unprecedented situation. He had no legitimate heir and was expected to pre-decease 
his lawful wife. His initial response to his wife’s recalcitrance was to attempt to 
obtain a decreet of Scottish Protestant divorce on the grounds of non-adherence, and 
to that end instituted further proceedings before the Commissaries of Edinburgh on 1 
March 1571/2. Yet the Commissaries were unclear as to the law on this head, and 
accordingly assigned the earl’s procurator, Thomas Craig, 10 March 1571/2 “to 
informe of the lawis allegeit that the caus libellit [i.e. malicious desertion] est causa 
divortii”.591 It must be presumed that Craig, one of the ablest men of law of his 
generation, was unable to demonstrate that Scots consistorial law held non-adherence 
to be a grounds for Scottish Protestant divorce, since the earl’s action was not 
pursued further. 
Having failed in his attempt to put away the countess, the earl pursued the 
only course left open to him and continued with his attempts to compel the countess 
                                                 
587 NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 170v, 28 January 1571/2, Argyll v. Countess, decreet of adherence. 
588 NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 170v, 28 January 1571/2, Argyll v. Countess, decreet of adherence. 
589 Dawson, ‘Noble and Bastard’, 160-161. 
590 Dawson, ‘Noble and Bastard’, 163, n. 61. 
591 Riddell, Inquiry, i, 548; Dawson, ‘Noble and Bastard’, 163. 
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to adhere to him in conformity with the Commissaries’ original decreet of adherence. 
Since the countess had already proved unresponsive to the civil censures of the Lords 
of Council and Session, the earl availed himself of the ecclesiastical censures of the 
Protestant Kirk. The countess was first admonished privately to adhere to her 
husband, and not proving amenable was solemnly warned on three successive 
Sundays in the kirk of Leith to adhere to her husband on pain of excommunication. 
These warnings were ignored by the countess; yet an excommunicate, outlawed, non-
adhering lawful wife was of no use to the earl in his increasingly overwhelming 
desire to secure his ancient and noble line. The excommunication was accordingly 
not effected, presumably in the hope that the countess would yet yield to the threat of 
ecclesiastical censure. Rather, the countess was again solemnly warned on three 
successive Sunday in the kirk of Edinburgh to adhere to her husband on pain of 
excommunication. She again proved defiant, and having in effect already called the 
Kirk’s bluff once, obliged them to formally excommunicate her on 26 April 1573.592 
Since the earl had now exhausted all possible means of coercion, both civil 
and ecclesiastical by which his wife could be made to adhere to him, his only 
remaining option was to authoritatively establish that the laws of Scotland permitted 
Scottish Protestant divorce on the grounds of malicious and obstinate desertion. His 
first recourse was to the General Assembly, but it demurred, “setting up a committee 
which recommended seeking the advice of other Reformed churches in Europe”.593 
Whilst this would occasion considerable delays, in other circumstances the earl 
might have patiently awaited the completion of the Kirk’s deliberations, but the 
uncertain state of his health meant that he could not abide further delays in ridding 
himself of his wife, lawfully remarrying, and producing an heir.594  
It is therefore certain that in the early 1570s neither the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh nor the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland could positively assert 
that malicious desertion was a competent ground for divorce with licence to remarry. 
                                                 
592 Dawson, ‘Noble and Bastard’, 161-164. 
593 Ibid., 164. It may be speculated that the Assembly’s consultation would have been favourable to 
the earl’s cause: see David Baird Smith, ‘A Note on Divorce for Desertion’ in Juridical Review, 51 
(1939), 254-259. Although Smith was mistaken in attributing the introduction of divorce for malicious 
desertion into Scotland directly to Genevan influences, the connection is certainly valid: Genevan 
influences certainly played a direct role in the Dutch Reformed context (see Alan Watson, ‘The 
Development of Marital Justifications for Malitiosa Desertio in Roman – Dutch Law’ in Law 
Quarterly Review, 79 (1963), 87-97). 
594 Dawson, ‘Noble and Bastard’, 162-4. 
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The only other course of action open to the earl was to have the three of estates of 
Parliament declare that malicious desertion was a competent ground for divorce with 
licence to remarry. Moreover, it was imperative for the earl to establish that this was 
the law of Scotland, and indeed had been the law at the time of the failure of his 
marriage: it was not enough for the three estates to prescribe the law of Scotland by 
statute in this respect, rather they would have to declare that the laws favourable to 
the resolution of the earl’s predicament had been effective from some date prior to 
his marital difficulties.  
On 30 April 1573 the three estates duly obliged, and it has long been held that 
the earl used his powers as Chancellor of Scotland to secure the enactment of this 
statute.595 As has already been discussed, the Act was declaratory, asserting that 
divorce for malicious desertion had been competent in Scotland since August 1560, 
and as such, the earl’s own marriage was encompassed by the terms of the Act. The 
Act also conveniently described that malicious desertion could only be proven if the 
deserter had been first privately admonished to adhere, then pursued for adherence 
before a competent judge, then compelled to conform to the ensuing decreet of 
adherence by the Lords of Session, then put to the horn by the Lords, then privately 
admonished by the ecclesiastical authorities, then publicly admonished by the 
ecclesiastical authorities and then excommunicated.596 This of course was a blow-by-
blow narration of the precise steps already taken by the 5th earl of Argyle against his 
countess. 
The law of divorce having been declared to be favourable to the earl’s first 
precept of divorce for malicious desertion raised before the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh on 1 March 1571/2, a second precept was raised on 9 May 1573.597 This 
time the Commissaries accepted the libel as competent in view of the recent 
parliamentary legislation, and admitted it to probation. Since the due diligence for 
establishing malicious desertion prescribed by the Act of 1573 had already been 
done, the libel was duly proven and the Commissaries pronounced their decreet in 
the earl’s favour on 22 June 1573. The Commissaries’ decreet employed the same 
                                                 
595 Riddell, Inquiry, 552; Dawson, ‘Noble and Bastard’, 164.  
596 RPS, A1573/4/2; APS, iii, 81, c.1. The Act even included a narrative of the ‘double’ public 
admonitions in the kirks of Leith and Edinburgh: “in case thair be nane or that the minister will not 
execute, to the minister of the nixt adjacent kirk thairto, quha sall proceid aganis the said offendar 
with publict admonitiounis”. 
597 NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 90v, 9 May 1573. 
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“divorce” and “licence” clauses employed in their decreets of divorce on the grounds 
of adultery, decerning Jane Stewart “to be simpliciter Diuorcit fra the said noble 
Lordis cumpany for the said malitious & obstinat desertioun and / decernis / hir to 
have tynt hir tocher donationes propter nuptias with all vther thingis gevin to hir in 
respect of the said mariage And the said noble Lord tobe fre to marye quhair he 
pleises in the Lord”.598 In this it may be presumed that Jane Stewart was not free to 
remarry during the lifetime of the 5th earl.  
Almost immediately the earl exercised the licence granted by the 
Commissaries’ decreet, marrying Jean Cunningham, daughter of the 4th earl of 
Glencairn, in the first week of August 1573. The second countess was soon got with 
child, but on 12 September 1573 the 5th earl died, whilst his posthumous son died at 
birth.599 
On 15 January 1573/4 the first countess raised a precept of reduction against 
the Commissaries’ decreet of adherence and subsequent decreet of divorce for 
malicious desertion. The central arguments in her precept of reduction were aimed at 
the decreet of adherence, arguing that she ought not to have been compelled to 
adhere to the late earl on the grounds of just dread and fear, the 5th earl’s adultery, 
and the fact that no interim aliment had been modified to her during her separation 
from the earl, and as such she had not had the means by which to conform to the 
earl’s initial admonitions to adhere.600 Nevertheless, Jane Stewart does not appear to 
have argued that the Act of 1573 was only prescriptive, and therefore applied only to 
cases of non-adherence from 1573. The Lords of Council and Session referred the 
precept of reduction to Parliament on the grounds that “the samyn is ane novalte” 
and that they “will haif advyss of the princis and three estaitis laufulle convenit upon 
the interpretation of the act of parliament libellit and quhat may result thairupon”.601 
In the event, full process was not led in the first countess’s precept of reduction 
before the Lords, and no sentence was ever pronounced in the matter. Rather, this 
action was referred by Jane Stewart and the late earl’s successor, Colin, 6th earl of 
Argyll for arbitration to “My Lordis Regentis grace [Regent Mar] & haill Lordis of 
                                                 
598 NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 122v. 
599 Dawson, ‘Noble and Bastard’, 165. 
600 A copy of the countess’s precept of reduction was located and transcribed by Professor Dawson in 
Oliver Colt’s Legal Style Book (NAS, RH13/2, fos 73v-77v), upon which this summary is based.   
601 NAS, CS7/63/2, fo. 243v, Professor Dawson’s transcription. 
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Counsale” on 24 June 1577, together with various other pieces of litigation pending 
between the parties,602 consenting that “however the saidis Lordis Regentis grace & 
Lordis foresaid decidit thairintill ather of the saidis parties band & oblist them to 
abyd thairat”.603    
 The Lords of Council, presumably in their appointed capacity as amicable 
compositors, pronounced their final decreet in the matter on 24 June 1577, ordaining 
that Jane Stewart “sall have frie and frie regres ingres and access in and to hir haill 
coniunctfie landis of Campbell Dolour Menstrie Mekill and Litill Pincartownis 
mainis of Fernwall lordschip of Lorne and to ye tak and teind schawis of ye said 
parochin and kirk of Dolour siclyk and in ye samen maner as yis pronuncit decreit 
and decreit of divorce writt above specifeit had nevir bein gevin”.604 This was clearly 
a compromise in which Jane Stewart’s action for reduction of the Commissaries’ 
decreets had been allowed to sleep in return for a handsome property settlement in 
her favour as if she had never been divorced from the 5th earl, and were still his 
widow. In a strict legal sense she nevertheless remained divorced for malicious 
desertion, but the fact that her property entitlements accorded with her claims to still 
be the countess dowager of Argyll very possibly reflected a general sense of unease 
within the government that her legal status was nothing more than the technical result 
of the late earl’s remarkable machinations.605  
 
 It is therefore clear that prior to the Act of 1573 neither the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh nor the Protestant Kirk had a clear understanding that divorce for 
malicious desertion was competent under the law of Scotland. Whilst legal clarity 
                                                 
602 See Dawson, ‘Noble and Bastard”, 166-167. 
603 NAS, CS15/22, Warrants of Decreets, bundle concerning Dame Jane Stewart and her lands of 
Menstrie and Campbell: “Apud Edinburt xxiiijto Junij Anno Dom etc lxxvijo, The quhilk day in the 
presence of the Lordis of Counsale comperit personalie Coleyne Erle of Ergile for him self & as 
brother & air to vmquhile Archibald Erle of Ergile his brother that last decissit on that ane part And 
Dame Jene Stewart relict of the said vmqhile Archibald Erle of Ergile on that vther part And REFFERIT 
the decisioun of all actionis vnder writtin And spealie the actioun & caus of reductioun persewit be the 
said Lady aganis the said Erle & Dame Jane Cunnyghame siclik allegit spous to the said vmquhile 
Erle & the Commissaris of Edinburt Tuiching the productioun & reductioun of ane decreit & sentence 
of diuorce [etc] / & adherence / obtenit be the said Erle aganis the said Lady befoir the saidis 
Commissaris…”  
604 NAS, GD16/41/42, Airlie Muniments, fos. 1r-2v (Professor Dawson’s transcription). 
605 The 6th earl of Argyll felt particularly aggrieved “that the 1573 act had not been properly 
enforced…” (Dawson, ‘Noble and Bastard, 167, n. 84). 
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was provided by Parliament, its seems that the Lords of Council were ultimately not 
prepared to deprive Jane Stewart of her property rights by virtue of the 
Commissaries’ decreets of adherence and divorce for malicious desertion, the latter 
having been pronounced in conformity with the Act. This seems reasonable and just 
given that the Act of 1573 was manifestly passed to favour the 5th earl of Argyll. 
From a study of all the relevant extant records for the period from the start of the 
Scottish Reformation, it is clear that the 5th earl’s actions of divorce on the grounds 
of malicious desertion were the first of their kind in Scotland. That the Kirk 
demurred on the question of whether this was part of the law of Scotland makes 
sense within the context of the arguments already put forward concerning Scottish 
Protestant divorce for adultery. On this head it is clear that the Kirk had introduced 
divorce for adultery on the understanding that the adulterous party would be 
executed, and as such, the Kirk’s reasoning still conformed closely with the Canon 
law conception of the death of one spouse freeing the survivor to remarry. No such 
rationale could be brought to bear where malicious desertion was concerned; there 
was certainly no call for the death penalty. Rather, the innovation prescribed by the 
three estates in 1573 consolidated the discernible shift in Scottish thinking about 
marriage from law being informed and validated by theological reasoning, to law 
being a matter of legal authority, with couples being formally divorced by the 
authority of judicial decree conforming to statute law, thereby diverging from the 
Canon law approach that the judgements of courts in matrimonial matters should 
seek to recognize and accord with the theologically defined inner realities of the 
marriage bond. Yet at the same time, the co-ordination between the differing 
jurisdictions of the Commissaries and the Kirk witnessed during the Argyll affair, 
and finally enshrined in statute, bore testimony to a new process of convergence in 
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CHAPTER IV 







 The Commissaries of Edinburgh, broadly speaking, employed the Romano-
canonical plenary procedure developed by the courts spiritual of the medieval 
Church prior to the European Reformations. The same basic structure of procedure 
had been employed in the Scottish Court of the Official, continued to be employed in 
the English ecclesiastical courts following the English Reformation, and provided the 
basis of the procedure used by the Scottish Lords of Session. Yet despite the 
common provenance of the plenary procedure of all these courts, the procedure of 
the Commissaries of Edinburgh was in essence a slightly more streamlined version 
of the Romano-canonical procedure than that found in the English ecclesiastical 
courts, and the courts of the Scottish Officials. As the Officials before them, the 
Commissaries also made use of a summary procedure in straightforward matters, and 
this will be considered after the plenary procedure of the Commissaries has been 
discussed.      
 
[i] PLENARY PROCEDURE 
 
The choice of whether to use plenary or summary procedure in any given 
action before the Commissaries of Edinburgh was at the discretion of the bench.606  
Plenary procedure was adopted by the Commissaries in actions which were expected 
to be difficult and arduous.607 The litigation began with the Commissaries issuing a 
libelled precept or summons to be served on the defender. Several distinctions in 
language were used by the Commissaries to denote the differences in the types of 
                                                 
606 “as the judges, be thair discretioun, thinkis expedient” (Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 655, item ii). 
Ollivant suspected that the same choice was at the judges’ discretion in the Official’s Court (Court of 
the Official, 114). 
607 Balfour’s Practicks, i, 655-656, item ii. 
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summonses they issued. In summary procedure the pursuer made a verbal petition 
and the Commissaries issued a summons ad instantiam, which did not inform the 
defender what the specific points alleged against them were. In plenary procedure, 
the pursuer produced a written libel, the contents of which were incorporated into a 
‘libelled summons’ (also often referred to as a ‘libelled precept’608), which was then 
served upon the defender.  
The precise procedural relationship between bringing a complaint before the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh and the production of a libelled precept is not entirely 
clear. Prospective litigants were not obliged to employ the services of a man of law 
as a procurator before the Commissaries and were permitted to represent themselves. 
Within the English context, Richard Helmholz has noted that the plaintiff was 
permitted to make their initial complaint orally as was “sensible to do in situations 
were the parties were illiterate”.609 Ollivant has argued that Balfour distinguished 
between verbal “petitions” and written “libels”.610 Such verbal and written 
approaches were competent before the old Officials, and were also valid in the 
English ecclesiastical courts.611 Since the “distinctioun of libelling or not libelling of 
the summoundis [wes] referrit to the arbitriment of the Judge” in the Court of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh,612 it seems reasonable to suppose that potential pursuers 
initially approached the bench with a verbal petition so that the form of procedure to 
be used might be selected by the judges. If an illiterate layperson without a man of 
law therefore made a verbal petition, on the basis of which the Commissaries decided 
that a libelled summons should be prepared, it is not clear whether the Commissaries 
directed the pursuer to a man of law to prepare a written libel, or whether a clerk of 
court prepared a libelled precept at once, setting down the allegations of the pursuer 
in writing for the first time directly into the libelled precept.613 In contrast, it is 
                                                 
608 These labels seems to have been used interchangeably in the Court of the Commissaries, although 
‘libellit summoundis’ tended to be ‘direct furth’, whilst ‘principal preceptis’ tended to be ‘raisit’, a 
distinction which may have reflected the original provenance of the libel or petition? 
609 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 319. 
610 Based on Balfour’s phrase that a libel was “ane petitioun made in writ be the persewar” (Court of 
the Official, 101).  
611 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 322. 
612 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 656, item ii. 
613 Helmholz points out that in the English ecclesiastical courts the consensus seems to have been 
“that determining the citation’s contents was better left for decision by court officials on a case by 
case basis” (Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 320). 
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reasonable to suppose that potential pursuers familiar with the workings of the 
courts, and aware of the potential complexity of their action, would have had a 
formal libel prepared by a man of law prior to the initial approach to the bench. But 
the existence of a written libel as distinct from a libelled precept or summons cannot 
always be pre-supposed,614 whilst there is ample evidence that the clerks of court 
often copied extracts from the libelled precept into the Register of Acts and 
Decreets.615 Whilst the exact manner in which libelled summonses were compiled is 
unclear, it is certain that the written libelled summons was the foundational element 
in the Commissaries’ plenary procedure.616  
In the English ecclesiastical courts, whilst the party who wished to begin a 
lawsuit first approached the judge, “most citations were issued by the person who 
kept the judge’s seal, [which] usually meant the registrar”.617 Likewise, in the Court 
of the Commissaries, the clerks of court certainly dealt with the preparation of 
summonses,618 whilst the keeper of the seals of the Commissariot presumably 
applied the wax impressed with the signet, under which all summons were to be 
given.619 In light of this, it is most probable that the clerks of court also prepared the 
libelled summonses.  
                                                 
614 But it is nevertheless certain that in plenary procedure, a verbal petition had to be reduced to 
writing, as had long been the practice in the Official’s Court (Court of the Official, 100-101). What is 
in question is whether or not verbal petitions had to be set down in a libel, which was then 
incorporated into a libelled precept, or whether the clerks of court produced a libelled precept on the 
basis of both verbal petitions and written libels. 
615 Such copied extracts usually break off with the clause “As at mair lenth is contenit in the said 
precept” (NAS, CC8/2/8, fo. 259r, 31 July 1576, Drummound v. Buchquhannane) or “As the said 
precept beris” (NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 275r, 19 January 1567/8, Andersone v. Allasone). 
616 In the procedure of the English ecclesiastical courts “the citation was regarded as the ‘foundation 
of the ordo iuris’” (Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 317-318). 
617 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 318. 
618 The clerk who prepared a summons was “to write his name and surname at length in all sic letteris” 
(Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 656, item iii); for an example see NAS, GD137/2201, [Papers of the 
Scrymgeour Wedderburn of Wedderburn Family, Earls of Dundee c. 1166-1910], 19 May 1567 – in 
this instance the clerk was Michael Marjoribanks, the seal had been applied by John Brown (keeper of 
the seals), and had been executed and duly endorsed by Alexander Lekprevik. 
619 The Lords of Session directed that in the ‘signet’ of the office “sall be graven ane crownit thissel, 
with M.R. and in the circumspectioun, S. OFFICII COMMISSARIATUS, with the name of the place of the 
said commissariat; and the seill, beand of greiter form, berand siclike” (Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 656, 
item iii). The keeper of the seal of the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh is briefly discussed 
above in Chapter II, under ‘Clerks of Court’. For an example of the impress of the seal see Royal 
Commission on Historical Manuscripts, Report on the Manuscripts of Colonel David Milne Home of 
Wedderburn Castle (London: HMSO, 1902), 44.  
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The formulas employed by the clerks of court contained a high degree of 
variation, a fact that has already been discussed above.620 Within the context of the 
English ecclesiastical courts, Helmholz has noted the lack of standard formulas used 
in definitive sentences. Here the variations are explained within both the general 
context that “the jurists did not treat omission of formal language as a cause of 
nullity,” together with the fact that definitive sentences were actually prepared by 
litigants and their proctors and submitted to the judges.621 Similarly, the ‘principal 
precepts’ or ‘libelled summons’ of the Commissaries contained a lack of standard 
formulas, a fact which is accounted for by the provenance of oral petitions and 
written libels: they were the at least semi-direct creation of litigants themselves 
(although often aided by men of law).  
Yet despite the variation of formulas, the principal precepts tended to 
conform in layout to the classical pattern ‘quis, quid, coram quo, quo jure petiture et 
a quo’ of the canonists.622 This is reflected in the entries made in the Registers of 
Acts and Decreets by the clerks in the first entry for a new case, the wording of 
which was usually repeated as a preamble to the entry recording the Commissaries’ 
final decision or decreet, and which was based upon the actual libelled summonses 
before the clerks.623 Such entries contained the names of the litigants, made mention 
that the action proceeded by virtue of the Commissaries’ precepts and narrated the 
principal allegations of the pursuer. The allegations made by the pursuer could 
contain varying degrees of condescendence, and the libelled summonses accordingly 
cost two or three shillings depending on length.624 The idea was that the defender 
would be simultaneously summoned before the Commissaries and furnished with the 
specific allegations being made against them so that they could prepare a written 
response to bring with them on the day to which they had been summoned.625 In 
practice, the defender invariably appeared at the initial diet and was immediately 
                                                 
620 See above 108-109. 
621 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 344. 
622 Cf Court of the Official, 100-101. 
623 As mentioned elsewhere, the actual process papers for this period have perished, and as such, 
observations must be based upon the contents of the Registers of Acts and Decreets. 
624 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 661, ‘Prices’. A copy of the principal precept could be obtained by the 
defender for 6 d. (Ibid., ii, 656, item iv). 
625 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 655-656, item ii. 
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assigned a new term at which to give in their defences to the libel in writing.626 This 
initial diet was recorded in the Registers of Acts and Decreets, and included an 
extract from the principal precept, the names of the parties present (with a note of 
anyone who had not compeared), together with the date of the term assigned for the 
defender to give in their answers.627 
  The defender usually appeared at the term assigned and gave in their defences 
in writing.628 However, if they did not they would be summoned with certification 
that if they failed to appear they would automatically succumb in their defence.629 As 
already noted, whilst there was no legal requirement for the involvement of men of 
law, even in those frequent instances where litigants represented themselves it is 
quite possible, and even likely, that the services of men of law had been procured for 
the preparation of such written documentation. The diet at which defences had been 
given in was recorded as an act in the Registers of Acts and Decreets, albeit briefly. 
The names of the litigants were recorded, the names of those present, and a brief note 
made that defences had been given in (without intimating their content) and a new 
term assigned630 for the pursuer to give in their answers to the defences.631 Copies of 
the defences were certainly made, since both the pursuer and the Commissaries 
needed to know and preserve their contents. 
                                                 
626 Possibly because the pursuer had altered their libel, which they had the right to do at the first diet 
(Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 657, item vi). 
627 There are hundreds of such entries, for example NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 25r, 18 May 1564, Dunlop v. 
Broun. 
628 Corresponding to the diet ad respondendum libello in the Court of the Official (Court of the 
Official, 102, 110). 
629 i.e. their failure to contest the action would be taken pro confesso; cf. Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 360, 
cxii. This was similar to the procedure of the Lords of Council and Session: when Euphame Nicole 
raised a precept of reduction against a decreet of divorce pronounced by the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh, the decreet was reduced on no other grounds than that the defender failed to compear 
(NAS, CS7/63, part 1, fos. 24v-25r (ink), 26 March 1576, Makcall v. Stewart). 
630 The next terms and diets in any action were either assigned to a specific date (usually if both 
parties were present) or were assigned litteratorie. This latter designation was used when litigants 
were to be summoned by letter, and presumably when the court was not sure when the next diet could 
occur (for example if the harvest recess intervened), or, as is more likely, if one of the litigants had 
neither compeared personally, nor sent a procurator. Ollivant had noted that in the Official’s Court 
litteratorie citatis  was used when one of the parties concerned was absent from the court (Court of the 
Official, 99). 
631 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 29r, 20 May 1564, Dunlop v. Broun. 
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 At the next diet, the pursuer gave in their answers to the defender’s defences 
in writing,632 copies were presumably made, and again a brief act was entered into 
the Registers of Acts and Decreet, recording the litigants’ names, those present, that 
answers had been given in (without intimating their contents), and recording the term 
assigned for the next diet.633 
 From this point onward the plenary procedure employed by the Commissaries 
of Edinburgh was “to be deducit efter the form usit befoir the Lordis of Session 
usque ad sententiam definitivam inclusive,”634 which was directly informed by 
Romano-canonical procedure, although as will be seen, the plenary procedure of the 
Commissaries (and by extension presumably the Session), was a somewhat reformed 
version of the procedure which had been used in the Court of the Official.635 Some of 
the obvious reasons why the Commissaries of Edinburgh were referred to the 
procedure of the Session rather than the procedure of the Officials included the fact 
that the bench of the Commissaries was in some respects an extension of the Session 
itself,636 and the fact that the Commissaries, unlike the Officials,637 were not 
permitted to employ excommunication or any other spiritual penalty for failure to 
conform to their acts and decreets. In addition, the Officials’ Courts no longer sat, 
whilst the Session remained an active forum within which further developments of 
its own stylus curiae,638 albeit within the broader context of Romano-canonical 
                                                 
632 Corresponding to the diets ad articulandum and  ad respondendum exceptioni in the Court of the 
Official (Court of the Official, 108, 110). 
633 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 33v, 30 May 1564, Dunlop v. Broun. 
634 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 657, item v. For a general discussion of Romano-canonical procedure see 
James Brundage, Medieval Canon Law (London: Longman, 1995), chapter 6; for a specific discussion 
of the procedure of the Session see Godfrey, Civil Justice, chapter 4 and for a discussion of the 
procedure used in the Courts of the Scottish pre-Reformation Officials see Court of the Official, 
chapter 6. 
635 Ollivant reasonably draws parallels between the procedure of the Officials and the Lords of 
Session, stating that “there is good reason to believe that customary procedure did not differ greatly 
between the two jurisdictions,” highlighting that from 1532 “it would be natural for the lawyers in the 
younger system [the Session] to look to the older system [the courts spiritual] for inspiration and 
example” (Court of the Official, 97). 
636 As argued above, pages 21-22. 
637 See Court of the Official, 100. 
638 For a discussion of the unique “stile practik and consuetude” of the Session see Godfrey, Civil 
Justice, chapter 4, esp. 204 et seq.  
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procedure,639 could continue to develop: it was reasonable to peg the Commissaries’ 
procedure to this ongoing Scottish process. 
 The next diet was normally that at which the Commissaries pronounced an 
interlocutor which constituted an act of litiscontestation.640 At this diet, but prior to 
the pronouncing of interlocutor, it was possible for either party to ‘eik’ or reform 
some aspect of the writs they had thus far given in.641 This allowed scope for some 
minor adjustment of the libel and defences in light of either parties’ arguments and 
positions. If one party ‘eiked’ their documents, a term was assigned for the other 
party to likewise adjust the contents of their documents.642 This was an efficient way 
of introducing minor adjustments without having to abandon the action and start 
fresh proceedings because of an error of detail or wording.643 This minor deviation 
did not necessarily occur, but either way the Commissaries would eventually 
pronounce the pivotal interlocutor of the action. By this interlocutor, the 
Commissaries passed judgement on the allegations contained in the libel, the 
exceptions contained in the defences and the replies contained in the answers. Any 
points which were irrelevant or legally invalid were repelled, whilst those adjudged 
to have a bearing on the outcome of the action were found relevant and admitted to 
                                                 
639 For a discussion of how “the procedural tradition of the ius commune left room for variation among 
the courts” whilst retaining a common core of approaches to procedure see Helmholz, Ecclesiastical 
Jurisdiction, 313. 
640 Stair defined an act of litiscontestation as an act by which “the points to be proved by either party 
are fixed and determined, that according as these points shall be proved or not proved, decreet 
condemnatory or absolvitor will follow, without any further dispute as to relevancy, unless some point 
emergent, or new come to knowledge”, a definition which certainly holds good for the Commissaries’ 
acts of litiscontestation (Institutions of the Laws of Scotland, IV.40.6). This diet corresponded to the 
term ad interloquendum in the Court of the Official (Court of the Official, 110). As in the English 
ecclesiastical courts “the litis contestatio became the event before which all matters preliminary to 
proof took place” (Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 326). 
641 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 40v, Bikkeson v. Reid, in which defences were given in “vnder protestatioun 
for eiking paring and reformyng of the samyn ante interlocutoriam”. 
642 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 142v, 7 January 1568/9, Giffert v. Dischingtoun, at which the pursuer’s 
procurator John Schairp, before interlocutor was pronounced, “eikit certane wordis to his libel”; at the 
next diet the defender’s procurator Alexander King gave in answers in writ “togidder with ane 
reformat exceptioun” (NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 150v, 14 January 1568/9). 
643 In the Court of the Official it was normal that “the libel document reserved the right of the pursuer 
to make any addition, subtractions or alterations that he thought fit, and this privilege was probably 
designed to avoid the long delays that could result from objections on purely technical points” (Court 
of the Official, 101). 
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probation.644 The interlocutor was issued in writing, copies made for the litigants, 
and a record made of it in the Registers of Acts and Decreets.  
 It seems likely that each action generated at least three sets of process papers, 
one for the Commissaries and one for either of the litigants.645 Process papers 
generated thus far in an action would have included the principal precept, the 
defences, the answers, and the Commissaries’ interlocutor, containing an act of 
litiscontestation. The apparent carelessness of some of the entries entered into the 
Registers of Acts and Decreets,646 strongly indicates that the Commissaries and the 
litigants before them placed primary reliance on the process papers generated during 
the course of litigation.  
 
In the plenary procedure used by the Commissaries, recourse was seldom had 
to probation by oath, which tended to be the preserve of summary actions.647 
Naturally, as was common practice in the Romano-canonical procedure, oaths de 
calumnia were routinely administered, but they were oaths whereby a party swore 
that they believed their libel or defence to be justly proponed in general terms.648  
These oaths were not conclusive in terms of the probation of points and arguments 
put forward, but rather served to re-assure the court that time was not being wasted 
with known calumnies and spurious arguments, and as such can be viewed as a test 
of sincerity.649 In plenary procedure relevant points tended to be admitted to 
                                                 
644 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/3, fos. 307v-312r, 10 May 1569, Dunbar v. Adair. Cf Court of the Official, 102-
103. Once an act of litiscontestation had been pronounced, the points thereby admitted to probation 
could not be proven by oath (Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 361). 
645 This seems likely, especially since litigants never “protested in despair” before the Commissaries, 
as they had been known to before the Official of Lothian, that they were “unable to propone any 
“contrary articles” on which to base [their] case since all [their] efforts to obtain copies of the pusuer’s 
articles had been in vain” (Court of the Official, 103). 
646 On occasion the clerks of court, when recording an initial diet for an action, could be cursory in the 
extreme, not even stating the type of action being brought, but referring any later reader of the 
Registers to the process papers. The majority of the process papers generated by the Court of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh are no longer extant for the period under study. 
647 They could be used in plenary procedure, but only if probation by witnesses and documents was 
not possible on a particular point: oaths ‘of verity’ as a primary means of probation are discussed 
below under summary procedure. As Ollivant has pointed out “it is perhaps not surprising that a 
litigant, who had expended much time and energy in formally contesting a suit would be reluctant to 
hazard it all on the honesty of his adversary, but it remained a useful recourse in actions where more 
substantial proof was in short supply” (Court of the Official, 104). 
648 If a party declined to take the oath de calumnia on any point, it was taken pro confesso and they 
would concede their cause (Court of the Official, 103). Cf Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 359. 
649 These oaths, variously called ‘ayths of fidelitie’ and ‘ayths de calumpnia’ could be requested on 
any point in the libel, or subsequent exceptions and replies (i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 176v, Criechtoun 
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probation by witness or writ or both,650 but not by oath. If points made both by the 
pursuer and the defender had been found relevant, the Commissaries sometimes 
admitted them to probation hinc inde, so that the probation of such points could be 
led simultaneously, presumably in order to reduce the time taken to resolve the 
action. 
Concerning probation by witness, the party by whom probation was led had 
three principal terms of probation.651 However, the total number of terms of 
probation could be considerably in excess of three. For example, if four witnesses 
were summoned to the first term of probation, and none appeared, there was clearly a 
need to do further diligence upon the absent witnesses. The next term to which they 
were summoned was not necessarily the second principal term of probation. This was 
because principal terms were essentially three separate opportunities for new 
witnesses to be summoned. So for example, A, B and C might be summoned at first, 
then D, E and F, and then G, H and I, but thereafter any witnesses not already 
summoned could not then be summoned. Nevertheless, those already summoned 
could be re-summoned any number of times until they appeared before the 
Commissaries, or until the party by whom probation was led renounced further 
probation.652 There does not appear to have been an upper limit on the number of 
witnesses a party might summon, but the minimum number of witnesses required to 
prove a point accorded with the Canon law minimum of two.653 
The three distinct opportunities to augment the number of witnesses 
summoned was of course quite reasonable: the depositions of the first witnesses 
                                                                                                                                          
v. Chreichtoun; fos. 176v-177r, Cheisholme v. Dikesoun). Those who refused to give such oath lost 
their actions (Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 359 et seq). The wordings of these oaths are not given in the 
Registers of Acts and Decreets, but see Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, 131. Such oaths originated in 
Roman civil procedure and were transmitted via the Canon law into the normative practice of Scottish 
courts, both spiritual and civil, from the fifteenth century onwards (see Michael Clancy, ‘A Further 
Note on Juramentum Calumniae’ in Juridical Review (1986), 170-176; David Baird Smith, ‘A Note 
on Juramentum Calumniae’ in Juridical Review, 51 (1939), 7-10). 
650 Cf Court of the Official, 104-5, ‘The Production of Evidence’. 
651 This was also general Romano-canonical procedure, used in the Court of the Official (Court of the 
Official, 108), and in the English ecclesiastical courts, although judges had the power to abbreviate 
them (Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 328). 
652 “na ma witnessis should be grantit to [the pursuer]  than he warnis and summoundis at the first, 
second, or at the leist, at the third term” (Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 373). Points in the libel and points in 
the exceptions could be admitted to probation at the same time, in which case probation would be led 
hinc inde, which was a regular occurrence, for example Cunnyngham v. Leky for which there are ten 
extant terms of probation (NAS, CC8/2/1, fos 403v, 418v; CC8/2/2, fos 1v, 3v-4r, 32r-v, 58v, 76r, 
100r, 117r, 125v). 
653 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 303. 
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could bring new witnesses to light. Yet the capping of the number of principal terms 
of probation provided a definite limit to prevent actions being disingenuously 
prolonged. The lesser terms of probation which theoretically had no limit were 
limited by an number of reasonable expedients. All witnesses were summoned under 
pecuniary pains.654 The pecuniary pains were increased incrementally from twenty 
shillings to five pounds to ten pounds.655 If a witness had still not appeared, recourse 
was had to the Lords of Session who interponed their own authority to the summons, 
threatening an obdurate witness with being put to the horn.656 This was repeated a 
further two times, and on the third time, the summons threatened putting to the horn, 
with certification that if the witness failed to appear before the Commissaries they 
really would be outlawed.657 The authority of the Crown could not be brought to bear 
to any greater extent in these matters than putting a witness to the horn and declaring 
their goods to be forfeit to the Crown. None of the spiritual censures employed by 
the old courts spiritual were at the disposal of the Commissaries. As has already been 
seen, the censures of the Kirk could be used to try to compell obedience to a decreet 
of the Commissaries,658 but this was never done in respect of the summoning of 
witnesses. The other principal means by which the terms of probation were kept to an 
appropriate number was the right of the party by whom probation was being led to 
renounce further probation even if all those they had desired to be summoned had not 
appeared. This was a useful device, often employed when a party was confident that 
they had proven their points.659 
Documents were produced before the Commissaries by summoning those in 
whose possession a document resided to either appear in court with the requisite 
document, or provide the original or an authentic copy to another party who would 
                                                 
654 This, of course, was a principal alteration from the Court of the Official, where witnesses (and it 
may be noted parties) were summoned under the pain of ecclesiastical sanctions, which also increased 
incrementally: after the first non-appearance, they were summoned under the pain of suspension, 
following which they were warned under pain of excommunication (Court of the Official, 100 
(parties), 105-106 (witnesses)). 
655 i.e. the terms of probation in Forbes v. Sandelands (NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 153v, 258v, 269r, 270v). 
656 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 657, item viii.  
657 i.e. see some of the terms of probation in Ker v. Dougall (NAS, CC8/2/2, fo 370r, 10 March 
1567/8; CC8/2/3, fo 30v, 20 May 1568). 
658 See above, 144-145. 
659 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/2, fo 271r,16 January 1567/8, Broun v. Blak; CC8/2/3, fo 298v, 5 May 1569, 
Cruik v. Hammiltoun.  
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then produce it in court.660 The scale of pains used when summoning witnesses 
applied likewise to the ‘havers’ or possessors of documents.661 Whilst probation by 
witness was more common than probation by writ, documentary evidence was a 
common feature of benefice litigation.662  
In a great many actions witnesses appeared when summoned, whilst 
documents were duly produced. However, complications could arise if a witness or a 
document was objected to. Witnesses were sometimes the subject of protests by a 
procurator on the grounds that they were related to one of the litigants or were 
tenants of one of the litigants, as could reasonably occur when the litigants were 
landowners.663 The usual allegation concerning documentation was that it was false, 
an allegation which could necessitate a separate action for the improbation of the writ 
in question.664  
The examination of witnesses had to take place in the presence of one of the 
Commissaries and a clerk of court.665 This was possibly a reform of pre-Reformation 
procedure, where notaries had often been used in the taking of depositions. In the 
English ecclesiastical courts, witnesses were examined not by the judge, but by an 
official appointed by the court, who examined the witnesses outside of the court. But 
in the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh, the judge had a central role in 
examining witnesses, although this did not have to take place in the court.666 Whilst 
                                                 
660 NAS CC8/2/1, fos 133r, 157v, 169v, 189r, 206v, Sympil v. Montgudy. 
661 Sometimes havers were summoned under the pain of rebellion in the first instance, without the 
preceding pecuniary pains used by the Commissaries (i.e. first term of probation in McGibbon v. 
Struthers, NAS, CC8/2/3, fo 273r, 20 April 1569). 
662 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 333-334; cf Green, ‘Scottish Benefices’, 50-52, 55, n.51. 
663 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/3, fos. 264v-265r, 2 April 1569, Giffert v. Dischingtoun; cf Court of the Official, 
111; Balfour’s Praticks, ii, 377-378. 
664 i.e. in Carnis v. Kennedy the pursuer’s procurator, Alexander King alleged that “tua instrumentis 
producit in process ar in the selff fals and fenzeit and off[erit] to impreve the same as law wald” 
(NAS, CC8/2/4, fo 42r, 30 July 1569). Cf Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 381 et seq ‘Anent improbatioun’. 
665 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 657, item ix. 
666 This is delightfully illustrated by the following complaint concerning the intimidation of witnesses, 
brought before the Commissaries of Edinburgh in November 1564: “And Maister Eduard Henrysoun 
ane of the saidis commissaris being with Maister Johne Kene examinen the saidis witness in his 
chalmer eftir none the said viij day of Junij and the said Schir Thomas being than awating vpoun the 
examinatioun thairof the Saidis Thomas and Robert in hie contemptioun of the said commissaris come 
to the said Maister Eduardis stair and thair oppinlie iniurit the saidis witnes and callit thaime 
mainsuorne sinakis and said thai wald maynsuer thame selffis for ane testane and in lyke maner said 
to the said Schir Thomas that he wald hing alslang vpoun the gallows as he bure the cross and als fals 
huresoun papist and alsua said plainlie that thai suld cut his hochis fals loun knaif that he wes” (NAS, 
CC8/2/1, fo. 258r-v, 30 November, 1564, Godwell v. Sandersoun & Broun). 
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there is no direct evidence of the use of interrogatories they must have been used, 
being normal practice in the old Official’s courts667 and the English ecclesiastical 
courts,668 as well as before the Lords of Session.669 The depositions of the witnesses 
were never recorded in the Registers of Acts and Decreets, but it is reasonable to 
suppose that depositions were written down, sealed, and set to one side until all the 
witnesses who had appeared had been examined. This was the normal Romano-
canonical procedure, and guarded against the possibility of one witness’s deposition 
being used to influence the subsequent depositions of other witnesses.670 What is 
certain is that when a deposition had been obtained as the result of a commission 
directed to one of the inferior Commissaries in the localities,671 the deposition was 
sent to the Commissaries as a writ, sealed under the seal of the relevant 
Commissariot.672 Such commissions were regularly granted on the grounds of a 
witness’s inability to travel, either on account of poor health, poverty or distance,673 
and were usually directed to inferior Commissaries, as had been the practice in the 
Court of the Official.674 It is also reasonable to suppose that the Commissaries 
                                                 
667 Court of the Official, 106. This was standard Romano-canonical procedure (Brundage, Medieval 
Canon Law, 132). 
668 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 339. 
669 Godfrey, Civil Justice, 185. 
670 Court of the Official, 106-107; Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, 133. 
671 Commissions are also known to have been directed to kirkmen: i.e. in Dougalsoun v. Kirkpatrick a 
commission was “direct furth to Patrick Vaus Commissar of Wigtoun and Maister Adame Foulis 
minster of Quhithorne” (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 272r, 7 December 1564), whilst in Wemis v. Dunbar a 
commission had been directed to the bishop of Orkney for the receiving of various depositions from 
witnesses (NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 209r, 27 November 1567). 
672 “Anent the terme assignit be the saidis commissaris To Symone and James Marioribankis to report 
the commissioun direct be thame to the commissar of glasgow and Renfrew for ressaving of the 
depositiones of Robert Spreule and Johne Patersone In the actioun and caus intentit and persewit be 
thame aganis Henry Wardlaw and Johne Weir The said Henrie being personalie present Comperit the 
said Symone and James Marioribankis and producit the said commissioun with the depositionis of the 
saidis witnes inclusit thairin vnder the saidis commissaris seillis Quhilk being producit The saidis 
Symone and James Renuncit forther probatioun The commissaris continewis the said mater to 
auisement and assignis littoratorie to pronounce thair decreit thairin” (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 168v, 21 
August 1564, Marioribankis v. Wier & Wardlaw). 
673 Testimonials were sometimes required by the Commissaries of Edinburgh prior to granting a 
commission: “and als producit tua testimoniallis that ane direct frome the commissar of Glasgw that 
vther frome the commissar of Hammyltoun vnder the seillis of thair offices and subscriptionis of the 
clerkis thairof testifiand the inhabilitie of the saidis [witnesses] in thair bodies quhairthrow thai mycht 
not travale for obseruatioun of the terme and thairfore desyring ane commissioun to be direct to the 
saidis commissars for ressaving of the saidis personis depositionis…” (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 131v, 
Marioribankis v. Wier & Wardlaw). 
674 Court of the Official, 106. 
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published such depositions in the court, in conformity with standard Romano-
canonical procedure,675 although it should be noted that there are no indications in 
the Registers of Acts and Decreets of terms being assigned ad publicandum producta 
as was common in the Court of the Official.676 When depositions and other 
documents had been produced or published in court, copies could be made as 
requested, but when used as a means of probation their contents were seldom copied 
down into the Registers of Acts and Decreets.  
 These terms of probation were always recorded briefly in the Registers of 
Acts of Decreets. The names of witnesses summoned were recorded, sometimes their 
domicile given, and usually the pains under which they had been summoned. 
Similarly, the names of ‘havers’ were usually stated, and the type of document in 
their possession was often recorded, for example if it were a feu, or a marriage 
contract, or an instrument of institution and so forth.  
  Once the terms of probation had been concluded, the Commissaries assigned 
a term at which they would pronounce their decreet in the matter. This direct 
progress from probation to decreet seems to have been a reform of the procedure 
used before the Courts of the Officials. In those courts, following probation, terms 
could be assigned ad opponendum and ad concludendum prior to pronouncing 
definitive sentence.677 Such terms could be used by litigants to encourage a late 
flourishing of further litigation before the old Officials. Given that an act of 
litiscontestation had been pronounced and probation of relevant points led according 
to its terms, it seems perverse in all but the most extreme circumstances to have 
allowed further exceptions to be brought after probation had been led: the complete 
absence of such terms in the procedure of the Commissaries should therefore be 
regarded as a welcome reform. 
When the Commissaries pronounced their decreet, its seems likely that one of 
their number read out a pre-prepared document, rather than made an oral 
pronouncement which was then committed to writing by the clerk.678 Copies of 
                                                 
675 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 339. 
676 Court of the Official, 106. 
677 Court of the Official, 107. The potential for similar terms seems to have existed in English 
ecclesiastical courts, although litigants were seemingly deterred from availing themselves of such 
terms by making them pay the costs incurred by such dilation if unsuccessful (Helmholz, 
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 341-342). 
678 See Brundage, Medieval Canon Law, 134. 
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decreets were certainly available to litigants, whilst the decreet was copied into the 
Registers of Acts and Decreets. The decreet included the names of the litigants, an 
extract of the libel from the principal precept, the names of those present, the 
Commissaries’ judgement, and the reasons they had arrived at their judgement.679 
This last section can sometimes be brief and relay little more than that certain points 
had been admitted to a party’s probation and that they had succeeded or succumbed 
in probation. Nevertheless, the more interesting decreets go into considerable detail 
about the case, and it is on these occasions that the tenor of the defences, answers, 
depositions and any documents produced may be conveyed. The precise wording of 
documentary evidence was seldom recorded, and it is usually not possible to know 
what a specific witness had deponed,680 but it is usually clear which facts and events 
had been established by their testimony. Similarly, if a peremptory exception was 
made and found relevant, its tenor and content was often recorded. It is also clear that 
the central narrative of a decreet, namely what grievance had been alleged and what 
remedy sought, was based on the principal precepts upon which an action had been 
founded. In this, whilst there is no evidence that litigants and their procurators 
actually prepared decreets for the judge to pronounce, as was the English practice,681 
the Commissaries were clearly prepared to rely on the wording used by litigants in 
formulating their judgements.682 Once the Commissaries had pronounced their 
decreet, it was to be executed “notwithstanding ony appelatioun, or summoundis of 
reductioun”683 and the losing party was to comply within 15 days684: this and any 
                                                 
679 For a printed example of a decreet of the Commissaries, albeit pronounced in a benefice action, see 
Green ‘Scottish Benefices’, 53-61. 
680 In contrast to the registers kept by the kirk session and superintendent’s court at St Andrews, which 
could contain copies of depositions (St Andrews, i, 160-167). 
681 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 344. 
682 This is illustrated by the general observation that an initial entry in the Registers of Acts and 
Decreets for an action usually included an extract from the principal precept, which was often 
repeated in the decreet pronounced in the same action (unless the litigation had proved quite complex, 
and the original narration of facts had been greatly augmented during the course of litigation). It is 
likely that an action relied primarily on the process, parts of which were recorded in the Register of 
Acts and Decreets as a backup, and that many of the central aspects of the contents of a process were 
generated by litigants themselves, a situation with which the Commissaries and men of law seem to 
have been comfortable.  
683 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 659, item xviii. 
684 This was not unlike proceedings in the English ecclesiastical courts, where a losing party was given 
an opportunity to conform to a sentence pronounced against them prior to threats of excommunication 
or the invocation of the secular arm (Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 345). 
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subsequent procedural steps have already been discussed above.685 Of particular 
note, however, is that the Commissaries did not assign a term at which objections 
could be brought against the execution of a decreet, as was the practice in the English 
ecclesiastical courts,686 which may have represented a further reform of procedure in 
the interests of avoiding disingenuous delays.  
[ii] SUMMARY PROCEDURE 
 
Summary procedure was employed by the Commissaries in simple actions at 
their discretion, especially where the pursuer was able to refer the matter to the 
defender’s great oath,687 referred to by Ollivant as the oath “of verity”,688 and by 
Helmholz as the “decisory oath”.689 Summary process had been formally accepted by 
the Catholic Church as part of Romano-canonical procedure “in two constitutions 
issue at the start of the fourteenth century” in which “all the formal steps that were 
not essential for the doing of justice could be omitted” so that litigation could 
proceed “simply and plainly”.690 Most notably, this meant that the act of 
litiscontestation was dispensed with.691 Within the Scottish context, the Provincial 
Council of 1549 had directed Officials to employ summary procedure in actions 
where the issue did not exceed the sum of £20 Scots.692 This reform was extended by 
the Lords of Session, in their first instructions to the Commissaries of Edinburgh, to 
include debts actions where the issue did not exceed the sum of £40 Scots.693 But in 
addition to debt actions, summary procedure was routinely used in actions which 
could only be resolved through probation by an oath ‘of verity’, most notably actions 
involving clandestine promises of marriage.694 Summary process before the 
                                                 
685 See above, pages 74-75. 
686 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 344, 346. 
687 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 655-661, item ii. 
688 Court of the Official, 103. 
689 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 335-336. 
690 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 314. 
691 This was certainly the case in the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh; cf Helmholz, 
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 327. 
692 Court of the Official, 113-114. 
693 The procedure for small debt actions and other such light and easy matters is relayed in Balfour’s 
Practicks, ii, 656-7, item v. 
694 Whilst debt and secret promise actions were routinely proven by oath, other forms of probation 
could be used if suitable witnesses and/or documents were though to be worth consulting, in which 
case the terms of probation could be slightly longer. For probation by oath see Duncane v. Fairley 
   165
Commissaries was initiated by the Commissaries issuing a precept or summons to 
the defender. The libel was called a libel ad instantiam, which unlike the libelled 
summons, did not inform defenders of the allegation(s) made against them and was 
similar to the summons used to summon witnesses.695 The cost of the summons ad 
instantiam to the pursuer was 8 d., 696 and the defender could obtain a copy for 2 d.697 
If the defender failed to compear, their absence could be taken pro confesso,698 whilst 
the Commissaries were also entitled to refer the petition to the pursuer’s oath of 
verity without the absent defender’s consent.699 If all went well and both parties 
appeared before the Commissaries on the appointed day, the pursuer proponed their 
petition verbally700 and the defender replied, or answered, verbally, as it were statim 
in campo.701 Alternatively, the defender might move to refer the matter to the 
pursuer’s oath.702 In the unlikely event that the action proved to be more complicated 
than anticipated, recourse would be had to plenary procedure.703 But given that the 
type of procedure adopted in any action was directed at the Commissaries 
discretion,704 such occurrences were rare. All being well, the Commissaries would 
admit the relevant point (there were rarely points) to probation. The preferred method 
here was probation by oath.705 In this scenario the matter had to be referred to the 
defender’s oath,706 but only with the consent of the pursuer.707 In a host of instances 
                                                                                                                                          
(NAS, CC8/2/3, fos. 52v-53r, 14 June 1568); Arniell v. Williamsone (NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 73v, 22 July 
1568). 
695 See Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 655-661, item iii, which dictates the form to be used. 
696 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 655-661, item iii. 
697 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 655-661, item iv. 
698 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 324v, Hammyltoun v. Sclater. Cf Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 317; 
cf Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 360, cxii. 
699 But only when the defender had clearly failed to compear. 
700 “purely oral petitions” were also “particularly frequent in debt litigation” brought before the 
English ecclesiastical courts (Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 322). 
701 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 656-7, item v. 
702 This was also the procedure before the Officials (Court of the Official, 115). 
703 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 656-7, item v. 
704 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 655-6, item ii. 
705 The summons ad instantiam for summary procedure was to be used “specialie quhair the persewar 
is able to refer the samin to the aith of the defender, or to prove it statim in campo” (Balfour’s 
Practicks, ii, 655-6, item ii). 
706 Which was usually called a ‘great oath’ in the Registers of Acts and Decreets, whilst Ollivant 
called it the ‘oath of verity’ (Court of the Official, 103-104). 
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this was the only viable means of resolving the action: a promise made in secret, a 
sum of money loaned privately, the purchase on credit of a commodity and so on 
could often not be proven by writ or witness. When probation by oath was consented 
to by the pursuer, the defender was sworn by their great oath708 and obliged to make 
faith as to the truth or falsity of the relevant point of the petition: the Commissaries 
pronounced their decreet accordingly. Whether or not this was given verbally in the 
first instance is not clear, but their decision was certainly committed to writing and 
copied down into the Registers of Acts and Decreets. The pursuer must normally 
have taken a copy away with them, since the cost to them of the decreet in simple 
actions was set at 3s/4d.709 Whether the defender desired a copy was dependent upon 
circumstance, and it is not clear whether the Commissaries contented themselves 
with the copy of the decreet in the Registers of Acts and Decreets,710 or whether their 






                                                                                                                                          
707 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 259v, 5 February 1573/4, Hamyltoun v. Heriot: “the saidis Commissaris be 
thair decreit assoilzeis the said Elene fra the contentis of the said precept simpliciter decernis hir quyt 
thairfra in tyme cumminge becaus the said precept being be the said George referrit simpliciter to the 
said Helenis aith and scho suorne be hir greit ayth and examinat declarit the same nocht to be of 
verritie”. Those who failed to give an oath or refer the allegations to the other party’s oath lost their 
actions (i.e. NAS , CC8/2/1, fo. 173v, Gray v. Godrik, “Becaus the said Williame [defender] being 
requirit to gif his ayth vpoun the said petitioun wald nowther depone thairupoun nor zit refer the 
samyn to the said Margaretis [pursuer’s] ayth”.) Morever, if the defender had been duly summoned, 
but failed to compear, it was lawful for the Commissaries to admit any allegations to the pursuer’s 
oath: the Commissaries were prepared to push matters along at considerable speed in these lighter 
matters (i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 129r, Brocas v. Sundrie Personis. “[those lawfully summoned to this 
diet and not compeired] …the said petition was referrit to the said [pursuer’s] ayth quha being suorne 
maid fayt…”). Cf Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 359 et seq. 
708 The form of the great oath is not certain to the writer, but Professor Cairns has pointed out (verbo) 
that when used before the Session in later times it ran “I swear by almighty God and as I shall answer 
to God on the great Day of Judgement etc”: whatever the precise form of the oath administered by the 
Commissaries, it is likely that its tenor would have been along these lines. 
709 This sum was the sentence silver paid: “For pronouncing of sentences in small actiounis, of the 
avail of xx lib. or within the samin, quhilk wer wount to be callit decreitis iii. s. iiij d.” (Balfour’s 
Practicks, ii, 662). 
710 Decreets were always entered into the Register, although the clerks occasionally failed to complete 
and entry (see NAS CC8/2/7, fo 265r, 30 July 1575, Murray v. Torphichane), which suggests that the 
writ from which they worked was retained in the court. 
711 The expenses of this type of plea are discussed below, Chapter V, § IV [ii]. 








THE PARAMETERS OF CONSISTORIAL LITIGATION 
 
[i] COMPETENT ACTIONS  
 
 Litigation before the Commissaries of Edinburgh was controlled and ordered 
within the overarching framework of plenary procedure or its abbreviated summary 
form. This framework was concerned primarily in the opening stages with 
establishing what the relevant points of a given case were, which was authoritatively 
decided after due process by an act of litiscontestation. The stages of proof which 
followed were concerned with establishing which relevant points could be proven to 
the satisfaction of the judges. The definitive sentence or decreet which was 
pronounced immediately following the terms of probation authoritatively decided 
which relevant points had been proven and ordained an apposite remedy to be 
applied. In this, the remedy applied by the Commissaries in any given action was 
primarily dependent upon the relevant points proven during litigation rather than the 
remedy desired in the pursuer’s libel. The distinction is an important one and is at 
odds with the practice of later generations of Commissaries in Scotland and with the 
practice of the English ecclesiastical courts.712 As had already been mentioned in the 
discussion concerning the functions of the Procurator Fiscal of the Court of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh,713 the Commissaries had what they perceived to be a 
moral duty to provide justice, sometimes at the expense of what would now be 
considered due process. Several themes can be highlighted in order to explain the 
Commissaries’ emphasis upon establishing relevant points as they arose in order to 
                                                 
712 In the English ecclesiastical courts it could be objected that “the sentence did not conform to the 
libel” (Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 346): English definitive sentences turned upon the 
intentio of the actor, namely whether or not the intentio had or had not been established (Helmholz, 
Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 343). 
713 See above, pages 45-46. 
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determine the remedy applied rather that forcing the outcome of the action to 
conform to the libel.  
 In the first place, the interaction between litigant and judge could be more 
direct in certain actions, that is to say less regulated by the intermediary of 
professional men of law. This was especially the case in summary proceedings where 
probation would often be by oath. In these circumstances the principal consideration 
in the outcome of an action was less the intention of the pursuer and more the 
discretion of the judges in the interest of justice and the due regulation of the lives of 
those whose circumstances were brought to the attention of the bench. For example, 
if banns were stayed, one of the persons whose banns had been stayed could pursue 
the stayer before the Commissaries, so that they might be put to silence. But if the 
stayer’s objection, that they were already irregularly married to one of the persons 
whose banns had been stayed, was proven, the Commissaries would ordain the stayer 
and the person against whom they had made the objection, to solemnize their union. 
In later times, the first action would have been dismissed, and a new action of 
solemnization brought against the pursuer of the first action and the person to whom 
they were already irregularly married. But the Commissaries, in applying the remedy 
suitable to the established facts were prepared for the original action to be altered in 
mid-course into an action centred upon the peremptory exception. Whilst this would 
appear to later generations as a conflation of two separate actions, resulting in an 
unacceptable degree of procedural confusion, it was appropriate given the 
Commissaries’ emphasis of remedy according to established facts, rather than 
remedy in strict accordance with the libel. 
 The Commissaries’ emphasis was very much a prerequisite for a court which 
allowed actions to be raised and pursued by litigants themselves, essentially in an 
amateur capacity, without insisting upon the involvement of procurators. In this 
respect, the pursuer’s libel could be treated as the means by which problematical 
disputes between various parties were brought to the Commissaries’ attention, rather 
than a definitive outline of the precise outcomes which could or could not be applied 
by the Commissaries. In a court thus directly accessible to men and women without 
legal training, the judges and not the litigants had to be the definers of the potential 
remedies applicable to the problems and wrongs thrown up in any given action.714 
                                                 
714 The almost total absence of the relationship between the libel and remedy is noteworthy in many of 
the actions which arose out of the staying of banns (discussed below, Chapter VI, [v]). 
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 The immediate problem this flexibility gives rise to in terms of analysis 
concerns how actions ought to be defined. In the majority of actions it is safe to 
define them according to the libel, since if the action succeeded the continuity 
between libel and remedy was maintained, or the action was such as the issue 
involved could only result in the granting or withholding of the remedy sought. 
Actions which were usually resolved by plenary procedure tended to be more 
complex, and therefore invariably required the expertise of procurators, a factor 
which tended to result in more precise libels and a more limited range of remedies. 
Yet in actions which were usually resolved by summary procedure, the direct verbal 
pleadings of litigants and a lesser degree of legal professionalism resulted in the 
continuity between libel and remedy being less important than the establishment of 
facts and the application of an appropriate remedy by the Commissaries. This latter 
type of action tended to be those involving allegations of pre-marriage contracts or 
clandestine and irregular marriages, a group of problems which could give rise to a 
considerable range of remedies. 
 In the following analysis, therefore, the focus is not upon competent libels 
and their probation, but rather upon competent allegations and exceptions (i.e those 
likely to be deemed relevant points, whether proponed by the pursuer or defender), 
the probation of relevant points, and the range of remedies that could be applied by 
the Commissaries.  
  
      
[ii] COMPETENT ALLEGATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS 
 
 Since the focus here is on competent points in terms of being relevant and 
founded on sound legal grounds, without regard as to whether such points were 
subsequently substantiated or not, there will be no need to consider replies to 
exceptions. This is because replies did not tend to introduce fresh points in law, but 
rather pointed out why relevant exceptions were nevertheless inconclusive.715 It 
should also be noted that there were different types of exceptions, which Balfour 
divided into dilatory and peremptory. Dilatory exceptions “prolongis and delayis the 
                                                 
715 For example, although not a consistorial action, in McGibbon v. Struthers, McGibbon’s replies to 
Struthers’s relevant exceptions were admitted to probation, but they sought to prove that whilst 
Struthers’s exceptions were relevant in theory, they did not conform to the facts, such discrepancies 
having been highlighted by McGibbon’s replies (Green, ‘Scottish Benefices’, 49 et seq). 
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actioun or clame to a certain time” and were temporary, such as objecting to the 
judge hearing the case, or claiming that the action was already pending before 
another judge. Peremptory exceptions on the other hand were considered perpetual, 
in that if proven they would finally resolve the action: it was with these latter type of 
exceptions that the Officials had been primarily concerned, and this continued to be 
the case with the Commissaries.716   
 The five principal allegations which could be made in any consistorial action 
were: allegation of promise of marriage (often, but not necessarily with copula);717 
allegation of desertion;718 allegation of adultery;719 allegation of non-adherence;720 
allegation of illegitimacy.721 The principal exceptions in consistorial actions 
concerned: promise of marriage (often, but not necessarily with copula),722 
adultery,723 reconciliation,724 cruelty and just dread725 or some sort of physical 
affliction (a party being either become grotesque or suffering from disease).726   
 When the principal allegation was of promise of marriage (often, but not 
necessarily with copula), the appropriate remedy was either solemnization, 
                                                 
716 Balfour’s Practicks, i, 343; Court of the Official, 108-110; cf Helmholz, Ecclesiastical 
Jurisdiction, 323-4. 
717 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 73v, 22 July 1568, Arneill v. Williamsone, (solemnization on the grounds of 
sponsalia per verba de futuro with subsequent copula); NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 322r, 25 January 1564/5, 
Auldingstoun v. McMyllane (solemnization on the grounds of sponsalia per verba de praesenti). 
718 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 284r-v, 23 January 1567/8, Crystesone v. Lindesay (adherence). 
719 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 304v-305v, 15 January 1564/5, Forbes v. Sandelands (divorce with 
licence). 
720 Which could only follow upon a decreet of adherence: the only example being NAS, CC8/2/6, fos. 
121r-122v, 22 June 1573, Argyll v. Countess (divorce with licence). 
721 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 76v-77v, 15 November 1569, Mortoun v. Mortoun (bastardy). 
722 A classic defence to an action for solemnization, i.e. prior promise of marriage to third party. 
723 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 352r-v, 4 June 1569, Flemyng v. Flemyng (exception to action of divorce 
with licence i.e. recrimination or mutual guilty); NAS, CC8/2/2, fos. 331v-332r, 17 February 1567/8, 
Hammyltoun v. Kirkpatrick (exception to action of adherence). 
724 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 393v-394v, 16 March 1564/5, Hammyltoun v. Maxwell & Lindesay. 
725 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 293r-v, 2 May 1569, Wallace v. Dowglass: “And allegit he durst not adheire 
to the said Cristiane for feir of his lif”. It will be noted that during the period under study the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh did not hear any actions for divorce a mensa et thoro on the grounds of 
saevitia – although see Ireland ‘Husband and Wife: Divorce’, 97-98 for a discussion of later Scots law 
on this head. 
726 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 251r, 7 January 1567/8, Thorntoun v. Sandersone (adherence) “that the said 
John on na wayis… be compellit to ressaue the said Margaret, scho being infectit and detestable 
haldin quhair scho is knawin and kend”. It may have been the case that Margaret Thornton had 
contracted a sexually transmitted disease. 
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adherence, adherence and solemnization, or annulment. In these instances, the 
principal defence was to deny the allegation,727 rather than to propone an 
exception.728 When this principal allegation was made outside of the context of a 
consistorial action, it was either made in response to the proclamation of banns or in 
some other context. In the former context, the allegations could form the basis of a 
consistorial action in its own right or, as was more commonly the case, could initiate 
an action before the Commissaries to have the maker of the allegations put to silence 
and the accused declared free of the promises made.729 The same basic parameters 
applied in the later context, but with the addition that the affair had the predominant 
sense of defamation and slander.730  
 When the principal allegation was of adultery, the appropriate remedy was 
Scottish Protestant divorce with licence to remarry. In this instance the valid 
exceptions were recrimination (or mutual guilt), that is to say the pursuer had also 
committed adultery, or reconciliation, that is to say the offender had been reconciled 
to the offended party.731 
 When the principal allegation was of desertion, the appropriate remedy was 
adherence. In this instance the valid exceptions were that the litigants were not 
married, that adultery had been committed by the pursuer, or that cruelty had been 
committed by the pursuer or that they had given some cause for dread and fear, or 
that the pursuer had some insurmountable physical ailment or defect. Dread and fear 
do not seem to have been an absolute bar to an action of adherence, since the court 
would compel adherence upon the pursuer finding caution and surety for their future 
conduct towards the defender.732  
                                                 
727 The importance of the promise was well understood by litigants: the defender regularly granted the 
copula, but denied the promise on oath (i.e. NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 318v-319r, 11 June 1570, Barclay v. 
Ewiot; CC8/2/6, fos 120v-121r, 22 June 1573, Andersoun v. Gudlad; cf NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 48r, 13 
January 1570/1, Wilsone v. Stowman; NAS, CC8/2/6, fos. 10v-11r, 5 November 1573, Wylie v. 
Stratharne; NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 182r-v, 2 November 1573, Young v. Proudfute). Alternatively, were 
the promise had been per verba de futuro denying the copula primed the Commissaries for declaring 
the litigant free from their pre-contractual obligations (NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 238r, 21 March 1568/9, 
Currye v. Stevin) 
728 If the promise was not denied, the principal exception was prior promise of marriage, by which the 
alleged promise was rendered null (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 250r, 27 November 1564, Scott v. Robesoun – 
Robesoun was in fact claimed by two women on the on the grounds of sponslia per verba de futuro 
with subsequent copula).  
729 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/7, fos. 3v-4r, 15 October 1574, Robesoun v. Liall. 
730 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/2, fos. 34v-35r, 24 May 1565, Gibsoun v. Robesoun. 
731 See citations give above in this chapter, §II, [ii], 2nd paragraph. 
732 See citations give above in this chapter, §II, [ii], 2nd paragraph. 
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 When the principal allegation was of non-adherence, the appropriate remedy 
was Scottish Protestant divorce. This allegation was only made twice during the 
period under stood, both times by the 5th earl of Argyll. On the first occasion the 
appositeness of the remedy was doubted by the Commissaries, but on the second 
occasion the validity of the remedy had been confirmed by Act of Parliament. As the 
litigation involving the fifth earl and his first countess illustrated, it was better for 
exceptions from the defender to be directed towards the decreet of adherence upon 
which the action for divorce on the grounds of malicious desertion had proceeded.733 
 When the principal allegation was of illegitimacy, the allegation was usually 
made outside of the context of a consistorial action, as an objection to a brieve of 
inquest.734 Depending on whether the accuser or the accused began proceedings 
before the Commissaries, the appropriate remedy was declarator of bastardy or 
declarator of legitimacy respectively.735 Exceptions to allegations of illegitimacy 
were those attendant upon any argument about whether or not a marriage had been 
duly contracted, since bastardy actions were a matter of establishing whether or not 





                                                 
733 The 5th earl of Argyll’s actions have already been discussed above, Chapter III, §III. 
734 All actions of bastardy before the Commissaries of Edinburgh from their appointment down to 
1576 were remitted to them on account of allegations of illegitimacy following upon brieves of 
inquest. The normal procedure and rights of the Commissaries was aptly summarized in Carnis v. 
Kennedye: “Makand mentioun That quhair anent the brevis of oure Soverane Lordis derrest farder & 
moderis chapell purchest at the instance of Jonet Kennedy allegit dochter to vmquhile Elizabeth 
Carnis sister germane to the said Jonet Carnis quha was ane of the airis portionaris of the said 
vmquhile Williame for seruing of hir as air to the said vmquhile Elizabeth hir moder in the Steuart 
Court of Kirkculdbryt haldin in the towbuith thairof the xiij day of Julij 1566 zeiris comperit the said 
Jonet quha being admittit for hir interest to obiect aganis the saidis brevis allegit that the said Jonet 
Kennedy purchessar thairof was in bastardie gottin & borne zit remand bastard & thair foir wes 
vnhabill to succeid as air to hir said vmquhile moder, [in re]spect of the quhilk exceptioun the said 
stewart & his deputis decessit fra forder proces and remittit the said bastardie to be cognost be the 
Juge competent thairto and it is of verrete that be oure Soverane Lordis derest moder author[i]te the 
said Commissaris ar special constitute hir heineses Commissaris to all sic causes” (NAS, CC8/2/4 fos. 
167v-168v, 31 January 1569/70). 
735 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 76v-77v, 15 November 1569, Mortoun v. Mortoun (declarator of bastardy); 
also NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 362v, 26 February 1564/5, Marioribanks v. Wier & Wardlaw which was 
actually an action which sought to have a gift of legitimation declared null on the grounds that the 
person so legitimated was actually de facto et de jure legitimate and therefore ought to be declared 
legitimate and so be allowed to test. 
736 See below, this chapter, n. 160. 





[iii] PROBATION OF RELEVANT POINTS IN CONSISTORIAL ACTIONS 
 
 The general categories into which consistorial actions can be grouped has 
been dealt with in the previous section. In this section the main concern is to consider 
all the relevant points737 made in consistorial actions and analyse the standards of 
proof required by the Commissaries of Edinburgh. Since, for example, allegations of 
various types of marriage could be made within the context of actions of freedom, 
silence and slander, of solemnization, of adherence, of annulment, and of bastardy it 
seems better to consider allegations of marriage in their own right, rather than 
considering them several times over at different points in the thesis within the 
context of types of actions.738  
 
[a] CLANDESTINE PROMISES 
  
 Since clandestine or secret promises could by their very definition only be 
proven by oath, none of the external signs from which marital consent might be 
proven directly or indirectly were of relevance. Only the makers of the promise knew 
the intention of their mind and will at the time of the alleged promise and only their 
oaths could resolve the issue.739 The only possible exception to this case was when 
                                                 
737 The category ‘relevant points’ is taken to include exceptions to relevant allegations. 
738 Some of the problems arising out of categorizing actions by libel have already been discussed. 
739 i.e. Reid v. Barclay, wherin it was alleged that the defender had promised the pursuer “diueris 
tymes Mariage scho beand than ane virgine and at the leist be his continuale sute consentit to 
accomplische and fulfill his desyre and had carnall copulatioun with hir vnder faithfull promes the 
said Alexander suld marie hir and tak hir to his wyfe and that befoir he had ony actuale daill with hir 
quhilk he than & diuers tymes sensyne faithfullie promittit be the faith and treuth of his body to do 
And scho belevand na fraude nore gile to haif followit submittit hir self to his desyre vnder the said 
promes like as he diueris tymes thareftir promittit to do the samin And it is of verite that the said Jonet 
vnder the said promes hes first borne to him ane child and thaireftir ane vther & hes partit with the 
thrid all gottin vnder the said promes”; in the event the clandestine promise was “with consent of the 
said Jonet [pursuer] referrit to his [the defender’s] aith and he being suorne be his greit aith maid faith 
he neuir maid promes of Mariage to the said Jonet at ony tyme” (NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 72v, 17 July 
1568). 
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the recalcitrant party had subsequently publicly admitted making the promise.740 
Nevertheless, even in these circumstances, the admission was usually made in an 
informal context, and pursers would have been well advised to refer the matter to the 
defenders’ oaths than hazard the action by subjecting their libel to higher standards 
of proof.741 
 
[b] PUBLIC PROMISES 
 
 Since sponsalia per verba de futuro was the normal prelude to the 
proclamation of banns, the promise was often made in a public and formal manner.  
The presence of a priest or minister was preferable, but not prerequisite in terms of 
the standards of proof. Indeed, a court which was prepared to tailor the standards of 
proof to the circumstances of the case, from a marriage contracted in a church before 
a minister or priest during divine service having been prefaced by the proclamation 
of banns, to a secret marriage made on a hillside and consummated in a barn, was not 
likely to turn down reasonable evidence simply because it did not conform to the 
desired ideal of the established religion. As such, the presence of ‘famous witnesses’ 
was the basic standard in Scotland which distinguished public promises from 
clandestine.742 In addition to the presence of witnesses, a prudent couple or their 
family would procure the services of a notary to make a formal note of the promise 
in his protocol book. In addition, a marriage contract could be signed, although 
marriage contracts could precede actual betrothals. 
                                                 
740 i.e. Brok v. Alexander, wherin it was narrated that “quhair Dauid Alexander in the moneth of 
November 1566 zeris come to the Dwelling hous of the said Jonettis fader and thair desirat hir in 
mariage and eftir lang talking and Ressoning thairvpoun the said Dauid maid promeis of mariage to 
the said Jonat lik as scho mad alsua promeis of mariage to the said Dauid the moneth & zeir forsaid 
and thaireftir be the persuasioun and intysement of the said Dauid the said Jonet gaif the vse of hir 
body to him in the moneth & zeir abouewrittin lik as scho did Diuers vtheris monethis the zeir forsaid 
and in the zeir of God jai vc lxvij and bure ane Man child to the said Dauid in the moneth of Januar 
the zeir of God jai vc lxviij lik as he diuers tymes sensyne hes confest in presence of diuers famous 
persounis that he had maid promeis of mariage to the said Jonet and that he had tane the vse of hir 
body be carnall copulatioun”; in the event the pursuer succumbed in probation (NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 
289v-290r, 10 June 1570).  
741 When clandestine promises had been repeated in public, the pursuer usually attempted 
(unsuccessfully) to prove the public admission of the promise without recourse to a great oath i.e. 
NAS, CC8/2/2, fo 67r, 27 June 1565, Reid v. Porteous; CC8/2/5, fo. 193r-v, 17 March 1571/2, Ker v. 
Williamsoun. Yet cf Wod v. Hamilton, wherein probation was successful (NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 124r, 24 
June 1573). 
742 Riddell argued that ‘famous’ was used “to denote persons holding high and public offices; not only 
“fide dignos” according to the ancient canon, but even clergymen, notaries and “Brethren of the Kirk 
of God”” (Inquiry, i, 480), but “not common domestics” (Ibid., 486). 
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 Naturally, promises which had been deliberately made in public before 
famous witnesses and duly recorded in a notarial instrument rarely came before the 
Commissaries within the context of actions for solemnization of marriage: such 
promises could not readily be denied.743 Rather, when allegedly public promises of 
marriage were disputed before the Commissaries, the usual means of probation was 
by witness. 
 Of the various facts to which a witness could testify, the most desirable and 
direct was a description of the words spoken by the parties involved. Such evidence 
of consent could be further augmented by outward physical indications of consent. 
Moreover, various physical gestures could be taken as tokens of consent, even in the 
event that no words were spoken. This idea originated from the Canon law’s 
provisions for the contracting of marriage by mutes, since their inability to speak 
rendered other manifestations of consent necessary, and as such outward signs of 
consent were legally acceptable.744 Chief among these tokens of consent were the 
taking of hands,745 the exchange of a kiss,746 and the exchange of rings.747 The 
                                                 
743 Exceptions occurred in Skirling v. Mairioribankis, wherein promise of marriage had been “maid 
betuix the saidis Jane [Skirling] and Master Thomas [Mairioribankis] of baith thair mutuale consentis 
in presence of diueris famous witnes & ane notar speacialie requirit thairto and ane contract of 
Mariage than maid betuix thame subscriuit be thame Quhairby the said Master Thomas than oblist 
him to mar[i]e the said Jane in face of halie kirk betuix the dait of the said contract the tyme foresaid 
and the feist of beltyme nixtthaireftir”; subsequent copula was likewise alleged, the Commissaries 
decerning solemnization (NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 79r, 31 July 1568): and in Skirling v. Wallace, wherein 
promise had been made “in presence of Williame Barbour minister of Lessuaid notar publict & in 
presens of Diuers famous witnes… to marie and solemziat the halie band of matrimony with the said 
Helene betuix the day foirsaid & Sanct Luikis day nixt thaireftir and the said Helene than wes 
contentit & consentit thairto & ather of the saidis parties tuik instrumentis thairvpoun & the said 
Williame promisit be his God to fulfill & solemziat the band foirsaid”; the Commissaries decerned 
solemnization (NAS, CC8/2/4, fo. 42v, 30 July 1569). 
744 i.e. Lectures on Marriage, 176/7 et seq. 
745 i.e. Scott v. Robesoun “And than he in takin of his faythfull promeis maid to hir and that scho 
inlykewyis acceptit the samyn and inlykewyis promittit to him to tak him to hir spous ather of thame 
tuke vtheris be the hand” (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 250r, 27 November 1564), admitted to probation and 
proven;  Kincaid v. Fairholme “the saidis parteis of thair mutuall consentis in presence of ane notar 
and diuers famous witneses maid contract of mariage maid betuix thame obleisand thame hinc inde 
faythfullie to Solemnizat mariage with vtheris and than be vphalding of thair Rycht handis to vtheris 
tuke vtheris in spouses per verba de futuro” (NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 56r, 19 January 1570/1), defender 
assoilized since no copula; Makewin v. Stalker “being baith solut personis contracti[t] Mareage befoir 
diuers famows wittneses bretheris of the kirk of the kirk of God per verba de presenti with thair 
mut[u]all consentis ilk ane to vtheris be thair faithfull promeses hinc inde & J[un]ying thair Rycht 
handis In takin of thair mutuall consentis quhilk in effect matrimony completit” (NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 
152v-153r, 20 January 1569/70). 
746 i.e. Murray v. Symsone “and than thay bayth of thair mutuall consentis acceptit and ressauit vtheris 
be wordis of the present as spous to vtheris and obleist thame to compleit marriage with vtheris in the 
face of the kirk and that be extentioun of thair rycht handis and than be outward synes kissing and 
drinking with vtheris eftir the promeis forsaid be wordis of the present grantit ather of thame tobe 
lauchfull spouses” (NAS, CC8/2/3, fos. 287v-288r, 28 April 1569), pursuer succumbed in probation.  
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exchange of rings can also be viewed within the context of a general giving of gifts, 
which are better considered as donationes propter nuptias,748 which are in turn best 
viewed within the context of tocher goods, liferents, conjunctfees and terces.749 
Nevertheless, the giving of physical commodities such as gold, jewels and clothing, 
and the granting of legal privileges such as giving sasine to a property could all be 
construed as tokens of consent. 
 All these elements could be used as evidence of any kind of sponsalia, but 
sponsalia per verba de praesenti, when it occurred outside of the context of banns 
and solemnization, was de facto irregular, and, unlike sponsalia per verba de futuro, 
was not likely to have been said with a view to proceeding to the proclamation of 
banns. As such, promises of marriage per verba de praesenti could tend towards a 
greater degree of informality than that found in promises per verba de futuro. 
 Yet the formality of promises was also influenced by the status of those 
making the promise. Nobles, burgesses and the like, well aware of the pitfalls of 
marital agreements prior to actual solemnization tended to insist upon a greater 
degree of formality in the plighting of troth than those from humbler backgounds. 
Indeed, there was undoubtedly a greater degree of frequency of casual promises de 
futuro with subsequent copula among couples from humbler backgrounds than was 
found among merchant families and the nobility. This is not to imply anything about 
                                                                                                                                          
747 i.e. McCrerie v. Hunter “the said Marioun Hunter Relict of the said vmqle Johne & the said Patrik 
promittit to Gode per verba Defutur to tak vtheris in the holie band of matrimony & in the mentyme in 
signe & takin of the said promeis the said Patrik gaif to hir ane Ring of gold quhilk scho than ressauit 
& exceptit the samin in contemplatioun thairof” (NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 448v, 23 July 1574), pursuer 
succumbed in probation; Hamyltoun v. Heriot “the said Helene Hammyltoun and the said George of 
thair mutuall consentis in presens of diuers famous witnes tuik athir vtheris mariag per verba de 
praesenti the said George sayand I tak zow to my wyfe and to haife nane vther during zour lyftyme 
And the said Helene siclik be word present tuik the said George to hir spous promesand to haue nane 
vther During his lyftyme quhairvpoun ather of thame tuik vther be the handis in takin thairof lik as 
thair wes diuers promises thairof befoir the said moneth And ryngis of gold gevin be ather of thame to 
vtheris in takinge of marriage” (NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 259v, 5 February 1573/4), although this action was 
resolved by oath. 
748 i.e. Thomsoun v. Wod “sensyne the said Margaret in taikin of hir consent and faithfull promes hes 
ressauit fra the said Johne in name of Mariage and tabillat of gold with the said Johnis pictoure gravit 
in cristalling thairin on the ane syde with ane ruby on the vthersyde ane ring of gold ane pece of siluer 
of dens cunzie bo[w]it the tyme of the deliuerance thairof” (NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 39r, 1 June 1568), 
admitted to probation and proven. Cf. Balfour’s Practicks, i, 101 et seq. 
749 i.e. Auldingstoun v. McMyllane “throw quhais promeis the said Isobell belevand the said Robert to 
haue bene ane faythfull trew man and to haue kepit his faythfull promeis maid to hir in presence of 
god his avne conscience and famouss witnes causit hir to gif ovir hir maling and steding of certane 
landis in Tranent quhilk wald haue bene worth zeirlie to hir the soum of ane hundreth pundis money 
of this realme” (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 322r, 25 January 1564/5), admitted to probation and proven. Cf. 
Balfour’s Practicks, i, 99 et seq. 
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the relative promiscuity of different classes of Scots, but rather to point out that 
wealthy people tended to be fully aware of the legal security provided by contracts of 
marriage and the plighting of a couple’s troth before a suitable group of family 
members, and preferably a notary. It tended to be people who seemed unaware of the 
normal workings of the law, or who were possibly more trusting or naïve, that tended 
to run into difficulties when forced to prove the existence of an irregular promise of 
marriage. Casual promises, whilst still public, were of course harder to prove. For 
example, a public promise de futuro made whilst stood on a table in an ale house at 
Leith docks could be hard to prove since the company were not ‘famous’ witnesses, 
were likely inebriated, and had possibly been subsequently dispersed across the 
Baltic and the Low Countries on the various vessels upon which they served.  
 
 
[c] COPULA WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF CONTRACTING MARRIAGE 
 
 Within the context of contracting marriage, actual copula could usually only 
be directly established by referral to the oaths of those involved.750 Yet copula not 
infrequently produced a clear indicator of the act in the issue of children.751 In a 
considerable number of cases, fathers had no wish to deny parentage, having their 
children baptized in their name, whether conceived within the context of a non-
regular marriage, or entirely outside of the context of matrimony.752 It was not 
                                                 
750 i.e. Ewart v. Dryisdale “The said petitioun and promes thairin contenit with consent of partie is 
referrit to the said James ayth quha being suorne grantit carnale copulatioun and maid fayth that he 
nevar promisit mariage to the said Margaret” (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 65v, 19 June 1564); cf Currye v. 
Stevin, NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 238r, 21 March 1568/9 (copula denied oath); cf Murray v. Barry, NAS, 
CC8/2/3, fo. 350r-v, 4 June 1569, wherein the defender “maid fayth that he neuir maid ony promeis to 
hir of mariage nor neuir appointit with hir in word or writt thairanent nather befoir he had vse of hir 
body nor thaireftir”. 
751 Forbes v. Sandelands: defender “committit adulterie with Williame Huntar in Balcarrais quhilk 
wes thaireftir manifestit be procreatioun of ane man chyld borne in the moneth of Maij the zeir of God 
jaj vc/lxiij zeris baptist in name of the Williame zit and continewalie sensyne brukand his surename 
reput and haldin tobe his”; adultery duly proven (NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 304v-305v, 15 January 1564/5); 
McCrache v. Patersoun “Neuirthles the said Johne [defender] be intyisement of satan and lustis of his 
flesche hes left the said Margaret his lauchfull spouses and hes defilit his body and lauchfull bed of 
spousage in filthie and abhominable adulterie with Margaret Jak gevand the vse of his body to hir 
continewalie sen the moneth of Januar the zeir of God jai vc lx zeris And as zit continewis with the 
said Margarett Jak in the said detestable and horrible cryme of adulterie aganis the ordinancis and 
lawis of halie kirk quha hes borne to him ane maid bairn of ane zeir auld”; adultery duly proven 
(NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 157r, 27 October 1567). 
752 i.e. in Duncane v. Fairley John Fairly had been assoilized from an action of solemnization, denying 
an alleged promise of marriage by his great oath (NAS, CC8/2/3, fos. 52v-53r, 14 June 1568); 
nevertheless, less than a fortnight later he agreed to pay Helen Duncan 8 marks in retrospective 
   178
uncommon for men who had granted that they were irregularly married, and who 
acknowledged their children, to have had no desire to solemnize their marriage in 
facie ecclesiae.  
 Where children were concerned the Kirk could be of considerable help to 
those engaged in consistorial litigation. On an informal level, those who acted in the 
station of mid-wife were instructed to insist that the father’s name be given, when 
unclear, and if it was not forthcoming prior to labour, inquisition was permitted when 
the woman was less composed during delivery of the child. On an official level, 
those by whom baptisms were administered were obliged to make enquiry as to a 
child’s parentage, when unclear, and parish kirks throughout Scotland were directed 
to keep registers of baptisms.753  In addition to the information which could be 
furnished by the Kirk, the local knowledge of the parish could also be drawn upon in 
order to establish whether or not a man was commonly held to be a child’s father, 
and whether or not a child’s material needs were being met by an alleged father.  
 Copula could thus readily be established by a number of means, particularly 
where issue were concerned. Yet copula was not the essential component in the 
formation of a marital bond. Possibly because this was readily understood, many 
men often granted copula as a matter of course, but took issue with the promise of 
marriage.754  
 
[d] COPULA WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ADULTERY 
 
                                                                                                                                          
aliment and “to tak and ressaue the foirsaidis barnis vpbring treit and interteny and sustene thamin all 
tymis cuming as efferis according to his facultie and that of his avne consent.” (NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 
82v, 26 June 1568); Barnair v. Nychole, wherein the defender was found guilty of begetting a bastard 
in adultery which he “requirit the ministeris Dauid Fergusoun minister of Dunfermline and Petir 
Blacader Minister of Abirdouer to haif baptizat the samyn barne in his name Quha refusit to do the 
samin Becaus the samyn wes gottin in adulterie” (NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 399v, 24 March 1567/8); 
Pawtoun v. Lindesay, wherein the defender was found guilty of “Manifest adulterie with Marioun 
Gemmill” having “begottin ane man barne callit [blank] Lindesay with hir baptisit in his 
name…commonlie repute and haldin his barne” (NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 63r-v, 2 July 1568); Small v. 
Moffett, wherein the defender was found guilty of having “committit adulterie with Matho Fairar 
walker in Edinburgh quhilk wes thaireftir manifest be procuratioun to him of ane woman child borne 
in the moneth of September the zeir of God jai vc lxv zeris baptisit at the mess in the abbay of 
Halierudhous in the said Mathewis name” (NAS, CC8/2/2, fos. 294v-295r, 29 January 1567/8). 
753 i.e. Buik of the Kirk of the Canagait, 14 (20 January 1564/5; inquiry as to parentage). For an 
example of an early register see ibid., 76 et seq. 
754 i.e. Strang v. Auchinlek (NAS, CC8/2/7, fos. 128v-129r, 23 April 1575); Wilsone v. Stowman 
(NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 48r, 13 January 1570/1); Young v. Proudfute (NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 182r-v, 2 
November 1573); Barclay v. Ewiot (NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 318v-319r, 11 June 1570). 
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 Within the context of adultery, copula could be proven by any of the means 
outlined above. In addition the actual act could be proven either directly or indirectly 
in a number of ways. Of course, indirect proof was not confined exclusively to 
adultery, but was much more likely, since adulterous intercourse frequently aroused 
the suspicions of spouses, servants, the Kirk and the civil magistrate which resulted 
in close observation of those suspected of adultery or direct attempts to apprehend 
adulterers in flagrante delicto.  
 Concerning direct proof, there are several instances in which agents of a 
town’s magistracy broke down doors and apprehended adulterous couples in the 
act.755 In other similar instances paramours were known to attempt to affect an 
escape when alerted to the possibility of detection, and although not apprehended in 
the act, were nevertheless accosted in circumstances which strongly implied 
adultery.756 
                                                 
755 i.e. Hendirsone v. Robesone, wherein the defender was proven to have given her body “in filthie 
adultery to mony and diuers persouns lik as frenche men scottismen and dutche men in Leyth 
Edinburgh and in the Cannogait and in speciall vpoun the last day of Aprile last was in Johnesonis 
Clois in Edinburgh in ane bordell hous callit Margaret Abircrumbyis hous with ane Dutcheman callit 
Ludkyn als Lucas Knotsoun skippar in Danskyne and Johne Thomsoun in Edinburgh Deprehendit 
with thame in the nycht nakit togidder in ane bed be the watche of the toun and careit on the morne to 
persone to the towbuith thairof quha immediatlie thaireftir viz vpoun the first day of Maij being ane 
commone mercat day at command of the magistratis thairof was be the ser[u]andis and hongman put 
to the heicht of the marcat croce buir heidit with ane tikket vpoun hir foirheid declaring planelie to the 
peple that scho was and is ane adulterar quhilk is maist notour to this haill toun and Inhabitantis 
thairof” (NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 130r-v, 27 March 1571); Andersone v. Allasone, wherein the defender 
had “joynit hir body in filthie adulterie with Matho Cole indwellar in Linlithgow and hes had diuers 
and sundrie tymis at thair plesour carnale dale togidder in the said Johne Andersonis hous in Glasgw 
and diveris vtheris places in the saidis monethis and sensyne like as thai wer bayth togidder tane furth 
be the baillies of Glasgw at mydnyt out of the said Johne Andersonis hous as maist manifest and 
sclanderous adulteraris And upoun the xxiij day of December last wes the zeir of God jai vc lxvj zeris 
wer be command of the saidis baillies put vpoun the croce of the said burcht of Glasgow tobe ane 
spectacle to the hale peopill of thair maist notorius and sclanderous adulterie”(NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 
275r, 19 January 1567/8); Ker v. Cranstoun, wherin despite the fact that adultery had been proven 
without recourse to an oath of the defender, she nevertheless appeared for the pronouncing of decreet 
“and said scho had na thing [to say against proceedings] but wes ane synnar and come repentent 
thairof” in effect confessing, or at it were granting the libel, albeit a little late (NAS, CC8/2/2, fos. 
275v-276r, 19 January 1567/8). 
756 i.e. Hopper v. Dauidsoun, wherein the defender’s paramour “was espyit to have past in the said 
hous at aucht houris at evin & the durris closit eftir him being suspectit to have had cumpanye with 
the said Jonet [defender] of befoir the magistratis of this burt being aduerteis thairof come to the said 
hous to have serchit gif the samyn was of verite quhair thai knokkit about ten houris at evening at the 
zet thairof in the said clois desirend to have intres and was refusit to have intres ane lang space that in 
the meintyme the said Patrik mycht eschew lik as he feirand tobe apprehendit past furth of ane bak dur 
on the eist side of the said hous and langis ane spout or gutter quhair he bete[ki]t secreitlie to have 
eschaipit quhair na commone entres was quhair he wes apprehendit be the magistratis and put in the 
towbuith” The paramour was duly “callit befoir the iustice generall of this Realme & his deputis for 
committing adultery with the said Jonet and wasting & consuming of the said George gudis and geir 
vpoun the xj day of Maij 1570 [and] wes convict criminally be assys of the same” (NAS, CC8/2/5, 
fos. 159v-160r, 27 April 1571); Cf. NAS, JC1/13, fos. 164r-165r, 11 May 1570, Hopper v. Vrquhard. 
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 In less dramatic instances, the testimony of witnesses, usually servants, that a 
couple had been alone together in dubious circumstances (solus cum sola in loco 
suspecto), sometimes with the additional assertion that they had been in a state of 
undress (nudus cum nuda), provided sufficient grounds upon which to establish that 
copula had occurred.757 As Helmholz notes, this was not strictly speaking a form of 
proof, but rather a substitute for proof, categorized in the Canon law as a 
presumption.758 In addition, confessions of adultery before the Kirk could also be 
used as evidence before the Commissaries of Edinburgh.759 
 
[e] REGULAR MARRIAGE 
 
 The principal aim of regular marriages was to address the dangers of 
probation inherent in non-regular marriages. Regular marriage, with its proclamation 
of banns and solemnization produced the most legally secure context within which to 
contract marriage. The sessions of the Reformed Kirk kept records of those whose 
names had been called, and the subsequent exchange of promises of marriage per 
verba de praesenti in facie ecclesiae were also noted in the record of banns.760 Yet 
where a written record was not made, or subsequently perished, the real strength of 
regular marriage was the exchange of promises de praesenti before the minister and 
parish within which at least one of the contracting parties was domiciled. Within the 
essentially static communities of the medieval and early modern period, the 
testimony of witnesses was regarded as a superior means of probation over written 
                                                 
757 i.e. Vrquhart v. Lyoun, wherein the defender was proven to have given “his body in adulterie as 
saidis to the said Issobell Murray & that in the said place of Hoppishill past oppinlie to bed with hir & 
war togidder in the said place solus cum sola nudus cum nuda the duiris closit vpoun thame diuers 
nytis within the said place beand than alredy personis to commit addulterie & suspect thairof of 
befoir” (NAS, CC8/2/6, fos. 63r-64r, 10 March 1572/3); Wemis v. Dunbar, wherein it was prove that 
the defender had given “hir body in filthie adulterie to Johne Giffart thai then beand and as zit hable 
personis and monethlie sensyne hes joynit thame selfis in filthie adulterie being solus cum sola nudus 
cum nuda in suspect places” (NAS, CC8/2/3, fos. 32v-33r, 25 May 1568); see also Merschale v. 
Broun (NAS, CC8/2/3, fos. 373v-374r, 18 June 1569). 
758 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 331. 
759 i.e. Kincaid v. Ross, wherein the defender was alleged to have committed adultery with various 
women, including one Margaret Muir “And for testificatioun of the said adulterie the said Margaret 
Mure within fourtie dayis thaireftir the said bairne was borne come in presence of halie congregatioun 
in the kirk of Glasgw in presence of Maister Dauid Wemis minister and maid hir oppin and publict 
repentance of the said adulterie done and committit be the said Jhon[n]e Ross in Holingbus with hir”; 
the defender was proven to have committed adultery with one of the alleged paramours and so decreet 
of divorce was granted (NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 18v-19r, 15 July 1569). 
760 The only extant source for this seems to be the Buik of the Canagait, 105-108. 
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documentation.761 The legal considerations surrounding regular marriage were 
clearly highly effective. This is seen most clearly in actions for adherence and 
divorce, a precondition of which was establishing whether or not the litigants were in 
fact married. There seem to be no recorded instances between 1563/4 and 1576 in 




[f] ESTABLISHING MARRIAGE BY HABIT AND REPUTE 
 
 One final and special type of probation in establishing the validity of a 
marriage was probation by habit and repute.762 This form of probation was intended 
to establish what was probable rather than what was certain,763 the clearer indicators 
of marriage having perished through lapse of time. The usual context in which this 
type of probation was employed was actions involving legitimacy. It goes without 
saying that legitimacy was entirely dependent upon the validity of the marriage of a 
child’s parents, and as such the key element in bastardy actions involved establishing 
promise of marriage, since copula was granted by the very nature of the case. The 
problem was that actions of bastardy were usually remitted to the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh following allegations of illegitimacy made in response to brieves of 
inquest. Questioning the validity of an heir apparent was naturally based upon 
allegations about the heir’s parents’ marriage, which in turn could have been 
contracted forty or fifty years previously.764 The problem then was that even if the 
marriage had been regularly solemnized the celebrant and many members of the 
congregation who witnessed the exchange of consent could be dead, whilst those still 
alive might not be able to recall explicitly the solemnization of the union. As the 
basis of a marriage declined as it were through the various types of irregular 
                                                 
761 i.e. Court of the Official, 104; cf Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 338 et seq. 
762 As David Sellar has correctly argued, habit and repute was not part of the constitution of marriage 
(as has sometimes been erroneously held in Scotland), but rather “has always been, and still remains, 
no more than a method of proof” (Sellar, ‘Habit and Repute’, 117, cf 122 for discussion of the Canon 
law in this respect).  
763 Habit and repute has always been intended to set up a presumption in favour of the existence of a 
marriage which cannot be proven in other ways, placing the onus of proof on those who deny such a 
marriage (Sellar, ‘Habit and Repute’, 117). Cf Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 331. 
764 As was the case in Marioribanks v. Weir & Wardlaw (see next n. below). 
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promises of marriage to clandestine promises of marriage, the likelihood of 
establishing the existence of a marriage with certainty diminished. In circumstances 
where recourse could not be had to documentary evidence, nor the explicit and 
detailed testimony of witnesses, the judges were prepared to allow the existence of 
the marriage to be established by habit and repute. This kind of proof was the lowest 
grade of probation the court was prepared to accept, and it was understood that only 
probability, not certainty, was achieved. Habit and repute therefore relied upon the 
general perception of a community that a couple had always been considered to be 
married, despite the fact that no one could testify explicitly to an exchange of 
promise.765  
 
[iv] OTHER RELEVANT POINTS 
 
 It remains to consider those relevant points which were not directly 
concerned with promises of marriage, or with actual copula, be it fornication, 
adultery or the act by which a promise of marriage was made perfect. These 
remaining points may be considered as impediments to the contracting of marriage, 
either because of factors for which no dispensation, if lawful, had been obtained, 
such as consanguinity, affinity and impotence, and the life of the innocent spouse 
following divorce for adultery, or because of factors which invalidated consent, such 
as just dread and fear, and nonage. Naturally, impediments arising out of prior 
marital relations, among them sometimes affinity, often involved the probation of 
points already discussed above.   
 
[a] CONSANGUINITY AND AFFINITY 
 
                                                 
765 i.e. Marioribankis v. Weir & Wardlaw, wherin it was proven that Janet Wier “wes lauchfull dochter 
to the said vmquhile Thomas quha wes begottin of him and vmquhile [blank] Montgumery his wyfe 
ane of the dochteris of the Lard of Scottistoun quhilk vmquhile Thomas and the said [blank] 
Montgumery father and mother to the said vmquhile Jonet wes mair nor fyftie zeris syne mariit at the 
leist haldin and repute as mariit folkis haldand hous togidder in the toun of Lanerk and vtheris places 
of Cliddisdale as mariit folkis And sua commonele repute and haldin in the hale cuntre quha begat the 
said vmquhile Jonet and diuers vtheris barnis Quhilk vmquhile Jonet and the remanent thair barnis 
Wes continualie without controuersie haldin and repute the lauchfull barnis and dochteris rexiue [i.e. 
respectively] of the said vmquhile Thomas” (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 362v, 26 February 1564/5). 
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 The other major reform to Scots consistorial law during the Reformation 
occurred in the reduction of the forbidden degrees of consanguinity and affinity.766 
As far as the contracting of marriage was concerned, the reform was in principle 
straightforward, reducing the forbidden degrees of consanguinity and affinity from 
four to two, according to the canonical computation, which reform was enacted by 
the Scottish Parliament on 15 December 1567, declaring all marriages contracted 
outside of the second degree or greater to have been lawful since 8 March 1558/9.767 
This revision to the law was well illustrated in 1569 in an action of declarator 
of bastardy before the Commissaries of Edinburgh. It was alleged that Thomas 
Morton (born 1543) was illegitimate on the grounds that his parents had contracted 
marriage within the forbidden degrees according to the Canon law. Against this it 
was excepted peremptorily that although this was true, nevertheless since “the 
ordoure now takin sen the Reformatioun of the Religioun the saidis far greis makis 
na nullitie of mariage Conforme to the Law of God” and that Morton’s parents had 
“levit Diueris and mony zeris eftir the said Reformatioun of Religioun in continewall 
to the tyme of his said faderis deceis quha deceis in Januar lastwas and sua the said 
mariage was Ratifit be thair mutuall consent togidder”. The Commissaries found the 
peremptory exception relevant and admitted it to probation: it was duly proven and 
the Commissaries assoilized Morton.768 
The post-Reformation forbidden degrees may also be illustrated by two 
actions of annulment. In the first, Spalding v. Spalding, the action never reached 
decreet, or else it is no longer extant. Nevertheless, the libel alleged that the pursuer 
Elizabeth Spalding had married David Spalding, “hir gudschir bruther” on 12 April 
1564 “in face of Halie Kirk”, which union was “contrair not onlie to the canone and 
ciuile law bot als to the law of God”. The Commissaries found the allegation relevant 
and admitted it to Elizabeth’s probation.769 That a woman could not marry her 
grandfather’s brother in post-Reformation Scotland seems at first peculiar, since 
according to the canonical computation such relations are in the third degree, and by 
                                                 
766 It should also be noted that cognatio spiritualis seems to have disappeared entirely at the 
Reformation. 
767 RPS, A1567/12/15; APS, iii, 26, c.16. This development has already been fully discussed by David 
Sellar in ‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 77 and by Ireland in ‘Husband and Wife: Divorce’, 93. The Act 
was prefigured by the ruling of the General Assembly, 21 December 1560 (Acts and Proceedings of 
the General Assemblies, i, 5). 
768 NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 76v-77v, 15 November 1569, Mortoun v. Mortoun. 
769 NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 24v (initial diet), 16 May 1565. 
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the civil law computations in the fourth.770 Yet this case suggests that in Scotland 
from the time of the Reformation a woman’s grandfather’s brother was reckoned to 
be in the second degree of consanguinity. This would appear to be confirmed by the 
definition of the forbidden degrees given by the Scottish Incest Act of 1649, which 
explained that “no person may marry or lie with those that are in the direct line 
ascending or descending; or with a brother or sister of one of those in the direct 
line”.771   
The reformed degrees are again illustrated in an action of annulment brought 
by the Procurator Fiscal of the Commissaries of Edinburgh during 1575. It was 
alleged and duly proven that Thomas Paterson had married first one Janet Johnston, 
upon whose death he had married one Cristine Johnson. This second marriage was 
annulled on the grounds that Thomas’s first wife had been the sister of the father of 
the second wife, and as such the second wife was “in first & secund decreis of 
consanguinity” with the first wife, such affinity being “of the law of God & man” 
unlawful.772 
 Nevertheless, the reform of the forbidden degrees was not without its 
problems, since it coincided with the criminalization of incest. Whilst the Canon law 
had held relations in the first degree by either consanguinity or affinity to be 
incestuous and thus subject to ecclesiastical censures, it had not prescribed that such 
fault be punishable by death. The Scottish reformers’ criminalization of incest, which 
prescribed the death penalty, failed to reform the distinction between relations 
established by consanguinity and affinity, and worse still, as Sellar has discussed at 
length, retained the Canon law principle that affinity was created by sexual 
intercourse, rather than by marriage. As such, a man who slept with a woman, and 
then the woman’s sister, was liable to criminal prosecution for incest. Whilst the 
criminal prescriptions for adultery had in practice been limited, the incest act was 
enforced with full rigour, providing Scots law with “one of the blackest chapters in 
its history”.773     
 
                                                 
770 See Lectures on Marriage, 241. 
771 Sellar, ‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 81. 
772 NAS, CC8/2/7, fo. 243r, 21 July 1575, Procurator Fiscal v. Patersoun & Johnestoun. 
773 Sellar, ‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 76 et seq for a full discussion of this episode, with various 
examples from the justiciary records. 
   185
[b] IMPOTENCE 
 
 The physical inability in either party to consummate a marriage, or ‘render 
the marriage debt’ as the canonists had it, was grounds for annulment both before 
and after the Reformation in Scotland. Pre-Reformation instances have been 
discussed above,774 whilst there are no instances of such actions for the period under 
study. The earliest post-Reformation case was that brought by the “beautiful, 
attractive and dissolute” Dame Elizabeth Stewart against her second husband, Robert 
Earl of March, which ran from 5 March 1579/80 to 19 May 1581.775  
 
[c] FORCE, FEAR, JUST DREAD AND NONAGE 
 
 Both before and after the Reformation in Scotland it was held that marital 
consent was invalid if given on account of force and fear776 or just dread. Similarly 
minors, or those of ‘less age’ were also held to be incapable of giving valid consent. 
Both impediments were raised in Gillaspene v. Marscheall in an action of annulment 
brought before the Commissaries of Edinburgh in 1565. The pursuer alleged that he 
had, when aged nine and under his father’s influence, “contractit mariage aganis his 
will with Cristiane Marscheall dochter to Isobell Aitkin scho than being within ix 
zeris of aige per verba de praesenti be the causing of hir foirsaid mother without 
bayth thair consentis, becaus of the law sik zoung personis being astrictit throw the 
feir of bayth thair parentis as said is being of sik tendir aige culd gif na consent to sik 
band”. The couple were both fifteen years of age at the time of the action, and “being 
suorne in presence of the saidis Commissaris ather of thame declarit that nane of 
                                                 
774 See above, pages 110-113. 
775 The case was discussed at length by John Riddell in his Inquiry, i, 531 et seq. who stated it to be 
the earliest example of a full process for the Commissaries of Edinburgh. Proving impotence could 
involve trial per septimam manum, whereby a number of persons were found to testify to the 
trustworthiness of a party alleging impotence. This was the nearest the Commissaries came to using an 
inquest to establish a fact and has parallels with the practice in the English ecclesiastical courts 
(Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 337).   
776 Vis et metus in the Canon law context is discussed in Scanlon, ‘Husband and Wife’, 76-77. 
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thame conuersit carnalie with vtheris at na tyme”,777 had their marriage duly annulled 
by the Commissaries.778 
 
[d] LIFE OF THE INNOCENT SPOUSE 
 
 It has already been argued in the section concerning Scottish Protestant 
divorce for adultery that the guilty party was impeded from remarriage during the 
lifetime of the innocent spouse. It appears that in exceptional circumstances a 
dispensation from this impediment could be obtained from the person of the 
sovereign. As both Riddell and Baird Smith have noted, one Robert Duguid received 
a special remission and dispensation from James VI in 1592, having been divorced 
for his own adultery, and having remarried during the lifetime of his innocent 
spouse.779  
 
[e] LEGITIMATION PER SUBSEQUENS MATRIMONIUM  
AND IGNORANTIA ET BONA FIDES 
 
 These two points were regularly alleged in bastardy actions in Scotland both 
before and after the Reformation. Legitimation per subsequens matrimonium allowed 
for the legitimation of illegitimate children if their parents married, and as such, 
whilst it was a relevant point unique to bastardy actions, it involved the usual 
standards of proof used in establishing the validity of marriages within the context of 
bastardy litigation.780 Whilst this principle was accepted in Scotland, it was rejected 
in England.781 John Riddell has discussed the principle at some length, and it may be 
noted that couples sometimes employed the ‘cair claith’ while solemnizing their 
union, the groom placing the cloth over the heads of those children he acknowledged 
as his own.782  
                                                 
777 It was important for the Commissaries to establish that no copula had occurred between the parties 
after reaching puberty since the marriages of minors were not necessarily null “if the parties had 
homologated the union after reaching puberty” (Scanlon, ‘Husband and Wife’, 75). 
778 NAS, CC8/2/2, fos. 133v-134r, 15 August 1565. 
779 Riddell, Inquiry, i, 394; Baird Smith, ‘ The Reformers and Divorce’, 20. 
780 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 167v-168v, 31 January 1569/70, Carnis v. Kennedye. 
781 Sellar, ‘Habit and Repute’, 119. 
782 Riddell, Inquiry, 478-479, 451, 520 et seq.  
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 Ignorance and good faith were relevant points by which those whose 
marriage was to be annulled sought to preserve the status of their children. If at least 
one of the parties to an invalid marriage could prove that they had married in 
ignorance of the impediment through which their marriage was to be annulled, the 
children were declared legitimate. Nevertheless, ignorance and good faith could be 
pleaded only when an invalid marriage had been regularly contracted. The law of 
Scotland held that those who failed to have the banns proclaimed had not made due 
inquiry into any impediments which may exist to their union, and as such were at 
sufficient fault, in that their ignorance could be considered to be at least partially 
intentional.783 This conformed to the Canon law, which in deprecating irregular 
married from 1215, sought to penalize the children of those who failed to conform to 
the Church’s desire that marriage be contracted regularly.784   
  
 
[v] COMPETENT REMEDIES 
 
Whilst positive or explicit remedies were not always applied in consistorial 
actions, since it was sometimes sufficient for the Commissaries to assoilzie the 
defender from the allegations libelled against them,785 a range of competent remedies 
could be applied by the Commissaries of Edinburgh. In the first place they could 
declare parties free from a promise of marriage in those instances when the promise 
was proven to have been per verba de futuro only, with no subsequent copula.786 A 
related remedy was applied when the banns were stayed by what were proven to be 
groundless allegations of promise of marriage (sometimes with copula), in which 
cases the stayer was put to silence, that is to say forbidden from making such 
allegations in the future.787 This remedy could also be applied when such allegations 
                                                 
783 Riddell, Inquiry, 512 et seq. 
784 Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, i, 258, canon 51. 
785 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 252r-v, 28 January 1573/4, Stewart v. Murray, wherein, uniquely for the 
period under study, the defender was assoilized from an action of divorce on the grounds of adultery 
since the pursuer succumbed in probation. 
786 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/2, 41r, 30 May 1565, McWalter v. Galbrayth. 
787 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/7, fos. 89v-90r, 5 March 1574/5, Ramsay v. Myll. 
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had been made publicly, although outside of the context of the proclamation of 
banns, which allegations constituted defamation.788 
 Where irregular marriage was proven to exist, the Commissaries ordained 
that the marriage be solemnized, that is to say regularized through the proclamation 
of banns and solemnization in facie ecclesiae.789 If an irregular marriage were proven 
to exist between parties not living together, the Commissaries would ordain 
adherence and solemnization.790 Adherence was also a remedy in its own right, 
applied in those cases where it was proven that one party from a regularly married 
couple had deserted their spouse without just cause.791 In actions of adherence, the 
Commissaries could also modify interim aliment to the wife, for the maintenance of 
herself (and her children if dependent), since it was deemed reasonable that the wife 
was entitled to receive aliment from her husband so that she might meet the costs of 
pursuing or defending an action of adherence.792 Aliment also could be modified by 
the Commissaries as a principal remedy for the maintenance of children by their 
father.793 
 The remedy of annulment could be applied by the Commissaries where 
marriages were proven to have been contracted in spite of some impediment.794 
Where annulled marriages had nevertheless resulted in issue, the Commissaries 
would also pronounce on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the issue, depending upon 
the parents’ ignorance of the proven impediment.795 Declarators of legitimacy or 
illegitimacy were also applied by the Commissaries as the principal remedies in 
actions concerning allegations of bastardy.796   
                                                 
788 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/2, fos. 34v-35r, Gibsoun v. Robesoun. 
789 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 42r-v, 2 June 1568, Diksone v. Tod. 
790 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 157r, 26 April 1571, Moffait v. Mertene. It will be noted that there were no 
‘declarators of marriage’ in the strict sense at this time, but of course a decreet of adherence and/or 
solemnization proceeded upon what amounted to a declarator of marriage. 
791 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 340r-v, 26 May 1569, Cruke v. Hammiltoun. 
792 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 82v-84r, 19 November 1569, Hammiltoun v. Dalmahoy (very detailed 
interlocutor in which the defender was assoilized from paying interim aliment to his wife  during an 
action of adherence since she was proven to be already in receipt of substantial incomes).  
793 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/6, fos. 224v-225r, 9 January 1573/4, Creich v. Bell. 
794 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 54r-v, 17 June 1568, Cromartie v. Caddell. 
795 i.e. in the action of annulment brought by the Procurator Fiscal against Ogilvy, Fraser and 
Chisholm, Chisholm’s procurator desired of the judges that “quhat euir be done heirin preiudice not 
the barnis” (NAS, CC8/2/6, fo. 429r, 8 July 1574).   
796 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/6, fos. 93v-97v, 20 May 1573, Dunbar v. Adair. 
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 The Commissaries could also apply the remedy of Scottish Protestant divorce 
with licence to the innocent party to marry forthwith where it was proven that the 
other spouse was guilty of adultery,797 or guilty of obstinate and malicious 
desertion.798 Such decreets also pronounced on the contractual consequences of 
divorce.799 In a number of a-typical actions resulting from the involvement of the 
tribunals of the Protestant Kirk in consistorial actions from 1559, the Commissaries 
could also pronounce on the contractual consequences of a sentence of divorce 
pronounced by the Kirk. The Kirk had not seen fit to pronounce in these contractual 
matters, and as such, where sentences of divorce pronounced by the Kirk were 
accepted by the Commissaries, the Commissaries proceeded to pronounce on tocher, 









                                                 
797 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/2, fos. 11v-12r, 7 May 1565, Murray v. Irwyng. 
798 The only example of which being that brought by the fifth earl of Argyll against his first countess, 
which is discussed above Chapter III, §III. 
799 i.e. Ker v. Cranstoun, wherein the defender was found guilty of adultery and decerned “to haue tint 
and to tyne hir tocher terce coniunctfee and liferent landis and quhat sumeuer vther thingis gevin and 
grantit be the said Schir Andro [pursuer] or ony vtheris in his name to hir, or ony vtheris in hir name 
to him in contemplatioun of the said Mariage with all donationis and vtheris thingis gevin be the said 
Schir Andro to hir in contemplatioun thairof” (NAS, CC8/2/2, fos. 275v-276r, 19 January 1567/8). 
800 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 323r-v, 26 January 1564/5, Westoun v. Ewart, wherein, the couple already 
having been divorced by the kirk of Edinburgh (who proceeded by virtue of a commission from the 
Privy Council), the Commissaries decerned the defender to have “tyne and to haue tint hir tochir and 
all vther thingis gevin be hir or to hir in contemplatioun and in respect of the said mariage and 
specialie hir infeftment of coniunctfee or lyfrent of all and hale the tenement of the landis 
abouespecifiit with thair pertinents [i.e. ane tenement of land hous biggingis zard and well thairof with 
the pertinentis lyand in the said burgh vpoun the south part of the quenis streit of the kowgait betuix 
the arable lands of the nunnis callit the sisteris of the seinis beside the said burt on the south part and 
the foirsaid pertening to oure lady kirk of feild vpoun the north] gevin to hir be the said Johne 
[pursuer] and Marioun Scot his mother ex causa donationis propter nuptias”. 







ANALYSIS OF EARLY CONSISTORIAL LITIGATION BEFORE THE 
COMMISSARIES OF EDINBURGH 
 
§I 
INTRODUCTION & METHODOLOGY 
 
 David Sellar has righly noted that “no one has yet searched through the 
commissary court records, still extant in manuscript in abundance, to determine the 
incidence of divorce at any particular time, or in any particular part of the country; to 
record the sorts and conditions of men and women who raised the actions; to 
distinguish between male and female pursuers; or to calculate the cost of litigation. 
Information on all these points would be of considerable interest”.801 The source 
material generated by the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh during the 
Reformation era has already been analysed in order to gain on the one hand a fuller 
appreciation of early Scots consistorial law and on the other a better appreciation of 
the procedure of the Commissaries of Edinburgh. Yet in addition the source material 
may be anaylsed in a different way in order to draw out the information desired by 
Sellar. The entries made in the Registers of Acts and Decreets for any given case 
have the potential to provide a wealth of information and detail about actual 
consistorial litigation before the Commissaries. In order to draw together these 
various insights from the Commissaries’ Registers, data has been compiled from the 
first three volumes of Acts and Decreets.802 These volumes cover the period from 
                                                 
801 Sellar, ‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 74.  
802 This data has been summarized in Appendix II. A list of contents for this appendix had been 
provided both in the contents pages at the beginning of this thesis, and on the second page of 
Appendix II. Further specific references to Appendix II for each catergory of data will also be given at 
appropriate points for each section and part of this chapter. 
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late April 1564 until the end of June 1569, and as such are unaffected by the later 
disruption of the Court during 1571 and 1572. Of the five year’s worth of Registers, 
only 36 months are extant, on account of the fact that the Registers compiled during 
the clerkship of Sebastian Danelourt are missing.803 These 36 months fall into two 
periods: fifteen and a half months from late April 1564 until mid August 1565 and 
twenty and a half months from mid October 1567 until the end of June 1569. Beyond 
these two sample periods, which presented themselves fairly naturally, it would have 
been possible to extend further the chronological scope of the second sample, but this 
was increasingly difficult since earlier diets in litigation began to be recorded with 
more brevity from about this time and promised diminishing returns only. The 
following section is therefore based upon the two sample periods outlined above, and 
as such it differs in chronological scope from the chapter dealing with consistorial 
law. This earlier chapter covered the period 1564 to 1576, since it was based 
primarily upon consistorial decreets, all of which had been located and transcribed 
for this period. In contrast, this section on consistorial litigation focuses upon the 
1560s only, although it has been possible to include some limited information for 
completed consistorial actions for the period 1564-1576. 
 A further point to be borne in mind is that several peculiar features of the 
extant Registers of Acts and Decreets affect some of the statistical elements that 
follow. The complete absence of ‘Danelourt’s Registers’ has already been 
mentioned, but within the extant Registers there are several minor lacunae. The 
reason for these minor lacunae arises from the fact that some of the Registers of Acts 
and Decreets may be, in their present physical format, the creation of later 
generations.  
 The earliest clerks of the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh were 
responsible for providing, at their own expense, the paper, ink and wax necessary for 
the various tasks they undertook at the court, in addition to a writing desk and 
chair.804 The clerks clearly purchased quires of French paper in which they recorded 
the acts and decreets of the Commissaries of Edinburgh.805 The quires used by the 
                                                 
803 Discussed above, page 50. 
804 see above, Chapter II, § II, [iv]. 
805 This may be inferred from the watermarks in some of the paper used ( i.e. NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 13; 
fo. 118). 
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clerks of the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh tended to number 16 folios.806 
Whether or not the original intention was to bind a number of quires together into a 
single volume as occasion dictated is not entirely clear. What is clear is that many of 
the quires were numbered so as to keep them in order, though whether this was done 
at the time, or at a later date cannot be established with certainty. It is tenable that the 
numbering of the quires belongs to a later date, since the ink used and the style of the 
Arabic numerals does not appear to be contemporary, and it is certainly the case that 
many of the quires are not numbered.807 These facts suggest that some later attempt 
was made to bind the quires, and that those stacks of quires which may have become 
deranged were numbered in the correct order prior to binding.808 
 This theory accords with the fact that the first folios of various quires of 
paper, whether they occur at the beginning of a Register or not, show signs of soiling 
and damage, and in some instances are missing altogether. It is this damage to the 
quires that gives rise to several minor lacunae in the extant Registers. The most 
obvious damage is often at the beginning of the Registers. The first folio is often 
severely damaged, and is usually the first extant folio only, rather that the folio 
which must have once been the uppermost in the first quire. To give some examples, 
CC8/2/1 starts abruptly with a number of acts from the last day the Commissaries sat 
before 29 April 1564. The Commissaries had been appointed at the end of February 
1563/4, and although the date from which the Commissaries began to sit in 
judgement is not known, they received instructions from the Session concerning the 
procedure they should adopt and the charges they should apply dated 12 March 
1563/4,809 and they were certainly sitting in judgement by April 1564. It is certain 
that folios are missing from the beginning of the first Register, and that the level of 
damage decreases with each folio until only a minimal amount of conservation has 
been required. A similar declension of folio damage occurs at the beginning of 
                                                 
806 For example quire numbers 10, 11, 12 and 17 in NAS, CC8/2/4, fos 143-158, 159-174, 175-190, 
260-275 respectively. Some quires had more folios than this, though a rigorous analysis has not been 
undertaken: presumably the clerks bought whatever was available over the years. 
807 See NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 143r, 159r, 175r, 260r for examples of this numbering. 
808 Each volume of acts and decreets probably has its own particular history, but further inquiries have 
not been made for this thesis: it may be the case that the quires used by the clerks were sometimes 
bound into volumes during their clerkship (i.e. this is suggested by the end of NAS, CC8/2/5 where 
the clerk notes that the ‘buke’ has come to an end), and that others were not. 
809 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 655-662. 
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CC8/2/2, and some of the early folios are certainly missing: CC8/2/1 ends on 14 
April 1564, whilst CC8/2/2 begins on 1 May 1564. 
 These random gaps in the Registers have various consequences for the 
present analysis. Chief among them is that they render unreliable, or at the least 
conditional, any statements about the number of actions which failed to reach 
decreet. It is not possible to establish which ‘incomplete’ cases where intentionally 
abandoned or resolved outside of the court, and the fact that the resolution of the 
action may have been recorded as a decreet at the beginning of a damaged quire 
further compounds the problem and renders unknowable the outcome of ‘unfinished’ 
actions. The random gaps also interfere with some of the actions where statistics 
about the length of consistorial litigation can be obtained: in several instances, the 
decreet for an action is extant, but there is no record of when the action started, 
despite the fact that various other diets from the same action were recorded. 
 Despite these shortcomings, various statistics have been compiled concerning 
the frequency of litigation, the gender of litigants,810 the social status of litigants, the 
domicile of litigants, the length of litigation, the cost of litigation and the use of 
procurators. The raw data upon which following summaries are based have been 
included in Appendix II. The drawbacks of describing actions exclusively in terms of 
libels has already been noted, but in the following analysis of the frequency of 
litigation each action has been defined in terms of the intention of the pursuer as 
expressed in the libel. Actions concerning Freedom, Silence and Slander (when 
involving a promise of marriage) have been grouped together, whilst actions for 
Solemnization with Adherence have been included with those actions which sought 
Solemnization only. Where fractions are expressed as a percentage, the percentage 
has been rounded up or down to the nearest whole percentage, except in those 
instances when a fraction expresses itself precisely to a half percentage (i.e. 12.5%). 
 In §II, three main groups of data have been used for the statistics for 
frequency of litigation and gender of litigants. The first group is comprised of data 
from all consistorial litigation for April 1564 to June 1569, regardless of whether the 
action reached decreet or not. The second group is comprised of data from all 
                                                 
810 Where relevant, i.e. some actions did not necessarily fall in “woman v. man” or “man v. woman” 
categories, such as bastardy actions, where the gender of the defender had no bearing on the gender(s) 
of the pursuer(s). 
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consistorial decreets for the same period, whilst the third group is comprised of data 
from all consistorial decreets for the period from April 1564 to the winter of 1576/7.  
 The most striking features of the analysis in §II concerns the gender of 
litigants in actions for solemnization, and as such §III discusses some of the gender 
related features of these actions in more detail.  
 §IV considers the length of litigation of consistorial actions beginning 
between April 1564 and June 1569; draws together any evidence for the expenses of 
the plea from consistorial decreets pronounced between April 1564 and January 
1576/7; and considers litigant’s use of procurators for the period April 1564 to June 
1569. §V considers the domicile and social status of litigants in consistorial litigation 
for the period April 1564 to June 1569.  
 
§II 
TABLE 1: FREQUENCY OF ALL CONSISTORIAL LITIGATION WITH 
GENDER OF LITIGANTS, APRIL 1564 – JUNE 1569.811 
 
           GENDER OF PURSUER 
         frequency         female   male   proc. fisc.812 
 
Freedom, Silence and Slander: 5  0 5 0 
Solemnization813   27  23 2 2814 
Adherence:     19   14 4 1  
Aliment:    3  2 1 0 
Annulment:    11  6 3 2 
Divorce for adultery:   57 815  28 29 0 
Reduction of sentence of divorce: 8 816   5817 2 1 
                                                 
811 Based on the data contained in Appendix II, A. Litigation over the fullfulment of the terms of 
marriage contracts (usually the payment of tocher goods) has not been analysed in this thesis. 
812 i.e. those actions brought by the Procurator Fiscal of the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh. 
813 A few actions concerning solemnization with adherence have been included in this category. 
814 The two actions brought by the Procurator Fiscal were brought against men. 
815 Thomsoun v. Lindesay is not entirely certain. 
816 5 pre-Reformation definitive sentences of divorce, 3 sentences of divorce pronounced by the 
Protestant Kirk. 
817 Note that the same woman brought the same action twice, since her opponent died, obliging her to 
pursue his heir. 
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Expenses818    1  1 0 0 
Separation:    1  1 0 0 
Tint:     3  0 3 0 
Bastardy:    5  (n/a) 
Retrospective Declarator of Divorce: 1  (n/a) 
 
TOTAL: 141  80 49 6 
 
TABLE 2: FREQUENCY OF CONSISTORIAL DECREETS WITH GENDER OF 
LITIGANTS, APRIL 1564 – JUNE 1569.819 
 
           GENDER OF PURSUER 
         frequency         female   male   proc. fisc.820 
 
Freedom, Silence and Slander: 5   0 5 0 
Solemnization821   15  13 1 1  
Adherence:     7  5 2 0  
Aliment:    2   2 0 0 
Annulment:    5  2 2 1822 
Divorce for adultery:   18  10 8 0 
Reduction of sentence of divorce: 2  2 0 0   
Tint:     3  0 3 0  
Bastardy:    1  (n/a)     





                                                 
818 Which proceeded upon a decreet of adherence. 
819 Based on the data contained in Appendix II, B. 
820 i.e. those actions brought by the Procurator Fiscal of the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh. 
821 A few actions concerning solemnization with adherence have been included in this category. 
822 The action brought by the Procurator Fiscal was brought on behalf of a wife against her former 
husband. 










TABLE 3: FREQUENCY OF CONSISTORIAL DECREETS WITH GENDER OF 
LITIGANTS, APRIL 1564 – JAN 1576/7.823 
 
           GENDER OF PURSUER 
         frequency         female   male   proc. fisc.824 
 
Freedom, Silence and Slander:825 16  2 14 0   
Solemnization826   52827  45 6 1 
Adherence:     18  13 5 0  
Aliment:    3  3 0 0 
Annulment:    8  4 1 3828 
Divorce for adultery:   73  38 35 0 
Divorce for non-adherence:  1  0 1 0 
Reduction of sentence of divorce: 2  2 0 0 
Reduction of sentence of solemnization: 1  0 1 0   
Tint:     3  0 3 0 
Bastardy:    9  (n/a) 
TOTAL: 186  107 66 4 
                                                 
823 Based on the data contained in Appendix II, C. 
824 i.e. those actions brought by the Procurator Fiscal of the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh. 
825 15 actions involving declarators of freedom and/or putting to silence; 1 action of slander involving 
an allegation of copula and promise of marriage. 
826 A few actions concerning solemnization with adherence have been included in this category. 
827 Including one action categorized as ‘solemnization and aliment’.  
828 One of the actions brought by the Procurator Fiscal was brought on behalf of a wife against her 
former husband. The other two were brought against an allegedly married couple. 


































































 Table 4 above contains several obvious points of interest. Actions for Scottish 
Protestant divorce on the grounds of adultery were by far the most popular 
consistorial action brought before the Commissaries of Edinburgh. This type of 
action accounted for 40% of all actions pursued during the sample periods (1564-
1569) and nearly 40% of all extant consistorial decreets pronounced between 1564-
1576/7. Actions for solemnization of an irregular marriage were the next most 
frequent, accounting for almost a fifth of all actions pursued during the sample 
                                                 
829 The statistics offered in tables 1-3 are summarized in tables 4 & 5. Various miscellaneous actions 
have been excluded. Bastardy actions were of course an infrequent occurence, actions for tint of 
tocher et donations propter nuptias were three a-typical actions which are discussed above, Chapter II 
§ V. Similarly, actions for reductions of sentences of divorce pronounced by the medieval Church or 
the Protestant Kirk were dealt with in Chapter II, §IV, [i] & Chapter VI, [ii] respectively. 
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periods (1564-1569) and over a quarter of all extant consistorial decreets pronounced 
between 1564-1576/7. Actions for adherence were the next most frequent, 
accounting for around 15% of all actions pursued during the sample periods (1564-
1569) and 10% of all extant consistorial decreets pronounced between 1564-1576/7. 
These three main types of action accounted for 73% of all consistorial litigation 
during the sample periods, and 77% of all extant consistorial decreets pronounced 
between 1564-1576/7. The three samples give a remarkably consistent picture.  
 
 
TABLE 5: GENDER OF PURSUER 
 
 All consistorial litigation   Consistorial Decreets   Consistorial Decreets 
            1564-1569            1564-1569           1564 - 1576/7 




















































































 Table 5 above also provides several obvious insights. The statistics for 
actions for divorce for adultery are remarkably clear, with the pursuer in any given 
action just as likely to be female as male. This equality in Scots law has already been 
noted for a later period,830 and had its origins in the Canon law.831 Scottish practice 
was in marked contrast to English: as Sellar has pointed out “only in 1923 were the 
sexes placed on an equal footing in English law”.832  
                                                 
830 The Lord Advocate, when pressed by a select committee in 1844 concerning the number of divorce 
actions brought by wives in Scotland stated that “I would say they are about as numerous as the 
others” [i.e. those brought by husbands] (Sellar, ‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 74).  
831 Scanlon, ‘Husband and Wife’, 71. 
832 Sellar, ‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 76. 
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Concerning actions involving promises of marriage it is clear that the pursuer 
was almost always male when it came to being declared free of a promise of 
marriage, or silencing a woman who was making allegations of promise of marriage. 
Conversely, the majority (85-87%) of actions for solemnization of irregular 
marriage, and a majority (71-74%) of actions for adherence were brought by women.  
 The statistics concerning promise of marriage are highly suggestive of the 
problems facing the late medieval Church and its policy of countenancing ‘non-
regular’ marriage. Indeed, it was quite clear at the Council of Trent that the Catholic 
Church was in fact perpetuating a social custom which it no longer needed to 
countenance nor accommodate. Accordingly, the Tridentine fathers chose to make 
‘clandestinity’, in the sense of ‘non-regularity’, an impediment to marriage, thereby 
giving the Canon law a strong propensity towards annulling all marriages contracted 
outside of the prescribed rituals of banns and solemnization. Yet in Reformation 
Scotland, the decrees of the Council of Trent were not accepted,833 and reasonably so 
from the Protestant perspective, given the various pronouncements of that Council 
concerning Protestant doctrine and indeed Protestant divorce.834 Yet nevertheless, the 
evidence concerning the gender of litigants in actions concerning ‘non-regular’ 
marriage at least suggests that the failure in Scotland to reform the law of marriage 
disadvantaged or failed to protect potentially vulnerable women. The extent to which 
this suggestion is true can be gauged by a more detailed consideration of actions for 











                                                 
833 “unhappily for the simplicity of the Scots law of marriage” (Ireland, ‘Husband and Wife: Post-
Reformation’, 86). 
834 i.e. Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ii, 754-755. 










ANALYSIS OF ACTIONS FOR SOLEMNIZATION: 
 PROBATION AND OUTCOMES835 
 
 Between April 1564 and January 1576/7, the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
pronounced 52 decreets as a direct result of actions brought for the solemnization of 
marriage. Of these 52 actions 6 are sufficiently exceptional that they need to be 
excluded from a general analysis of the outcomes of the remaining 46 actions for 
solemnization. In two of the excluded cases, the clerk’s entry in the Register of Acts 
and Decreets was wanting, and as such, whilst the tenor of the libel is known, the 
Commissaries’ judgement was not recorded.836 Ormiston v. Black involved a strong 
likelihood of collusion, whilst Dalmahoy v. Menteith certainly involved perjury on 
the part of the defender.837 In Kinross v. Loch & Weyland, the Procurator Fiscal 
actually failed (‘succumbed’) in probation. Finally in Goddiskirk v. Tenent the action 
shifted into an action for divorce on the ground of adultery, despite that fact that the 
libel held good.838 
 Of the 46 actions thus remaining the pursuer was female in 41 instances 
(89%) and male in the remaining 5 (11%). This division of litigation between female 
and male can be further broken down into the means by which each action was 
resolved together with its outcome. In most cases, actions for solemnization could 
only be resolved by admitting the libel to the pursuer’s probation. In these instances 
                                                 
835 Based on data in Appendix II, D (1), (2) and (3), which provides the full citations for the actions 
discussed below. 
836 Walker v. Kay and Danlielstoun v. Suyntoun. 
837 Both cases are discussed below presently. 
838 This action is discussed in more detail above, Chapter IV, §II, [i]. 
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the pursuer had two options only: either to attempt to lead probation themselves, 
through recourse to witnesses and written evidence, or to refer the libel to the oath of 
the defender. If the pursuer attempted to lead probation themselves, they could either 
succeed or succumb in probation, whilst if they referred the matter to the defender’s 




OUTCOME WHEN PURSUER MALE 
 
Probation:  3  succeeded:  1  succumbed:  2 
Oath:   2  granted:  0  denied:  2 
Total:  5 solemnize: 1  assoilized: 4 
 
OUTCOME WHEN PURSUER FEMALE 
 
 Three cases out of the 41 cases remaining where the pursuer was female need 
to be set aside. In Greve v. Eclis Katherine Greve failed to appear in court and pursue 
her action, leaving the Commissaries with no option but to assoilize the defender. In 
Arneill v. Williamsone the defender ‘confessed’ that the libel was true, seemingly 
before the libel was formally referred to his oath, the Commissaries decerning him to 
solemnize the union accordingly. In Kincaid v. Fairholme the pursuer libelled 
sponsalia per verba de futuro only, with no subsequent copula. The defender readily 
granted the promise, but intimated that he no longer wished to marry the pursuer, and 
the Commissaries duly assoilized him. The remaining 38 actions break down further 
as follows:   
 
Probation:   20 succeeded:  8  succumbed:  12 
Oath:    18 granted: 1   denied:  17 
Total:  38 solemnize: 9  assoilized: 29 
 
As can be seen, only in one action (Richartsoun v. Aikin) did the defender grant the 
promise (and as it happened the copula) when the matter was referred to his oath. Of 
the 17 denials of promise on oath, none of them can be demonstrated to have been 
perjury. Yet closer analysis of these instances as well as the 12 cases where the 
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pursuer succumbed in probation of the promise of marriage reveals an unhealthy 
inclination of the unreformed law against the interests of women which must have 
made a strong case for reform. Whilst there is direct evidence on one occasion only 
that the Commissaries were convinced that a male defender had committed perjury, 
they cannot have been reasonably satisfied that on the one hand so many woman 
tried to prove ‘non-regular’ marriages before them, and on the other hand so many 
failed. That this situation was allowed to continue suggests that the Commissaries 
believed that male Scottish litigants continued to take their great oaths seriously.   
 Those actions where a promise was denied on oath may be broken down 
further as follows:  
 
Denied on oath: 17 Copula also libelled:  16 Issue libelled: 10 
   Copula explicitly granted: 6 +1 839 Issue libelled:
 3+1 
   Copula explicitly denied: 1 Issue libelled: 1 
   Copula not mentioned: 8 Issue libelled: 5 
 
Succumbed:     12 Copula also libelled:   11 Issue libelled: 5 
 
 Quite clearly then, in only one instance (i.e. 1/17) where promise of marriage 
was denied on oath, was the promise per verba de praesenti.840 In every other 
instance (94%) the libel was sponsalia per verba de futuro subsequente copula, and 
in 62.5% of these cases is was libelled that the non-regular marriage had resulted in 
the procreation of children. Of course, it cannot be taken for granted that the children 
in the libel belonged to the defender,841 and in many instances this point of the libel 
was not the subject of judicial pronouncement. In 6 cases the defender granted 
copula on oath, whilst denying the promise, in one case denied the copula explicitly, 
and in a further 8 cases no clear statement regarding the alleged copula was recorded. 
Of course, the material point was the promise of marriage, without which copula 
alone was fornication.  
                                                 
839 In 6 instances the copula was granted on oath, but in a seventh, the copula had already been granted 
by the defender before the Kirk (Clerk v. Auchinlek). 
840 Carpentyne v. Syme. 
841 It is unlikely that the issue were fictitious, since the existence of children could readily be verified: 
the problem was one of proof of parentage. 
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In 3 of these 6 cases where irregular marriage with issue was libelled, the 
defender, whilst under oath, denied the promise but granted the copula. In two of 
these cases the alleged issue of the union had in fact been baptized in the name of the 
defender, which naturally inclined the defender to grant the copula, thereby 
acknowledging his children, since the verity of the oath could subsequently be 
verified by the Procurator Fiscal through recourse to the parish minister who had 
preformed the baptism(s). In Barclay v. Ewiot Helene Barclay plainly libelled that 
the defender had “begat vpoun hir ane sone baptezit in his name and at his command 
callit Robert Ewiot”. Similarly in Andersoun v. Gudlad Marion Anderson libelled 
that the she and the defender had “had carnall daill togidder be the space of diuers 
zeiris be procreatioun of tua wemen children the ane thairof callit Helene Gudlad and 
the vther callit Katherine bayth baptizat in the said Dauidis name”. On both 
occasions the women alleged that copulation had proceeded upon a promise of 
marriage per verba de futuro. The men, in denying the promises of marriage on oath, 
exposed their acknowledged lovers to the approbation of Kirk and community as 
whores, and compounded the precarious situation of their offspring by adding the 
stigma of illegitimacy. This seems at least dishonourable, since even if the promises 
of marriage were not of verity, the men could still have married the women they had 
procreated children with, saving them from the discipline of the Kirk, whilst 
legitimating their children per subsequens matrimonium. Similar conclusions apply 
in the third case, Wilsone v. Stowman, where, despite the absence of the mention of 
any public acknowledgement of the couples’ daughter by the defender at baptism, the 
defender nevertheless granted the copula. It seems somehow strange to grant copula 
with the subsequent issue, whilst simultaneously bastardizing that issue. 
 
The cases where the pursuer succumbed in probation also yield further points 
if interest under closer scrutiny. In 8 of the 12 instances, it was libelled that the 
promise of marriage had been before ‘divers famous witnesses’ or the equivalent, or 
that the promise had subsequently been acknowledged before some such group of 
persons.842 Naturally, the expectation was that the famous witnesses would be 
forthcoming and would depone on oath, and as such it was reasonable that the 
pursuers attempted to prove their libel without referring to the defender’s oath. Yet in 
4 of the 12 instances, the libel makes no mention of witnesses to the promise, which 
                                                 
842 For ‘famous witnesses’ see above, page 174, n. 137.  
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suggests that on these occasions the pursuer erred in not referring the matter to the 
defender’s oath.843 In 2 of the 8 instances it seemed reasonable for the pursuer to 
have attempted probation by witnesses, since the baptism of the issue resulting from 
the couples’ copula had been mentioned explicitly. Thus in Ker v. Williamsoun the 
defender had allegedly refused “to present his said barne to the kirk tobe baptissat,” 
which suggests that the defender had been alive to the legal consequences of such a 
public acknowledgment of parentage: the decreet relays simply that the pursuer 
succumbed in probation without giving further particulars. In Bischope v. Fynlaw it 
was alleged that the promise of marriage had been made “in presence of diuers 
famous witneses” and that the issue of their copula “was baptest in his [the 
defender’s] name at his desire callit Thomas Fynlaw”. There must have been a 
reasonable chance of proving the non-regular marriage libelled, since if true, the 
pursuer’s legal position could only have been augmented by the production of a 
marriage contract and an instrument made by a notary present at the exchange of 
promises. Nevertheless, the pursuer succumbed in probation, although it is unclear 
why. 
 Whilst it seems likely that early Scots consistorial law, in that it retained un-
reformed the medieval Canon law approach concerning ‘non-regular’ marriages, 
rendered woman more vulnerable to being abandoned by their alleged husbands, to 
the detriment not only of themselves but also their illegitimate children, there is only 
one case in which it is certain that a man perjured himself on oath by denying a 
promise of marriage, and one other in which a woman passed from her libel, the 
Commissaries suspecting collusion.  
In the first case, Dalmahoy v. Menteith, the defender was assoilized from an 
allegation of promise of marriage with subsequent copula by “his declaratioun gevin 
thairupoun being with consent of the said Marioun [pursuer] referrit thairto”. 
Nevertheless, the pursuer’s procurator, Master Thomas Weston immediately 
“protestit that the said decreit be nocht preiudiciall to oure souerane Lady anent the 
actioun quhilk hir grace may haue aganis the saidis parteis844 and requirit Maister 
Henrie Kinross procuratour fischale to oure soverane Lady to insist in persute 
thairof”.845 Within a month, the Procurator Fiscal brought an action of adherence 
                                                 
843 Bell v. Wardroper, Denis v. Brysoun, Reid v. Romanois, Reidho(ch)t v. Robesone. 
844 The earliest extant [but not the initial] diet is NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 21v, 14 May 1565. 
845 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 424r, 7 April 1565 [note: 1564 in Register, but this is an error]. 
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against the couple, appointing Master Thomas Weston as his deputy.846 As part of his 
defence against this second process, Menteath produced “ane decreit absoluitour fra 
the said Marionis libell of adherence”, by which may be understood the decreet 
pronounced in the earlier action of solemnization.847 Unfortunately, the outcome of 
the action is not known, since if a decreet was pronounced it has been lost in 
Danelourt’s Registers.848 Yet despite this frustration, the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
and their Procurator Fiscal must have had serious grounds for believing that 
Menteath had perjured himself. 
In the second case, Ormistoun v. Blak, the pursuer alleged promise of 
marriage per verba de futuro following which, in a rare first person narration, Beatrix 
Ormiston alleged that “I gaif to the said John the vse of my bodie quhilk he hes 
possessit at all tymes at his pleser sensyn thairby hes begottin me with child”. 
Nevertheless, the Commissaries assoilized the defender from the allegation because 
having admitted the allegation to Beatrix’s probation, she compeared before the 
Commissaries and declared that “scho had na probatioun to deduce thairvpoun & 
wald pas to849 the said actioun”. The Commissaries suspected collusion between the 
litigants and therefore “refferrit the said promeis of mariage to the Johnnis850 aith 
quha being suorne denyit the same simpliciter as was cleirlie knawin to the saidis 
Commissaris”. Thus, whilst the defender was assoilized on the strength of his oath, 
the Commissaries suspected that the pursuer had been persuaded to connive at such 
an outcome.851    
 The actions for solemnization brought before the Commissaries during the 
period under consideration illustrate one of the shortcomings of the late medieval 
Canon law and its continued countenance in early Scots consistorial law. Whilst 
                                                 
846 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 21v, 14 May 1565, Procuratour Fischale v. Menteith & Dalmahoy. 
847 NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 27r, 18 May 1565. Actions for solemnization could also be classed as actions 
for adherence, for example when the defender was also not only refusing to solemnize a union, but 
was refusing to live with the spouse to whom they were non-regularly married (see NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 
250r, 27 November 1564, Scott v. Robesoun, being a decreet of solemniztion next to which the clerk 
had written ‘Adherence’). 
848 The two year lacunae occasioned by Danelourt’s clerkship began several folios after the last know 
interlocutor (NAS, CC8/2/2, fo 134v) pronounced in the action of adherence brought by the 
Procurator Fiscal. 
849 fra would make more sense in the context, but is not in the MS. 
850 No antecedent said. 
851 NAS, CC8/2/7, fo. 60v, 9 February 1574/5.  
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there are few explicit examples of defenders perjuring themselves or using other 
unjust means to extricate themselves from non-regular marriages, that fact that so 
many actions for solemnization were brought by women and that so many failed does 
suggest that the law required reform. That is not to say that the male litigants 
involved in these cases were necessarily knaves or that the women involved all were 
trying to ensnare innocent men into marriage. Rather, it is surprising that the 




LENGTH OF LITIGATION, EXPENSES OF THE PLEA  
AND EMPLOYMENT OF PROCURATORS 
 
[i] LENGTH OF LITIGATION IN EXTANT CONSISTORIAL ACTIONS, 
BEGINNING BETWEEN APRIL 1564 AND JUNE 1569 
 
 From the data available, where both the date of the initial diet and the date of 
decreet are known, the following statistics may be offered.852 The length of litigation 
is given in days.853 
 
Freedom and Silence 1,1,12  
Solemnization  416, 3, 1, 113, 1,1, 195, 42, 47, 58, 90, 222, 218, 239, 43 
Adherence  421, 300, 676, 1 
Aliment  1,1 
Annulment  47, 547, 169, 113 
Divorce for adultery 31, 698, 300, 310, 248, 63, 72, 434, 107, 10, 374, 31, 306 
Bastardy  429 
Tint of Tocher etc 218, 239, 43  
 
Reduction of Kirk’s 
sentence of divorce 121 
                                                 
852 The data here summarized may be found in Appendix II, E.  
853 Inclusive of the first and last day of the process; Scotland then using the Julian calendar, February 
having 29 days in 1564 (Calendar of State Papers, foreign series, of the reign of Elizabeth, vii, 67) 
and 1568. Actions highlighted in bold are those which encompassed the period of severe plague 
during the winter of 1568/9. 
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Reduction of pre- 
Reformation sentence  
of divorce  1406 
  
What is at once clear is that actions involving freedom, silence, solemnization, 
adherence and aliment all had the potential to be resolved at a single diet. Where 
terms of probation were required, litigation could clearly take some time. Actions for 
solemnization of an irregular union took 113 days on average, or 83 days if the two 
actions affected by the plague during the winter of 1568/9 are excluded. Actions for 
Scottish Protestant divorce for adultery were only once resolved within a month, and 
took 230 days on average, or 209 days in the two ‘plague’ actions are excluded. For 
all the consistorial litigation above, the average number of days for a process to be 
led was 200,854 whilst the average excluding the action for the reduction of the pre-
Reformation sentence of divorce (being somewhat a-typical at 1406 days), was 174 
days.855  
 Taken all together there were 47 actions during the sample period whose 
length of litigation is known. Of these the following may be said: 
 
      total      cumulative total 
Resolved in one day:    8 (17%)  8 (17%) 
Resolved in 31 days or less:   5 (11%)  13 (28%) 
Resolved in 3 months (92 days) or less: 9 (20%)  22 (47%) 
Resolved in 6 months (183 days) or less: 5 (9%)   27 (57%) 
Resolved in 1 years or less:   11 (24%)  38 (81%) 
Resolved in two years or less   8 (17%)  46 (98%) 
 
These statistics demonstrate that even for complex litigation the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh got through business at a reasonable rate. It is difficult to ascertain if this 
was an improvement on the record of the Officials’ Courts. Although Ollivant 
estimated “an average duration per contested action of between 14 and 35 days”, 
thereby bringing into question the accuracy of Lindsay’s satirical criticisms, he still 
                                                 
854 9416 days/47. 
855 8013 days/46. If the five ‘plague’ actions are also excluded, the average is further reduced to 157 
days (i.e. 6418 days/41).  
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thought these “academic figures should be treated with caution”.856 This caution is 
well advised, since the records had furnished Ollivant with very few examples of 
case were the initial and final diet were known. As such, he had had recourse to 
estimating the average number of diets per case and the average number of days 
between each diet, which method generates figures of limited value. 
It is difficult to gauge popular attitudes towards the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh. Helmholz has quite rightly drawn attention to “the grousing that is the 
common lot of lawyers in most ages” together with the fact that “it is rare for courts 
of any kind to be the object of affection among the populace”.857 As such, the 
question of popularity can be an awkward issue: in the British context the leaven of 
Mr. Sentimentality 858 still may be regularly observed among the middle classes.  
Yet despite the fact that data concerning the length of litigation in consistorial actions 
before the Commissaries is not in itself conclusive, there is ample evidence from the 
Registers of the Acts and Decreets that the Commissaries of Edinburgh were indeed 
popular with litigants of humbler means where small debt actions were concerned. 
Thus a cursory analysis of CC8/2/1 demonstrates that fleshers, cordinars, baxters,859 
cowpers, cutlers, “bonat” makers,860 listars,861 tailors,862 apothecaries,863 surgeons,864 
merchants, burgesses, farmers, gardeners,865 smiths,866 and a mariner867 all used the 
                                                 
856 Court of the Official, 145. 
857 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 301. 
858 Trollope’s lampoon against Dickens. 
859 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 285r, Hog v. Wauchop. 
860 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 151r, Young v. Litill. 
861 That is to say dyers, NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 211r-v, Hoppringle v. Meldrum;  
862 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 220r, Broun v. Sundrie Personis; fo. 269v, Patersoun v. Sundrie Personis. 
863 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 175v, Bog v. Sundrie Personis; fo. 203r, Diksoun v. Sundrie Personis; fo. 231r-
v, Diksoun v. Sundrie Personis; fo. 285r, Diksoun v. Ramsay. 
864 NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 188v-189r, Libertoun (barbour) v. Sundrie Personis, including three payments 
for mending and curing men’s legs (4 merks, 30s. and 10s. respectively) with 5s. for mending a fourth 
man’s arm; also CC8/2/1, fo. 192r-v, Craig v. Sundrie Personis, including sums for the “curing and 
mending of [a defender’s] wife” and also “for mending of ane boy”; fo. 228v, Hardy (chyrurgiane) v. 
Allaine; fo. 268v, Gray (chirurgiane) v. Falcone, for £5 for mending and curing the defenders 
shoulder and fingers; fo. 382r, Wentoun v. Walker – Wentoun was not called a surgeon explicitly, but 
sought 19s. in total for “heling the heid of George Williamsonnis”. 
865 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 161v, Methesoun v. Hammyltoun. 
866 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 213r, Hendirsoun v. Sundrie Personis, the pursuer being a “loksmyth”, one 
of the defenders being a “buke bindar” (Robert Lekprevik). 
867 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 367v, Skeith, mariner in Leyth v. Galloway. 
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court regularly, seeking the delivery or return of, or payment for, items such as 
“quhingaris”,868 “ane hand aix”,869 a chain mail coat,870 “ane Jedburt staff”,871 
“daggis”,872 oxen,873 sheep,874 cows,875 hens, rabbits,876 horses,877 wool and fleeces, 
meat, wine,878 ale,879 bread,880 cheese,881 grains, cereals and legumes of all 
descriptions, timber,882 bolls of “dung aik bark”,883 hides,884 gold,885 silver, “sylver 
spvnis”,886 francs,887 ducats, nobils, drugs,888 candles, coals, cloths, cloaks, 
bonnets,889 doublets,890 shoes, wainscot pannelling,891 iron work,892 and even the 
                                                 
868 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 120r, 25 July, 1564, Ka v. Thomson. 
869 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 379r, Megot v. Craig. 
870 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 121v, 26 July, 1564, Cor v. Lors. 
871 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 23r-v, 16 May, 1564, Auld v. Sundrie Personis. 
872 NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 221r, 5 December, 1567, Freich v. Spens. ‘Daggis’ were heavy pistols or hand 
guns. 
873 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 28r, 19 May, 1564, Chirnside v. Chirnsyde for “ane litill black pleuch ox”. Also 
fo. 187v, Moffett v. Frog for payment for two oxen; fo. 401r, Broun v. Hendirsoun. 
874 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 361v, Craig v. Megot, seeking monies owed for “iiij wedderis”. 
875 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 327v, Sam(per)soun v. Ingoun. 
876 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 395r, Bellenden v. Auchmowtie, “twentie tua schillingis for certane cunnyngis 
cost and ressavit”. 
877 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 221v, Duncane v Duncane, 5 marks for “ane quhite meir”; fo. 232r, Cuthill v. 
Patersoun, 9 marks for “ane quhite horss”; fo. 236v, Aitkin v. Andersone; fo. 385r, Aikman v. Wilsoun, 
30s. for “ane quhite meir”. 
878 For example, NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 190r, Murdestoun v. Smyth, for £13 owing for “sevin punscheonis 
of wyne”, immediately followed by Smyth v. Murdestoun, for delivery of “xij gallonis of wyne”, 
Murdestoun being assoilized since the 12 gallons were “lekcagewyne”; fo. 192v, Gilbert v. Sundrie 
Personis, makes mention of monies owed for the delivery of ane “punscheoun of dreggis”; fo. 202r, 
Cowy v. Mortoun, “ane tvn of claret wyne”; fo. 361v, Vduard v. Marioribankis;   
879 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 192v, Cosair v. Hesalhop. 
880 NAS, CC8/2/1. fo. 194v, Newtoun v. Sauchy & Hintoun. 
881 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 271r, Creichtoun, Vicar of Innerwik v. Sundrie Personis. 
882 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 192v, Gilbert v. Sundrie. 
883 Presumably for tanning, NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 258r, Godrell v. Sandersoun and Broun. Indeed, fo. 
266r, Goss v. Sundrie Personis, payment for “barkit leddr” was sought. 
884 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 421v, Huntar v. Michell (cordinar), for £5/15s being the price of 14 “barkit 
hydis”. 
885 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 215r, Wilsoun v. Wilsoun, desiring the delivery of “ane signet of gold”. 
886 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 179r, Stakar v. Fergusone. 
887 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 299r, McGauchane v. Lindesay. 
888 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 175v, Bog v. Sundrie Personis; fo. 203r, Diksoun v. Sundrie Personis. 
889 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 178v, Dik v. Robesoun. The “blak bonet” had cost 14 shillings. The litigants had 
registered an act to this effect in the “court buks of Edinburgh”, but it having been subsequently 
deleted, Robeson was still willing to pay the sum. 
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monies owing for the hire of “ane fedder bed”.893 Whilst these were not ‘consistorial’ 
actions, they occurred in the same court before the same judges and strongly suggest 
that the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh was not commonly held to be a 
hotbed of procrastinating judges and shysters, stringing out litigation for sordid gain. 
Within this general context of ‘popularity’, the Commissaries’ record in 
lengthier actions appears more reasonable. Half of the consistorial actions analysed 
above were despatched within 3 months and the majority within a year. In addition, 
for every consistorial action that lasted over a year, one was despatched in one day 
(using summary procedure and relying on probation by oath, as was the case, it may 
be noted, in most small debt actions). It is interesting to note that 57% of consistorial 
actions were resolved within 6 months (183 days), whilst the average length of 
litigation was around six months (174 days, or 200 with the inclusion of the a-typical 
action of reduction noted above). On the face of it these figures seem quite 
reasonable given that the Commissaries employed the high standards of proof 
required by the Romano-canonical procedure in the examination of witnesses and 
documents, and given that they had to summon and examine witnesses, litigants and 
‘havers’ from all over the realm: the problems attending travel in early modern 
Scotland, especially during the winter months should not be underestimated.894 It 
should also be born in mind that the period under consideration included the winter 
of 1568/9 during which Edinburgh suffered one of the worst outbreaks of plague in 
its history.895 That the Commissaries of Edinburgh had been commissioned with a 
national jurisdiction in all consistorial matters was ambitious; that they administered 
it efficiently is remarkable.    
                                                                                                                                          
890 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 326v, Andersoun v. Hammyltoun, defender to deliver “ane dowblat of poildany 
[cloth of high Dutchland, DOST, VI, 29, ‘Polonia’] extending to sex quarteris with ane frenche blak 
bonat” or else 30s. 
891 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 43v, 5 June, 1564, Birny v. Gourlay; fo. 281v, Rynd v. Kinloch, “wanscot 
burdis”. 
892 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 361r, Smyth v. Danyelstoun. £5/4s/6d for “irne wark”. 
893 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 136v, 3 August, 1564, Todrik v. McGawchane. Also unusual was CC8/2/1, fo. 
220r, Jak v. Kiltra for £12 owing for the fostering of a child for two years; fo. 268v, Flakar v. 
Fergusoun, for “ane pot of brass weyand half ane stane”. 
894 In Dougalsoun v, Kirkpatrick the pursuer had the greatest difficulty reporting a commission which 
had been directed to the Commissary of Wigtown on account of the “continewale storme of wedder 
notourlie knawin to the saidis commissaris” on account of which the pursuer had not had “fair access 
to this burgh [i.e. Edinburgh]” (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 380r, 5 March 1564/5). 
895 J.F.D. Shrewsbury, A History of Bubonic Plague in the British Isles (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1971), 206-209. 
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[ii] EXPENSES OF THE PLEA 
 
 The instructions of 12 March 1563/4 given to the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
by the Lords of Council and Session stated “that all expensis be taxt and insert in the 
principal decrete, or sentence, and the precept to be direct out, for execution of the 
sentence, beirand to poind, als weill for the saidis expensis, as for the principal 
sowme”.896 Whilst this instruction was likely directed at decreets pronounced in 
small debt actions, it is frustrating that its principle was not regularly extended to 
consistorial decreets. Out of the 186 extant consistorial decreets pronounced between 
the appointment of the Commissaries and the winter of 1576/7 only eight (less than 
one in twenty) recorded the expenses of the plea, whilst a further two noted that a 
party had been assoilized from them.897 Among these eight actions three were actions 
for Scottish Protestant divorce on the grounds of adultery, four were actions of 
bastardy and one was an action for solemnization. In the three divorce actions the 
expenses of the plea (in Scots) were 10 marks (£6/13s/4d),898 £4899 and 40 marks 
(£26/13s/4d).900 In the four bastardy actions the expenses of the plea were £10,901 
£12,902 £12903 and £60.904 In the action for solemnization the expenses of the plea 
were £5.905 
 Although the sample group is small, taken all together this data indicates that 
the average expense of plea was £17/-/1d Scots.906 If the a-typical sum of £60 is 
                                                 
896 Balfour’s Practicks, i, 658, item xii. 
897 The latter two cases were NAS, CC8/2/3, fos. 287v-288r, 28 April 1569, Murray v. Symsone and 
NAS, CC8/2/8, fos. 236v-237r, 21 July 1576, Murray v. Bruce. In the Courts of the Officials a diet ad 
taxandum could be  set followed the pronouncing of sentence “but this does not always appear nor, 
when it does, do we always find that the actual sum was written down” (Court of the Official, 117). 
898 NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 25r-v, 5 May 1568, Makcanzie v. Makgillechallum. 
899 NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 9v, 27 April 1568, Wrycht v. Drippis. 
900 NAS, CC8/2/6, fos. 445r-446v, 22 July 1574, Drummound v. Campbell. 
901 NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 167v-168v, 28 February 1569/70, Carnis v. Kennedye. 
902 NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 76v-77v, 15 November 1569, Mortoun v. Mortoun. 
903 NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 272r-273r, 27 April 1570, Dury & Lummisden v. Cokburne. 
904 A summons of error had been raised before the Lords of Session for the reduction of a retour 
proceeding upon a brieve of inquest, on the grounds of bastardy, that question being remitted to the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh (NAS, CC8/2/8, fos. 259v-260r, 31 July 1576, Bartane v. Richesoun). 
905 NAS, CC8/2/8, fos. 154v-155r, 15 May 1576, Denis v. Brysoun. 
906 i.e. £136/6s/8d divided into eight equals £17/0s/1d (with a bodle left over). 
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omitted, the more reasonable average of £10/18s/1d is arrived at.907 Yet near £11 was 
still a hefty sum by the standards of the day, and certainly not to be endured by poor 
litigants.908  
 Yet where the expenses of the plea were recorded for relatively complex 
litigation, they were usually substantial, even in non-consistorial actions. For 
example in an action for the reduction of a decreet pronounced by the Commissary of 
Glasgow concerning a marriage contract, the pursuers were awarded £10 expenses of 
the plea,909 whilst in an action before the Commissaries of Edinburgh concerning the 
payment of a dowry, the defender was ordained to pay the tocher (£40) and 8 marks 
(£5/6s/8d) expenses of the plea.910 These figures are similar to those mentioned 
above. 
 It is difficult to know if litigants felt overwhelmed by such costs. For contrast, 
it may be noted that the expenses of the plea in summary actions for small debts were 
often noted. Here the expenses of the plea clearly made the court accessible, being 
between 2 shillings911 and rising to around 8s/4d,912 with 4 to 6 shillings being very 
common.913 On occasions when a number of persons were pursued in the same 
action the expense of plea could be divided between the defenders.914 Since litigants 
                                                 
907 i.e. £76/6s/8d divided into seven equals £10/18s/1d (with one penny left over). This seems very 
high compared to the limited figures offered by Ollivant for the Officials Court in the 1540s and ‘50s, 
of between 19 to 50 shillings (Court of the Official, 147). Sellar has noted the cost of divorce actions 
in Scotland in 1843 (see ‘Canon Law and Scots Law’, 75).  
908 £10 was the entire sum paid to John Brown, keeper of the seals of the commissariot of Edinburgh 
for his half-yearly stipend (NAS, CS4/6, ‘Accounts of the Collectors of the Quots 1566-1567’, fo. 6v). 
909 NAS, CC8/2/7, fos. 106v-108v, 22 March 1574/5, Kincaid v. Striviling. 
910 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 165r, 21 August 1564, Myllar v. Nicole. 
911 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 66r, Inglis v. Wedderspvne, 2s; fo. 72r-v, 21st June, 1564, Andersoun v. 
Lowrestoun, 32 d in this case.  
912 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 72r, 21 June, 1564, Smyth v. Bonkill. 8 shillings or more was fairly unusual - 
this action had involved the production of an act registered between the litigants, which undoubtedly 
increased the costs incurred by the pursuer. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 66r-v, 19 June, 1564, Hoppringle v. 
Hoppringle, expense of pley 8 shillings; fo. 147r, 10 August 1564, Myllar v. Drummound, the 
exceptional sum of 13s/4d was awarded to the pursuer for the expense of pley, but the sum of £40 was 
involved and the defender had clearly defaulted payment several times and broken his pledge and 
oath. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 163 Gibsoun v. Lauder, defender ordained to pay £20 for the principal 
“togidder with threttene shillingis foure pennies for expenssis of the pley”.  
913 i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 42v, Dewar v. Liddale, 4s; fo. 53v, Broun v. Howden, 4s; fo. 58r, Lauder v. 
Young, 4s; fo. 66r, Inglis v. Thomsoun, 4s; fo. 74v, Dowgall v. Howden, 5s; fo. 64r, Vduard v. 
Patersoun, 6s; fo. 65v, Seytoun v. Lady Yester, 6s/8d. 
914 i.e. NAS CC8/2/1, fo. 145r, 9 August, 1564, Thomson v. Sundrie Personis, expense of plea split 3 
shillings and 2 shilling. 
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would represent themselves and since the costs of the plea were reasonable,915 the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh were readily accessible to those who brought grievances 
before them.916 There is one piece of evidence which suggests that expenses of the 
plea in summary consistorial actions were about the same as those in small debt 
actions: in an action arising out of the staying of the banns, the stayer was ordained 
to pay 6s/8d expenses of the plea.917 
In the ‘consistorial’ actions mentioned above, the litigants seemed able to 
pay. In the divorce actions, those found guilty of adultery were “Gillechallum 
Makgillechallum of Rasar” (10 marks), “Johne Drippis tailzeour in Glasgow” (£4) 
and “Duncan Campbell of Glenlyon” (40 marks). Both Macgillichallum of Raasay 
and Campbell of Glenlyon were clearly lairds.918 In the bastardy actions, all of which 
had been remitted to the Commissaries following objections to brieves of inquest, the 
expenses of the plea were to be paid by those who had made allegations of bastardy 
to those decerned legitimate by the Commissaries: they were “Jonet Carnis nevoy & 
air to vmquhile Williame Carnis of Orchartoun” (£10), “James Mortoun sone 
lauchfull to vmqle Alexander Mortoun of Randerstoun” (£12), “James Dury and 
Elizabeth Lumisden relict of vmquhile Johne Cokburne of Newtoun” (£12) and 
“Helene Bartane and George Maw induallaris in Leith” (£60). The first three were all 
related to landholders or principal tenants. There are no indications of the social 
status of those involved in the action for solemnization. 
The limited evidence from consistorial decreets suggest that when noted, the 
expenses of the pleas in plenary actions averages the substantial sum of nearly £11, 
but the evidence does suggest that the majority of those ordained to pay such sums 
were people with access to landed wealth. In addition, it should be noted that such 
expenses of the plea may not have borne a direct relation to the actual costs of the 
litigation. Rather, as Helmholz has argued for the English ecclesiastical courts,919 
expenses of the plea may have been employed by the Commissaries to correct and 
                                                 
915 Sometimes the relatively trifling sums of five of six shillings could be sought, hardly suggestive 
that the expenses of such actions were high (i.e. NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 177v, Smyth v. Sprot). 
916 Small debt actions are by far the most common entry in the Registers of Acts and Decreets, there 
being in excess of 500 such actions in CC8/2/1 alone.  
917 The entry comes from the ‘Hamilton and Campsie’ Acts and Decreets, NAS, CC10/1/1, fo 123v, 9 
February 1564/5, Zoung v. Richie. 
918 ‘of such and such a place’ indicated that a person held land in free barony, whilst ‘in such and such 
a place’ indicated that a person was a principal tenant. 
919 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 347-348. 
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punish wealthy litigants who made allegations they were subsequently unable to 
substantiate. In this respect, hefty expenses of the plea may actually have been a 
device by which litigants were discouraged from bringing frivolous actions or 
making spurious defences for the sake dragging out litigation. Conversely, the fact 
that more than 95% of consistorial decreets made no mention of the expenses of the 
plea may reflect the fact that the Commissaries did not award such costs if they felt 
the loosing party had nevertheless had reasonable cause for litigating.920 Of course 
this does not alter the fact that litigating before the Commissaries did cost money at 
each stage, but in this respect it should be noted that a list of fixed prices was passed 
to the Commissaries shortly after their appointment.921 Such lists were known in the 
Courts of the Officials922 and must have been intended to limit the fees that could be 
paid at each step of litigation. Similar attempts to fix the cost of litigation can be 
found in the English ecclesiastical courts.923  
The expenses of the plea for such plenary consistorial actions is in marked 
contrast to the relatively inexpensive924 5 shillings or thereabouts regularly incurred 
in summary actions, the majority of which were resolved by great oaths. It is also 
clear that the poorest litigants were not expected to incur costs from the court in the 
first place. In an action of annulment it would seem that the sentence silver was 
waived for a poor litigant,925 whilst in an action for Scottish Protestant divorce for 
adultery the pursuer alleged “him self tobe ane pover man not habile to insist in 
persute of his just actioun and thairfoir and in respect that the saidis personis and 
vtheris quha knawis best the veritie of the said mater duellis within the jurisdictioun 
of Dunblane desiring ane commissioun tobe direct to the commissar of Dunblane for 
the examiniatioun of the said personis”.926 The Commissaries duly granted the 
                                                 
920 As was the practice in English ecclesiastical courts (Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 348). 
921 Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 661-662. 
922 The details of which do not survive, but which were certainly part of the Church reforms of 1549 
(Court of the Official, 63). 
923 Helmholz, Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, 300. 
924 To set the sum of 5 shillings in context, a witness who sought to be modified expenses for 
travelling to Edinburgh to depone, and who swore that he had no other business in the burgh, was 
awarded 6 shillings per day to cover the cost of maintaining himself, a horse and a boy for a total of 9 
days of travelling (NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 248v-249r, 25 November 1564). 
925 The clerk wrote gratis paupercula in the margin (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 247v, 25 November 1564, 
Paislie v. Haistie). 
926 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo 403r, 23 March 1564/5, Malard v. Reid. 
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commission in conformity with the charter of constitution by which they had been 
appointed.927      
 Whilst there can be no doubt that plenary actions before the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh could be complex and incur considerable costs for those pursuing and 
defending such actions, it does not appear that poor litigants were thereby excluded 
from seeking remedies for their grievances before the Commissaries of Edinburgh. 
On the contrary, the Commissaries’ discretionary use of summary procedure 
provided a fast and cheap means of dispensing justice even to those who were poor, 
illiterate and unaided by men of law. 
[iii] PURSUER’S AND DEFENDER’S USE OF PROCURATORS IN 
CONSISTORIAL LITIGATION, APRIL 1564 TO JUNE 1569. 
 
The frequency of consistorial litigation has already been summarized, but for those 
actions occurring between April 1564 and June 1569 the following statistics may be 
given concerning litigants’ use of procurators. The statistics are based on those 
actions where a man of law was explicitly named in the Registers of Acts and 
Decreets as being a litigant’s procurator for at least one diet in for any given case. 
 
         frequency pursuer928 defender929 both930 
 
Freedom, Silence and Slander: 5 1 (20%) 1 (20%) -  
Solemnization (occasionally with Adherence): 27 14 (52%) 11 (41%) 10 (37%) 
Adherence:     19  13 (68%) 10 (53%) 9 (47%) 
Aliment:    3 -  1 (33%) - 
Annulment:    11 5 (45%) 6 (55%) 4 (36%) 
Divorce for adultery:   57 35 (61%) 20 (35%) 14 (25%) 
Reduction of sentence of divorce: 8 931  6 (75%) 4 (50%) 3 (37.5%) 
                                                 
927 See Appendix I, clause [5]. 
928 The data upon which these figure are based is provided in Appendix II, F (1). 
929 The data upon which these figure are based is provided in Appendix II, F (2). 
930 That is to say, actions were it is known that both the pursuer and defender used at least one 
procurator at at least one diet. The names of such cases have been highlighted in Appendix II, F (1) by 
italicizing the relavant case names, and can be verified by searching for the corresponding case names 
in Appendix II, F (2).   
931 5 pre-Reformation definitive sentences of divorce, 3 sentences of divorce pronounced by the 
Protestant Kirk. 
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Bastardy:    5 2 (40%) 1 (20%) 1 (20%) 
Tint:     3 3 (100%) 2 (67%) 1 (33%) 
Retrospective Declarator of Divorce: 1 1  1   - 
Expenses having obtained decreet of adherence:  1 1  1   1 (100%) 
Separation:    1 -  -   - 
 
TOTAL: 141 81 (57%) 58 (41%) 43 (30%) 
 
Whilst the procurators of the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh have already 
been discussed in general terms in Chapter II,932 these statistics allow a limited 
insight into their use by litigants in consistorial actions. The general totals show that 
procurators tended to be used by pursuers (57%) more than by defenders (41%), 
whilst procurators were used by both parties in less than a third of the actions heard 
by the Commissaries. Conversely, it may be said that in 43% of consistorial actions 
the pursuer never933 compeared before the Commissaries with a procurator whose 
name was recorded in the registers, and that in 59% of consistorial actions the 
defender never compeared before the Commissaries with a procurator. Of the main 
consistorial actions, actions for adherence seems to have involved the greatest use of 
procurators, whilst actions for solemnization and for Scottish Protestant divorce seem 




DOMICILE AND SOCIAL STATUS 
 
[i] DOMICILE OF LITIGANTS IN CONSISTORIAL LITIGATION,  
APRIL 1564 TO JUNE 1569 
 
 The map on the next page concerning the domicile of litigants has been based 
upon those entries in the Registers of Acts and Decreets for the sample period where 
the domicile of a litigant was explicitly stated and where the place-name given has 
been positively identified and located. As such, whilst the data upon which the map 
                                                 
932 See above, Chapter II, §II, [vi]. 
933 As far as the records note. 
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has been based is not exhaustive, it does provide a good idea of the practical reach of 
the Commissaries’ national consistorial jurisdiction.934 Each place-name has been 
recorded for each pursuer or defender, whether in the same or different actions. 
Where several different litigants came from the same place, the frequency had been 
noted in brackets next to the place-name. A (2) next to a more unlikely place-name 
may only indicate a litigating couple from the same place. 
 
                                                 
934 The data is summarized in Appendix II, G (1) and G (2). It should be noted that further data could 
be collected from the consistorial decreets pronounced from April 1564 to the winter of 1576/7 for 
comparative purposes, but that this has not been undertaken for this thesis. 
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[ii] SOCIAL STATUS OF PURSUERS AND DEFENDERS IN CONSISTORIAL 
LITIGATION, APRIL 1564 TO JUNE 1569935 
 
 In general terms it is clear that the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh 
was used by persons from every kind of social background. The popularity of the 
court in the resolution of small debt actions has already been noted in detail. Added 
to this was the fact that executors of the greater testaments for the whole kingdom, as 
well as the lesser testaments within the Commissariot of Edinburgh regularly 
appeared in the court, whilst the Commissaries’ national jurisdiction in disputes over 
rights and titles to Scottish benefices and their local jurisdiction relating to 
ecclesiastical revenues brought the full range of ecclesiastical dignitaries to the 
court.936 The cost of litigation was also clearly not prohibitive, being as little as 4 
shillings, although in more complex actions the expenses of the plea could be in 
excess of £10 Scots. 
 In consistorial litigation for the period from the Commissaries’ appointment 
to the summer of 1569, a range of relatively distinguished persons appeared before 
the Commissaries. Notable pursuers included four ladies, two daughters of earls, the 
daughter of a lady, a knight, the widow of a knight, the son of a knight, two 
daughters of knights, a Lord of Session, three burgesses (two of Edinburgh, one of 
“Cowpar”937), the daughter of a burgess of Edinburgh, the daughter of a skipper 
living in Leith, a “fermorar to the quenis grace”, a carpenter, two landowners and 
three sons, one widow and four daughters of persons styled “of such and such a 
place” thus denoting relatives of lairds.938  
 Notable defenders included one lord, the daughter of a lord, the daughter of a 
lady, a laird, a master,939 two burgesses (one from Edinburgh, one from Glasgow, the 
                                                 
935 Based on the data contained in Appendix II, H(1) and H(2). 
936 Whilst the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Commissaries of Edinburgh has not been studied in 
detail, a preliminary survey of the Register of Act and Decreets in this respect reveals that churchmen 
from parsons and vicars (i.e. NAS, CC8/2/4, fos. 262v-264r; fos. 268v-269v) to deans (i.e. NAS, 
CC8/2/4, fos. 35r-36r, James Lauder, Dean of Restalrig) abbots (i.e. NAS, CC8/2/4, fo. 178v, George 
Abbot of Dunfermline) and bishops (i.e. NAS, CC8/2/5, fos. 186v-188r, Bishop of Orkney) litigated 
before the Commissaries (not always in person), as did ministers of the Protestant Kirk (Green, 
‘Scottish Benefices’). 
937Either Coupar Angus (centre of the ecclesiastical barony pertaining to the Cistercian Abbey there) 
or Cupar Fife (royal burgh). 
938 The data upon which this paragraph is based is contained in Appendix II, H (1). 
939 As in the eldest son of a lord. 
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latter a tailor), the widow of a burgess of Dundee, the son of a burgess of Edinburgh, 
a sheriff (of Linlithgow), an advocate (who was also a burgess of Edinburgh), a 
writer, a lord’s servant, the natural daughter of a parson, a tailor, a butcher, a weaver, 
two cobblers, a landowner and three daughters of persons styled “of such and such a 
place” thus denoting the daughters of lairds.940 
 Some statistics may be tentatively offered from these observations, but there 
are several factors which limit their value: there is often no indication of the social 
status of litigants, and where litigants may have had some noteworthy status, there is 
no guarantee that it was noted by the clerks of court in the Registers of Acts and 
Decreets. Nevertheless, out of the 141 actions from which the above observations 
have been drawn in 29 (21%) cases the pursuer had some kind of social status noted 
in the Registers, whilst in 23 (16%) cases the defender had some kind of social status 
noted in the Registers. This suggests that about one in five pursuers or defenders had 
some distinct social status worthy of note, usually a link with landownership, burghs 
or crafts. For the rest of the consistorial actions brought before the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh during the sample period it is difficult to differentiate the remaining 
litigants, although there is direct evidence that they were sometimes in a state of 
poverty.941 Extensive reading among the Registers of Acts and Decreets leaves the 
impression that Scots from all walks of life brought their consistorial actions before 
the Commissaries of Edinburgh, and the fact that litigants could represent 
themselves, that sentence silver could be waived for poor litigants and that the judges 
tended to control litigation in terms of applying appropriate remedies according to 
the relevant points proven rather than the remedy sought in the libel suggests that the 
Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh was accessible to all Scots.942     
 
 
                                                 
940 The data upon which this paragraph is based is contained in Appendix II, H (2). 
941 i.e. in Malard v. Reid, being an action for Scottish Protestant divorce on the grounds of adultery, 
the pursuer Robert Malard was described as “a pover man” (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 403r, 23 March 
1564/5), whilst in Paislie v. Hastie, being an action for annulment on the grounds of bigamy, the 
guilty man’s second wife had brought the action, and when the decreet annulling this second marriage 
was entered in the Register, the clerk wrote “gratis paupericula” in the margin (NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 
247v, 25 November 1564). 
942 This accords well with David Sellar’s statement that “I know of nothing to suggest that there was a 
bias in favour of men, or that the rules effectively excluded all but the very rich” which he based on 
evidence for the Commissaries of Edinburgh during the 17th to 19th centuries (Sellar ‘Canon Law and 
Scots Law’, 74-75). 
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CHAPTER VI 
ONGOING RELATIONS WITH THE TRIBUNALS OF  
THE PROTESTANT KIRK FROM 1564 
  
 At the end of chapter II the conclusion was drawn that the Commissaries did 
not consider the sentences of divorce pronounced by the tribunals of the Protestant 
Kirk from 1559 down to the appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh to 
possess an inherent authority in consistorial matters. Rather, it was argued that the 
Commissaries accepted such sentences on account of the legitimating involvement of 
the Lords of Council and Session or the Scottish episcopate. Yet it was also 
suggested that from this it did not follow that the Commissaries considered the 
tribunals of the Kirk to have had no competent authority and jurisdiction within the 
Scottish realm. Since the consistorial law and procedure of the Commissaries has 
now been discussed at some length, the ongoing relations of the Commissaries and 
the Kirk will be considered in this final chapter. 
 On the one hand, the Commissaries of Edinburgh considered themselves sole 
judges competent of the consistorial jurisdiction in Scotland, by virtue of their 
charter of constitution and the national jurisdictions it entrusted to them for 
administration. It may therefore be asked to what extent this opinion was shared by 
the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk. The answer would appear to be mixed, the 
actions of some tribunals of the Kirk seemingly conforming to this understanding, 
whilst the court of the superintendent of Fife, Fotherick and Strathearn seemingly 
maintaining that the Kirk enjoyed some inherent competence in consistorial actions. 
On the other hand, the disciplinary jurisdiction of the tribunals of the Kirk appears to 
have been both acknowledged and worked with by the Commissaries. In this, it 
would appear that the Commissaries and the Kirk sought to achieve a degree of 
jurisdictional co-operation between their respectively ‘consistorial’ and ‘disciplinary’ 
jurisdictions.  
 
[i] CONFORMING TO THE COMMISSARIES 
 
 A remarkable divorce action involving both the minister, elders and deacons 
of the kirk of Jedburgh and the Commissaries of Edinburgh clearly illustrates that at 
least one tribunal of the Kirk conformed to the Commissaries’ and various members 
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of the Scottish government’s understanding of the administration of the consistorial 
jurisdiction in Scotland from 1559. During the early 1560s the kirk of Jedburgh had 
proceeded to hear an action of Scottish Protestant divorce for adultery, Hardy v. 
Rutherfurde “be verteu of ane commissioun grantit be the lordis of secreit counsale 
to thame thairupoun”. The libelled adultery appears to have been “notourlie knawin 
to the hale burcht and paroche of Jedburcht” and having been “be the saidis Minister 
eldaris and deaconis admittit to the said [pursuer’s] probatioun” was duly proven. 
Nevertheless the “actioun of diuorce being concludit befoir the saidis Minister eldaris 
and deaconis, reddy to the avysing thairwith and geving furth of thair decreit thairin, 
thai, in respect of the erecting of the jurisdiction of the said commissarie, on na wyis 
will pronunce the samyn, and thairfoir the saidis commissaris direct out thair precept 
to summound the said Katherine [defender] to compeir befoir thame at ane certane 
day bipast To heir it be proceidit befoir thame in the said actioun quhair it left befoir 
the saidis minister eldaris and deaconis That is to say to heir sentence and decreit 
gevin and pronuncit in the said mater secundum allegata et probata in the samyn”.943 
This remarkable case demonstrates that at least in Jedburgh, the kirk thought its 
competence in an action of divorce depended upon commission from the Lords of 
Council and Session, and that even this was a temporary expedient until such time as 
the Commissaries of Edinburgh might continue to administer the consistorial 
jurisdiction. This accords well with the thesis advanced in chapter I that the Lords 
administered the consistorial jurisdiction in lieu of the sitting of the episcopal 
consistories, which administration passed to the Commissaries upon their 
appointment. 
 No other case brought the jurisdictional relations between the Commissaries 
and the Kirk into such sharp focus and with such a clear resolution. Nevertheless 
other evidence discussed below,944 further suggests that following the appointment of 
the Commissaries other tribunals of the Kirk and individual ministers co-operated 




                                                 
943 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 425r-v, 11 April 1565, Hardy v. Rutherfurde. 
944 Generally, see the discussion below concerning freedom, silence and slander (this Chapter, [iv]), 
but in particular see the discussion of the staying of banns (this Chapter, [v]). 
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[ii] DIVERGING FROM THE COMMISSARIES 
 
 The manifest conformity of the kirk session of Jedburgh to the authority of 
the Commissaries of Edinburgh was not repeated in Fife and St Andrews. These 
territories were subject to the powerful kirk of St Andrews and the superintendent of 
Fife, Fotherick and Strathearn, John Winram. The case of Forbes v. Sandelands was 
discussed at the end of chapter II, and it was concluded from that case that the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh were at pains to underline the fact that they did not 
consider the decisions of the court of the superintendent of Fife at St Andrews, acting 
upon its own authority, to be binding consistorial decisions. Further evidence 
suggests that the Commissaries’ position went unheeded and occasioned some direct 
confrontation between Edinburgh and St Andrews. 
 This was certainly the case in the celebrated precept of reduction raised by 
Henry Morris before the Commissaries of Edinburgh against a sentence of 
solemnization pronounced by the superintendent of Fife, John Winram, 8 January 
1571/2. The case was discussed by John Riddell in some detail, and was taken as 
evidence of the conflict between the Commissaries and the “usurping” tribunals of 
the Protestant Kirk during the Reformation era.945 Conflict there was, but as with 
Forbes v. Sandelands, Moreis v. Johnesoun was specifically concerned with the 
court of the superintendent of Fife. Winram’s sentence of solemnization was reduced 
by the Commissaries of Edinburgh on 16 June 1572 because the Commissaries 
accepted Morris’s argument “that the said decreit is pronuncit & gevin be the said 
superintendent wranguslie, he na wayis being judge to cognosce or decerne thairintill 
or ony sik actioun, in respect mony zeris of befoir the pronunceing of the said 
pretendit decreit thair was ane commissioun gevin be oure soverane for that tyme, 
with the advis of the lordis of secreit counsale, to the saidis commissaris to cognosce 
in all sik actionis as solemnizatioun of mariage adherence & dissolutioun of mariage 
lik as thai have bene in vse continewalie sensyne to cognosce thairintill and all vther 
consistoriall causes as only judge competent thairto; quhair foir the said decreit being 
pronuncit and gevin as said is be the said superintendent cumque per non suum 
judicem aucht tobe reducit”.946 It should be noted that the Commissaries could reduce 
the decreets of other courts on two grounds, either because they were the superior 
                                                 
945 Riddell, Inquiry, i, 431-432. 
946 NAS, CC8/2/5, fo. 208r-v, 16 June 1572, Moreis v. Johnesoun. 
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judges (as was the case in respect of the inferior Commissaries), or because they 
could reduce the decrees of incompetent authorities. It was in this latter sense that the 
Commissaries reduced Winram’s sentence: had they intervened in proceedings 
before Winram prior to the pronouncing of sentence, they would have inhibited 
Winram from proceeding, conform to their charter of constitution.947 
 Indeed the Commissaries seem to have deliberately avoided making any 
claims of direct superiority over the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk. In Hammyltoun 
v. Maxwell & Lindesay a precept of reduction was raised before the Commissaries, 
against a sentence of divorce that had been pronounced by the superintendent, elders 
and deacons of Glasgow, prior to the appointment of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh. The sentence of the Kirk had divorced Elizabeth Hamilton and John 
Maxwell on the grounds on Hamilton’s adultery. The adultery had been proven, but 
in defence Hamilton had alleged the mutual guilty of Maxwell, yet Maxwell’s 
adultery had not been proven. Yet when Hamilton brought her action of reduction 
against the sentence of the Kirk, she had fresh and conclusive evidence that Maxwell 
had indeed committed adultery at such a time as to make her original defence 
valid.948 In the action for reduction, Maxwell’s procurator Henry Kinross objected 
that the Commissaries “aucht not to proceid as juges competent in this mater being 
discussit befoir be the kirk of befoir”. In response, Hamilton’s procurator Richard 
Strang argued that the action of reduction was being brought not because of “ony 
iniquitie commitit be the kirk bot vpoun ane new emergent”.949 The Commissaries 
accepted Strang’s argument: the new evidence concerning Maxwell’s recrimination 
was duly proven before the Commissaries and they accordingly reduced the Kirk’s 
sentence of divorce.  
Such issues were also directly addressed before the Commissaries in Forrest 
v. Rollok & Gardin wherein a precept of reduction was raised against a sentence of 
Scottish Potestant divorce on the gounds of adultery pronounced by “Cristofer 
Gudman Minister James Lavell Robert Kid Alexander Weddirburne and the 
remanent eldaris and deaconis of the burgh of Dundee and Johne Erskin of Dun 
                                                 
947 See Appendix I, clauses [7] and [8]. Robertson notes the Commissaries’ right to inhibit 
incompetent judges (Concilia Scotiae, i, clxxvi).  
948 Elizabeth Lindsay had borne Maxwell a child, whose time of conception, it was argued, proved 
Hamilton’s allegation of recrimination. 
949 NAS, CC8/2/1, fos. 222v-223r, 15 November 1564; fo. 248r, 25 November 1564; fos. 393v-394v, 
16 March 1564/5. 
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Superintendant of Angus”. The defender’s procurator, John Shairp, alleged that such 
a sentence could only be reduced by the “general kirk” against which the pursuer’s 
procurator, Henry Kinross asserted that the Commissaries were judges competent for 
the reduction of the sentence. The Commissaries took the matter “to avysemen” and 
assigned litteratorie to pronounce their interlocutor upon the arguments: yet some 
alternative arrangement seems to have been made, since the case does not occur 
again in the Registers of Acts and Decreets.950 In both these instances, whether by 
chance or design, the Commissaries had avoided explicitly asserting a direct 
superiority over the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk.  
 From this evidence it is clear that whilst the Commissaries did not attempt to 
assert a direct superiority over the tribunals of the Kirk, they nevertheless explicitly 
rejected the superintendent of Fife’s claim of an inherent right to pronounce 
consistorial decreets, first in 1564 (i.e. Forbes v. Sandelands) and again in 1572 (i.e. 
Moreis v. Johnesoun). Such a conflict naturally raises the question of the grounds 
upon which Winram presumed to hear consistorial actions. Whilst this cannot be 
gone into in detail, there is a distinct possibility of some episcopal element. 
Winram’s superintendency certainly featured some episcopal functions. He held 
synods,951 collated ministers to medieval benefices,952 presided over a court which 
pronounced consistorial sentences involving adherence,953 solemnization954 and 
divorce for adultery,955 and was remembered in death as ‘Bishop of the Fife men’.956 
Yet despite these episcopal functions, it is noteworthy that the Commissaries, who 
acknowledged the continued authority of the Scottish episcopate in the consistorial 
jurisdiction, did not acknowledge Winram’s authority in the same jurisdiction by 
virtue of his superintendency.     
                                                 
950 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 46v, 6 June 1564, Forrest v. Rollok & Gardin. 
951 See Linda Dunbar, ‘Synods and Superintendence: John Winram and Fife, 1561-1572’ in Records 
of the Scottish Church History Society, 27 (1997), 97-125 and Dunbar, ‘An early record from the 
Synod of Fife, c. 1570’ in Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 28 (1998), 217-238.  
952 Green, ‘Scottish Benefices’, 46-47. 
953 St Andrews, i, 156-167. 
954 i.e. Moreis v. Johnesoun as just discussed. 
955 i.e. Dunbar, Reforming the Scottish Church, 89. 
956 Dunbar, Reforming the Scottish Church, 193-194. There are other intriguing episcopal themes 
surrounding Winram’s superintendency: his court ceased to sit following John Douglas’s consecration 
as Archbishop of St Andrews (Ibid., 83), at which Winram and superintendent Spottiswoode 
participated (Donaldson, The Scottish Reformation, 163-4).  
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[iii] JURISDICTIONAL CO-OPERATION 
  
 Whilst it has been shown that the kirk session of Jedburgh conformed to the 
authority and jurisdiction of the Commissaries, and that the court of the 
superintendent of Fife did not, the question of the inherent authority and competent 
jurisdiction of the tribunals of the Kirk and its relation to the Commissaries must 
now be discussed. As is well understood, the Scottish Reformers insisted that one of 
the three notes “of the trew kirk”, by which it might be differentiated from “the kirk 
malignant”, was “ecclesiasticall discipline uprichtlie ministerit as Goddis words 
prescribis, quhairby vice is repressit and vertew nurischit”.957 From the seventh head 
of the First Book of Discipline, which devoted itself to “ecclesiastical discipline” it is 
clear that the principal grounds of the Kirk’s authority in such matters was founded 
upon its right to excommunicate and re-admit Scots from the congregation of the 
Kirk.958 The principal tribunal through which discipline was enforced was the kirk 
session, which among other offences sought to correct fornication, adultery, and 
desertion. But as could be reasonably anticipated, such a competence in the 
correction of morals could involve the tribunals of the Kirk in the consistorial 
jurisdiction. It is easy to imagine how a kirk session’s attempt to punish fornicators 
could be countered by protestations that the couple had in fact secretly promised to 
marry each other, and as such were irregularly married: were this to be investigated 
ought not they to be compelled to marry regularly in facie ecclesiae? Similarly, as in 
the case above, if two members of a congregation had been publicly married before 
their congregation, was it not a scandal to the kirk for one of the parties to desert the 
other, and in such an event was the session not obliged to discipline the deserting 
party? And finally, if a married member of a congregation committed adultery, 
should they not be forced publicly to repent?  
Within the context of Godly discipline, therefore, the tribunals of the Kirk 
regularly made pronouncements about fornication, marriage, adherence and divorce, 
all of which had legal consequences within the context of consistorial actions. That 
both moral and legal consequences arose from various actions in and around 
marriage and that both were no longer regulated by the unified authority of the courts 
                                                 
957 The Scots Confession as per RPS, A1560/8/3, under the heading “Of the notis by the quhilk the 
trew kirk is decernit fra the fals, and quha salbe juge of the doctrine”; cf APS ii 526, c.1.  
958 First Book of Discipline, 165 et seq. 
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spiritual, but by the differentiated tribunals of the Kirk and the Commissaries, 
resulted in a complex situation whereby the enforcement of moral discipline by the 
Kirk could have similar outcomes to the enforcement of Scots consistorial law by the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh. Indeed, the community-based power of the Kirk, rooted 
in a theological understanding and emphasis on the Kirk as Christ’s congregation, 
brought with it disciplinary powers which at times were almost indistinguishable 
from the legal authority of the Commissaries of Edinburgh, and suggests in the 
strongest way possible that the old spiritual jurisdiction had not relied on the force of 
law alone.  
An excellent example of this was the way in which the Kirk, on the grounds 
of Godly discipline and through the working of its sessions, could compel a couple to 
contract a regular marriage in facie ecclesiae without the need to obtain a decreet of 
solemnization from the Commissaries of Edinburgh, and indeed on the grounds of 
copula alone, without any prior promise to marry. In Dorothy Anderson’s study of 
the decisions of the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland in relation to marriage 
between December 1560 and March 1573,959 attention has been drawn to the 
Assembly’s discipline of ministers who were suspended from the ministry on the 
grounds of fornication. Where ministers were concerned, the Kirk’s power was 
considerably amplified, since in addition to the power of excommunication which the 
Kirk could exercise over the faithful, ministers could be further controlled by 
exclusion from their office and its corresponding remuneration. Anderson draws 
attention to two ministers, Thomas Duncanson and Alexander Jardine, who had 
committed fornication with virgins.960  
“Having performed their public repentance whilst suspended from office, the 
Assembly had to decide whether they could be readmitted. It deferred the 
decision to allow further enquiry to be made from the Superintendent but did 
state, in Duncanson’s case, that “if the woman was a maiden with whom he 
had committed the said fornication, that he sall marie her if sho requyre the 
samein, in part satisfactioun to the kirk”.961 Jardine had pre-empted a similar 
decision in his case by having already married the virgin whom he had 
                                                 
959 Dorothy Anderson, ‘The Blessed Ordinance of God’: A Study in the Decisions of the General 
Assembly in Relation to Marriage, December 1560 – March 1573 (unpublished BD dissertation, 
School of Divinity, University of Edinburgh, 2004). 
960 Acts and Proceedings of the General Assemblies, i, 44-45. 
961 Acts and Proceedings of the General Assemblies, i, 45 
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deflowered. At the ensuing meeting, in June 1564, the Assembly readmitted 
Jardine, but Duncanson’s fate is not recorded”.962  
 The idea that those who deflowered virgins ought to be compelled to marry 
them even though no promise of marriage had been made was set out in the First 
Book of Discipline,963 and it seems quite reasonable to conclude that had the Kirk 
assumed sole competence for compelling solemnization, this principle would have 
become part of the law of Scotland. The principle was certainly enforced by the kirk 
session of St Andrews in the affair of Robert Thomas and Gelis Moffat. Thomson 
had had the banns proclaimed for his marriage to another woman, but they were 
stayed by Moffatt’s brothers on the grounds that Thomas had deflowered their sister 
Gelis, and as such ought to be compelled to marry her. Not only was the alleged 
impediment of deflowering found relevant for staying the banns, but the session 
decerned Thomas “for his trangression of the law of God and offence done in 
defloryng of the virginite of the said Gelis Moffatt, to marye and tak to his lawfull 
wyf the said Gelis Moffat, and solemnizat the band of matrimonye wyth hyr, 
according to the ordor of the kyrk…”.964  
 The language used in this last case is worth discussing further. Robert 
Thomas had not transgressed the law and ‘practick’ of Scotland, but rather the moral 
‘law of God’, for which offence he was considered bound to marry Gelis Moffat. The 
emphasis was clearly upon solemnization as a correction for a moral offence rather 
than solemnization as the legally enforceable conclusion of contracting an irregular 
marriage. The moral and the legal elements of marriage in post-Catholic Scotland are 
clearly delineated: the Kirk could compel solemnization as the remedy for moral 
wrong within the context of Godly discipline and the moral regulation of Christ’s 
congregation; the Commissaries of Edinburgh could compel solemnization as the 
remedy for the contracting of a legally binding, but non-regular marriage.  
Despite the Kirk’s enforcement of the idea that the deflowerer ought to be 
compelled to marry the deflowered, it did not become part of Scots consistorial law. 
Nevertheless, the idea found occasional resonance in consistorial litigation before the 
Commissaries. In Reid v. Barlcay, the pursuer alleged that Barclay had “promist hir 
diueris tymes marriage, scho beand than ane virgine, and at the leist be his continuale 
                                                 
962 Anderson, ‘The Blessed Ordinance of God’, 22. 
963 First Book of Discipline, 39 et seq. 
964 St Andrews, i, 221. 
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sute consentit to accomplische and fulfill his desyre and had carnall copulatioun with 
hir vnder faithfull promes”.965 Barclay was assoilized from the libel, denying the 
promise of marriage on oath, whilst the question of virginity was not discussed, since 
irrelevant in proceedings before the Commissaries of Edinburgh.  
 
 
[iv] SLANDER, SILENCE AND FREEDOM 
 
 Nowhere was the potential for co-operation and co-ordination between the 
Kirk and the Commissaries more likely that in actions involving freedom, silence and 
slander, since these actions usually arose following the proclamation of banns by 
ministers of the Kirk or, in the case of slander, regularly involved some form of 
public repentance. Moreover, it so happens that two of the actions to be discussed in 
this section involved ministers of the Reformed Kirk. Slander ought to be considered 
in its own right before entering upon a discussion of freedom, silence and slander. 
This is not only on account of the fact that actions for slander introduce the central 
themes which reoccur throughout the remainder this section, but also because 
slanderous allegations did not necessarily centre upon allegations of promise of 
marriage and copula, yet when they did, they could be caught up into a more specific 
piece of litigation concerning promise of marriage.  
 
 The first entry in the Register of Acts and Decreets of the Commissary of 
Edinburgh concerning slander is the public confession for slander made by George 
Wilkie before the Commissaries on 1 May 1564. Whilst the slander had occurred in 
St Andrews, Wilkie was domiciled in Edinburgh and as such it may be presumed that 
the domicile of the offender decided the Commissariot in which an action of slander 
was brought, although this is not certain.966 There was clearly a range of competent 
courts in St Andrews for hearing confessions of slander; the kirk session there, the 
superintendent of Fife, Fotherick and Strathearn’s court and the commissary court 
presided over by William Skene. The brief entry in the Acts and Decreets is a 
follows:  
                                                 
965 CC8/2/3, fo. 72v, 17 July 1568. 
966 It may be that the action could have been brought before any competent authority in either St 
Andrews or Edinburgh. 
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 “Anent the terme assignit to George Wilkie sclater in Edinburgh to compeir 
befoir the saidis Commissaris to the effect vnderspecifiit. Compeirit the said 
George in presence of the saidis Commissaris sittand in jugement and of the 
haill audiritoris (sic) and people thair assemblit and on his kneis confessit 
and grantit that he had first offendit God and syne Johne Hill thair present in 
calling of him commone theif vpoun the xj day of Aprile lastbipast in the 
abbay cloister of Sanctandrois at the semze fair967 thairof. And thairfoir 
desyrit God to fogif him his offence and the said Johne Hill forgevante, quha 
in presence of the saidis Commissaris and people did the samyn and in takin 
thairof tuke him be the hand: Quhairupoun the said Johne askit 
intrumentis”.968   
 The religious elements in the confession are clearly pronounced and contain 
similar elements to an entry for the court of John Winram, superintendent of Fife, 
Fotherick and Strathearn. There, David Ballingall and Elizabeth Dury had been 
accused of adultery, which was described by the court as “the slander rased” against 
them. Dury was found innocent of any wrongdoing, whilst Ballingall confessed that 
he had desired to commit adultery with her. The entry narrates that Ballingall  
 “now (moved be the Spirit of God) he hes confessed and schawyn owtward 
signes of repentance, with humil submission of himself to disciplyn; and 
heirfor is decernit to compeir in the essemble of the congregacion of the kyrk 
of Kennowy, upon Sunday the xj of October instant, and thar in presens of 
God at the command of the minister humyll hymself upon his kneis, confes 
his offence and ask God mercy tharof and the congregacione forgyfnes. And 
of his occasion of sclander gevyn to tham, and for avoyding of all occasion 
of suspicion and sclander gevyn for the tym to cum, the said Dauid 
Ballingall is discherged and forbyddyn to accumpany wyth the said 
Elizabeth Dwry in ony maner or sort, privatly or oppynlye, bot [to] absteyn 
fra talkyn eatyng drynkyn or other resortyng wyth hyr; to the quhilk he hes 
consented, and is oblest to keip the same under pane of bannesing hym the 
bowndis of Fyff for all the dayes of his lyftym…”.969 
 These two cases were not quite the same; whilst both arose as a response to 
slander, and involved confession whilst kneeling, and repentance, in the former 
instance Wilkie admitted the slander, whilst in the latter Ballingal confessed that he 
had desired to do that which had been slandered against him. Despite these 
variations, the themes of slander, confession in court and confession and repentance 
before the kirk occur severally, and quite unexpectedly, in actions of freedom, 
silence and slander before the Commissaries.  
                                                 
967 i.e. ‘synod fair’. 
968 NAS, CC8/2/1, fo. 5v. 
969 St Andrews, i, 173, 7 October 1562. Burgh magistrates could also hear actions for defamation and 
compel public penance. For a full discussion of such actions see Elizabeth Ewan, ‘ “Tongue You 
Lied”: The Role of the Tongue in Rituals of Public Penance in Late Medieval Scotland’ in The Hands 
of the Tongue: essays on Deviant Speech, ed. E.D. Craun (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute 
Publications, 2007), 115-136). 
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 As part of the Commissaries’ competence in actions of defamation, they 
could ordain that repentance and restitution be made at the place of slander, even if 
this was a Protestant kirk. This occurred in the next two actions to be considered, 
Bennet v. Blythman and Gibsoun v. Robesoun. In addition, these two cases illustrate 
the crossover between normal actions of slander, and those which involved 
allegations of promise of marriage and copula and therefore also involved freedom 
and silence.  
 The affair of Bennet and Blythman was composed of three distinct actions, 
two before the Commissaries of Edinburgh and one before the kirk session of Leith, 
all of which centred upon allegations of promise of marriage and copula made by 
Margaret Blythman against Master John Bennet, minister of the kirk of Leith. The 
precise order of the actions must be deduced from evidence to be given presently, but 
the order of decreets was: 20 December 1575, John Bennet was assoilized by the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh from an action for solemnization brought by Margaret 
Blythman; 22 December 1575, Margaret Blythman succumbed in probation before 
the kirk session of Leith following allegations of copula and promise of marriage; 26 
January 1575/6, Margaret Blythman was decerned by the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh to make public repentance in the kirk of Leith for her slanderous 
allegations. Discussion of this affair is best facilitated by starting with the final 
decreet, which is cited here in full: 
 “Anent the clame persewit be Maister Johne Bennet minister of Goddis word 
aganis Margaret Blythman; berand that scho callit and convenit him befoir 
the ministeris eldaris and Deoconis of the kirk of Leith, alleging wickitlie 
that he had carnall copulatioun with hir in the house of Andro Burn in Leith, 
and that thairthrow scho consauit barne to him; and pairtit thairwith; and that 
the said Maister Johnne promittit the said Margaret mariage and that in the 
moneth of November 1575, quhilk being admittit be the said ministeris 
eldaris and Deoconis of the said kirk to hir probatioun, and diuers termes 
assignit to hir for preving thairof, failzeit thairin, as ane decrete pronuncit be 
thame the xxij day of December 1575 [beris]. And siklike in the samin 
moneth the said Margaret convenit him befoir the Commissaris for the samin 
caus and referrit the same to his conscience, quhair vpoun in lykmaner he 
obtenit obsoluitour in respect of his aith, as the decrete thairof pronuncit the 
xx day of December lastbipast heir present proportis: be quhilk persuitis he 
being ane minister of Goddis word and ane publict persone is hevele 
sclanderit and diffamit be the said Margaret, quha maist vickitlie hes 
persewit the samin to his greit dishonour & schame with the saidis 
Commissaris provydit remeidy thairunto, as at mair lenth is contenit in the 
said clame. Bayth the saidis parteis being parsonnalie present, the saidis 
Commissaris be thair decreit decernis & ordanis the said Margaret Blythman 
at tua seu(er)all sondayis nixt eftir scho be chairgeit heirto eftir preching to 
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stand at the pillar of repentaince within the kirk of Leyth & thair in presence 
of the congregatioun thair assemblit humlie to confess hir offence done to 
the said Maister Johne & to craif God, his kirk & the said Maister Johne 
forgevinnes thairof: becaus the said clame being be the saidis Commissaris 
admittit to the said Maister Johnis probatioun & ane terme assignit to him for 
preving thairof he previt the samin sufficientlie, as wes cleirlie knawin to the 
saidis Commissaris”.970 
 The narration of events contained in this decreet suggests that although the 
kirk session of Leith pronounced its sentence or decreet two days after the 
Commssaries pronounced theirs in the action of solemnization, Margaret Blythman’s 
first recourse had been to the kirk session, and she had been leading probation before 
them when she instigated the action of solemnization before the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh. It would appear that Blythman, realizing that she was going to succumb 
in probation before the kirk of Leith, brought the action of solemnization before the 
Commissaries. When the Commissaries admitted her libel to probation she referred 
the libel “simpliciter to his [John Bennet’s] aith & he [beand] suorne & examinat 
vpoun his gritt aith deponit he nevir maid promeis of mariage to hir”.971 This rapid 
resolution of the action by oath is noteworthy: if the theory concerning her 
anticipation of succumbing in probation before the kirk session of Leith is correct, 
this was her only option, but since actions of solemnization resolved by the 
defender’s oath usually resulted in an immediate outcome (that is to say the actions 
usually lasted one day only) she could be fairly certain that the Commissaries’ 
decreet would pre-empt that of the kirk session of Leith. If this was the case it was a 
most sophisticated exploitation of the consequences of the fragmentation of the old 
spiritual jurisdiction. 
 This theory is given some support by the wording of the allegations made by 
Blythman before the different courts. Interestingly, before the kirk session Blythman 
alleged copula, with issue, then promise of marriage,972 whilst before the 
Commissaries in the action of solemnization she alleged that John Bennet “in the 
moneth of September or thairby the zeir of God Jai vc lxxiiij zeiris and in his awin 
chamber within Andro Burnes Close in Leith maid to the said Margaret ane faithfull 
                                                 
970 NAS, CC8/2/8, fos. 24v-25r. 
971 NAS, CC8/2/7, fo 367v, 20 December 1575. 
972 This order is known only from the narration of the kirk session’s sentence in the subsequent decreet 
pronounced by the Commissaries. Yet although the kirk’s sentence is no longer extant, it was 
produced before the Commissaries and was before the clerk of court as he made this entry. 
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promeis of mariage promittand faithfullie to tak hir to his wyfe & to solemnizat the 
band of matrimony with hir & than in takin thairof gaif to hir his ryt hand lyke as 
scho than maid lykevayis promeis of mariage to him promittand faithfullie to tak him 
to hir husband and solempnizat the band of mariage with him: eftir the quhilk 
promeis the said Maister Johne had carnell deill with the said Margaret in his said 
chalmer & consauit with barne to him, with the quhilk the said Margaret partit in the 
moneth of November or thairby nixtthaireftir…”.973 This variation of the sequence of 
promise and copula is indicative of the differing functions of the kirk sessions and 
the Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh. 
 The proceedings before the kirk session of Leith could not have been a 
strictly consistorial action belonging to the Commissaries of Edinburgh. This 
suggests that, as would be expected, Bennet was ‘callit and convenit’ before the 
‘ministeris eldaris and deoconis of the kirk of Leith’ in order to be corrected for his 
alleged immoral conduct. If Blythman had been pursuing for solemnization 
according to Scots consistorial law, the libel would have been singularly loose, 
alleging promise after copula, and as such no grounds for solemnization before the 
Commissaries. Rather, the looseness of order suggests that Blythman anticipated that 
the minister of Leith would be disciplined in conformity with the line already 
adopted by the General Assembly and the courts of the Protestant Kirk sitting at St 
Andrews in re those who deflowered virgins: a minister who had sired a bastard and 
then promised marriage to the mother would surely be compelled by the Kirk to 
marry the woman in question, regardless of the order of events. By contrast, more 
care was taken over the libel in the action for solemnization, placing the order of 
events as promise then copula, which suggests that Blythman was alive to the 
requirements of consistorial litigation before the Commissaries. One final 
consideration suggests that the actions before the kirk session and the Commissaries 
were of different qualities: had the kirk session of Leith already been hearing the 
same case, John Bennet could surely have excepted that the action of solemnization 
before the Commissaries be sisted on the gounds of lis alibi pendens.  
 The final point of interest is the action brought before the Commissaries by 
John Bennet. The Commissaries’ decreet from the action of solemnization and the 
kirk session of Leith’s sentence were produced before the Commissaries of 
                                                 
973 NAS, CC8/2/7, fo. 367r-v, 20 December 1575. 
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Edinburgh, and Bennet stated that on account of the two actions “he being ane 
minister of Goddis word and ane publict persone is hevele sclanderit and diffamit”. 
The Commissaries concurred and ordained that on two separate Sundays Margaret 
Blythman was “eftir preching to stand at the pillar of repentaince within the kirk of 
Leyth & thair in presence of the congregatioun thair assemblit humlie to confess hir 
offence done to the said Master Johne & to craif God, his kirk & the said Maister 
Johne forgevinnes thairof”. It is striking that given that the slander was made against 
a Reformed minister, it was the Commissaries, rather than the Kirk, who ordained 
this public repentance. The reason for this is not clear: either the Commissaries were 
accepted as judges competent in all actions of slander within their local jurisdiction, 
or the kirk of Leith felt the need for some external court to vindicate the character of 
their minister. The former seems more likely, since had the latter pertained surely 
recourse could have been had to the General Assembly or some other superior 
tribunal of the Kirk. Either way, despite the close and overlapping involvement of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh and the kirk session of Leith in the Bennet and 
Blythman affair, there is no evidence of a jurisdictional conflict between the two 
authorities. 
 The confluence of the jurisdictions of the Commissaries and the Kirk may be 
illustrated and explored further by the second case involving slander and allegations 
of non-regular marriage. This time, the accused was not a minister, but a senator of 
the College of Justice, and the kirk session involved that of Edinburgh rather than 
Leith. The events are known only from a decreet pronounced by the Commissaries 
on 24 May 1565, which again merits and requires quoting in full: 
 “Anent the supplicatioun rasit at the instance of George Gibsoun ane of the 
memberis of oure Soverane Ladeis Sessioun aganis Isobell Robesoun relict 
of vmquhile Johne How, makand mentioun that quhair vpoun the fyft day of 
Aprile lastbipast the said Isobell gaif in ane sclanderous bill, to the greit 
infamitie of the said George[is] honour and dignitite of that rowme in the 
quhilk he is placit, befoir the Minister elderis deaconis and rest of the kirk of 
Edinburght; berand in effect that the said George at my chalmer last [wes] or 
thairby maid faithfull promeis to hir to haue contractit the band of 
matrimony with hir and thairupoun to haue conuersit with hir carnalie to the 
greit contempt of God and sclander of his Kirk of the quhilk the said George 
confeses him self tobe ane member. Off the quhilk cryme the said George 
being innocent and the samyn being reportit to him within tua dayis thaireftir 
revokit the samyn as iniurie to his mynd lyke as he zit dois, Quhilk… the 
said George wald not beir with nor zit sustene for fyve hundreth crownis zea 
rather or the samyn had bene done to him he wald haif debursit of his avne 
geir samekle in respect of the circumstances aboue rehersit, as the said 
supplicatioun beris. Bayth the said parteis being personalie present, the said 
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Isobell producit the said complaint gevin in be hir befoir the saidis Ministeris 
eldaris and deaconis befoir the saidis Commissaris berand that the said 
George maid to hir the said faythfull promeis in maner foirsaid, ffor quhome 
it wes allegit be Maister Thomas Fermour hir prolecutoure that scho 
committit na iniuris aganis him in geving in of the said complaint befoir 
thame, in respect that the promeis specifiit thairin wes of veritie and 
faithfullie maid be him to hir and conuersit carnalie with her as said is and 
abaid thairat; Quhilk being admittit be the saidis Commissaris to hir 
probatioun sche referrit the samyn to the said George ayth simpliciter. The 
saidis Commissaris assoilzeis the said George and Isobell hinc inde fra 
vtheris clames foirsaidis and decernis ather of thame quit thairfra in tyme 
cuming, and ordanis the said Isobell to desist and resist fra all speking or 
allegeing of the making of the said promeis be the said George to hir owther 
in his presence or outwith the samyn without that scho call him befoir the 
juge competent and preif that he maid the said promeis to hir sufficientlie as 
accordis, vnder the pane of fourtie pundis tobe payit [to] him [be] hir suift as 
scho cummis in the contrair thairof: Becaus the said George being takin be 
the saidis Commissaris alsweill vpoun the making of the said promeis as 
carnale copulatioun allegit had be him with the said Isobell declarit and 
deponit that he neuir did the samyn. And preceptis to be direct thairupoun as 
efferis”.974 
 The notion of slander is drawn upon twice during the decreet. In the first 
place Robeson claimed that George Gibson’s alleged promise and copula was “to the 
greit contempt of God and sclander of his Kirk of the quhilk the said George 
confesses him self to be ane member”. Here the wording suggests the framework of 
Godly discipline, that those who belong to Christ’s congregation ought not to 
contract marriage in this fashion, and it was presumably on this understanding that 
Robeson petitioned the kirk session of Edinburgh for remedy. Nevertheless, the 
Senator of the College of Justice considered Robeson’s petition given into the kirk 
session to be “ane slanderous bill” and therefore moved to have her punished as a 
slanderer by the Commissaries of Edinburgh. It is quite clear that the Commissaries 
considered both Robeson’s allegation of promise and copula, as outlined in the bill 
given into the kirk session (which was produced before the Commissaries) as well as 
the senator’s allegation of slander at the same time and assoilized either party hinc 
inde from each others’ claims. What is also clear is that precedence had been given 
to the allegation of promise and copula, since this was referred to Gibson’s oath, on 
the strength of which he was assoilized. From this basis, it was clearly accepted that 
Robeson had made her allegations in good faith, and not from any malice towards 
Gibson. What is interesting is that Robeson was not actually put to silence in the 
                                                 
974 NAS, CC8/2/2, fos. 34v-35r, 24 May 1565. 
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normal manner: rather the Commissaries used a unique formula, decerning “the said 
Isobell to desist and reist fra all speking or allegeing of the making of the said 
promeis be the said George to hir owther in his presence or outwith the samyn 
without that scho call him befoir the juge competent and preif that he maid the said 
promeis to hir sufficientlie as accordis…”. This curiosity can be accounted for in the 
following manner: had Robeson pursued before the Commissaries in the first 
instance, she would have pursued for solemnization of marriage, and if unsuccessful 
would have in effect been silenced on the matter. Yet the Commissaries had given 
consideration to her allegations as per her complaint given into the kirk session of 
Edinburgh, which would have been framed in terms of Godly discipline rather than 
being strictly consistorial. As such, the Commissaries restrained her from making 
further allegations unless she call Gibson before “the juge competent” and prove her 
allegations. The “judge competent” was surely the Commissaries themselves, the 
action an action for solemnization, and the means of probation other than by oath, 
since this had already been used to resolve the complaint given into the kirk, but 
which through the complication of Gibson’s action of slander had been pronounced 
upon by the Commissaries rather than the kirk session of Edinburgh. Yet within the 
relative complexity of proceedings neither the litigants, nor the Commissaries, nor 
the session of Edinburgh appear to have questioned the involvement of both the 
Commissaries and the Kirk. The Commissaries had dealt with the actions arising 
from the overlap of the competent jurisdictions of the Kirk and the Commissaries, 
and directed that any subsequent litigation arising from the affair be led before them.  
 
[v] THE STAYING OF BANNS 
 
 Having discussed those actions which fall under the general category of 
slander, it remains to discuss those actions involving allegations of promise of 
marriage (and sometimes copula) made either in direct response to proclamations of 
banns, or so as to pre-empt them. In such cases the local parish kirk was of course 
intimately involved: names had been given to the minister so that banns might be 
proclaimed, during which proclamation a public objection had stayed them. Yet since 
the normal objections to banns had potential consequences governed by the 
Commissaries and their laws, such objections could not be investigated by the 
minister, but had to be remitted to the Commissaries. In one case, Carrik v. Gibsoun, 
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the jurisdiction of the Commissaries was explicitly stated: the names of a couple had 
been given into the elders and deacons of the kirk of Musselburgh, but when the 
banns were called an impediment to the couples’ marriage was alleged before the 
elders and deacons, who “on na wayis will proclame thair banes vnto the tyme the 
same wer first decydit befoir the saidis Commissaries, juge competent in that 
behalf”.975 In another case recorded in the Buik of the Kirk of the Canagait, one 
Christine Weddell appeared before the session there on 8 December 1565 “allegand 
promis of marriaig of Thomas Russall, cordinar, desiring the said Thomas to be no 
ferder proclamit with nane uthair”: “The kirk avasing thairupon…remittis bothe the 
perteis to the commissaris, requyring the said Cristane to intend actioun befoir thame 
quha wes juge competent”.976 These examples demonstrate yet further that various 
tribunals of the Protestant Kirk were prepared to both acknowledged and co-operate 
with the lawful jurisdiction of the Commissaries of Edinburgh. 
There are 15 cases in the Registers of Acts and Decreets between April 1564 
and the winter of 1576/7 involving the staying of banns, 11 of which mention the 
kirk in which the proclamation of banns were stayed, whilst in one other case, 
McWalter v. Galbrayth, it is know from another source where their banns were 
proclaimed.977 The map on the following page shows the location of each kirk where 
the banns were stayed, whilst the number in brackets indicate the number of times 
this occurred for a given kirk.978 As can be seen, the majority of cases arose from 
banns stayed in Edinburgh or ports and villages close by, whilst none of them 
originate from south-west, west, highland or north-east Scotland, thereby strongly 
suggesting that the inferior Commissaries dealt with such actions in the provinces. 
 
                                                 
975 NAS, CC8/2/8, fos. 161v-162r, 21 May 1576. 
976 Buik of the Kirk of the Canagait, 30. 
977 Buik of the Kirk of the Canagait, 105. 
978 The 15 cases upon which the map is based and upon which much of the following dicussion is also 
based are listed with full references in Appendix II, J. 





   239
There are a considerable number of possible variations within all of these 
actions, variations which give each action a different emphasis and possible outcome. 
The general outcomes sought in these actions brought before the Commissaries were 
usually either to have one or more parties declared free from a promise of marriage, 
or for the party by whom the banns had been stayed to be put to silence, depending 
on circumstance. Yet they were all predicated upon the fact that whilst the parish kirk 
was the proper forum for the proclamation of banns and the celebration of marriage, 
the resolution of objections involving questions of consistorial law were the preserve 
of the Commissaries. As shall be seen, the relative complexity of some of the actions 
which arose out of the staying of banns may have on the one hand furnished 
ministers with good cause to avoid entanglement in such issues; but on the other, 
they again underline the manifest need for law reform which the Commissaries failed 
to take in hand.   
The three cases where proclamation of banns were not explicitly mentioned, 
but may be inferred, are McWalter v. Galbrayth, Currye v. Stevin and Robesoun v. 
Liall and these will be discussed first. In McWalter v. Galbrayth it was libelled that 
the pursuer and defender had made promise of marriage per verba de futuro with 
faithful promise to solemnize marriage. Whilst not mentioned in the Register of Acts 
and Decreets, it is certain that the couple had given in their names to the minister of 
the Canongate kirk to be called on three separate Sundays, and that they had been 
proclaimed twice before Elizabeth Galbraith thought better of the union.979 Yet 
having had the banns proclaimed, the couple could not extricate themselves from the 
situation without recourse to the Commissaries of Edinburgh. There were two main 
points which had to be established before the Commissaries. The more pressing point 
was whether or not the couple had consummated their promise and therefore 
contracted an imperfect marriage, from which there would be no freedom. In this 
respect the couple were “suorne be thair greit aithis in presence of the saidis 
Commissaris [and] maid fayth that nane of thame had carnale conuerstaioun with 
vtheris”. Having satisfied the Commissaries that marriage had not been completed 
imperfectly between the couple, it nevertheless remained that they had entered a 
marital pre-contract which formed a bar to contracting marriage with other parties 
until it was set aside by judicial decree. Since it was MacWalter who was pursuing 
                                                 
979 “Valter McValter, Bessie Cabreth, 1, 2; devorsement vith the commissar” (The Buik of the Kirk of 
the Canagait, 105). 
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for declarator of freedom on the narrative that it was Galbraith who in fact not longer 
desired to marry, the Commissaries “inquirit gif scho wald fulfill the said promeis 
maid to the said Walter, for hir part declarit that scho wald not stand content 
thairwith and refusit to do the samyn”. The Commissaries accordingly declared 
McWalter “fre of the said promeis and to haue libertie in mariage notwithstanding 
the samyn”.980 
In Currye v. Stevin the defender had “allegit & spokin opinlie in presence of 
diuers famous witneses in the monethis of November December Januar and Februar 
last at the leist in diueris of thame that the said Johne [Currye] hes contractit mariage 
with the said Jonet [Stevin] and that scho is his lauchfull spous and thairby the said 
Johne is stoppit fra his vther gude purpossis of mariage and trublit thairfoir”. Since 
the proclamation of banns was not explicitly mentioned, and since Steven’s 
allegation of marriage seems to have occurred before famous witnesses rather than a 
Protestant minister (which made it slanderous, though the allegation was not 
explicitly called so) it seems reasonable to speculate that Steven had heard of 
Currie’s “other good purpose of marriage” prior to the actual proclamation of banns, 
and therefore made a public allegation of marriage, which in the probable 
circumstances was tantamount to staying the banns. Since Steven had not made the 
allegation before the Commissaries within the context of an action for solemnization 
of marriage, the onus was upon Currie to pursue Steven before the Commissaries in 
order to have her put to silence, so that she might not re-iterate her allegations when 
the banns were called once more. It transpired that there was no promise between the 
couple, nor any subsequent copula “bot only ane contract [for marriage] quhilk tuke 
na effect and was content of hir fre motive vnrequirit to past fra the samyn and mak 
na furder instance thairintel”. Since there was no actual promise of marriage, there 
was no need for Currie to be declared free, and so the Commissaries decerned “that 
the said Jonet on na wayis molest truble or inped the said Johne anent his marriage,” 
and so in effect put her to silence.981    
 In Robesoun v. Liall all three elements of slander, freedom and silence were 
present, and again the intention at least to have the banns called may be inferred. The 
pursuer, Isobel Robeson, libelled before the Commissaries that “scho is informit 
                                                 
980 NAS, CC8/2/2, fo. 41r, 30 May 1565. 
981 NAS, CC8/2/3, fo. 238r, 21 March 1568/9. 
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William Liall in Leyth wpoune sundrie and diuers dayis of the monethis of 
September and October the zeir of God Jai vc lxxiiij zeiris, vpoune quhat occasioun 
scho knawis not, maist wniustlie sclanderis hir alegand promes of marriage maid be 
hir to him and sua wpoun malice intendis to stope the said persewer of hir godlie 
purpois and to marie in the Lord as sall pleis hir”. In this instance, the purpose of the 
action before the Commissaries was a little muddled. Whilst Robeson was designated 
as the pursuer, the Commissaries had actually summoned Liall to appear before them 
so that he might be assigned a day on which to prove his allegations, with 
certification that if he failed to appear “he sall not be hard heirefter”. This was one of 
the many ways of dealing with those who made accusations of promise of marriage, 
but seemed unwilling to pursue for solemnization before the Commissaries. But 
without actually having the accuser in court it was difficult to establish the truth of 
the matter with any degree of certainty. If the accuser did appear, the Commissaries 
would refer the libel to their oath, thus availing themselves of the only means of 
probation left available to them. As shall be illustrated presently, it was sometimes 
felt to be unacceptable to resolve an action without any kind of probation and silence 
the accuser simply because they had not appeared when summoned. Yet on this 
occasion the Commissaries accepted that there was no marriage between the parties, 
and hedged against the possibility that there may have been a promise of marriage 
per verba de futuro by decerning Robesoun “frie to marie in the Lord quhair scho 
pleses”.982 This was a curious turn of phrase, since in the context it may be taken as a 
declarator of freedom, but the wording was actually that of the ‘licence’ clause used 
in annulment decreets, which was borrowed into Scottish Protestant divorce for 
adultery sentences and decreets pronounced from 1559 onwards.983 
 
 In the 11 cases remaining, it was stated explicitly that the banns had been 
stayed by an allegation of at least a prior promise of marriage, if not an imperfect 
marriage. The staying of the banns brought the jurisdictional schism between Kirk 
and Commissaries into sharp focus. Whilst a couple might give their names up to 
their parish minister, have them proclaimed on three separate Sundays during divine 
service and proceed to solemnize their union in facie ecclesiae, the moment any 
                                                 
982 NAS, CC8/2/7, fos. 3v-4r, 15 October 1574. 
983 This use of the “licence” clause has been discussed at more length above, i.e. Chapter III, §II, [v], 
[c] & [vi]. 
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objection was made to this ecclesiastical procedure, the kirkmen were excluded from 
its resolution in favour of the Commissaries. The distinction was again one of the 
regulation of marriage by the community of the Protestant faithful, and the regulation 
of marriage by the consistorial law of Scotland. 
 Nevertheless this distinction was not an area of jurisdictional conflict, as far 
as the records show. This proviso is worth elaborating a little, and remains a 
condition of the conclusions reached in this section. Those cases coming before the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh as a direct result of the staying of banns suggest that 
these types of actions were not reserved to Edinburgh at the expense of the inferior 
Commissariots. As the map showing the geographical location of the kirks concerned 
suggests the Commissaries of Edinburgh’s jurisdiction would appear to have been 
local in these matters. 
From the period under discussion, only the Register of Acts and Decreets of 
the inferior Commissariot of Hamilton and Campsie survives, but its evidence 
indicates that inferior Commissaries could hear actions arising from the staying of 
banns, and that at least the kirk of Hamilton co-operated with the local Commissary’s 
jurisdiction. In Zoung v. Richie the pursuer, Thomas Zoung, libelled that “he had 
contractit the band of matrymonie to be endit and celebrat in face of halie kirk with 
Isabell Stute and that he causit proclame the bannis oppinlie in the paroche kirk of 
Hammyltoun thre sundrie sabboth dayis; nochttheles the said Bessie Riche allegand 
promit of mareage maid to hir be the said Thomas had malicuislie stoppit the 
solempnizatioun of the said mareage with the said Isabell quhairthrew the completing 
of the said band of matrimony cesit quhill cognitioun984 wes tane thairintill, be 
seikand the Juge to caus the said Bessie to preif hir allegeit promit of mareage.” 
There is of course a suggestive phrase concerning jurisdiction here, and it must be 
presumed from the litigation which followed that ‘seikand the Juge’ meant instituting 
proceedings before the local Commissary.  
When Master Andrew Hay, parson of Renfrew and Commissary of Hamilton 
examined Elizabeth Richie “scho affirmit the stopping of the said mareage and that 
the said Thomas promittit to hir mareage, and that in that name had carnall daill 
with985 hir and farther allegeit that the said Thomas in presens of the minister of 
                                                 
984 Actually incognitioun, although the in look more like m. Variation not in DOST. 
985 off seems to have been overwritten by wt in the MS. 
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Ha(mmi)ltoun for the tyme promittit other to abstene fra carnale daill with hir or ellis 
in caice he abstenit nocht to compleit the said band of matrimonie eftir the quhilk 
promit before the said minister the said Thomas continuit in carnall daill with hir”. 
This second conditional promise of marriage before the minister is fairly unique. 
Whilst it is irrelevant in terms of the fact that the first promise followed by copula 
was marriage, the second promise was probably mentioned with an eye to probation. 
It is noteworthy that despite the fact that the second promise had allegedly been 
made before the minister of Hamilton, the minister had not sought to take cognition 
of the matter to himself. 
The matter was admitted to Elizabeth Richie’s probation, but at the term 
assigned neither she nor her procurator appeared, nor had any diligence been done 
for proving of her allegations. As such, the Commissary of Hamilton “pute silence to 
the said Bessie and to hir farther probatioun. And inconsideratioun that the said 
Bessie failzeit in hir preif he could nocht find nor considder ony Lauchfull 
Impediment bot that the said Thomas mycht faythfullie contract and compleit the 
band of matrymonie in face of halie kirk with the said Isabell Stute and that the 
minister may proceid in the solempnizatioun of the said mariage betuixt the said 
Thomas and Isabell nochtwithstanding the said Besseis allegeance foirsaid”.986  
  
Turning to the 11 remaining cases heard by the Commissaries of Edinburgh, 
it is worth beginning with a text book illustration of why these types of actions are 
categorized under the heading ‘freedom and silence’. This case was Warno v. Craig 
and it is perhaps significant that it did not occur until February 1570/1.987 The 
pursuer, Janet ‘Warno’, had given up her name along with William Taylor to Master 
John Burn, minister of the kirk of Musselburgh, that their banns might be 
proclaimed. The defender, Nicoll Craig, stayed the banns, alleging prior promise of 
marriage. When summoned before the Commissaries, Craig “grantit that he had na 
vther caus except onle ane promeis of mariage maid be hir [Janet Warno] to him”. 
                                                 
986 NAS, CC10/1/1, fo. 123v, 9 February 1564/5, Zoung v. Richie. 
987 That is to say, the first textbook freedom and silence case which would have been readily 
recognized by later generations did not occur until nearly seven years after the appointment of the 
Commissaries of Edinburgh. This observation suggests that the established Scottish form emerged 
gradually out of the diverse array of disorganized forms thrown up by the fragmentation of the 
spiritual jurisdiction. 
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This promise was at most a pre-contract from which ‘Warno’ might be freed, and 
indeed the wording does not make explicit that Nicol Craig had actually responded to 
her promise of marriage: the Commissaries found accordingly and decerned “the said 
Jonet quit & fre of the said promeis & Inputtis silence to him [Craig] in tymes 
cuming and ordanis the said minister to proceid to the solemnizatioun of mariage 
betuix the said Jonet & William Tailzeour as efferis of the law”.988 The employment 
of both declarator of freedom and putting to silence in this type of action was almost 
certainly unique. 
 This case also highlights a fundamental problem arising from the 
fragmentation of the spiritual jurisdiction. The initial allegation of prior promise was 
made in the kirk of Musselburgh, but the only course the minister could take was to 
suspend proceedings whilst the Commissaries of Edinburgh resolved the matter. 
Since the minister could not make use of the presence of the stayer and make further 
inquiries on the spot, the Commissaries were left with the potential problem of 
getting the stayer to subsequently appear before them so that further inquiries could 
be made. As shall be seen, many of those who stayed the banns seem to have been 
reluctant to pursue matters further before the Commissaries. This placed the onus on 
the person whose banns had been stayed to bring proceeding before the 
Commissaries. In Warno v. Craig the stayer actually appeared before them, but in 
many of the cases that follow, the Commissaries were forced to resolve the matter 
without the presence of the stayer, with various complications for the precise 
wording of the remedy applied.    
 From here on in, the cases conform less to the text book ideal and the full 
spectrum of possible combinations and outcomes must be described before some 
sense can made of them. In Warno v. Craig it was unusual that both parties appeared 
before the Commissaries and that the alleged promise of marriage was not only true, 
but of such a quality as to allow the Commissaries to declare a person free from its 
obligations. The case was also unusual in that the Commissaries respected the 
direction of the case, given that it was brought by the party whose banns had been 
stayed against the party by whom the banns had been stayed, the normal outcome of 
which was putting to silence.  
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 In one instance only, Cunninghame v. Gillaspy, did the objector to the banns 
actually start proceeding before the Commissaries. On this occasion, the alleged 
impediment was prior promise of marriage per verba de praesenti, but the pursuer 
succumbed in probation, the Commissaries accordingly assoilizing the defender and 
decerning them quit of the allegation in all times coming. Since the allegation had 
not been proven there was no place for a declarator of freedom and since the objector 
to the banns had succumbed in probation, there was no need to put them to silence 
explicitly. The action was conceived as seeking solemnization of marriage between 
the litigants on the grounds of sponsalia per verba de praesenti and as such, whilst is 
arose from the staying of the banns, it was not a matter for freedom and silence. 
 In the remaining cases the pursuer was always the person whose banns had 
been stayed, whilst the defender was the stayer of the banns. In 4 of these 9 
remaining cases, the stayer of the banns appeared before the Commissaries, whilst 
the remaining 5 had to be resolved without the Commissaries having seen the stayer. 
In the 3 of the 4 instances when the stayers appeared, the case was conceived 
as if the stayers had in fact started the proceeding themselves, and the case proceeded 
along the lines of Cunninghame v. Gillaspy. In Williamsone v. Stevinsone, following 
the proclamation of banns in the kirk of Kirknewton for the marriage of James 
Williamson to a third party (Elizabeth Johnston), Janet Stevenson had stayed the 
banns on the grounds of prior promise of marriage with subsequent copula. Whilst 
Stevenson had clearly delayed in resolving the matter before the Commissaries, she 
appeared before the Commissaries when summoned and referred her accusations to 
James Williamson’s great oath. Williamson denied the promise, and the 
Commissaries duly assoilized him from Stevenson’s allegation of irregular marriage. 
As with Cunninghame v. Gillaspy, the action was essentially one which sought 
solemnization on the grounds of imperfect marriage, despite the fact that this was the 
desire of the defender rather than the pursuer. This being so, there was no call for 
Williamson to be declared free (no promise of marriage having been proven), nor for 
Stevinson to be put to silence.989 Murray v. Barry followed this exact same 
pattern,990 whilst in Carrik v. Gibsoun, the objection to the banns was promise of 
marriage only, and whilst the Commissaries provided the same remedy as these other 
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similar cases, they added that the marriage for which the banns had been proclaimed 
was to proceed.991 
The final case in this group does not conform to this pattern of construing the 
action as essentially one of solemnization. In Pawton v. Dauidson the defender had 
stayed the banns of Walter Paton, alleging promise of marriage. Whilst Euphame 
Davidson did not appear before the Commissaries to hear them pronounce decreet, 
she had “comperit personalie befoir the saidis Commissaris, and suorne declarit that 
the said Valter had mad na promeis of mariage to hir in ony tyme bigane”. In this, 
there is a suggestion of irregular procedure: had the defender appeared during the 
course of litigation, it would have been normal to admit the allegation to the 
defender’s probation, who would then have referred the matter to the pursuer’s oath, 
as with the other 3 cases in this group. However, there is a suggestion that the 
defender appeared before the Commissaries of her own accord and, prior to the 
matter being formally admitted to probation, made faith that she had no just cause to 
stay the banns. This might explain the unexpected wording of the Commissaries 
decreet, since they decerned “the said Valter to be frie of the said Ewfame Dauidsoun 
of the allegit promeis of mariage allegit maid to hir be the said Valter”.992 This 
declarator of freedom was clearly inappropriate in the context: since it had been 
established that there was no promise of marriage, there was no call for Paton to be 
declared free from it. The question therefore is whether or not the Commissaries 
could have applied another remedy. Since the allegation had not actually been 
admitted to the defender’s probation, it follows that it would have been inappropriate 
for the Commissaries to assoilize the pursuer as they had done in the other 3 cases in 
this group. Similarly, since the defender had nevertheless admitted that the allegation 
was unfounded, there was no direct need to put the defender to silence, since it would 
have been reasonable to presume that the defender would not continue to make her 
allegations, having already admitted that she had no just cause. The problem of 
remedy would therefore seem to have arisen out of an irregularity of procedure, 
namely the failure of either party’s position to be formally admitted to probation. In 
this scenario, it would perhaps have been best for the Commissaries to positively 
decern the minister to proceed to solemnize the marriage for which the banns had 
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been proclaimed, as was the case in Carrik v. Gibsoun. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
Commissaries elected to declare Paton free demonstrates that the various remedies 
which could be applied were tantamount to the same thing, and that in an a-typical 
case, freedom, silence or decreet authorizing solemnization would have had the same 
effect.  
The relatively indiscriminate application of any of these three remedies may 
be seen in the final 5 cases which remain to be discussed. Before proceeding, a 
number of terms must be qualified. In the cases that follow the ‘stayer’ of the banns 
proved reluctant to pursue the matter further before the Commissaries of Edinburgh. 
The party whose banns had been stayed was therefore obliged to institute 
proceedings before the Commissaries themselves, and was often designated the 
‘complainer’. Thus, in terms of the ensuing litigation, the ‘complainer’ was the 
pursuer, the ‘stayer’ the defender. Nevertheless, in the event that the ‘stayer’ 
appeared when summoned, the Commissaries were inclined to admit the stayer’s 
original accusations (by which the banns had been initially stayed) to probation, thus 
in effect making the stayer the pursuer, and their earlier accusations a formal libelled 
allegation.    
For example, in Ramsay v. Myll the defender stayed the banns by making an 
accusation of promise of marriage, but when summoned to “tak ane day for 
persewing of the complener vpoun his allegit promeis and ony vther caus scho hes to 
lay to his charge” with certification that is she failed to appear the Commissaries’ 
would put her to silence, she failed to appear. The turn of phrase used here reveals 
the way in which the case could run against the grain of its initial conception: the 
pursuer became the ‘complainer,’ whilst the defender (the ‘stayer’) was invited to 
pursue them. Since Mill failed to appear when summoned, the Commissaries 
“imputtis silence to the said Christiane [Myll] in tyme cuming and ordanis the bannis 
& mariage to proceid, nochtwithstanding ony impediment opponit be hir 
thairaganis”.993 In this respect, the failure of the defender to take up the 
Commissaries offer to pursuer the ‘complenar’ simplified the case, casting the 
‘complenar’ in the role of a pursuer seeking the Commissaries to put a defender to 
silence.  
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The resolution of this kind of action without the presence of the stayer of the 
banns was of course unsatisfactory in terms of formal probation. The allegation could 
only be referred to the complainer’s oath with the permission of the stayer of the 
banns, and as such, when they failed to appear, the Commissaries were obliged to 
pronounce decreet in lieu of any formal probation of whatever quality. In 
Maistertoun v. Stobye the case proceeded upon the same lines as Ramsay v. Myll, 
with the exception that when the defender failed to appear before the Commissaries, 
she was ordained “not to stop the proclamatioun of the saidis bannis nor mariage in 
tyme cuming nor to mak impediment thairto bot that the samyn salbe done as aucht 
of the law”.994 This conditional putting to silence has already been noted in Gibsoun 
v. Robesoun where the discrepancy was accounted for by drawing attention to the a-
typical jurisdictional features of the case. But in the present case, it is difficult to 
understand why the silence was conditional, since it scarcely differed in particulars 
from Ramsay v. Myll. The answer may lie in the discretion of the Commissaries. 
Some of these cases did not readily lend themselves to the pronouncement of legally 
binding final decisions, and on occasion the Commissaries were clearly inclined to 
allow for the possibility that the stayer of the banns might have just cause to institute 
proceedings before them at a later date. This tentative approach may well have arisen 
out of the separation of ecclesiastical procedure and consistorial jurisdiction which 
the Reformation had occasioned. The Commissaries must have lacked the intimate 
parochial knowledge of the clergy which had aided the resolution of similar actions 
prior to the Reformation. The lack of certainty or finality in some of the 
Commissaries’ decisions also suggests a more fundamental problem: the laws 
governing the contracting of marriage were ripe for reform. 
Baxter v. Dun proceeded upon similar lines to the cases just discussed, but 
with a different remedy applied. Again the defender had stayed the banns of the 
pursuer, alleging prior promise of marriage, but failed to appear before the 
Commissaries when summoned with certification. In conformity with the 
certification, the Commissaries decerned “the said Patrik [Baxter] tobe fre of the said 
allegit promeis in tyme cuming & him to have libertie to marye the said Alesone 
[Strae] according to his said promeis”.995 There is no clear indication of why on this 
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occasion the Commissaries chose the remedies of declarator of freedom and of 
authorizing solemnization over putting to silence. 
Similar details pertained in Quhytlaw v. Thomsoun with the addition that the 
allegation was promise of marriage with subsequent copula. The alleged copula 
seems to account for the variation of remedy applied by the Commissaries in this 
instance: “The saidis Commissaris be thair decreit decernis the said Jonet 
[Thomsoun] to have na actioun aganis the said Barthilmo [Quhitlaw] for the said 
promeis [& the same]996 gif ony wes maid tobe of nane avale force nor effect & him 
to be fre thairof in all tymes cuming”.997 This belt and braces approach makes sense 
in the circumstances. Since the allegation had not been admitted to probation, the 
Commissaries could not be certain the litigants were not imperfectly married. 
Accordingly, the Commissaries were required to annul the first promise of marriage, 
as a hedge against the possibility that it might actually have been made. Given that 
the promise was annulled, it seems inappropriate to have immediately declared 
Quhytlaw free from the annulled promise; but as has already been discussed, a 
declarator of freedom was tantamount to ordaining the ‘complainer’ to proceed to 
solemnize the marriage for which the banns had been proclaimed.  
The final case to be discussed, Johnestoun v. Kello, has several peculiar 
features, but still falls within the ambit of the group under discussion. In the action 
pursued before the Commissaries, John Johnston of Ridhall libelled that “Cristiane 
Kello now Indwellar in Leyth vpoun hir pretendit maner maid allegience to the said 
minister [Master Adam Lytman Minister of Curry] that the said Johne Johnestoun 
had maid promeis of mariage vnto hir, quha thaireftir stayit the solempnizatioun of 
the said marriage sik as the said Minister yet dois, and on nawyis will nocht do the 
samin, howbeit the said Johnestoun maid na promeis of mariage to the said Cristiane; 
And als that scho is marreit sensyne with Johne Fin[c]al[t]ie indwellar in Leyth”. 
Kello was duly summoned before the Commissaries with certification that if she 
failed to appear “the saidis Commissaris will decerne the said mariage to be 
solemnizat betuix the said Johne Johnestoun and Jonet Stewart.” Kello failed to 
appear, the Commissaries duly decerning “the said marriage to be solempnizat betuix 
the said Johne Johnestoun & Jonet Stewart” in conformity with the banns 
                                                 
996 This is not at all clear, the ‘&’ being interfered with from an ‘f’ on the line below, followed by a 
blurred word, followed by what appears to be ‘same,’ but which is difficult to confirm. 
997 NAS, CC8/2/6, fos. 207v-208r, 9 December 1573. 
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proclaimed.998 Given that it was libelled that Kello had in fact married a third party 
subsequent to the alleged promise of marriage on account of which she stayed 
Johnston’s banns, it seems likely that despite the fact that this point was not admitted 
to probation, the Commissaries judged that there was no need to declare Johnston 
free from the promise, and that it was unlikely that Kello needed formally to be put 
to silence. In this situation, the Commissaries clearly deemed it best to decern the 
proposed solemnization to proceed in conformity with the banns proclaimed. 
 
 Several conclusions can be drawn from the evidence presented in this 
chapter. It has been seen that in strict jurisdictional terms the tribunals of the 
Protestant Kirk were prepared to both accept and resist the consistorial jurisdiction of 
the Commissaries of Edinburgh. Yet the complex nature of the legacy of the spiritual 
jurisdiction in post-Reformation Scotland led to more pragmatic co-operation in the 
more nebulous world of the day-to-day regulation of the personal lives of Scots by 
the Commissaries and the Kirk. Such co-operation occurred in an often confused and 
fragmented context. Whilst the differentiation of the old spiritual jurisdiction into 
consistorial and legal aspects on the one hand, and disciplinary and moral aspects on 
the other, was undoubtedly a prominent feature of the difficulties of the situation, this 
was only part of the problem facing the Commissaries and the Kirk from the mid-
1560s. The analysis of the litigation and relations arising out of the staying of banns 
demonstrates that the failure in Scotland to simplify and reform the laws governing 
the contracting of marriage compounded the problems experienced by the 
Commissaries in trying to regulate the marital lives of early modern Scots. Yet 
within this confused situation, boundaries of a sort do appear to have been drawn as 
both the Commissaries and Kirk felt their way forward into new and in some ways 
subtly unfamiliar territory. The analysis of actions of slander involving an 
overlapping or confluence of the Commissaries’ and Kirk’s jurisdictions has 
demonstrated that far from being a source of conflict, such actions witnessed a 
mutual desire for order and co-operation from both sides. The formulation of precise 
jurisdictional boundaries between the two systems of courts and tribunals was not 
always achieved, but in a sense that was the nature of the case: the harmony of the 
                                                 
998 NAS, CC8/2/6, fos. 226v-227r, 11 January 1573/4. 
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medieval polity had taken centuries to develop; it could not be replaced in a few 






 The early history of the Commissaries of Edinburgh is one of the forgotten 
chapters in the history of the Scottish Reformation. The research and arguments put 
forward in this thesis have had both a general significance for Scottish Reformation 
studies, as well as a more particular significance for certain branches of legal and 
ecclesiastical history.  
 The Commissaries of Edinburgh seem to have been intimately involved at the 
very centre of the jurisdictional and legal disorder which the early stages of the 
Scottish Reformation occasioned. Indeed, it is really the disorder and revolutionary 
nature of events which make the history of the spiritual jurisdiction during the 
Scottish Reformation so unique: issues and ideas which normally remained latent, 
un-discussed or simply abandoned in other Reformations were often brought into 
sharp focus and directly addressed. From the very beginning the events surrounding 
the cessation of the old courts spiritual and the appointment of the Commissaries 
raised several major issues. It has been argued that for various members of Mary’s 
government involved in the appointment of the Commissaries of Edinburgh, the 
actions of the Lords of the Congregation had indeed been rebellious and illegal, and 
had not been the just resistance of loyal subjects against the religious and political 
policies of unjust rulers. It has also been argued that in the same way the legality of 
the first Reformation Parliament and the constitutional basis of the Protestant Kirk 
were also not accepted by various jurists within Mary’s government. These positions 
found direct expression both in the nuanced manner in which the Commissaries were 
appointed and in a number of practical problems the Commissaries had to deal with. 
Great care seems to have been taken not to grant the constitutional validity of the 
suppression of the courts spiritual and the statutes of the first Reformation 
Parliament, whilst at the same time dealing with the practical legal and jurisdictional 
consequences of the ‘uproar for religion’.  
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 From the perspective of Reformation ecclesiology the early history of the 
Commissaries has also proved significant. There are clear indications that the early 
stages of the Scottish Reformation were not only anti-papal but anti-episcopal, and 
that those who appointed the Commissaries were hard pressed to preserve the 
principle of episcopal jurisdiction and continue the administration of its legal 
functions. Yet at the same time the manifest conflict between the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh and John Winram, superintendent of Fife, Fotherick and Strathearn has 
suggested that the principle and authority of episcopal government were also present 
in the early Reformed organization of the Protestant Kirk.  
 The early history of the Commissaries has also proved significant in terms of 
legal history, contributing a further chapter in the history of the Canon law in 
Protestant lands. Given the initial violence expressed towards the Canon law by 
radical sections within Scottish Protestantism, it has been argued that the retention of 
so much of the Canon law in early Scots consistorial law avoided the mistakes of the 
early Lutheran Reformation, an achievement attributed in part to the skill and 
cunning of James Balfour. Yet this thesis’s approval of the survival of the Canon law 
has not been uncritical, and the problems attending the continued enforcement of the 
un-reformed Canon law concerning the contracting of marriage have been 
deprecated, both within the context of actions for solemnization and of actions 
arising out of the staying of banns. Protestant reforms of the Canon law have also 
been considered, and it has been argued that Scottish Protestant divorce on the 
grounds of adultery was a uniquely Scottish divorce combining concepts from both 
Canon law divorces a mensa et thoro and a vinculo matrimonii. It has also been 
argued that such reforms were predicated in part upon the alteration of the 
relationship between theology and law, and that the direct interpolation of the 
Levitical law into Canon law bypassed the need for a thorough formulation of a new 
Scottish Protestant doctrine of marriage. 
 In terms of ecclesiastical history the early history of the Commissaries has 
also proved significant, re-visiting issues and ideas which were last discussed in the 
mid-nineteenth century. The various and often complex policies employed by the 
Commissaries towards the tribunals of the Protestant Kirk when dealing with the 
legacy of the years between the cessation of the courts spiritual and the 
Commissaries’ appointment, and in the years following their appointment, suggest 
that the learning of the first Commissaries was well employed. The old nineteenth-
century narrative of the conflict of two discrete systems competing over the same 
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jurisdiction has been placed within its proper constitutional and historical 
perspective. It has been argued that the Commissaries and the Kirk enjoyed their own 
respective jurisdictions, neither of which were considered at the time to be civil, and 
that whilst these jurisdictions touched and overlapped in many complex ways, the 
general approach of both authorities seems to have been one of mutual 
acknowledgement and a desire for co-operation. Yet at the same time the example of 
John Winram has provided a tantalizing glimpse of how the jurisdiction of the Kirk 
might have developed had the Commissaries not been appointed. 
 The actual Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh has also proved 
interesting in its own right. The Court itself has been shown to have been well 
organized and well staffed, hearing a multitude of actions from all over Scotland. It 
has been argued that its Romano-canonical procedure was a slightly improved 
version of that employed in the Courts of the Officials, whilst its summary 
procedure, together with a willingness to allow even illiterate parties to litigate 
without the services of men of law, has been argued to have rendered the 
Commissaries accessible to Scots from all walks of life. The length and cost of 
litigation has been argued to have been reasonable and efficient within the ambitious 
context of the administration of national jurisdictions within early modern Scotland. 
On a local level, the ‘Commissariot of Edinburgh’ has been portrayed as a popular 
court, or at least a court which provided a number of useful legal functions in an 
accessible and reasonably priced manner. Indeed the Court of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh has been shown to be a significant, even integral part of the wider Scottish 
legal system. 
 Finally, it has been maintained that the principle of episcopal authority and 
jurisdiction was central to the intellectual and constitutional coherence of the 
jurisdiction of the Commissaries of Edinburgh and the inferior Commissariots during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This is despite the fact that many of the 
outward signs of episcopacy and episcopal jurisdiction were for a time obscured 
during the Reformation era. But it is clear that the principle survived in constitutional 
thought and was given fuller outward expression during the reign of James VI. This 
theme of episcopal authority and jurisdiction gives the Scottish history of the 
spiritual jurisdiction strong parallels with the English example. It is indeed truly 
remarkable that it was neither during the Scottish nor English Reformations that the 
medieval idea of the spiritual jurisdiction was in fact undermined, but rather during 
the rise of new religious forces and ideas during the troubled reign of Charles I.  
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 If progress has been made in the history of the early Commissaries, at the 
same time there is still further work to be done at every point. The limits of the 
knowledge and understanding of the present researcher have undoubtedly led to a 
lack of awareness of the wider significance that this study may have for other 
branches of historical knowledge. The very nature of the subject has demanded the 
straddling of the disciplines of medieval and early modern history, together with 
legal and ecclesiastical history. In this, the limits of the study will be apparent to 
those whose specialize in each respective field. John Riddell’s closing remark at the 
end of his own treatise on the Commissaries of Edinburgh and their consistorial law 
still seems remarkably apt: “I cannot at the same time bid adieu to this curious and 
interesting subject, which strikes me on the whole to have been but little canvassed, 
without hoping that, having thus far broken ground, it may be further investigated 
and matured by others in the manner I have attempted, from our pure native 
sources”.999  
    
 
                                                 
999 Riddell, Inquiry, i, 554. 
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Carta constitutionis Commissariorum Edinburgi1 
 
 
[1] MARIA Dei gratia, Regina Scotorum, omnibus probis hominibus suis, ad quos 
praesentes literae pervenerint, salutem.2 Noveritis, quod uti palam constat ob 
cessationem seu absentiam ecclesiasticae jurisdictionis Officialium & 
Commissariorum intra hoc nostrum regnum, omnes actiones & causae  
consistoriales cognoscendi & in consistoriis decidendi antea in usu fuerunt, per 
longam justitiae dilationem sic dampnificatae extiterunt, magna una pars 
nostrorum subditorum, quod ipsi qui dictas actiones occurrentes habent, 
mentisque existunt promptitudinem atque ad prosequendum haben’ multimode 
per carentiam ordinis ejusdem postpositi existunt:  
 
[2] Et nos ingens gravamen, aut populi nostri laesionem per hujusmodi recepimus, 
ac indies recipimus, volentes eos inde relevare ; nec non per provisionis viam in 
hujusmodi locum, vulgo Rowme,3 bonum quendam ordinem stabilire, sic quod 
justitiam illis exacte, rationabiliter, & cum omni diligentia in posterum ministrari 
seu fieri poterit:  
 
[3] Quocirca, cum avisamento Dominorum nostri secreti consilii, fecimus, 
constituimus, & ordinavimus, ac facimus, constituimus, & ordinamus, per 
praesentes, dilectos nostros, consiliarium confisum, & clericos, Magistros 
Jacobum Balfour Rectorem de Flisk, Edwardum Henrysoun in juribus seu 
legibus Doctorem, Clementem Litill Advocatum, & Robertum Maitland, ac 
quemque eorum, conjunctim & divisim in modo sequenti, nostros Commissarios 













                                                 
1 as per Balfour’s Practicks, ii, 670-673. Another version of this charter may be found in RPC, xiv, 
Addenda AD 1545-1625, 304-307: Masson notes of the version he worked from that “the Latin in this 
document is very bad, not only in the copy among the Miscellaneous Papers, but also in the two other 
and more complete copies with which that has been compared and which have supplied some defects 
in it: viz. (1) A copy in the Commissary Office of Edinburgh, (2) A copy in Balfour’s Practicks…”.  
2 salutem missing in RPC version. 
3 rowme in RPC version. 
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Charter of constitution of the Commissaries of Edinburgh4 
 
 
[1] MARY by the grace of God, Queen of Scots, to all her good men, to whom this 
present letter5 shall come, greeting. Know,6 that since it is clearly known by 
reason of the inactivity or absence of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the 
Officials and Commissaries within this our realm, all consistorial actions and 
causes which used to be7 discussed and decided in the consistories have been 
thus damaged8 through long delay of justice, since a great part of our subjects 
have these said actions in dependence, and intentions in readiness, and also 
divers things to be prosecuted in different ways, which through a lack of order 
have been postponed:  
 
[2] And we have willingly undertaken, and do undertake, to relieve our people from 
the great damage and skaith which through these things has arisen; and also to 
establish certain good ordinance by way of provision in this Realm,9 so that 
justice may be ministered and done exactly, reasonably and with all due 
diligence hereafter to all those [subjects]:  
 
[3] On account of which, with the advice of our secret council, we have made, 
constituted and ordained, and make, constitute and ordain, by [these] presents, 
our trusted counsellor and well beloved clerks10 Masters James Balfour, parson 
of Flisk, Edward Henryson, doctor in the laws, Clement Litill, advocate and 
Robert Maitland, and any one of them jointly and severally, in manner 





                                                 
4 I am grateful to David B Smith, M.A., LL.B., formerly Sheriff of North Strathclyde at Kilmarnock 
for examining a draft of this translation and for offering various improvements in style and in the 
accurate use of current Scots legal phrases. Any inaccuracies and defects in this translation remain my 
own. 
5 R.E. Latham’s Revised Medieval Latin Word List (British Academy, 2004), 369 indicates that 
praesentes (pl.) has the sense of ‘the present letter or document’. 
6 lit. fut. perf. 2nd per. pl. nosco, but seems to be rendered ‘know’ in RPS translations and church 
documents, i.e. ‘noveritis, frater meus…’ etc. 
7 lit. ‘which were formerly in the habit of being’. 
8 i.e. sic dampnificatae extiterunt, ‘they have stood out to such an injurious degree’. 
9 “per provisionis viam in hujusmodi locum, vulgo Rowme [rowme in RPC version]”. It is tempting at 
first glance to think this refers to Rome, but “by was of provision in this place, in the vulgar rowme”, 
suggests DOST’s definition of “Roume, Rome, Rwme, n., A realm, as in the rovme of Scotlande”. The 
presentation by which Alexander Sym was appointed a Commissary of Edinburgh stated that he had 
been ‘surrogated’ “in the place and rowme of the said Maister James Balfoure” (RSS, v, 2396).   
10 lit. ‘beloved clerics’ but the form ‘traist counsaloure and weilbelovit clerkis’ is used at RPC, v, 
2396. 




[4] dando, concedendo & committendo illis, illorumque cuique conjunctim & 
divisim, nostram plenam potestatem ac mandatum speciale intra burgum 
nostrum de Edinburgh, in quacunque conveniente parte ejusdem, sedendi, & ullo 
diei tempore, prout illis placuerit, coram eis omnes nostros ligeos infra bondas 
vicecomitatuum nostrorum de Edinburgh principali, & intra constabulariam de 
Haddinton, Peblis, Linlithgow, & vicecomitatus nostri de Striveling, a Striveling 
orientaliter, in eisdem villam & parochiam de Striveling comprehendendo, atque 
omnes actiones concernentes decimas, testata bona, injurias, curatorum 
donationem, acto nostri parliamenti conformiter discutiendi, decernendi & 
decidendi: nec non omnes alias actiones & causas intentatas seu intentandas, 
coram illis per ullas personas intra bondas praedictas residentes, aut contra ipsas 
per quascunque alias, quae in consistorio perprius judicari & decidi solent;  
 
[5] una cum omnibus causis & actionibus beneficialibus, matrimonialibus, divortii 
& bastardiae, intentatis sive intentandis, per quascumque personam seu 
personas, infra ullas hujus nostri regni partes vel loca commorantes, aut materias 
matrimoniales inter partes procul residentes, quae ob paupertatem, longum 
placitum, seu justitiam prosequi minime valent, qualificatis personis in patria, 
vel locis proximioribus locis quibus ipsi commorantur sive resident 
committendi; pro quibus in causa illa respondere tenebuntur:  
 
[6] Omnibus quoque appellationibus interpositis seu dependentibus ab ullo alio 
Commissario, seu Commissariis, quoquove alio judice ecclesiastico hoc nostrum 
infra regnum retroactis temporibus; appellationes etiam sive reductiones 

























[4] by giving, granting and committing to them, and any of them jointly and 
severally, our full power and special commission within our burgh of Edinburgh, 
to sit in whichever convenient part of the same, and at whatever time of day it 
pleases them, for discussing, decerning and deciding before them all actions 
concerning teinds,11 bequests of goods12, defamation, [and] giving of curators, 
conforming to the act of our parliament,13 pertaining to our lieges within the 
bounds of our principal Sheriffdom of Edinburgh, and within the Constabulary 
of Haddington, of Peebles and of Linlithgow, and our Sheriffdom of Stirling, 
from east Stirling, including the same town and parish of Stirling: and also all 
other actions and causes brought or to be brought before them, by any persons 
residing within the bounds foresaid, or against them by whatsoever other person, 
which were formerly accustomed to be judged and decided in the consistory;  
 
[5] together with all benefice, matrimony, divorce and bastardry causes and actions, 
brought or to be brought by whatsoever person or persons within any parts or 
dwelling places of this our realm, or matrimonial matters between parties 
residing far distant, which on account of poverty, long plea14, or justice they are 
not able to pursue, by committing15 such matters to qualified persons in the 
district or places nearer the places where [the parties] themselves dwell or 
reside; for which they16 will be held to answer in these causes:  
 
[6] and also all appellations interponed or depending from any other Commissary or 
Commissaries or other ecclesiastical judge whatsoever within this our realm in 
times gone by; also appellations or reductions interponed hereafter from any 










                                                 
11 decimas. 
12 testata bona. 
13 Presumably the Act “Anent the ordour for geving of curatouris to minouris” (RPS, A1555/6/9; APS, 
ii, 493, c.8). 
14 longum placitum. 
15 lit. of committing as in with power… of committing. 
16 presumably the Commissaries of Edinburgh. 




[7] CUM POTESTATE praenominatis Magistris Jacobo, Edwardo, Clementi, & 
Roberto, ac ipsorum ulli, conjunctim & divisim,  
 
[8] omnes alios judices incompetentes in illis causis, seu casibus, infra hoc nostrum 
regnum, inhibendi ad procedendum in causis dictorum Commissariorum 
nostrorum jurisdictioni pertinentibus five spectantibus; cum certificatione iis; si 
in hoc succubuerint, aut defecerint, sive processerint, quodcunque illis agere 
contigerit depost, in se nullum nulliusque effectus declarabitur, cum omnibus 
quae desuper sequentur ; ipsique pro eorum inobedientia punientur:  
 
[9] Omnimodos contractus, obligationes, acta, aliave scripta per partes, vel notarios 
ad ipsorum mandata, subscript’17 proportantes sive gerentes, quod ipsae partes 
eosdem in dictorum Commissariorum libris registrari contentae sunt, cum literis 
ad eorum 18nostrum positionis seu namationis desuper donandis, recipiendi, 
atque in eorum libris supradictis registrari causandi ;  
 
[10] Praecepta pro testium summonitione ad comparendum fidele testimonium 
perhibere in omnibus causis, motis movendisve coram illis, sub similibus 
pecuniariis poenis, ac si praelibatis noftris Commissariis, secundum qualitatem 
causae expediens visum fuerit, dirigendi ; & si testes summoniti existentes 
minime comparuerint, eorum Officiarios namare, & dictas poenas 
instructionibus sibi desuper exhibitis applicandas fore causandi:  
 
[11] Omnia deforciamenta, per quascunque personam, seu personas, super eorum 
Officiariis praescriptis commissa vocandi, discutiendi, ac coram illis decernendi, 
quorum poenae adeo graves erunt, ac si noster Officiarius armorum in 
executione nostrarum literarum deforciatus extitisset; ex eo quod eorum 













                                                 
17 subscripta in RPC version. 
18 [cornu?] inserted here in RPC version. 




[7] WITH POWER to the forenamed Masters James, Edward, Clement and Robert, or 
any of them jointly or severally,  
 
[8] of inhibiting all other judges not competent to these causes or cases, within this 
our realm, from proceeding in causes pertaining or belonging19 to the 
jurisdiction of our said Commissaries; with certification to them; if in this they 
should succumb or fail or continue proceedings, whatsoever falls to them to do 
afterwards will be declared null in the self and of no effect, with all that follows 
thereupon; and for their disobedience they themselves will be punished; 
 
[9] of receiving and causing to be registered all manner of contracts, obligations, 
acts and other deeds20 signed by parties, or by notaries at their instruction, 
purporting or bearing that the parties themselves are content for the same to be 
registered in the books of the said Commissaries, with letters to be given to them 
thereupon of our fines or poindings.21 
 
[10] of directing precepts for the summoning of witnesses to compear to bear faithful 
witness in all causes, commenced or to be commenced before them, under 
similar pecuniary pains, as if [before] our aforementioned22 Commissaries,23 
according to the nature of the cause as will have seemed expedient; and of 
causing their Officers to poind,24 if witnesses having been summoned do not 
compear,25 poinding26 the said pains by their own instructions thereanent, the 
said instructions having been first exhibited in court:27 
 
[11] of calling, discussing and decerning before them all deforcements committed 
against their Officers’ precepts, by whatsoever person or persons, the pains of 
which are as grave as if our Officers of Arms had been deforced in the execution 
of our letters; since their Officers are executors of our justice and so in this 
respect they are our Officers: 
                                                 
19 spectantibus: specto ab has the sense of ‘to pertain, belong to’ (Latham, 447). 
20 scriptum is noted as having the meaning ‘deed, bond’ (Latham, 426). 
21 cum literis ad eorum nostrum positionis seu namationis despuer donandis: namatio can have the 
sense ‘distraining’ (Latham, 310) – thus poinding, whilst position can have the sense ‘impost’ 
(Latham, 361) – thus fines. 
22 praelibatis nostris. 
23 coram illis… ac si praelibatis nostris Commissariis. The sense seems to be “before them [the new 
Commissaries]… as if before our aforementioned Commissaries [i.e. pre-Reformation]”. 
24 namare, to distrain or attach (Latham, 310). 
25 minime comparuerint. 
26 dictas poenas…applicandas, from applico ‘to attach’. 
27 lit. “by their own having been exhibited in court instructions”. 
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[12] Testamenta quarumcumque personae vel personarum infra bondas suae 
particularis jurisdictionis supradictas, cujusvis valoris & quantitatis cujuscunque 
sint : Nec non omnia alia testamenta quarumcumque28 personarum infra ullam 
aliam partem hujus nostri regni residentium aut commorantium, quorum pars 
defuncti summam quinquaginta librarum excedet, confirmandi ;  
 
[13] praefata testamenta in libris ipsorum Commissariorum registrari causandi ; 
dativas, si opus fuerit, in forma juris sub cautione dandi sive deliberandi:  
 
[14] Qui quidem processus, ac quaecumque dicti Commissarii, ullive ipsorum 
conjunctim aut divisim, aut eorum Officiarii in actionibus & causis suprascriptis 
illorum nominibus agere seu perficere contigerint, cum omnibus incidentibus, 
emergentibus, annexis, connexis, & dependentiis desuper, adeo valide, legitime 
tantique grandis valoris, fortitudinis & effectus, veluti ullus processus seu 
sententiae, quae per quemcumque judicem aut judices consistoriales deductae, 
vel datae intra hoc nostrum regnum, quocumque29 elapso tempore fuerunt:  
 
[15] Acta, decreta, & sententias pronunciandi: Procuratores coram illis, pro 
prosecutione defensioneque dictarum actionum admittendi; Ordinarios 
officiarios pro executione suarum directionum faciendi, creandi & ordinandi; pro 
quibus respondere tenebuntur; & generaliter omnia alia & singula faciendi, 
exercendi & utendi, quae in similibus officiis de jure seu consuetudine sunt, aut 





















                                                 
28 quarumcunque in RPC version. 
29 quocunque in RPC version. 
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[12] of confirming testaments of whatever person or persons within the bounds of our 
abovementioned particular jurisdiction, of whatever value and amount: and also 
all other testaments of whatever person or persons dwelling or residing within 
any other part of this our realm, of which the dead’s part shall exceed the sum of 
fifty pounds;  
 
[13] of causing the foresaid testaments to be registered in the books of the 
Commissaries themselves; and of giving or delivering datives, if it was needful, 
in the form of law under caution:  
 
[14]Which proceedings30 and whatever else the said Commissaries, or any of them 
jointly or severally, or their officers, will resolve certainly to do or perform in 
their names in the above written actions and causes, with all and sundry 
powers31 thereanent, [are to be] just as valid, lawful32 and of the same great 
worth, value, strength and effect as any proceedings or sentences which were 
deduced or given by whatever consistorial judge or judges within this our realm 
at any time past33:  
 
[15] of pronouncing acts, decreets and sentences: of admitting procurators before 
them for the prosecution and defence of the said actions; of constituting, creating 
and ordaining ordinary officers for the execution of their precepts; for whom 
they will be held to answer; and of making, exercising and using generally all 
other things34 that are in similar offices according to law or custom, or are 













                                                 
30 processus may have the sense of legal ‘proceedings’ (Latham, 374). 
31 literally with all appurtenances, emergents, annex, connex and dependencies. 
32 The sense of this clause seems to be “whatever the Commissaries now do is to enjoy the same 
strength, force and effect as anything done by the old consistorial judges”: sunt or erunt has therefore 
been inferred as [are to be]. 
33 quocumque elapso tempore, which might be better rendered in Older Scots ‘at ony time bipast’. 
34 omnia alia et singula, thus lit. ‘all other and every things’. 
35 ullo elapso tempore. 
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[16] Ratum et gratum habentes & habiturae totum & quicquid praenominati nostri 
Commissarii, aut eorum quicumque, suive officiarii & ministri in praemissis rite 
duxerit seu duxerint faciendum. Ac volumus quod praesens nostra commissio 
jurisdictioni collegii nostri justitiae, Vicecomitum, Senescallorum, Balivorum 
regalium regalitatum Comitum, Dominorum, Baronum, & Liberetenentium, 
Praepositorum ac Balivorum, seu ullius alius temporalis judicis cujuscumque 
infra hoc nostrum regnum, in causis eorum jurisdictioni pertinentibus, 
nequaquam praejudicabit, neque derogationem faciet.  
 
[17] Quare, universis & singulis quorum interest, vel interesse poterit, stricte 
praecipimus & mandamus, quatenus supra specificatis nostris Commissariis, aut 
eorum cuilibet conjunctim & divisim, suisque officiariis & ministris, in omnibus 
& singulis praemissa concernentibus prompte respondeant, pareant & intendant, 
sub omni poena quae competere poterit in hac parte:  
 
[18] Praesentibus, nostris bona voluntate & beneplacito, ac quousque ulterior ordo in 
praemissis capiatur, duraturis.  
 
[19] Datum sub testimonio nostri magni sigilli, apud Edinburgh octavo die mensis 
Februarii, anno Domini millesimo quingentesimo sexagesimo tertio, & regni 
noftri vicesimo secundo. 
 

















                                                 
36 Per signaturam manu Supremae Dominae nostrae Reginae subscriptam in RPC version. 
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[16] Regarding as established and approved, now and in the future, all this and 
whatever else our forenamed Commissaries, or whichever of them, or their 
officers and servants, will have duly caused to be done in these aforementioned 
things.37 And we intend that our present commission will by no means prejudice 
nor cause derogation to the jurisdiction of our College of Justice, of Sheriffs, of 
Stewards, of Baillies’ Regalities,38 of Earls’ Regalities,39 of Lords, of Barons, 
and of Freeholders,40 of Provosts and of Baillies, or any other temporal judges 
whatsoever within this our realm, in causes pertaining to their jurisdiction.   
 
[17] Therefore to each and all persons of which it is of interest or will be of interest, 
we strictly enjoin and admonish that they promptly respond, obey and submit to 
our above specified Commissaries, or any of them41 jointly or severally, and 
their officers or servants, in each and every thing concerning the premises under 
every penalty which will be competent in this respect:42  
 
[18] by the present letter, to be confirmed at our good will and pleasure, and until 
such time as further order43 may be taken.  
 
[19] Given under the testimony of our great seal, at Edinburgh the eighth day of the 
month of February, in the year of the Lord one thousand five hundred and sixty 
three, and in the twenty-second of our reign.  
 
Signed by the hand of our supreme lady the Queen.44 
 
                                                 
37 in premissis has the sense of ‘premises, things mentioned before’ (Latham, 368). 
38 balivorum regalium. 
39 regalitatum comitum. 
40 liberetenentium: ‘liberetenentibus serviciis’ had been translated as ‘freeholders’ services’ in RPS, 
1581/10/89. 
41 cuilibet eorum, as per William of Ockham’s Dialogus, part 3, tract 1, book 4, caput VII, as 
translated by John Scott (www.britac.ac.uk/pubs/dialogus/t31d4.html). 
42 in hac parte. 
43 ulterior ordo: ulterior may have the sense ‘further, additional’ (Latham, 499). 
44 Per signaturam manu S. D. N. R. Subscriptam translated as per RPS, 1703/5/3 & 1706/10/3. 
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1 Those cases names shown in bold are known to have reached decreet, but after June 1569: for references for these decreets, please consult Appendix II, C. 
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   285 
 
B: FREQUENCY OF CONSISTORIAL DECREETS, APRIL 1564 TO JUNE 1569 
 
 
Tally Case name Volume Folio 
Date 
YYYY/MM/DD Action Pursuer Defender 
1
Bosuell v. 
Wemyss CC8/2/2 403r-v 1568/03/26 Adherence Bosuell, Robert Wemys, Janet 
2
Cristesone v. 
Lindesay CC8/2/2 284r-v 1567-8/01/24 Adherence 
Crystesoun, 
Williame Lindesay, Isobell 
3
Cruik v. 
























Dowglass CC8/2/3 293r-v 1569/05/02 Adherence 
Wallace, 
Cristiane Dowglass, Andro 
1
Hoppringle v. 
Gib CC8/2/1 196r-v 1564/10/25 Aliment 
Hoppringle, 
Janet Gib, George 
2
Duncane v. 
Fairley CC8/2/3 82v 1568/06/26 
Aliment  
and care of bastards Duncane, Helene Fairley, Duncane 
   286 
1
Cromartie v. 
Caddell CC8/2/3 54r-v  1568/06/17 Annulment 
Cromartie, 
Katherine Caddell, Andro 
2
Lummisden v. 
Maxwell  CC8/2/3 
381r-
382r 1569/06/24 Annulment 
Lummisden, 




























Symone Wier, Johne 
1
Andersone v. 







Nychole CC8/2/2 399v 1567-8/03/24 Divorce for adultery 
Barnair / 
Barnard, 
Margaret Nychole, Johne 
3 Dunlop v. Broun CC8/2/1 
387v-
388r 1564-5/03/14 Divorce for adultery Dunlop, Hew Broun, Elizabeth 
4
Flemyng v. 
Flemyng CC8/2/3 352r-v 1569/06/04 Divorce for adultery 
Flemyng, 





305v 1564-5/01/15 Divorce for adultery Forbes, Johne 
Sandelandis, 
Barbara 
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6
Hardy v. 







276r 1567-8/01/19 Divorce for adultery 






























374r 1569/06/18 Divorce for adultery 
Marchall, 
Elizabeth Broun, Andro 
12 Murray v. Irrwin CC8/2/2 11v-12r 1565/05/07 Divorce for adultery 
Murray, 
Margaret Irwyng, Herbert 
13
Patersone v. 
Bernis CC8/2/3 79v-80r 1568/07/31 Divorce for adultery 
Patersone, 
Cristiane Bernis, Robert 
14
Pawtoun v. 





15 Small v. Moffett CC8/2/2 
294v-
295r 1567-8/01/29 Divorce for adultery Small, Johne Moffett, Isobell 
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16
Wemis v. 
Dunbar CC8/2/3 32v-33r 1568/05/25 Divorce for adultery Wemis, Johne Dunbar, Margaret 
17
Wilsoun v. 





Drippis CC8/2/3 9v 1568/04/27 Divorce for adultery Wrycht, Marioun Drippis, Johne 
1 Currye v. Stevin CC8/2/3 238r 1568-9/03/21 Freedom & Silence Currye, Johne Stevin, Jonet 
2
Gibsoun v. 
Robesoun CC8/2/2 34v-35r 1565/05/24 Freedom & Silence Gibsoun, George Robesoun, Isobell 
3
McWalter v. 





4 Murray v. Barry CC8/2/3 350r 1569/06/04 Freedom & Silence Murray, Robert Barry, Helene 
5
Williamsone v. 
Stevinsone CC8/2/3 67r 1568/07/06 Freedom & Silence 
Williamsoun, 
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divorce 
Hammyltoun, 
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4
Clerk v. 










6 Diksoun v. Tod CC8/2/3 42r-v 1568/06/02 Solemnization 
Diksoun, 
Cristiane Tod, Alexander 
7
Duncane v. 
Fairley CC8/2/3 52v-53r 1568/06/14 Solemnization Duncane, Helene Fairley, Duncane 
8
Ewart v. 
Dryisdale CC8/2/1 65v 1564/06/19 Solemnization Ewart, Margaret Dryisdale, James 
9
Kinross v. Loch 
& Weyland CC8/2/1 48v-49r 1564/06/07 Solemnization 
Kinross, Maister 
Henry, 










11 Reid v. Barclay CC8/2/3 72v 1568/07/17 Solemnization Reid, Jonet 
Barclay, 
Alexander 
12 Reid v. Portuous CC8/2/2 67r 1565/06/27 Solemnization Reid, Janet Portuous, Robert 
13
Scot v. 










Wod CC8/2/3 39r 1568/06/01 Solemnization 
Thomsoun, 
Johne Wod, Margaret 





324v 1564-5/01/26 Tint 
Hammyltoun, 
Jherome Sclater, Elizabeth 
2
Tulloch v. 
Sinclair CC8/2/1 411r-v 1565/03/31 Tint Tulloch, James Sinclair, Margaret
3
Westoun v. 
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C: FREQUENCY OF CONSISTORIAL DECREETS, APRIL 1564 TO JANUARY 1576/7 
 
 
Tally Case name Volume Folio 
Date 





327r 1570/07/19 Adherence Abirnethy, Jonet Moncur, Johne 
2
Archibald v. 
Matho CC8/2/4 4v-5r 
1569/07/03 





171r 1571-2/01/28 Adherence 
Argyll, Archibald 





Wemyss CC8/2/2 403r-v 1568/03/26 Adherence Bosuell, Robert Wemys, Janet 
5
Cristesone v. 
Lindesay CC8/2/2 284r-v 1567-8/01/24 Adherence 
Crystesoun, 
Williame Lindesay, Isobell 
6
Cruik v. 















332r 1567-8/02/17 Adherence 
Hammyltoun, 
Elizabeth Maxwell, Rodgair 
   292 
10 Moffet v. Quhit CC8/2/8  208r-v 1576/07/04 Adherence Moffet, Symont Quhit, Katherine 
11 Murray v. Bruce CC8/2/8  
236v-
237r 1576/07/21 Adherence Murray, Margaret Bruce, Robert 
12
Murray v. Lord 
Torphichane CC8/2/7  265r 1575/07/30 Adherence Murray, Jonet 
Torphichane, 
James Lord 

















Dowglass CC8/2/3 293r-v 1569/05/02 Adherence 
Wallace, 
Cristiane Dowglass, Andro 
17 Wallace v. Sprot CC8/2/5 207v 1572/06/14 Adherence Wallace, Jonet Sprot, Henrye 
18 Watsoun v. Bell CC8/2/4 330v 1570/07/24 Adherence Watsone, Thomas Bell, Jonet 
1 Creich v. Bell CC8/2/6 
224v-
225r 1573-4/01/09 Aliment Creiche, Alesone Bell, Thomas 
2
Hoppringle v. 
Gib CC8/2/1 196r-v 1564/10/25 Aliment Hoppringle, Janet Gib, George 
3
Duncane v. 
Fairley CC8/2/3 82v 1568/06/26 
Aliment  
and care of bastards Duncane, Helene Fairley, Duncane 
1
Cromartie v. 
Caddell CC8/2/3 54r-v  1568/06/17 Annulment 
Cromartie, 
Katherine Caddell, Andro 
2
Kinross v. 
Ogilvy, Fraser & 
Chisholme CC8/2/6 
428r-
429r 1574/07/08 Annulment 
Kinross, Maister 
Henrie, 
Procurator Fiscal Ogilvy, Thomas 












Maxwell  CC8/2/3 
381r-
382r 1569/06/24 Annulment 
Lummisden, 
Jonet Maxwell, Johne 
5
Newtoun v. 
Dalzell CC8/2/5 16v-17r 1570/12/10 Annulment 
Newtoun, 

















8 Paislie v. Haistie CC8/2/1 247v 1564/11/25 Annulment  Paislie, Margaret Haistie, Johne 
1
Bartane v. 
Richesoun CC8/2/8  
259v-







168v 1569-70/02/28 Bastardrie Carnis, Jonet Kennedy, Jonet 
3 Dunbar v. Adair CC8/2/6 
93v-






273r 1570/04/27 Bastardrie Dury, James 
Cokburne, 
Williame 
   294 
5 Lauder v. Lauder CC8/2/7  
245v-
246v 1575/07/23 Bastardrie 
Lauder, Maister 










336v 1570/07/27 Bastardrie Oliphant, Petir 
Oliphantis, 
Margaret & Jonet 
8
Sibbald v. 
Sibbald CC8/2/7  2v-3r 1574/10/[14] Bastardrie Sibbald, Patrik Sibbald, Dauid 
9
Marioribanks v. 





Symone Wier, Johne 
1
Andersone v. 












Nychole CC8/2/2 399v 1567-8/03/24 Divorce for adultery 
Barnair / Barnard, 





275v 1573-4/02/17 Divorce for adultery 
Caquhoune. 
Thomas Watsoun, Violat 
5 Cellare v. Hagye CC8/2/5 
182v-
183r 1571-2/02/26 Divorce for adultery Cellare, Andro Hagye, Eufame 
6 Clerk v. Scot CC8/2/5 46r-v 1570-1/01/12 Divorce for adultery Clerk, Johne Scot, Jonet 
7
Cunnyngham v. 
Hunter CC8/2/6 130r-v 1573/07/02 Divorce for adultery 
Cunyngham, 
Marioun Hunter, William 
   295 
8
Dalmahoy v. 







Borthwick CC8/2/4 335r-v 1570/07/27 Divorce for adultery Diksoun, Adame Borthuik, Jeane 
10
Drummound v. 
















Cowtis CC8/2/8  244r-v 1576/07/25 Divorce for adultery Ducharis, Johnne Cowtis, Mairiorie 
13 Dunlop v. Broun CC8/2/1 
387v-
388r 1564-5/03/14 Divorce for adultery Dunlop, Hew Broun, Elizabeth 
14
Flemyng v. 










Lyndesy CC8/2/6 41r-v 1572-3/01/23 Divorce for adultery Forret, Kathrene Lindesay, David 
17
Fraser v. 





Stewart CC8/2/5 98r 1570-1/02/27 Divorce for adultery Garland, Thomas Stewart, Kathrene 
19
Gourlay v. 
Crystie CC8/2/4 257r 1570/04/15 Divorce for adultery 
Gourlay, 
Kathrene Cristie, Thomas 
20
Gourlay v. 
McQuene CC8/2/8  
116v-





   296 
21 Grant v. Leslie CC8/2/8  
255r-
257r 1576/07/30 Divorce for adultery Grant, Elizabeth Leslie, Johne 
22
Hammiltoun v. 
Caldwell CC8/2/6 27r 1572/12/12 Divorce for adultery 
Hammiltoun, 
Marioun Lady 
Hammiltoun Cladwell, Thomas 
23
Hardy v. 







331r 1570/07/24 Divorce for adultery Hay, Robert Quhyeheid, Jonet 
25
Hendirsone v. 







Sinclair CC8/2/7  
217v-
218v 1575/07/09 Divorce for adultery 
Hepburne, Dame 
Jane Sinclair, Johne 
27
Hereis v. 
Welsche CC8/2/8  
223r-
224r 1576/07/12 Divorce for adultery Hereis, Mathow Welsche, Issobell 
28
Herring v. 
Skrymgeor CC8/2/6 177r-v 1573/10/22 Divorce for adultery 
Herring, 
Elizabeth Skrymgeor, Johne 
29 Hog v. Cutlar CC8/2/6 
147v-










184v 1573/11/04 Divorce for adultery 
Houstoun, 
William Adame, Jonet 
32 Innes v. Innes CC8/2/7  26r-v 1574/11/19 Divorce for adultery Innes, Maragret Innes, Robert 
   297 
33 Ker v. Cranstoun CC8/2/2 
275v-
276r 1567-8/01/19 Divorce for adultery 
Ker, Sir Andrew 
of Hirsale, knycht 
Cranstoun, 
Margaret 
34 Kincaid v. Ross CC8/2/4 18v-19r 1569/07/15 Divorce for adultery Kincaid, Grissell Ross, Johne 
35
Lamb v. 
Andersoun CC8/2/7  
266v-
267r 1575/07/30 Divorce for adultery Lamb, Margaret 
Andersoun, 
Gilbert 
36 Leslie v. Betoun CC8/2/7  164r-v 1575/06/02 Divorce for adultery Leslie, Beatrix Betoun, Dauid 
37
Levingstoun v. 

























418r 1574/06/30 Divorce for adultery 
Leuingstoune, 
Alexander Gordoune, Jonet 
41
Lyndsay v. 
Betoun CC8/2/7  91r-v 1574-5/03/08 Divorce for adultery 
Lyndsay, 






322v 1573-4/03/22 Divorce for adultery 











Foulir CC8/2/6 431r-v 1574/07/09 Divorce for adultery 
Martyne, 
Alexander Foulis, Alisoun 
   298 
45
Maxwell v. 
Maxwell CC8/2/7  8r-v 1574/10/23 Divorce for adultery 
Maxwell, 
Edwarte Maxwell, Jenny 
46
McCrache v. 









374r 1569/06/18 Divorce for adultery 
Marchall, 






diet CC8/2/6, fo. 
318r, 1573-










115r 1570-1/03/12 Divorce for adultery Mure, Gilbert 
McCullocht, 
Elizabeth 
51 Murray v. Irrwin CC8/2/2 11v-12r 1565/05/07 Divorce for adultery Murray, Margaret Irwyng, Herbert 
   299 
52
Ogilvy v. 





Bernis CC8/2/3 79v-80r 1568/07/31 Divorce for adultery 
Patersone, 
Cristiane Bernis, Robert 
54
Pawtoun v. 





55 Porter v. Neill CC8/2/7  
122v-
123r 1575/04/16 Divorce for adultery Porter, Jonet Neill, Dauid 
56 Provand v. Steill CC8/2/4 44v-45r 1569/08/06 Divorce for adultery Provand, James Steill, Isobell 
57 Reid v. Osburne CC8/2/4 
327v-
328r 1570/07/20 Divorce for adultery Reid, James 
Osburne, 
Kathrene 
58 Ross v. Cathcart CC8/2/6 
141r-
142r 1573/07/15 Divorce for adultery Ross, Agnes Cathcart, Johne 
59 Russell v. Wylie CC8/2/8  225r-v 1576/07/13 Divorce for adultery Russell, Issobell Wylie, Alexander 
60
Setoun v. 
Buquhanane CC8/2/7  
154v-
155r 1575/05/19 Divorce for adultery Setoun, Elizabeth 
Buquhanane, 
Johne 
61 Small v. Moffett CC8/2/2 
294v-
295r 1567-8/01/29 Divorce for adultery Small, Johne Moffett, Isobell 
62 Souter v. Dunce CC8/2/6 
358r-
359r 1574/05/03 Divorce for adultery Souter, Dauid Douce, Jonet 
63
Stewart of Appin 
v. McConle CC8/2/6 157r-v 1573/07/29 Divorce for adultery Stewart, Johne Nicole, Ewfame 
64
Stewart v. 
Murray CC8/2/6 252r-v 1573-4/01/28 Divorce for adultery Stewart, Robert Murray, Eufame 
   300 
65
Sutherland  v. 
Sinclair CC8/2/5 
212v-
213r 1572/06/30 Divorce for adultery 
Sutherland, 
Alexander Earl of 
Sinclair, Dame 
Barbara 
66 Vrquhart v. Ley CC8/2/6 
335v-
336r 1574/04/02 Divorce for adultery 
Vrquhart, 
Alexander Ley, Elizabeth 
67
Vrquhart v. 





314r 1573-4/03/12 Divorce for adultery Wallace, Jane Carmichell, Johne 
69
Wemis v. 
Dunbar CC8/2/3 32v-33r 1568/05/25 Divorce for adultery Wemis, Johne Dunbar, Margaret 
70
Wilsoun v. 





Mathy CC8/2/5 168r 1571-2/01/07 Divorce for adultery 
Willsoun, 
Alexander Mathy, Elizabeth 
72
Wrycht v. 
Drippis CC8/2/3 9v 1568/04/27 Divorce for adultery Wrycht, Marioun Drippis, Johne 









Campbell, Earl of 
Stewart, Dame 
Jane 
1 Baxter v. Dun CC8/2/7  82r 1574-5/02/28 Freedom & Silence Baxter, Patrik Dun, Marioun 
2
Carrik v. 
Gibsoun CC8/2/8  
161v-





Gillaspy CC8/2/4 4r-v 
1569/07/03 
[frag] Freedom & Silence 
Cunninghame, 
Mathow Gillaspy, Jonet 
4 Currye v. Stevin CC8/2/3 238r 1568-9/03/21 Freedom & Silence Currye, Johne Stevin, Jonet 
   301 
5
Gibsoun v. 





227r 1573-4/01/11 Freedom & Silence Johnestoun, Johne Kello, Cristiane 
7
Maist(er)toun v. 
Stobye CC8/2/6 39v 1572-3/01/20 Freedom & Silence 
Maist(er)toun, 
Patrik Stobye, Margaret 
8
McWalter v. 
Galbrayth CC8/2/2 41r 1565/05/30 Freedom & Silence McWalter, Walter
Galbrayth, 
Elizabeth 
9 Murray v. Barry CC8/2/3 350r 1569/06/04 Freedom & Silence Murray, Robert Barry, Helene 
10
Pawtoun v. 







208r 1573/12/09 Freedom & Silence 
Quhitlaw, 
Bartilmo Thomsoun, Jonet 
12 Ramsay v. Myll CC8/2/7  89v-90r 1574-5/03/05 Freedom & Silence Ramsay, Patrik Mill, Christiane 
13
Robesoun v. 
Liall CC8/2/7  3v-4r 1574/10/15 Freedom & Silence Robesoun, Isobell Liall, Willaime 
14 Warno v. Craig CC8/2/5 91r-v 1570-1/02/19 Freedom & Silence Warno, Jonet Criag, Nicoll 
15
Williamsone v. 
Stevinsone CC8/2/3 67r 1568/07/06 Freedom & Silence 
Willsiamsoun, 
James Stevinsone, Jonet 
1
Bennet v. 










of Kirk's sentence of 
divorce 
Hammyltoun, 
Elizabeth Maxwell, Johne 






Reduction of pre-Ref 





Johnesoun CC8/2/5 208r-v 1572/06/16 
Reduction of Kirk's 
sentence of 















3 Barclay v. Ewiot CC8/2/4 
318v-
319r 1570/07/11 Solemnization Barclay, Helene Ewiot, Patrik 
4
Bartene v. 
Mowbray CC8/2/7  
372v-
373r 1575-6/01/09 Solemnization Bartene, Issobell Mowbray, Robert 
5
Bell v. 
Wardroper CC8/2/7  246v 1575/07/23 Solemnization Bell, Margaret Wardroper, Johne 
6
Bischope v. 
Fynlaw CC8/2/6 346r 1574/04/21 Solemnization Bischope, Helene Finlaw, Johne 
7
Blythman v. 









290r 1570/06/10 Solemnization Brok, Jonet Alexander, Dauid 
9
Broun v. 
Gardnare CC8/2/7  68v-69r 1574-5/02/18 Solemnization Broun, Jonet Gardnare, Patrik 
   303 
10
Carmichell v. 









300r 1573-4/03/03 Solemnization Carpentyne, Jane Syme, Michell 
12
Clerk v. 










Makdill CC8/2/8  
145v-
146r 1576/05/05 Solemnization Crawfurde, Roger Makdill, Margaret 
15
Creichtoun v. 







Hoige CC8/2/7  25r-v 1574/11/18 Solemnization 
Cunnynghame, 
Robert Hoige, Agnis 
17
Dalmahoy v. 









184r 1571-2/02/28 Solemnization Danielstoun, Jane Suyntoun, Johne 
19 Denis v. Brysoun CC8/2/8  
154v-
155r 1576/05/15 Solemnization Denis, Alesoun Brysoun, Adame 
20 Diksoun v. Tod CC8/2/3 42r-v 1568/06/02 Solemnization 
Diksoun, 
Cristiane Tod, Alexander 
21
Duncane v. 
Fairley CC8/2/3 52v-53r 1568/06/14 Solemnization Duncane, Helene Fairley, Duncane 
22
Ewart v. 
Dryisdale CC8/2/1 65v 1564/06/19 Solemnization Ewart, Margaret Dryisdale, James 
   304 
23
Goddiskirk v. 
Tenent CC8/2/5 46v-47r 1570-1/01/12 Solemnization 
Goddiskirk, 
Gilbert Tenent, Isobell 
24 Greve v. Eclis CC8/2/7  199v 1575/06/29 Solemnization Greve, Katherine Eclis, Johne 
25
Hammyltoun v. 










Fairholme CC8/2/5 56r 1570-1/01/19 Solemnization Kincaid, Margaret Fairholme, Andro 
28 Kay v. Broun CC8/2/6 186r 1573/11/09 Solemnization Kay, Elizabeth Broun, Thomas 
29
Kinross v. Loch 
& Weyland CC8/2/1 48v-49r 1564/06/07 Solemnization 
Kinross, Maister 
Henry, Procurator 
Fiscal Loch, Patrick 





153r 1569-70/01/20 Solemnization Makewin, Jonet Stalker, Williame 
32
McCrerie v. 
Hunter CC8/2/6 448v 1574/07/23 Solemnization McCrerie, Patrik Hunter, Marioun 
33
Moffait v. 












Blak CC8/2/7 60v 1574-5/02/09 Solemnization 
Ormistoun, 
Beatrix Blak, Johne 
36
Quhitlaw v. 
Stewart CC8/2/6 172r-v 1573/10/20 Solemnization Quhitlaw, Helene Steuart, Henry 
   305 
37 Reid v. Barclay CC8/2/3 72v 1568/07/17 Solemnization Reid, Jonet 
Barclay, 
Alexander 
38 Reid v. Portuous CC8/2/2 67r 1565/06/27 Solemnization Reid, Janet Portuous, Robert 
39
Reid v. 














Aikin CC8/2/5 203r 1572/05/13 Solemnization 
Richartsoun, 
Marioun Aikin, George 










Wallace CC8/2/4 42v  1569/07/30 Solemnization Skirling, Helen Wallace, William 
45
Strang v. 
Auchinlek CC8/2/7  
128v-





Wod CC8/2/3 39r 1568/06/01 Solemnization Thomsoun, Johne Wod, Margaret 
47 Walker v. Kay CC8/2/7  184r 1575/06/18 Solemnization Walker, Agnes Kay, Petir 
48
Wilsone v. 
Stowman CC8/2/5 48r 1570-1/01/13 Solemnization Stowman, Agnes Wilsone, Mungo 
49
Wod v. 
Hamiltoun CC8/2/6 124r 1573/06/24 Solemnization Wod, Cristiane Hamiltoun, Dauid 
   306 
50
Wylie v. 



















324v 1564-5/01/26 Tint 
Hammyltoun, 
Jherome Sclater, Elizabeth 
2
Tulloch v. 
Sinclair CC8/2/1 411r-v 1565/03/31 Tint Tulloch, James Sinclair, Margaret 
3
Westoun v. 
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D (1): OUTCOMES OF ACTIONS FOR SOLEMNIZATION (MALE AND FEMALE PURSUERS), 
 APRIL 1564 TO JANUARY 1576/7 
 
 
Tally Case name Volume Folio 
Date 











Marioun Gudlad, Dauid 
OATH 
(defender) denied granted assoilized lib 
(x) 2 
Arneill v. 


























Helene Ewiot, Patrik 
OATH 











Robert PROBTN proven proven solemnize lib  
6
Bell v. 






in probation lib lib assoilized lib 
7
Bischope v. 
Fynlaw CC8/2/6 346r 1574/04/21 
Bischope, 
Helene Finlaw, Johne 
succumbed 











(defender) denied lib assoilized lib 




















(defender) denied lib assoilized   
11
Carmichell v. 








in probation lib lib assoilized lib 
12
Carpentyne 











praesenti n/a assoilized   
13
Clerk v. 








Kirk assoilized lib 
14
Cokburne v. 




























in probation lib lib assoilized   
17
Cunningham
e v. Hoige CC8/2/7 25r-v 1574/11/18 
Cunnyngha
me, Robert Hoige, Agnis 
OATH 
(defender) denied n/a assoilized   
(x)18 
Dalmahoy v. 




















adherence)   
   309 
(x)19 
Danielstoun 


























in probation lib lib assoilized   
21
Diksoun v. 















(defender) denied lib assoilized lib 
23
Ewart v. 






(defender) denied granted assoilized   
(x)24 
Goddiskirk 











adultery   
(x)25 
Greve v. 
Eclis CC8/2/7 199v 1575/06/29 
Greve, 
Katherine Eclis, Johne 
pursuer fails 
to appear lib lib assoilized   
26
Hammyltoun 






















in probation lib lib assoilized lib 
   310 
(x)28 
Kincaid v. 















marry   




















g banns) lib assoilized   
31
Liddell v. 
Boge CC8/2/7 201v 1575/07/01 
Liddell, 
Beatrix Boge, Thomas 
OATH 













in probation lib n/a assoilized   
33
McCrerie v. 






in probation lib lib assoilized   
34
Moffait v. 
Mertene CC8/2/5 157r 1571/04/26 
Moffait, 
Jonet Mertene, Johne PROBTN proven proven 
solemnize & 











in probation lib lib assoilized   
(x)36 
Ormistoun v. 






















Helene Steuart, Henry 
OATH 
(defender) denied lib assoilized   
   311 
38
Reid v. 




(defender) denied lib assoilized lib 
39
Reid v. 















in probation lib lib assoilized   
41
Reidho(ch)t 








in probation lib lib assoilized   
42
Richartsoun 
v. Aikin CC8/2/5 203r 1572/05/13 
Richartsoun, 
Marioun Aikin, George 
OATH 
(defender) granted granted solemnize   
43
Scot v. 




William PROBTN proven proven 
solemnize & 
adhere   
44
Skirling v. 





Thomas PROBTN proven proven solemnize   
45
Skirling v. 




William PROBTN proven proven 
solemnize & 











(defender) denied lib assoilized lib 
47
Thomsoun v. 
Wod CC8/2/3 39r 1568/06/01 
Thomsoun, 
Johne Wod, Margaret PROBTN proven proven solemnize   
   312 
(x)48 
Walker v. 
Kay CC8/2/7 184r 1575/06/18 
Walker, 







wanting   
49
Wilsone v. 








(defender) denied granted assoilized lib 
50
Wod v. 
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D (2): OUTCOMES OF ACTIONS FOR SOLEMNIZATION (MALE PURSUERS), 
 APRIL 1564 TO JANUARY 1576/7 
 
 
Tally Case name Volume Folio 
Date 




copula Outcome issue? 
1
Cunninghame 
v. Hoige CC8/2/7 25r-v 1574/11/18 
Cunnynghame, 
Robert Hoige, Agnis 
OATH 
(defender) denied n/a assoilized   
2
Hammyltoun 
v. Heriot CC8/2/6 259v 
1573-



















probation lib lib assoilized   
4
McCrerie v. 







probation lib lib assoilized   
5
Thomsoun v. 
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D (3): OUTCOMES OF ACTIONS FOR SOLEMNIZATION (FEMALE PURSUERS), 
 APRIL 1564 TO JANUARY 1576/7 
 
 
Tally Case name Volume Folio 
Date 




copula Outcome issue? 
1
Andersoun 




Marioun Gudlad, Dauid 
OATH 







Helene Ewiot, Patrik 
OATH 
(defender) denied granted assoilized lib 
3
Blythman 



















(defender) denied lib assoilized   
5
Carpentyne 











praesenti n/a assoilized   
6
Clerk v. 


















(defender) denied denied assoilized lib 











(defender) denied lib assoilized lib 
9
Ewart v. 






(defender) denied granted assoilized   
10
Kay v. 






(defender) denied lib assoilized lib  
11
Liddell v. 
Boge CC8/2/7 201v 1575/07/01 
Liddell, 
Beatrix Boge, Thomas 
OATH 







Helene Steuart, Henry 
OATH 
(defender) denied lib assoilized   
13
Reid v. 















(defender) denied lib assoilized lib 
15
Wilsone v. 






























(defender) denied granted assoilized   
18
Richartsoun 
v. Aikin CC8/2/5 203r 1572/05/13 
Richartsoun, 
Marioun Aikin, George 
OATH 











Robert PROBTN proven proven solemnize lib  
   316 
20
Diksoun v. 













Thomas PROBTN proven proven solemnize   
22
Wod v. 



















& adhere   
24
Moffait v. 
Mertene CC8/2/5 157r 1571/04/26 
Moffait, 
Jonet Mertene, Johne PROBTN proven proven 
solemnize 
& adhere   
25
Scot v. 




William PROBTN proven proven 
solemnize 
& adhere   
26
Skirling v. 




William PROBTN proven proven 
solemnize 
& adhere   
27
Bell v. 







probation lib lib assoilized lib 
28
Bischope v. 
Fynlaw CC8/2/6 346r 1574/04/21 
Bischope, 
Helene Finlaw, Johne 
succumbed 
in 










probation lib lib assoilized   


















































probation lib lib assoilized lib 
34
Makewan 























probation lib lib assoilized   
36
Reid v. 
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E: LENGTH OF EXTANT CONSITORIAL LITIGATION,  




Case name Volume Folio 
Date 
YYYY/MM/DD Action Term / Diet 
Duration 
(days) 
Abirnethy v. Moncur CC8/2/3 334r 1569/05/24 Adherence initial   
Abirnethy v. Moncur CC8/2/4 
326v – 
327r 1570/07/19 Adherence Decreet 421 
Cruik v. Hammiltoun CC8/2/3 123r 1568/07/30 Adherence initial   
Cruik v. Hammiltoun CC8/2/3 340r - v 1569/05/26 Adherence Decreet 300 
Hammyltoun v. Kirkpatrick CC8/2/1 428r 1565/04/12 Adherence intial   
Hammyltoun v. Kirkpatrick CC8/2/2 331v - 332r 1567-8/02/17 Adherence Decreet 676 
Thorntoun v. Sandersone CC8/2/2 251r 1567-8/01/07 Adherence 
Decreet (initial 
and final) 1 
Hoppringle v. Gib CC8/2/1 196r - v 1564/10/25 Aliment 
Decreet (initial 
and final) 1 
Duncane v. Fairley CC8/2/3 82v 1568/06/26 
Aliment  
and care of bastards 
Decreet (initial 
and final) 1 
                                                 
2 Those cases highlighted in bold encompassed the period during which Edinburgh experienced a severe outbreak of plague during the winter of 1568/9. 
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Cromartie v. Caddell CC8/2/3 20r 1568/05/01 Annulment initial   
Cromartie v. Caddell CC8/2/3 54r - v 1568/06/17 Annulment Decreet 47 
Newtoun v. Dalzell CC8/2/3 363r 1569/06/11 Annulment initial   
Newtoun v. Dalzell CC8/2/5 16v – 17r 1570/12/10 Annulment Decreet 547 
Kinross & Patersoun v. 
Stevinsoun & Pollock  CC8/2/1 318v 1564-5/01/23 Annulment  initial   
Kinross & Patersoun v. 
Stevinsoun & Pollock  CC8/2/2 86r-v 1565/07/11 Annulment  Decreet 169 
Paislie v. Haistie CC8/2/1 138r 1564/08/04 Annulment  initial   
Paislie v. Haistie CC8/2/1 247v 1564/11/25 Annulment  Decreet 113 
Oliphantis v. Oliphantis CC8/2/3 333v - 334r 1569/05/24 Bastardrie initial   
Oliphantis v. Oliphantis CC8/2/4 
335r – 
336v 1570/07/27 Bastardrie Decreet 429 
Barnair v. Nychole CC8/2/2 339v 1567-8/02/21 Divorce for adultery initial   
Barnair v. Nychole CC8/2/2 399v 1567-8/03/24 Divorce for adultery Decreet 31 
Clerk v. Scot CC8/2/3 183v 1568-9/02/14 Divorce for adultery initial   
Clerk v. Scot CC8/2/5 46r – v 1570-1/01/12 Divorce for adultery Decreet 698 
Dunlop v. Broun CC8/2/1 25 r 1564/05/18 Divorce for adultery intitial   
Dunlop v. Broun CC8/2/1 387v - 388r 1564-5/03/14 Divorce for adultery Decreet 300 
Flemyng v. Flemyng CC8/2/3 119r 1568/07/29 Divorce for adultery initial   
Flemyng v. Flemyng CC8/2/3 352r - v 1569/06/04 Divorce for adultery Decreet 310 
Forbes v. Sandelands CC8/2/1 18v - 19r 1564/05/12 Divorce for adultery initial   
Forbes v. Sandelands CC8/2/1 
304v - 
305v 1564-5/01/15 Divorce for adultery Decreet 248 
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Kincaid v. Ross CC8/2/3 318r 1569/05/13 Divorce for adultery initial   
Kincaid v. Ross CC8/2/4 18v – 19r 1569/07/15 Divorce for adultery Decreet 63 
Levingstoun v. Crawfurd CC8/2/2 160v 1567/10/29 Divorce for adultery initial   
Levingstoun v. Crawfurd CC8/2/2 261r 1567-8/01/09 Divorce for adultery Decreet 72 
Levingstoun v. Kincaid CC8/2/3 326r 1569/05/18 Divorce for adultery initial   
Levingstoun v. Kincaid CC8/2/4 
331v – 
332r 1570/07/26 Divorce for adultery Decreet 434 
Michell v. Broun CC8/2/3 205v 1568-9/03/03 Divorce for adultery initial   
Michell v. Broun CC8/2/3 373v - 374r 1569/06/18 Divorce for adultery Decreet 107 
Patersone v. Bernis CC8/2/3 109v 1568/07/21 Divorce for adultery 
initial & first 
probation of 
libell   
Patersone v. Bernis CC8/2/3 79v - 80r 1568/07/31 Divorce for adultery Decreet 10 
Provand v. Steill CC8/2/3 117v 1568/07/28 Divorce for adultery initial   
Provand v. Steill CC8/2/4 44v – 45r 1569/08/06 Divorce for adultery Decreet 374 
Wilsoun v. Creichtoun CC8/2/2 424r 1568/04/07 Divorce for adultery initial   
Wilsoun v. Creichtoun CC8/2/3 28v - 29r 1568/05/08 Divorce for adultery Decreet 31 
Murray v. Irrwin CC8/2/1 90r - v 1564/07/05 Divorce for adultery  initial   
Murray v. Irrwin CC8/2/2 11v - 12r 1565/05/07 
Divorce for adultery, 
Aliment and Tint Decreet 306 
Currye v. Stevin CC8/2/3 238r 1568-9/03/21 Freedom & Silence 
Decreet (initial 
and final) 1 
Gibsoun v. Robesoun CC8/2/2 34v - 35r 1565/05/24 Freedom & Silence 
Decreet (initial 
and final) 1 
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McWalter v. Galbrayth CC8/2/2 26v 1565/05/18 Freedom & Silence initial   
McWalter v. Galbrayth CC8/2/2 41r 1565/05/30 Freedom & Silence Decreet 12 
Hammyltoun v. Maxwell & 
Lindesay CC8/2/1 222v - 223r 1564/11/15 
Reduction  
of Kirk's sentence of 
divorce intial   





of Kirk's sentence of 
divorce Decreet 121 
Leslie v. Oliphant CC8/2/1 16v - 17r  1564/05/10 
Reduction of pre-Ref 
sentence of divorce initial   
Leslie v. Oliphant CC8/2/2 382r - 383v 1567-8/03/16 
Reduction  
of pre-Ref sentence of 
divorce Decreet 1406 
Auldinstoun v. McMyllane CC8/2/1 64v 1564/06/17 Solemnization intial   
Auldinstoun v. McMyllane CC8/2/1 322r 1564-5/01/25 Solemnization Decreet 222 
Carmichell v. Calderwod CC8/2/3 152v 1567-8/01/18 Solemnization initial   
Carmichell v. Calderwod CC8/2/3 217v 1568-9/03/09 Solemnization Decreet 416 
Clerk v. Auchinlek CC8/2/3 60r 1568/06/25 Solemnization initial   
Clerk v. Auchinlek CC8/2/3 61r 1568/06/28 Solemnization Decreet 3 
Dalmahoy v. Menteith CC8/2/1 424r 1565/04/07 Solemnization 
Decreet (initial 
and final) 1 
Diksoun v. Tod CC8/2/2 314v 1567-8/02/09 Solemnization initial   
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Diksoun v. Tod CC8/2/3 42r - v 1568/06/02 Solemnization Decreet 113 
Duncane v. Fairley CC8/2/3 52v - 53r 1568/06/14 Solemnization 
Decreet (intial 
and final) 1 
Ewart v. Dryisdale CC8/2/1 65v 1564/06/19 Solemnization 
Decreet (intial 
and final) 1 
Murray v. Symsone CC8/2/3 131r - v 1568/10/15 Solemnization initial   
Murray v. Symsone CC8/2/3 287v-288r 1569/04/28 Solemnization Decreet 195 
Reid v. Portuous CC8/2/2 24r 1565/05/16 Solemnization initial   
Reid v. Portuous CC8/2/2 67r 1565/06/27 Solemnization Decreet 42 
Scot v. Robesoun CC8/2/1 177v 1564/10/11 Solemnization intial   
Scot v. Robesoun CC8/2/1 250r 1564/11/27 Solemnization Decreet 47 
Skirling v. Mairioribankis CC8/2/3 43v 1568/06/03 Solemnization initial   
Skirling v. Mairioribankis CC8/2/3 79r 1568/07/31 Solemnizatioun Decreet 58 
Thomsoun v. Wod CC8/2/2 358r 1567-8/03/03 Solemnization intitial   
Thomsoun v. Wod CC8/2/3 39r 1568/06/01 Solemnization Decreet 90 
Hammyltoun v. Sclater CC8/2/1 72v - 73r 1564/06/22 Tint intitial   
Hammyltoun v. Sclater CC8/2/1 
323v - 
324v 1564-5/01/26 Tint Decreet 218 
Tulloch v. Sinclair CC8/2/1 140r-v 1564/08/05 Tint initial   
Tulloch v. Sinclair CC8/2/1 411r-v 1565/03/31 Tint Decreet 239 
Westoun v. Ewart CC8/2/1 281v 1564/12/14 Tint intial   
Westoun v. Ewart CC8/2/1 323r - v 1564-5/01/26 Tint Decreet 43 
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F (1): PROCURATORS REPRESENTING PURSUERS IN CONSISTORIAL ACTIONS 





Procurator Case name Volume Folio 
Date 
YYYY/MM/





























Hammiltoun CC8/2/3 298v 1569/05/05 Adherence Cruik, Mairiorie 
Hammiltoun, 































                                                 
3 The first entry for each case which also occurs in Appendix F(2), had been highlighted in italics, denoting that the pursuer and defender both used a procurator at at 
least one diet during the same case, even if this was not the same diet. 



















v. Kirkpatrik CC8/2/2 
30v - 














Dalmahoy CC8/2/2 21v 1565/05/14 Adherence 
Kinross, 
procurator fiscal  
Menteith, 





Edmestoun CC8/2/1 188r 1564/10/20 Adherence Lindesay, Janet 
Edmestoun, 





Ramsay CC8/2/2 306r 1567-8/02/04 Adherence 
Ostlar, David 
als Andro Ramsay, Helene 
Westoun, Master 
Thomas 
9 Cowlis, Johne 
Pennycuke v. 











Ker CC8/2/2 81v 1565/07/07 Adherence 
Robertsoun, 







Ker CC8/2/2 84v 1565/07/10 Adherence 
Robertsoun, 







Ross CC8/2/1 368r 1564-5/03/01 Adherence Stewart, Gellis Ross, Williame   





Hammiltoun CC8/2/2 253r 1567-8/01/08 Adherence Sympill, Isobell 
Hammiltoun, 



























Dalzell CC8/2/3 363r 1569/06/11 Annulment 
Newtoun, 







Tulloch CC8/2/1 183v 1564/10/16 Annulment 
Sinclair, 











Spalding CC8/2/2 24v 1565/05/16 Annulment 
Spalding, 





Spalding CC8/2/2 45v 1565/06/04 Annulment 
Spalding, 








Broun CC8/2/1 30r 1564/05/20 Annulment 
Stewart, 
William of 












Mure  CC8/2/1 288r 1564/12/19 Bastardrie Kennedy, Janet Mure, Agnes   





Oliphantis CC8/2/3 342r 1569/05/27 Bastardrie 
Oliphantis, 
Margaret & 

























Vaus CC8/2/1 1v 1564/04/28 
Divorce for 










































(in this act 
'Denis') 
Patersoun, 


















Broun CC8/2/1 33v 1564/05/30 
Divorce for 









Thomas Flemyng, Jonet 
Craig, Master 
Thomas 























adultery Giffert, James 
Dischingtoun, 

















































Margaret   
14 
King, 
Alexander Ker v. Dougall CC8/2/2 155r 1567/10/25 
Divorce for 
adultery Ker, Isobell Dowgall, Johne   
14 
Strang, Master 
Johne Ker v. Dougall CC8/2/2 157r 1567/10/27 
Divorce for 





Master Johne Ker v. Dougall CC8/2/2 158v 1567/10/27 
Divorce for 





Johne Ker v. Dougall CC8/2/2 175v 1567/11/06 
Divorce for 











Grissell Ross, Johne   






















































































































adultery Provand, James Steill, Isobell   
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26 
Westoun, 
Master Thomas Reid v. Ker CC8/2/1 226r 1564/11/16 
Divorce for 
adultery Reid, Isobell Ker, Johne   
26 
Harvy, Master 
Thomas Reid v. Ker CC8/2/1 256r 1564/11/29 
Divorce for 
adultery Reid, Isobell Ker, Johne   
27 
Kinross, Master 
Henrie Ross v. Reid CC8/2/1 83r 1564/06/29 
Divorce for 











Margaret King, Alexander 
29 
Gaw, Master 
David Speir v. Tuedy CC8/2/1 275r 1564/12/09 
Divorce for 





















Turnbull CC8/2/2 392v 1567-8/03/22 
Divorce for 





Dunbar CC8/2/2 219v 1567/12/05 
Divorce for 









Boiswall CC8/2/2 5v 1565/05/03 
Divorce for 
adultery Wemys, Janet 
Boiswell, 






















Marioun Drippis, Johne   



















Stevin CC8/2/3 238r 1568-9/03/21 
Freedom & 





v. Maxwell & 




















Fraser, Janet et 











































Oliphant CC8/2/1 70r 1564/06/20 
Reduction of 
pre-ref process 





























































fischale to our 
soverane lady  
Jaksoun, Schir 






Gardin CC8/2/1 46v 1564/06/06 
Reduction of 



































































William   





Tod CC8/2/2 327v 1567-8/02/16 Solemnization 
Diksoun, 
Cristiane Tod, Alexander   
7 
Fermour, 







Rankin CC8/2/2 83v 1565/07/09 Solemnization 
Medowfield, 







































Portuous CC8/2/2 28v 1565/05/21 Solemnization Reid, Janet 
Portuous, 





Robesoun CC8/2/1 202v 1564/10/30 Solemnization Scot, Margaret 
Robesoun, 





Mairioribankis CC8/2/3 47v 1568/06/09 Solemnization Skirling, Jane 
Mairioribankis, 
Maister Thomas   
13 
Mairioribankis, 
Michaell Steill v. Auld CC8/2/3 159v 1568-9/01/24 Solemnization Steill, Jonet Auld, Richard   





Wod CC8/2/2 386v 1567-8/03/18 Solemnization 
Thomsoun, 







v. Sclater CC8/2/1 














Sinclair CC8/2/1 336v 1564-5/02/06 Tint Tulloch, James 
Sinclair, 





Ewart CC8/2/1 281v 1564/12/14 Tint  Westoun, Johne 
Ewart, 
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F (2): PROCURATORS REPRESENTING DEFENDERS IN CONSISTORIAL ACTIONS 





Procurator Case name Volume Folio 
Date 





















Buchquhanane CC8/2/2 351r 1567-8/02/27 Adherence 
Buchquanane, 









































































Ramsay CC8/2/2 306r 1567-8/02/04 Adherence Ramsay, Helene 






















10 King, Alexander 
Sympill v. 
Hammiltoun CC8/2/2 253r 1567-8/01/08 Adherence 
Hammiltoun, 
James Sympill, Isobell 
Kinross, Master 
Henrie 
1 King, Alexander 
Duncane v. 
Fairley CC8/2/3 82v 1568/06/26 
Aliment  























Henrie   





Flemyngis CC8/2/3 119r 1568/07/29 Annulment 
Flemming, 
Thomas & Jonet 
Maxwell, 





Flemyngis CC8/2/3 268r 1569/04/18 Annulment 
Flemming, 












































Henrie   
1 
Skene, Master 







Alexander Dunbar v. Adair CC8/2/3 
307v 
- 312r 1569/05/10 Bastardrie Adair, Cristiane Dunbar, Alisoun 
Schairp, Master 
Johne 






King, Alexander Dunbar v. Adair CC8/2/3 
368v 


























Johne   
2 
Hay, Master 











Leky CC8/2/1 84v 1564/06/30 
Divorce for 









v. Cathcart CC8/2/1 83r 1564/06/29 
Divorce for 
























Elizabeth Dunlop, Hew   
6 
Gaw, Master 









Flemyng CC8/2/3 119r 1568/07/29 
Divorce for 














- 200r 1568-9/02/28 
Divorce for 















Barbara Forbes, Johne   
9 
Abircrumby, 
Master Johne  
Giffert v. 




Helene Giffert, James 
Schairp, Master 
Johne 
9 King, Alexander 
Giffert v. 






































Master Johne & 
King, Alexander 
Giffert v. 




Helene Giffert, James 
Schairp, Master 
Johne 
10 King, Alexander 
Glendonyng v. 
Grahame CC8/2/2 116r 1565/07/28 
Divorce for 
adultery Grahame, Janet 
Glendonyng, 














   339 
12 
Kinross, Master 
Henrie Ker v. Dougall CC8/2/2 158v 1567/10/27 
Divorce for 





Thomas Ker v. Dougall CC8/2/3 30v 1568/05/20 
Divorce for 





Alexander Leslie v. Betoun CC8/2/2 429v 1568/04/10 
Divorce for 
























Margaret   
16 King, Alexander 
Lindesay v. 




Williame Lindesay, Isobell   
17 King, Alexander 
Sched v. 















Williame Speir, Janet 
Gaw, Master 
David 
19 King, Alexander 
Tailzeseir v. 






















Margaret Wemis, Johne   
   340 
1 
McCalzean, 


























Lindesay CC8/2/1 263v 1564/12/02 
Reduction  
of kirk's 












































Forrest v. Rollok 




Maragret Forrest, Johne 
Kinross, Master 
Henrie 







- 194r 1564/10/24 
Retrospective 
Declarator of 
Divorce Abirnethy, Janet 
Forrester, 








































56r 1564/06/12 Solemnization 
Cunnynghame, 




































6 King, Alexander 
Murray v. 
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7 
King, Master 
Alexander Reid v. Portuous CC8/2/2 32v 1565/05/24 Solemnization 
Portuous, 







Robesoun CC8/2/1 194r 1564/10/24 Solemnization 
Robesoun, 





Mairioribankis CC8/2/3 43v 1568/06/03 Solemnization 
Mairioribankis, 





Wod CC8/2/2 358r 1567-8/03/03 Solemnization Wod, Margaret 
Thomsoun, 





Wanis CC8/2/2 334r 1567-8/02/19 Solemnization Wanis, George 
Watsoun, 





Wanis CC8/2/2 360r 1567-8/03/04 Solemnization Wanis, George 
Watsoun, 











Jherome   
2 King, Alexander 
Tulloch v. 
Sinclair CC8/2/1 334r 1564-5/02/05 Tint 
Sinclair, 
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map as: Pursuer Domicile Case name Volume Folio 
Date 






Stratherne" Malard v. Reid CC8/2/1 328r 1564-5/01/30 
Divorce for 






Bouchane CC8/2/1 160v 1564/08/17 
Reduction  
of pre-ref divorce  
Fraser, Janet, 






Grahame CC8/2/2 60r 1565/06/21 
Divorce for 




















dochter to vmql 
Johne Dikkesoun in 











53r 1568/06/14 Solemnization Fairley, Duncane 




relict of Nicolas 
Murray burgess of 
Edinburgh, [see 
decreet also - her 
hous in within the 




v 1568/10/15 Solemnization 
Sympsone, 
Laurence 















owned a house in 
Glasgow, and his 
wife punished for 
adultery by baillies 
of Glasgow 
Andersone v. 









Heriott CC8/2/2 316r 1567-8/02/10 
Divorce for 
adultery Heriott, Margaret 
Glasgow Reid, Isobell 
indwellar of 
glasgow Reid v. Ker CC8/2/1 226r 1564/11/16 
Divorce for 
adultery Ker, Johne 
Harperrig Clerk, Johne Harperig Clerk v. Scott CC8/2/3 183v 1568-9/02/14 
Divorce for 
adultery Scott, Jonet 
















the parish of 
Mowswald 
Murray v. 





Jedburgh Hardy, Patrik Jedburgh 
Hardy v. 



















Williame Burgess of Perth 
Bunche v. 
Moncreif CC8/2/3 17v 1568/04/30 
Divorce for 
adultery Moncreif, Isobell 
Rires Forbes, Johne apperand of reres 
Forbes v. 









Sinclair CC8/2/1 411r-v 1565/03/31 Tint Sinclair, Margaret 















adultery Moffett, Isobell 
   346 
Tain 
Ross, 
Nicholas Tane / Tain, toun of Ross v. Reid CC8/2/1 29v 1564/05/20 
Divorce for 
adultery Reid, Marioun 
Tranent Clerk, Jonet Tranent 
Clerk v. 









map as: Defender Domicile Case name Volume Folio 
Date 




















Maister Thomas Corstorphine 
Skirling v. 
Mairioribankis CC8/2/3 79r 1568/07/31 
Solemnizatioun 
& Adherence Skirling, Jane 
Creich Betoun, Dauid of Creich Leslie v. Betoun CC8/2/2 429v 1568/04/10 
Divorce for 





McMyllane CC8/2/1 64v 1564/06/17 Solemnization 
Auldinstoun, 
Isobell 
Dirleton Tod, Alexander 
son to George Tod 
thair (Direltoun) Diksoun v. Tod CC8/2/2 314v 1567-8/02/09 Solemnization 
Diksoun, 
Cristiane 







Robesoun CC8/2/1 177v 1564/10/11 Solemnization Scot, Margaret 







53r 1568/06/14 Solemnization 
Duncane, 
Helene 
Edinburgh Wod, Margaret 
relict of vmquhile 
Alexander Moreis 
burges thairof [pres. 
Edinburgh, which 




Wod CC8/2/3 39r 1568/06/01 Solemnization 
Thomsoun, 
Johne 
Glasgow Drippis, Johne burgess of Glasgow 
Wrycht v. 









Rutherfurde CC8/2/1 425r-v 1565/04/11 
Divorce for 
adultery Hardy, Patrik 
Kilconquhar Leslie, Robert of ky(n)m()noquhn 
Gordoun v. 









Hammiltoun CC8/2/2 253r 1567-8/01/08 Adherence 
Sympill, 
Isobell 
Kinsteary Ross, Williame Kinstarie Stewart v. Ross CC8/2/1 368r 1564-5/03/01 Adherence Stewart, Gellis 
Leith 
Richesoun, 
Walter indwellar in leyt 
Pennycuke v. 
Richesoun CC8/2/1 39r 1564/06/02 Adherence 
Pennycuke, 
Marioun 
Leith Ker, George in Leyth 
Robertsoun v. 
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Leith Loch, Patrick indwellar in Leyth 
Kinross v. Loch 
& Weyland CC8/2/1 
48v - 
49r 1564/06/07 Solemnization 
Kinross, 
Maister Henrie 
Leith Ramsay, Helene Leyth 
Leirmoth v. 














Rasar (Rasaay off 
the east coast of 
Skye) 
Makcanzie v. 











Dischingtoun CC8/2/3 133v 1568/11/22 
Divorce for 
adultery Giffert, James 
Whithorn Kirkpatrik, Johne Quhitherne 
Dougalsoun v. 
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H (1): PURSUERS’ SOCIAL STATUS IN CONSISTORIAL LITIGATION, APRIL 1564 TO JUNE 1569 
 
 
Pursuer Social status Case name Volume Folio 
Date 
YYYY/MM/DD Action Defender 
Hammyltoun, 




332r 1567-8/02/17 Adherence Maxwell, Rodgair 
Kincaid, Grissell Lady Baltarroche Kincaid v. Ross CC8/2/3 318r 1569/05/13 Divorce for adultery Ross, Johne 
Ross, Helene Lady S[t]rowyn Ross v. Oliphant CC8/2/3 280v 1569/04/25 
Expenses since she 
obtained decreet of 
adherence against her 
husband Oliphant, William 
Hammyltoun, 





223r 1564/11/15 Reduction Maxwell, Johne 
Leslie, Beatrice 
lawfull dauchter 
to the late George 
Erle of Rothes Leslie v. Betoun CC8/2/2 429v 1568/04/10 Divorce for adultery Betoun, Dauid 
Grahame, Marie 
lauchfull dauchter 
to the Erle of 
Mentieth 
Grahame v. 
Buchquhanane CC8/2/2 351r 1567-8/02/27 Adherence 
Buchquanane, 
George 
   350 
Kennedy, Janet 
dauchter Lady 
Culzene Kennedy v. Mure CC8/2/1 288r 1564/12/19 Bastardrie Mure, Agnes 
Ker, Sir Andrew 





relict of the late 
Sir Alexander 
Oliphant of Kelly, 
Knycht Leslie v. Oliphant CC8/2/1 16v - 17r 1564/05/10 
of pre-Ref sentence of 
divorce 
Oliphant, 
Laurence Lord  
Carnegy, Johne 
lauchful son to Sir 
Robert Carnegy 
of Kynnard, knyt Carnegy v. Vaus CC8/2/1 1v 1564/04/28 Divorce for adultery Vaus, Margaret 
Oliphantis, 














"ane of the 




Robesoun CC8/2/2 34v - 35r 1565/05/24 Freedom & Silence Robesoun, Isobell 










edinburgh Westoun v. Ewart CC8/2/1 281v 1564/12/14 Tint Ewart, Katherine 
Crystesoun, 
Williame burgess of cowpar 
Cristesone v. 
Lindesay CC8/2/2 284r - v 1567-8/01/24 Adherence Lindesay, Isobell 
Ker, Isobell 
lawful daughter to 
the late William 
Ker burgess of 
Edinburgh Ker v. Dougall CC8/2/2 155r 1567/10/25 
Divorce for adultery 
(inferred) Dowgall, Johne 
Robertsoun, Janet 




of leyth Robertsoun v. Ker CC8/2/2 80r 1565/07/06 Adherence and Aliment Ker, George 
Heriot, James 
fermorar to the 
quenis grace Heriot v. Methven CC8/2/1 1v 1564/04/28 Divorce for adultery Methven, Isobel 





Dischingtoun CC8/2/3 133v 1568/11/22 Divorce for adultery 
Dischingtoun, 
Helene 
   352 
Ross, Nicholas 
Nicholas Ross of 
D[un]skeyt Ross v. Reid CC8/2/1 29v 1564/05/20 Divorce for adultery Reid, Marioun 
Dunlope, Hew 
sone and 
apparend heir to 
Alexander Dunlop 
of Crawfield Dunlop v. Broun CC8/2/1 25 r 1564/05/18 Divorce for adultery Broun, Elizabeth 
Flemyng, Thomas 





Flemyng CC8/2/3 119r 1568/07/29 Divorce for adultery Flemyng, Jonet 
Stewart, Williame 
sone and 
apperand air to 
Johne Stewart of 
Bultreis 
Stewart v. Dunlop 
& Broun CC8/2/1 71r 1564/06/20 Declarator of Marriage? Dunlop, Hew 
Wemys, Janet 





Boiswall CC8/2/2 5v 1565/05/03 Divorce for adultery Boiswell, Robert 
Johnesoun, 
Marioun 





Johnesoun CC8/2/2 8v 1565/05/05 Divorce for adultery Johnesoun, James 
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Levingstoun, 
Agnes 





















Leky CC8/2/1 84v 1564/06/30 Divorce for adultery Leky, Walter 
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H (2): DEFENDERS’ SOCIAL STATUS IN CONSISTORIAL LITIGATION, APRIL 1564 TO JUNE 1569 
 
 
Defender social status Case name Volume Folio 
Date 





occupier of the lands 
and barony of Kelly 
in Fyfe 
Leslie v. 
Oliphant CC8/2/1 16v - 17r 1564/05/10 





lawful daughter to the 
late Johne Lord 
Lindesay of the Byris 
Cristesone v. 




dauchter to Elizabeth 
Sempill Lady Bultres Dunlop v. Broun CC8/2/1 
387v - 
388r 1564-5/03/14 Divorce for adultery Dunlop, Hew 
Kirkpatrik, Roger Laird of Cloisburne. 
Hammyltoun v. 








Edmestoun CC8/2/1 188r 1564/10/20 Adherence Lindesay, Janet 
Dowgall, Johne burgess in Edinburgh Ker v. Dougall CC8/2/2 186r-v 1567/11/13 Divorce for adultery Ker, Isobell 
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Drippis, Johne 
talzeoure, burgess of 
Glasgow  
Wrycht v. 




relict of the late 
George Lovell burges 
of Dundee 
Forrest v. Rollok 
& Gardin CC8/2/1 46v 1564/06/06 
Reduction of kirk's 
divorce Forrest, Johne 
Dowgall, Johne 
sone and air to the 
late Johne Dowgall 
burgess of Edinburgh Ker v. Dougall CC8/2/2 155r 1567/10/25 
Divorce for adultery 
(inferred) Ker, Isobell 
Hammiltoun, 
James scherif of Linlithgow 
Sympill v. 
Hammiltoun CC8/2/2 419v 1568/04/03 
Reduction of Kirk's 
sentence of divorce Sympill, Isobell 
McCalzean, 
Maister Thomas 
burgess of edinburgh, 
advocate before the 
Lords of Session 
Galbrayth v. 
McCalzean CC8/2/1 418r 1565/04/04 
Reduction  














servitoure to Eduard 
Lord Sancquhair 
Wilsoun v. 
Creichtoun CC8/2/3 28v - 29r 1568/05/08 Divorce for adultery 
Wilsoun, 
Beatice 
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Galbrayth, 
Elizabeth 
natural daughter to 











Auchinlek CC8/2/3 61r 1568/06/28 Solemnization Clerk, Jonet 
Foirman, David flescheour 
Myluif v. 
Foirman CC8/2/2 342v 1567-8/02/23 Solemnization Myluif, Malie 
Nychole, Johne Wobster 
Barnair v. 
Nychole CC8/2/2 339v 1567-8/02/21 Divorce for adultery 
Barnair, 
Margaret 
Wilson, Andrew Cordinar 
Young v. 
Wilsoun CC8/2/1 115r 1564/07/22 Adherence Young, Janet 





of all and hale landis 
of the Month with the 
pertinentis liand 
within the 
scheriffdome of Fyf 
Abirnethy v. 
Moncur CC8/2/1 63v 1564/06/16 
Adherence and 
Aliment Abirnethy, Janet 
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Vaus, Margaret 
lauchful dochter to 
Johne Vaus of 
[erany] Carnegy v. Vaus CC8/2/1 1v 1564/04/28 Divorce for adultery Carnegy, Johne 
Sandelandis, 
Barbara 
dauchter of vmql 





305v 1564-5/01/15 Divorce for adultery Forbes, Johne 
Dischingtoun, 
Helene 
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Case name Volume Folio 
Date 
YYYY/MM/DD Action Term / Diet Pursuer 1 Defender 1 
Kirk in which 
Banns called 








Gillaspy CC8/2/4 4r-v 
1569/07/03 
[frag] Freedom & Silence Decreet 
[Cunninghame], 
Mathow  Gillaspy, Jonet St. Cuthberts 
Cunninghame v. 
Hoige CC8/2/7  25r-v 1574/11/18 Freedom & Silence Decreet 
Cunninghame, 
Robert Hoige, Agnis St. Cuthberts 
Currye v. Stevin CC8/2/3 238r 1568-9/03/21 Freedom & Silence 
initial & 




227r 1573-4/01/11 Freedom & Silence Decreet 
Johnestoun, 
Johne Kello, Cristiane Currie 
Maist(er)toun v. 
Stobye CC8/2/6 39v 1572-3/01/20 Freedom & Silence Decreet 
Maist(er)toun, 
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Murray v. Barry CC8/2/3 350r 1569/06/04 Freedom & Silence Decreet Murray, Robert Barry, Helene Edinburgh 
Pawtoun v. 










208r 1573/12/09 Freedom & Silence Decreet 
Quhytlaw, 
Bartilmo Thomsoun, Jonet Fishwick 
Ramsay v. Myll CC8/2/7  
89v-
90r 1574-5/03/05 Freedom & Silence Decreet Ramsay, Patrik Myll, Christiane Fouldon 
Robesoun v. 
Liall CC8/2/7  3v-4r 1574/10/15 Freedom & Silence Decreet 
Robesoun, 
Isobell Liall, William not stated 
Warno v. Craig CC8/2/5 91r-v 70-1/02/19 Freedom & Silence Decreet Warno, Jonet Craig, Nicoll Musselburgh 
Williamsone v. 
Stevinsone CC8/2/3 67r 1568/07/06 Freedom & Silence Decreet 
Willsiamsoun, 
James Stevinsone, Jonet Kirknewton 
 




MANUSCRIPT PRIMARY SOURCES 
 
 
Acts of the Lords Interpreters of the Law of Oblivion (NAS, PA9/1). 
Books of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session, 27 Jul 1560-13 Nov 1567 
(NAS, CS1/2/1). 
Books of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session, 8 Jan 1574-9 Jul 1575 (NAS, 
CS1/2/2). 
Commissions to Commissaries, Acts of Admission of Officers of Court and 
miscellaneous papers regarding their duties, emoluments and 
fees,1564/1565-1815 (NAS, CC8/7/39). 
Compt of Duncan Levingstoun Collector of the Coittis of Testaments, 1566-1568 in 
Warrants of the Books of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session. 
Portfolio: Papers as to pecuniary affairs of the Lords of Session (NAS, 
CS4/6 [/2]). 
Register of Acts and Decreets (Court of Session), 1st Series (NAS, CS7/-). 
Register of Acts and Decrees (Edinburgh Commissary Court) 29 April 1564 – 9 Feb 
1576/7 (NAS, CC8/2/1 to CC8/2/8). 
Register of Acts and Decrees (Hamilton & Campsie Commissariat) 15 April 1564 – 7 
May 1566  (NAS, CC10/1/1). 
Register of Acts and Decreets (St. Andrews Commissariat) 1 Jan 1573/1574-4 Apr 
1575 and 30 Apr 1576-17 Aug 1577 (NAS, CC20/1/1 to CC20/1/2) 
Register of Deeds and Protests (Edinburgh Commissary Court), 27 Mar 1564 – 25 
Jul 1581 (NAS, CC8/17/1 to CC8/17/2). 
Register of Testaments (Edinburgh Commissary Court) 15 Oct 1567 – 24 Jan 
1576/1577 (NAS, CC8/8/1 to CC8/8/4). 
Register of Testaments (Glasgow Commissariat), 1563 – 1565 (NAS, CC9/7/2). 
Register of Testaments (Hamilton & Campsie Commissariat), 8 May 1564 – 9 Mar 
1575/1576 (NAS, CC10/5/1). 
Register of Testaments (Lauder Commissariat), 1561 – 23 Jul 1566 (NAS, 
CC15/5/1). 
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PRINTED PRIMARY SOURCES AND REFERENCE WORKS 
 
Accounts of the Collectors of the Thirds of Benefices, 1561-1572, ed. G. Donaldson 
(Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1949). 
Accounts of the Lord High Treasurer of Scotland  (Compota thesaurariorum Regum 
Scotorum), eds. C. T. McInnes, et. al. (Edinburgh: H.M. General Register 
House, 1877-1978), volumes 11-13. 
Acts and Proceedings of the General Assemblies of the Kirk of Scotland, from the 
year M.D.LX: collected from the most authentic manuscripts ed. T. 
Thomson (Edinburgh: Maitland Club, 1839-1845), 3 volumes. 
The Acts of Sederunt of the Lords of Council and Session, from the 15th January 
1553, to the 11th of July 1790 (Edinburgh: Elphinston Balfour, 1790). 
The Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, eds. T.Thomson, and C.Innes (Edinburgh, 
1814-41), 12 volumes. 
Atlas of Scottish History to 1707, eds. P.G.B.McNeill and H.L.MacQueen 
(Edinburgh: The Scottish Medievalists and Department of Geography, 
University of Edinburgh, 1996). 
Bannatyne, Richard, Journal of the Transactions in Scotland, During the Contest 
Between the Adherents of Queen Mary, and Those of Her Son, 1570, 1571, 
1572, 1573 (Edinburgh: A. Constable and Co. Edinburgh; London: J. 
Murray, 1806). 
Beza, Theodore, Propositions and principles of diuinitie, propounded and disputed 
in the Vniuersitie of Geneua, by certaine students of Diuinitie there, vnder 
M. Theod. Beza, and M. Anthonie Faivs, professors of Diuinitie. Translated 
ovt of Latine into English by Antoine de La Faye (Edinburgh: Printed by 
Robert Waldegraue, 1591). 
-------------, Tractatio de polygamia et divortiis, in qua et Ochini ... pro polygamia, et 
Montanistarum ac aliorum aduersus repetitas nuptias argumenta refutantur 
... Add ... Juris Civilis Romanorum & veterum his de rebus ... examen. Ex 
Theodore Beza ... prælectionibus in priorem ad Corinth, epistolam. 
(Geneva, 1568-1569). 
-------------, Tractatio de polygamia in qua et ochini apostatae pro polygamia, et 
Montanistarum ac aliorum adversus repetitas nuptias argumenta refutantur, 
addito veterum canonum & quarundam civilium ad normam verbi divini 
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The Bible and Holy Scriptures conteyned in the Olde and Newe Testament. 
Translated according to the Ebrue and Greke, and conferred with the best 
translations in diuers languges. With moste profitable annotations vpon all 
the hard places, and other things of great importance as may appeare in the 
epistle to the reader (Geneva: Printed by Rouland Hall, 1560). 
Black, George F., The Surnames of Scotland (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 1999). 
Book of Records of the Ancient Privileges of the Canongate, ed. Marguerite Wood 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Record Society, 1955). 
The Booke of the Universall Kirk of Scotland, ed. Alexander Peterkin (Edinburgh: 
The Edinburgh Printing and Publishing Co., 1839). 
The Books of the Assumption of the Thirds of Benefices: Scottish Ecclesiasitcal 
Rentals at the Reformation, ed. James Kirk (Oxford: OUP for the British 
Academy, 1995).  
The Buik of the Kirk of the Canagait, 1564-1567 ed. A. B. Calderwood (Edinburgh: 
Scottish Record Society, 1961).  
Calendar of the Laing Charters, A.D. 854-1837, belonging to the University of 
Edinburgh ed. John Anderson, (Edinburgh: J. Thin, 1899). 
Calendar of State Papers, foreign series, of the reign of Elizabeth, ed. Joseph 
Stephenson et al (London: Longman, Roberts and Green, 1863-1950), 23 
volumes. 
Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland and Mary, Queen of Scots, 1547-
1603: Preserved in the Public Record Office, the British Museum, and 
Elsewhere in England, ed. J. Bain et al (Edinburgh: H. M. General Register 
House, 1898-1969), 13 volumes. 
Calendar of the State Papers Relating to Scotland, Preserved in the State Paper 
Department of Her Majesty's Public Record Office: the Scottish Series, ed. 
Markham John Thorpe (London: Longman, Brown, Green, Longmans & 
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records of the Burgh.  A.D.1165-1710 ed. W. Chambers (Edinburgh: 
Scottish Burgh Records Society, 1872). 
Charters of the Abbey of Inchcolm, eds. D.E.Easson and A. MacDonald (Edinburgh: 
Scottish History Society, 1938). 
The Court Book of Shetland, 1602-1604, ed. Gordon Donaldson (Edinburgh: Scottish 
Record Society, 1954). 
The Court Book of the Barony of Carnwath, 1523-1542, ed. William Croft Dickinson 
(Edinburgh: T. and A. Constable Ltd., 1937). 
   363
The Commissariot of Edinburgh: Consistorial Processes and Decreets, 1658 – 1800, 
ed. Francis J Grant (Edinburgh: Scottish Record Society, 1909), volume 34. 
The Commissariot Record of Hamilton and Campsie: Register of Testaments, 1564-
1800, ed. Francis J Grant (Edinburgh: British Record Society Limited 
(Scottish Section), 1898), volume 5. 
The Commissariot Record of Lauder: Register of Testaments 1561-1800, ed. Francis 
J Grant (Edinburgh:  Scottish Record Society, 1903), volume 18. 
Concise Scots Dictionary ed. M.Robinson (Edinburgh: Polygon at Edinburgh, 1999).  
Corpus Iuris Canonici, ed. A.Friedberg (Graz: Akademische Druck-u. 
Verlagsanstalt, 1959), 2 volumes. 
Correspondence of Sir Patrick Waus of Barnbarroch, Knight, 1540-1597 ed. Robert 
Vans Agnew (Edinburgh: D. Douglas, 1882). 
Correspondence of Sir Patrick Waus of Barnbarroch, Knight: Parson of Wigtown, 
First Almoner to the Queen, Senator of the College of Justice, Lord of 
Council, and Ambassador to Denmark, ed. Robert Vans Agnew (Edinburgh: 
Ayr and Galloway Archaeological Association, 1887), 2 volumes. 
Craig, Thomas, Sir, The Jus Feudale: with an appendix containing the Books of the 
Feus, trans. James Avon Clyde. (Edinburgh: W. Hodge, 1934), 2 volumes. 
Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, ed. N.P.Tanner, S.J. (Sheed & Ward and 
Georgetown University Press, 1990), 2 volumes. 
A Dictionary of the Older Scottish Tongue: from the twelfth to the seventeenth 
century, eds. W.A.Craigie et.al. (London: Oxford University Press, 1931- 
2002), 12 volumes. 
A Diurnal of Remarkable Occurents that have passed within the country of Scotland 
since the death of King James the Fourth till the year 1575, ed. T. Thomson 
(Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1833). 
Early records of the University of St. Andrews: the graduation roll, 14l3-1579, and 
the matriculation roll, 1473-1579, ed. James Maitland Anderson 
(Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1926). 
The Exchequer Rolls of Scotland (Rotuli Scaccarii regum Scotorum) , eds. Ae. J. G. 
Mackay, J. Stuart and G. P. MacNeill (Edinburgh: H.M. General Register 
House, 1878-1908), 23 volumes, volumes 19-21.  
Extracts from the Kirk Session Records of Perth transcribed by James Scott, 
appended to Mercer, John and James Maidment, The Chronicle of Perth: a 
register of remarkable occurrences, chiefly connected with that city, from 
the year 1210 to 1668 (Edinburgh: Maitland Club, 1831), Maitland Club, 
no.10. 
   364
Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Peebles 1652-1714: with appendix, 1367-
1665, ed. R. Renwick (Glasgow: Scottish Burgh Records Society, 1910). 
Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanae Medii Aevi ad annum 1638, eds. D.E.R.Watt & A.L. 
Murray (Edinburgh: Scottish Record Society, 2003). 
Fasti ecclesiae Scoticanae: the succession of ministers in the Church of Scotland 
from the Reformation, ed. Hew Scott (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1915-
1928), 7 volumes. 
The First Book of Discipline, ed. J.K.Cameron (Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 
1972). 
Gouldesborough, Peter (compiler), Formulary of Old Scots Legal Documents 
(Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1985). 
Guide to the National Archives of Scotland (Edinburgh: The Stationary Office & The 
Stair Society, 1996). 
Habbakuk Bisset’s Rolement of Courts, ed. Sir Philip Hamilton-Grierson (Edinburgh: 
Scottish Text Society, 1920-1926), 3 volumes. 
An Historical Account of the Senators of the College of Justice from its Institution in 
1532, eds. Brunton and Haig (Edinburgh: Thos. Clark, 1832). 
John Knox's History of the Reformation in Scotland, ed. W. C. Dickinson (London: 
Nelson, 1949), 2 volumes. 
Knox, John, The History of the Reformation in Scotland, ed. David Laing 
(Edinburgh: Wodrow Society, 1846-1848), 2 volumes. 
The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (Edinburgh: Law Society of 
Scotland, 1988), volume VI.  
Liber collegii Nostre Domine: registrum ecclesie B.V. Marie et S. Anne infra muros 
civitatis Glasguensis, 1549; accedunt Munimenta fratrum predicatorum de 
Glasgu. Domus dominicane apud Glasguenses carte que supersunt 1244-
1559, ed. J. Robertson (Glasgow, Maitland Club, 1846). 
Liber Officialis Sancti Andree, ed. Cosmo Innes (Edinburgh: Abbotsford Club, 
1845).  
Lord Hermand’s Consistorial Decisions, 1684-1777, ed. F.P.Walton (Edinburgh: 
Stair Society, 1940). 
Melville, James, The Autobiography and Diary of Mr. James Melvill (Edinburgh: 
Wodrow Society, 1842). 
Melville, James, The Diary of Mr. James Melvill, 1556-1601 (Edinburgh: Bannatyne 
Club, 1829), Bannatyne Club, no. 34. 
Mercer, John, and James Maidment, The Chronicle of Perth: a register of 
remarkable occurrences, chiefly connected with that city, from the year 
1210 to 1668 (Edinburgh: Maitland Club, 1831). 
   365
Miscellaneous Papers principally illustrative of events in the Reigns of Queen Mary 
and King James VI, ed. W.J. Duncan (Glasgow: Maitland Club, 1834). 
Munimenta Alme Universitatis Glasguensis / Records of the  University of Glasgow: 
from its foundation till 1727, ed. Cosmo Innes (Glasgow: Maitland Club, 
1854), 4 volumes Maitland Club, no.72. 
Officers and Graduates of University & King's College, Aberdeen 1945-1860, ed. 
Peter John Anderson (Aberdeen: New Spalding Club, 1893), New Spalding 
Club, no.11. 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, eds. H.C.G.Matthew and B.Harrison 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 60 volumes; 
http://www.oxforddnb.com. 
Papal Negotiations with Mary Queen of Scots During her Reign in Scotland 1561-
1567, ed. John Hungerford Pollen (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 
1901). 
Pitcairn, Robert, Ancient Criminal Trials in Scotland (Edinburgh: Maitland Club, 
1833), 3 volumes. 
The Practicks of Sir James Balfour of Pittendreich, ed. P.G.B.McNeill (Edinburgh: 
The Stair Society, 1962-3), 2 volumes. 
Protocol book of Mark Carruthers, 1531-1561, ed. R. C. Reid (Edinburgh: Scottish 
Record Society, 1956). 
Records of Elgin, ed. William Cramond (Aberdeen: New Spalding Club, 1903-08), 2 
volumes. 
Records of Inverness, eds. William Mackay and Herbert Cameron Boyd (Aberdeen: 
New Spalding Club, 1911), 2 volumes. 
Records of the Earldom of Orkney, 1299-1614, ed. J. Storer Clouston (Edinburgh: 
Scottish History Society, 1914). 
Records of the Parliament of Scotland, eds. Keith Brown et al (St Andrews, 2007), 
www.rps.ac.uk. 
The Records of the Synod of Lothian and Tweeddale 1589-1596, 1640-1649, ed. 
J.Kirk (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1977). 
Register of the Minister, Elders and Deacons of the Christian Congregation of St 
Andrews, ed. D.H.Fleming (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1889-90), 
2 volumes. 
Register of the Great Seal of Scotland (Registrum Magni Sigilli Regum Scotorum), 
ed. J.M. Thomson et al (Edinburgh, 1912- ), 11 volumes.   
Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, ed. J.H.Burton et al (Edinburgh, 1877- ), 
37 volumes. 
   366
Registrum Secreti Sigilli Regum Scotorum, eds. M. Livingstone et al (Edinburgh, 
1908- ), 8 volumes. 
Rentale Dunkeldense: being accounts of the bishopric (A.D.1505-1517) with Myln's 
Lives of the bishops (A.D.1517), trans. and ed. Robert Kerr Hannay 
(Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1915). 
Rentale Sancti Andree, trans. & ed. R.K.Hannay (Edinburgh: Scottish History 
Society, 1913). 
Revised Medieval Latin Word List, prepared by R.E. Latham (British Academy, 
2004). 
Robertson, Joseph, Concilia Scotiae Ecclesiae Scoticanae Statuta tam Provincialia 
quam Synodalia quae Supersunt  (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1866), 2 
volumes. 
Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts, Report on the Manuscripts of Colonel 
David Milne Home of Wedderburn Castle (London: HMSO, 1902). 
The Scots Confession, 1560, ed. G.D.Henderson (Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 
1960). 
The Scots Peerage, ed. Sir James Balfour Paul (Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1904-
1914), 9 volumes. 
Second Book of Discipline, ed. James Kirk (Edinburgh: St Andrew Press, 1980). 
Selections from the Records of the Kirk Session, Presbytery, and Synod of Aberdeen, 
ed. John Stuart (Aberdeen: Spalding Club, 1846), Spalding Club, 15. 
Selections from the Records of the Regality of Melrose, ed. C.S.Romanes, C.A., 
(Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1917). 
Simpson, Grant G., Scottish Handwriting 1150-1650 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 
1998). 
The Spottiswoode Miscellany: a collection of original papers and tracts, illustrative 
chiefly of the civil and ecclesiastical history of Scotland, ed. James 
Maidment (Edinburgh: The Spottiswoode Society, 1844-45), 2 volumes. 
Stair, James Dalrymple, Viscount of, Institutes of the Laws of Scotland (Edinburgh: 
Hamilton and Balfour, 1759). 
The State Papers and Letters of Sir Ralph Sadler, ed. Arthur Clifford (Edinburgh: 
Archibald Constable and Co., 1809), 2 volumes. 
Statutes of the Scottish Church, 1225-1559, trans. & ed. D.Patrick (Edinburgh: 
Scottish History Society, 1907). 
A Source Book of Scottish History, eds. W.C. Dickinson, G. Donaldson and 
A.I.Milne (Edinburgh: Thomas Neslon and Sons, 1953), volume II. 
   367
Thomae Dempsteri Historia ecclesiastica gentis Scotorum: sive, De scriptoribus 
scotis, ed. David Irving (Edinburgi : excudebat Andreas Balfour cum sociis, 
1829), 2 volumes, Bannatyne Club, no. 21. 
Trayner’s Latin Maxims (Edinburgh: W. Green & Son, 1894), fourth edition. 
Wigtownshire Charters, ed. R. C. Reid (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1960). 
William Hay’s Lectures on Marriage, trans. & ed. J.C.Barry (Edinburgh: The Stair 
Society, 1967). 
Williamson, Elizabeth, Anne Riches and Malcolm Higgs, Glasgow (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin in association with the National Trust for Scotland, 1990). 
The Works of John Knox, ed. D. Laing (Edinburgh: Bannatyne Club, 1846-1864), 6 
volumes. 
 
SECONDARY SOURCES: BOOKS 
 
Berman, Harold Joseph, Law and Revolution II: the impact of the Protestant 
Reformations on the western legal tradition (Cambridge, Mass. & London: 
Harvard University Press, 2003). 
-------------, The Interaction of Law and Religion (London: S.C.M. Press, 1974). 
Brown, Keith M., Noble Society in Scotland: wealth, family, and culture from the 
Reformation to the Revolution (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2000). 
Brundage, James A., Medieval Canon Law (London: Longman, 1995). 
-------------, Law, Sex, and Christian Society in Medieval Europe (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
Calderwood, David, The History of the Kirk of Scotland (Edinburgh: The Woodrow 
Society, 1843), volume II, 1560 – 1570. 
Chalmers, George, Caledonia, or, a historical and topographical account of North 
Britain, from the most ancient to the present times with a dictionary of 
places chorographical and philological (Paisley: Gardner, 1887-1902), 8 
volumes. 
Cockburn, James Hutchison, The Medieval Bishops of Dunblane and Their Church 
(Edinburgh: Society of Friends of Dunblane Cathedral, 1959). 
Connell, John, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland, Respecting Tithes and the Stipends 
of the Parochial Clergy (Edinburgh, 1815), 3 volumes. 
Coutts, Winifred Katherine, The Business of the College of Justice in 1600: how it 
reflects the economic and social life of Scots men and women (Edinburgh: 
The Stair Society, 2003). 
   368
Cowan, Ian B., The Parishes of Medieval Scotland (Edinburgh: Scottish Record 
Society, 1967),  SRS, 93. 
Dalrymple, David, Sir, Annals of Scotland, from the accession of Malcolm III in the 
year M.LVII. to the accession of the House of Stewart in the year 
M.CCC.LXXI.: to which are added, tracts relative to the history and 
antiquities of Scotland, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh : A. Constable, 1819), 3rd ed., 3 
volumes; see especially volume iii, 221 et seq. 
Dawson, Jane E.A., Campbell Letters, 1559-1583 (Edinburgh: Scottish History 
Society, 1997), fifth series, volume X. 
-------------, The Politics of Religion in the Age of Mary, Queen of Scots (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
-------------, Scotland Re-Formed, 1488-1587 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2007). 
Dirleton’s Doubts and Questions in the Law of Scotland, Resolved and Answered by 
Sir James Stewart of Goodtrees (Edinburgh: Hamilton & Balfour, 1762). 
Donaldson, Gordon, Scotland: James V to James VII (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 
1971). 
-------------, The Scottish Reformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1960). 
Dowden, John, The Medieval Church in Scotland: its constitution, organisation and 
law (Glasgow: J. MacLehose, 1910). 
Dunbar, Linda J, Reforming the Scottish Church: John Winram and the example of 
Fife (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002). 
Durkan, John and Anthony Ross, Early Scottish Libraries (Glasgow: John S. Burns, 
1961). 
Evans, G R, Law and Theology in the Middle Ages (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2002). 
Fergusson, James, Reports of Some Recent Decisions by the Consistorial Court of 
Scotland, in Actions of Divorce, Concluding for Dissolution of Marriages 
Celebrated Under the English law (Edinburgh: A. Constable and Co., 
1817). 
-------------, A Treatise on the Present State of the Consistorial Law in Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Bell & Bradfute, 1829). 
Finlay, John, Men of Law in Pre-Reformation Scotland (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 
2000). 
Finlayson, Charles P., Clement Litill and His Library: The Origins of the Edinburgh 
University Library (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Bibliographical Society, 1980). 
   369
Ford, John, Law and Opinion in Scotland during the Seventeenth Century (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2007). 
Fraser, Patrick, Treatise on Husband and Wife, According to the Law of Scotland 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1876-1878), 2 volumes. 
-------------, A Treatise on the Law of Scotland: as applicable to the personal and 
domestic relations; comprising husband and wife, parent and child, 
guardian and ward, master and servant, and master and apprentice 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1846), 2 volumes. 
Fraser, William, Sir, The Book of Carlaverock: Memoirs of the Maxwells, Earls of 
Nithsdale, Lords Maxwell and Herries (Edinburgh: Privately printed for 
William Lord Herries, 1873), 2 volumes. 
-------------, Memorials of the Montgomeries, Earls of Eglinton (Edinburgh: 1859), 2 
volumes. 
-------------, The Sutherland Book (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1892), 3 
volumes. 
Godfrey, Mark, Civil Justice in Renaissance Scotland: the Origins of a Central 
Court (Leiden: Brill, 2009). 
Goodare, Julian, The Government of Scotland, 1560-1625 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
Graham, Michael F., The Uses of Reform: ‘Godly Discipline’ and Popular Behaviour 
in Scotland and Beyond, 1560-1610 (Leiden: Brill, 1996). 
Hannay, Robert K., The College of Justice (Edinburgh: Wm. Hodge, 1933 reprinted 
by The Stair Society, 1991). 
Haws, Charles H., Scottish Parish Clergy at the Reformation, 1540-1574 
(Edinburgh: Scottish Record Society,1972), new series, volume 3. 
Helmholz, R. H. (ed.), Canon Law in Protestant Lands (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 
1992). 
Helmholz, R. H., Marriage Litigation in Medieval England (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974). 
-------------, The Oxford History of the Laws of England: Volume I, The Canon Law 
and Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction from 597 to the 1640s (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004).  
Herkless, John, Sir, and Robert Kerr Hannay, The Archbishops of St. Andrews 
(Edinburgh & London: W. Blackwood, 1907-1915), 5 volumes. 
Innes, Cosmo, Lectures on Scotch Legal Antiquities (Edinburgh: Edmonston & 
Douglas, 1872). 
Joyce, George H., Christian Marriage: An Historical and Doctrinal Study (London: 
Sheed and Ward, 1948).  
   370
Keith, Robert, History of the Affairs of the Church and State in Scotland (Edinburgh: 
Spottiswoode Society, 1844), volume I. 
Kennedy, William, Annals of Aberdeen: from the reign of King William the Lion to 
the end of the year 1818; with an account of the City, Cathedral and 
University of Old Aberdeen (London: Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and 
Brown, 1818), 2 volumes. 
Kingdon, Robert M., Adultery and Divorce in Calvin’s Geneva (Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
Kirk, James, Patterns of Reform: Change and Continuity in the Reformation Kirk 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1989). 
Kuttner, Stephan, Studies in the History of Medieval Canon Law (Aldershot: 
Variorum, 1990). 
Laing, David (ed.), The Miscellany of the Wodrow Society: containing tracts and 
original letters chiefly relating to the ecclesiastical affairs of Scotland 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Edinburgh: Wodrow 
Society, 1844). 
Lawson, Roderick, Crossraguel Abbey: a history and a description (Paisley: J. and 
R. Parlane, 1883). 
Lothian, Maurice, The Law, Practice and Styles Peculiar to the Consistorial Actions 
Transferred to the Court of Session by Act 1, Gul. IV, c. 69 (Edinburgh: 
Adam Black, 1830). 
Lynch, Michael, Edinburgh and the Reformation (Edinburgh: John Donald 
Publishers Ltd, 1981). 
MacDonald, Alan R., The Jacobean Kirk, 1567-1625: Sovereignty, Polity and 
Liturgy (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998).      
Mackenzie, George, Sir, Observations on the Acts of Parliament: made by King 
James the First, King James the Second, King James the Third, Queen 
Mary, King James the Sixth, King Charles the First, King Charles the 
Second: Wherein 1. It is observed, if they be in desuetude, abrogated, 
limited, or enlarged; 2. The decisions relating to these acts are mentioned; 
3. Some new doubts not yet decided, are hinted at; 4. Parallel citations from 
the civil, canon feudal and municipal laws, and the laws of other nations are 
adduc'd, for clearing these statutes (Edinburgh: Printed by the heir of 
Andrew Anderson, 1687). 
MacQueen, Hector L., Common Law and Feudal Society in Medieval Scotland 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1993). 
Mason, Roger (ed.), John Knox on Rebellion (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994). 
   371
McCrie, Thomas, Life of Andrew Melville: containing illustrations of the 
ecclesiastical and literary history of Scotland during the latter part of the 
sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century; with an appendix, 
consisting of original papers (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1824), 2nd ed., 2 
volumes. 
McRoberts, David (ed.), Essays on the Scottish Reformation, 1513-1625 (Glasgow: 
Burns, 1962).  
Merriman, M.H., The Rough Wooings: Mary, Queen of Scots, 1542-1551 (East 
Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2000). 
Mitchison, Rosalind and Leah Leneman, Sexuality and Social Control: Scotland, 
1660-1780 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).  
Mortimer, Robert C., Western Canon Law (London: A&C Black, 1953). 
Ollivant, Simon, The Court of the Official in Pre-Reformation Scotland (Edinburgh: 
The Stair Society, 1982). 
Outhwaite, R. B. (ed.), Marriage and Society: studies in the social history of 
marriage (London: Europa, 1981). 
Parker, T.H.L., Calvin: An Introduction to His Thought (London: Continuum, 1995). 
Phillips, Roderick, Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Society 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
Reichel, Oswald, J., A Complete Manual of Canon Law (London: John Hodges, 
1896), volume I. 
Reid, Charles J., Power over the Body, Equality in the Family: Rights and Domestic 
Relations in Medieval Canon Law (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 
2004). 
Riddell, John, Inquiry into the Law and Practice in Scottish Peerages: Before, and 
After the Union; Involving Questions of Jurisdiction, and Forfeiture: 
Together with an Exposition of our Genuine, Original Consistorial Law 
(Edinburgh: Thomas Clark, 1842), 2 volumes. 
-------------, Tracts Legal and Historical with Other Antiquarian Matter Chiefly 
Relative to Scotland (Edinburgh: Thomas Clark, 1835). 
Ryrie, Alec, The Origins of the Scottish Reformation (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2006). 
Salmond, James Bell, Veterum laudes: being a tribute to the achievements of the 
members of St. Salvator's College during five hundred years (Edinburgh: 
Oliver and Boyd, 1950). 
Sanderson, Margaret H.B., A Kindly Place?: Living in Sixteenth-Century Scotland 
(East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 2002). 
   372
Sanderson, Margaret H.B., Cardinal of Scotland: David Beaton, c.1494-1546 
(Edinburgh: John Donald, 1986). 
-------------, Mary Stewart’s People: Life in Mary Stewart’s Scotland (Edinburgh: 
The Mercat Press, 1987). 
Shrewsbury, J.F.D., A History of Bubonic Plague in the British Isles (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1971). 
Stevenson, David, King's College, Aberdeen, 1560-1641: from Protestant 
Reformation to Covenanting Revolution (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University 
Press, 1990). 
Stuart, John, A Lost Chapter in the History of Mary Queen of Scots Recovered 
(Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 1874). 
Tierney, Brian, Church Law and Constitutional Thought in the Middle Ages 
(Variorum, London, 1979). 
-------------, Religion, Law, and the Growth of Constitutional Thought 1150-1650 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
Tytler, Patrick Fraser, An account of the life and writings of Sir Thomas Craig of 
Riccarton : including biographical sketches of the most eminent legal 
characters, since the institution of the  Court of Session by James V, till the 
period of the Union of the Crowns (Edinburgh: W. & C. Tait, 1823). 
Ullman, Walter, The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages (London: 
Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1970). 
Walker, David M., A Legal History of Scotland (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 
volume III – the sixteenth century.  
Witte, John, From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage Religion and Law in the 
Western Tradition (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 
1997). 
-------------, Law and Protestantism: the legal teachings of the Lutheran Reformation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
Wormald, Jenny, Court, Kirk, and Community: Scotland 1470-1625 (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1991). 
 
SECONDARY SOURCES: ARTICLES 
 
Anton, A. E., ‘‘Handfasting’ in Scotland’ in Scottish Historical Review, 37 (1958), 
89-102. 
-------------, ‘Medieval Scottish Executors and the Courts Spiritual’ in Juridical 
Review 67 (1955), 129-154. 
   373
Anderson, William J., ‘Rome and Scotland, 1513-1625’ in Essays on the Scottish 
Reformation, 1513-1625 (Glasgow: John Burns, 1962), 463-483. 
Barry, John C., ‘William Hay of Aberdeen: A Sixteenth Century Scottish Theologian 
and Canonist’ in Innes Review, 2 (1951), 82-99. 
Cairns, John W., ‘Changing Rituals and Symbols in Scottish Courts’ in R. Schulze 
(ed.), Symbolische Kommunikation vor Gericht in der Fruhen Neuzeit 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2006), 251-267. 
-------------, ‘Historical Introduction’ in A History of Private Law in Scotland 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), volume I, 14-182. 
-------------, ‘Ius Civile in Scotland, ca. 1600’ in Roman Legal Tradition (Lawrences, 
Kansas: University of Kansas, 2004), volume 2,136-170. 
-------------, ‘The Law, the Advocates and the Universities in late eighteenth-century 
Scotland’ in Scottish Historical Review 73, issue 2 (1994), 171-190. 
-------------, ‘Revisiting the Foundation of the College of Justice’ in Miscellany V 
(Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 2006), 27-50. 
Clancy, Michael, ‘A Further Note on Juramentum Calumniae’ in Juridical Review 
(1986), 170-176. 
Dawson, Jane E.A., ‘The Face of Ane Perfyt Reformed Kyrk: St Andrews and the 
Early Scottish Reformation’ in James Kirk (ed.), Humanism and Reform: 
The Church in Europe, England and Scotland, 1400-1643 (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991), 413-435. 
-------------, ‘The Noble and the Bastard: the earl of Argyll and the Law of Divorce in 
Reformation Scotland’, in J. Goodare & A.A. MacDonald (eds.), Sixteenth-
Century Scotland: Essays in honour of Michael Lynch (Leiden: Brill, 2008) 
147-68. 
-------------, ‘The Scottish Reformation and the Theatre of Martyrdom’ in Studies in 
Church History, 30 (1993), 259-270. 
-------------, ‘ ‘There is Nothing Like a Good Gossip’: Baptism, Kinship and Alliance 
in Early Modern Scotland’ in Kay and Mackay (eds.), Perspectives on the 
Older Scottish Tongue (Edinburgh:  Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 40-
47. 
Dolezalek, Gero, ‘The Court of Session as a Ius Commune Court – Witnessed by 
“Sinclair’s Practicks”, 1540-1549’ in Miscellany IV (Edinburgh: The Stair 
Society, 2002), 51-84. 
Donaldson, Gordon, ‘The Church Courts’, in An Introduction to Scottish Legal 
History (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1958), 363-373. 
-------------, ‘The Legal Profession in Scottish Society in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries’ in Juridical Review, 21 (1976), 1-19. 
   374
Dunbar, Linda J., ‘An early record from the Synod of Fife, c. 1570’ in Records of the 
Scottish Church History Society, 28 (1998), 217-238. 
-------------, ‘Synods and Superintendence: John Winram and Fife, 1561-1572’ in 
Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 27 (1997), 97-125. 
Durkan, John, ‘The French Connection in the Sixteenth and early Seventeenth 
Centuries’ in T. C. Smouth (ed.) Scotland and Europe, 1200 – 1850 
(Edinburgh, 1986), 19-27. 
Durkan, John, ‘The Royal Lectureships Under Mary of Lorraine’ in Scottish 
Historical Review, 62 (1983),73-78. 
Ewan, Elizabeth, ‘ “Tongue You Lied”: The Role of the Tongue in Rituals of Public 
Penance in Late Medieval Scotland’ in The Hands of the Tongue: essays on 
Deviant Speech, ed. E.D. Craun (Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute 
Publications, 2007), 115-136. 
Forte, A.D.M., ‘Some Aspects of the Law of Marriage in Scotland: 1500-1700’ in 
Elizabeth M. Craik (ed.), Marriage and Property: women and marital 
customs in history (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1984), 104-118. 
Gardiner, J.C., ‘The Influence of the Law of Moses’ in An Introductory Survey of the 
Sources and Literature of Scots Law (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1936), 
235-240. 
Godfrey, Mark, ‘The Assumption of Jurisdiction: Parliament, the King’s Council and 
the College of Justice in Sixteenth-Century Scotland’ in The Journal of 
Legal History, 22/3 (2001), 21-36.  
Goodare, Julian, ‘The First Parliament of Mary, Queen of Scots’ in The Sixteenth 
Century Journal, 36 (2005), 55-75. 
Green, Thomas, ‘Scottish Benefices and the Commissary Court of Edinburgh: the 
Example of McGibbon v. Struthers’ in Miscellany VI (Edinburgh: The Stair 
Society, 2009), 45-61. 
Guthrie, Charles J., ‘The History of Divorce in Scotland’ in Scottish Historical 
Review, 8 (1911), 39-52. 
Hannay, Robert, K., ‘On the Church Lands at the Reformation’ in The Scottish 
Historical Review, 16 (1919), 52-72. 
Helmholz, Richard, ‘Bastardy Litigation in Medieval England’ in American Journal 
of Legal History, 13 (1969), 360-383. 
Ireland, Ronald D., ‘Husband and Wife: Divorce, Nullity of Marriage and 
Separation’ in An Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Edinburgh: The 
Stair Society, 1958), 90-98. 
-------------, ‘Husband and Wife: Post-Reformation Law of Marriage of the 
Commissaries’ Court and Modern Common and Statute Law’ in An 
   375
Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1958), 
82-89. 
Leneman, Leah, ‘Marriage as interpreted by church and state in eighteenth-century 
Scotland’ in Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 30 (2000), 103-
123. 
MacQueen, Hector L., ‘Two Visitors in the Session, 1629 and 1636’ in Miscellany IV 
(Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 2002), 155-168. 
McNeill, Peter G. B., ‘Discours Particulier D’Escosse’ in Miscellany II (Edinburgh: 
Stair Society, 1984), 86-131. 
-------------, ‘The Legitimacy of the Earl of Arran’ in Miscellany V (Edinburgh: The 
Stair Society, 2006), 51-67. 
-------------, ‘ “Our Religion, Established Neither by Law or Parliament”: Was the 
Reformation Legislation of 1560 valid?’ in Records of the Scottish Church 
History Society, 35 (2005), 68-89. 
Paton, G. Campbell H., ‘Husband and Wife: Property rights and relationships’ in An 
Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Edinburgh, The Stair Society, 1958), 
chapter 9. 
Robertson, J.J., ‘The Canon Law Vehicle of Civilian Influence’ in Miller and 
Zimmermann (eds.), The Civilian Tradition in Scots Law (Berlin: Dunker & 
Humbolt, 1997), 117-133. 
Scanlon, James D., ‘Husband and Wife: Pre-Reformation Canon Law of Marriage of 
the Officials Court’ in An Introduction to Scottish Legal History 
(Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1958), 69-81. 
Sellar, W.D.H., ‘Marriage by Cohabitation with Habit and Repute: Review and 
Requiem?’ in D L Carey Miller and D W Meyers (eds.), Comparative and 
Historical Essays in Scots Law: A Tribute to Professor Sir Thomas Smith 
QC (Edinburgh: The Law Society of Scotland, 1992), 117-136. 
Sellar, W.D.H., ‘Marriage, Divorce and the Forbidden Degrees: Canon Law and 
Scots Law’ in W.N. Osborough (ed.), Explorations in Law and History: 
Irish Legal History Society Discourses, 1988-1994 (Dublin: Irish Academic 
Press, 1995), 59-82. 
Seton, Sir Bruce, ‘The Distaff Side: A Study in Matrimonial Adventure in the 
Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries’ in The Scottish Historical Review, 17 
(1920), 272-286.   
Smith, David Baird, ‘Canon Law’ in An Introductory Survey of the Sources and 
Literature of Scots Law (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1936), 183-192. 
-------------, ‘The Reformers and Divorce: A Study in Consistorial Jurisdiction’ in 
Scottish Historical Review, 9 (1912), 10-36. 
   376
Smith, David Baird, ‘A Note on Divorce for Desertion’ in Juridical Review, 51 
(1939), 254-259. 
-------------, ‘A Note on Juramentum Calumniae’ in Juridical Review, 51 (1939), 7-
10. 
Smith, Sheriff David B., ‘The Dean of Restalrig’s Book’ in Journal of the Law 
Society of Scotland, 39 (1994), 409-410.  
Smith, Sheriff David B., ‘The Spiritual Jurisdiction 1560-64’ in Records of the 
Scottish Church History Society, 25 (1995), 1-18. 
Smith, J. Irvine, ‘Succession’ in An Introduction to Scottish Legal History 
(Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1958), 208-221. 
Stevenson, David, ‘The Commissary Court of Aberdeen in 1650’ in Miscellany II 
(Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1984), 144-147. 
Walton, Frederick P., ‘The Courts of the Official and the Commissary Courts 1512-
1830’ in An Introductory Survey of the Sources and Literature of Scots Law 
(Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1936), 133-153. 
Watson, Alan, ‘The Development of Marital Justifications for Malitiosa Desertio in 
Roman-Dutch Law’ in Law Quarterly Review, 79 (1963), 87-97. 
Willock, Ian D., ‘Introduction to William Hay’s Lectures – The Significance of the 
Lectures for Scots Law’ in William Hay’s Lectures on Marriage trans. & ed. 
John C. Barry (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1967), xxxi-xlvi. 
Witte, John, ‘Canon Law in Lutheran Germany’, in M. Hoeflich (ed.), Lex et 
Romanitas: Essays for Alan Watson (Berkley, California: Robbins 
Collection Pub., 2000), 181-224. 
-------------, ‘The Catholic Origins and Calvinist Orientation of Dutch Reformed 
Church Law’ in Calvin Theological Journal 28 (1993), 328. 
-------------, ‘The Transformation of Marriage Law in the Lutheran Reformation’ in 
John Witte and F. S. Alexander (eds.), The Weightier Matters of the Law: 
Essays on Law and Religion (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 57-97.  
